3 lives lost

Colin,

You are very 'on' with both points. There are quite a few (not a
majority, but enough to drive up the statistics) for whom no amount of
education will eradicate their emotionally-driven ignorance. And I
fully agree with you that the real problem was that he took off in the
first place. The conditions were iffy enough that his own flight
instructor called him and said words to the effect "It looks pretty
bad, let me go with you." And he is reported to have replied, "No,
this is something Ive got to do by myself." That statement is all
about proving that he is 'good enough,' which is, I believe, where he
drove off into the psychological 'ditch.'

I have been told that there were two CFI's holding down a couch in the
lobby just a couple of hundred feet away when he was loading up. When
his sister in law was 2hr late, and forced his planned daylight flight
into a night departure, that was the point where he shoulda walked into
that lobby and said "Which one of you guys wants to make $300?" (He
was reportely collecting $5mil a year off of his trust. $300 would
have been pocket change.)

I have also read that he and his instructor had been having problems
with the autopilot; it apparently was prone to occaisionally doing a
roll-axis hard-over failure for no apparent reason. Given that, and
his low time in type (30hr), and thus a probable lack of familiarity
with that autopilot, it may be that he was reluctant to turn it on.
Maybe he *did* turn it on, and it did its hard-over thing and made a
marginal situation worse.

I have, as of late, made it my business to study the human factors
issues associated with these kinds of accidents, because I agree with
you that it was the decision to go under these conditions that was the
real problem. My research has led me into the psychology of
narcissism, and I believe that is a major factor in this seemingly
mysterious penchant some pilots have to go ahead and launch when
prudence would dictate another less risky course of action.

If you trace the history of the Kennedys and the behavior of the men
(date rape, skiing into trees, trophy wives, affairs with actresses,
need to prove, and angrily blaming others when something doesnt go
right), and then bounce that off the DSMV-IV diagnostic criteria for
narcissistic personality disorder, you wil find it is a near perfect
match.

Unfortunately for our industry, a large percentage of the people who
have the money to fly are highly driven, type A, take-no-prisoners
types--and these traits are often symptoms of the narcissistic
personality.

The downside includes a need to constantly prove oneself 'good enough,'
trophy seeking, and the appearance of competence being valued much more
than the actual competence itself.

I wrote an article about this that was published in Plane and Pilot ,
called "The Wrong Stuff." It is available to view on my website at
www.genehudson.com if you care to read more about this stuff.

Become a therapist and open an office in LA? You are not the first
person to have said that... others have offered that I already have
done both... I don't want to advertise it too much, though, for fear
that then *all* my time would be spend wrestling with these types! (It
is, in fact, *very* hard work--getting some of these types to 'see
through their own bs.')

And, as you point out, it only works some of the time. Probably much
less than half the time.

A couple of years ago I lost one... ex-fighter pilot, took his
commercial training from me... I thought I had really made some
progress when after many hours of pushing and pulling, I finally got
him to agree to actually use a checklist. A year later he was leading
a flight of two, 'hot-dogging' at low level in mountainous terrain; he
turned up the wrong canyon, and found he could not outclimb the
terrain, and could not turn around. Both aircraft impacted the ridge
600 feet below the pass.

The unfortunate reality of this is that he and the other pilot took
four other (trusting) souls with them into the fireball. Six lives
snuffed out--and for what? To prove that you can fly up the canyon at
low level? Big deal.

He proved it all right. So did JFK Jr. ('I can do it by myself!')

I think this is in large part the answer to the painful question raised
by the accident that started this thread; why would someone who 'knows
better' take off in conditions such that the impact could be heard, but
not seen, from a hangar a 1/4 mi away?

I bristle at the notion that the weather just 'closed in'
unexpectedly.' The aircraft was airborne for about 60 seconds. I
argue that the conditions did not change that fast. She knew fully
well she was launching into a low vis condition (IMHO).

Why would Jessica Debroff's CFI allow them to depart, over-gross, in
the summer, at a high alt airport, in a non-turboed airplane, when hail
was falling on the roof of their car as they drove to the airport, with
a huge cell sitting directly on the airport, and the 414 that departed
before them called back with a windshear report, stating that he (with
620 turbocharged hp) 'almost didnt make it?'

What are we trying to prove? Can't we re-define 'good pilot' to mean
one that has the guts to tell everyone else to 'put a sock in it, I
a-ain't a-goin'?'
I gotta get a new soapbox, I am wearging this one out.

Regards,

Gene

Good question...

A 1954 study (Stonecipher, et al) found that of 20 private pilots, of
varying levels of experience, exactly 0 'survived' a simulated
encounter with IFR conditions. 19 did graveyard spirals, and 1 was
going to do a whip stall when the data-taker/safety pilot said "I've
got it."

My experience on BFR's may not be representative, as I am considered a
'tough; insturctor and that reputation precedes me to the point that
most of the people who call me are pretty good pilots to begin with and
probably perform better than the average. Given that, my experience is
such that I think that in excess of 70% of private pilots would 'buy
it' if they wandered into instrument conditions. The real numbers may
be higher.

One of the problems we have (but is not well discussed) is that in
training the stress level (even on a BFR) is a tiny fraction of what
the pilot will experience if he runs into these conditions solo.
Stress degrades performance in every area, so I think that what we see
on the BFR is something of a best case scenario. I try to make the
hood work a little more demanding than the average CFI, to simulate
some of the stress that may occur in the real situation, but I think I
am still an order of magnitutde or two below what a
non-instrument-rated private pilot experiences in a real (solo) IMC
encounter. A clue can be had by listening to the video presentation
"17 Ways to Fall Out of the Sky"; there is an audio tape in that video
of a real life VFR-into-IMC encounter involving a VFR C310 pilot trying
to get down through an overcast. Noteably, when he first gets into
trouble his voice goes up at least two octaves. (He did not make it.)

Unlike some CFIs, I aggressively seek out actual instrument condtions
in which to take up not only my instrument students but also my private
students. I figure if they have proven to themselves that they can
indeed hold it right side up in turbulence in IMC, then their stress
will be (a little) lower if it ever happens for real. I like to train
them well beyond the PTS in this area, but not all students are willing
to do that (those that aren't have to go somewhere else--I sleep really
well at night and want to keep it that way.)

I have unique methods for teaching flight by reference to instruments,
and I have at least one known 'save' of a student pilot who got into
IMC on his first solo, and flew there for 20 min successfully before
breaking out and landing--using the methods he heard me present in a
Wings Seminar. (Please don't try this at home...!)

I think most pilots are grossly unaware of how insidious spatial
disorientation can be for the non-IMC-experienced pilot. Most people
seem to think that the accident pilot is unaware of his improper flight
attitude, and would correct to level if he or she knew; I think this is
a dangerous idea. I have personally observed a student pilot in IMC as
she rolled into a left spiral while literally screaming at me for help
because 'it's rolling to the left and I can't stop it.' Her conscious
mind could read the instruments and correctly deduce our real attitude,
but it had lost the battle for control of her hands to her unconscious,
which was following the (erroneous) inner ear indications into the left
spiral. To her it felt as if the controls were jammed, and she could
not get it to roll to the right. (I had her let go and then I rolled
out with two fingers.)

I think a major portion of the spatial disorientation accidents are of
this ilk; i.e. fully aware of the nature of the problem but unable to
move their hands to recover. JFK, for example; needle slap indicated
he had applied maximum takeoff power before he hit the water... I
suspect he knew fully well what was going on but could not stop it.

This is the difference between an instrument rated pilot and an
instrument competent pilot; the competent instrument pilot has enough
IMC experience that he has been able to condition his unconscious to
let go and let the conscious mind take control of the hands.

I think most VFR-rate pilots are nowhere near this level of IMC
experience, and when the stress maxes out, they are toast. All the
more reason to avoid situations that get anywhere close to the edge.
Gene

nrp wrote:

Gene (and others too)

Not being an instructor but a 42 year Pvt Instrument (no longer current
by a long ways) -

In biennials, in your opinions, what fraction of the experienced (say
over 10 years experience) pvt-onlys are instrument competent (not
necessarily legal) when confronted by a sudden loss of visibility?

It has really bugged me that Kennedy, who I understand was nearly
complete with his instrument rating, couldn't even make the transition
in a slowly deteriorating situation. I know another case some years
ago of a fellow that was working on an instrument that also lost a
Mooney and three other guys in a similar situation with ground fog and
a night departure, and 5 hours of fuel on board.

For that matter - what fraction of experienced instrument people could
make that same rapid transistion to the gages?

You raise two interesting questions. I'm not a CFI or DE either, just
an instrument rated private pilot (who has passed the commercial written
recently though! :-) ) with 26 years of flying history.

I personally don't think many non-instrument pilots can handle
unexpected IMC. In fact, even many instrument rated pilots aren't
current and proficient enough to handle it. Also, I think there is a
pyschological "switch" that must be made even for instrument pilots when
encountering marginal conditions. You have to make a decision to
abandon your attempt to remain visual and go onto instruments full time.
I think the really dangerous part is trying to switch back and forth
and keeping hoping that you'll return to visual. I think this can trap
even proficient instrument pilots.


Matt

On 1-Jan-2005, wrote:

I think you are close to the answer. Every time I hear about one of
these, I silently ask myself "Where was the time pressure coming from?"

To me, this is one of the more perplexing questions arising from this tragic
story. As I understand it, the young girl was having a Christmas gift
fulfilled by the ill-fated flight. Why would you "treat" someone to a
flight with 1/4 mi visibility? For most non-pilots, flight in IMC in a
light airplane is boring at best and uncomfortable at worst. The primary
splendor of fight at low elevations is in the sightseeing. For this reason,
a "joyride" should always be conducted in good VFR even if the pilot and
airplane are fully capable of safe operation in less favorable weather. It
seems to me that "Jean" thus had a perfectly good reason to postpone or
cancel this flight without feeling any pressure.


Your passengers deserve better, and so did the little girl in this
accident.

Absolutely correct!! What we as pilots need to remember is that most
passengers do not have any basis on which to form their own judgments as to
the safety of a flight, and are thus forced to rely fully on us for that
call. This is an AWESOME responsibility -- by far the most significant
"right and privilege" granted with a pilot's license.

--
-Elliott Drucker

snipped

The FARs are 'written in blood;' for every paragraph in there, somebody
died to prove to us we needed that rule. I wish that no one will ever
again have to give their life to teach us something; but they do it
anyway.

I just wish that if someone insists on making the ultimate sacrifice to
teach us something, would they please try at least to pick something we
don't already know?

Sincerely,

Gene Hudson
CFI-IA, MEI, ASC


Thanks for the considered & helpful words in this thread by you, Dudley and
others.

I note that most of the responders are suggesting flight into
IMC/disorientation as the probable cause of the loss of control. Based on
the metars showing deteriorating trends of vis & dp spread I would tend to
agree this is a probable scenario but
I would like to relate an experience which may or may not have any relevance
to this crash (I cannot bring myself to call it an accident)

I drove from Banff to Springbank(Calgary) on a winter morning under a
blindingly clear Alberta sky and was surprised to see the airport lying in a
thin veil of ground fog. Approaching from the west and looking down to the
airport I could see that the fog was very thin and no more than 100 ft
thick. Driving up to the school it was obvious that it was below VFR but
looked like it would clear later after the sun got a little higher and
warmed things up. The ATIS noted expected equal temp/dp. Horizontal vis
was minimal and very grey but looking up the sky was clear blue.

It was one of those sucker traps where it was easy to think that with my
instrument training (but not rating) I would be able to easily take off and
climb s&l through the thin fog to the clear sky above and that the fog would
have long burned off by the time of return for landing. My training and
instinct for self preservation stopped me from giving this any serious
consideration but I did perform a short experiment.

I started an aircraft engine and allowed it to idle @ 8-900 rpm for the same
time as it would have taken to reach the run-up bay, I then performed a
standard run-up @ 1800 rpm then shutdown. I felt that this duplicated the
conditions that would exist if attempting to fly.

After shutdown I examined the prop and found that the inner half of the prop
was covered with very thick ice and with ridges as much as 3/8 in. thick,
the outer prop showed thinner icing. I consider it probable that any
attempt to take off would have resulted in a failure to climb out of ground
effect and a likely a blind landing in the soup off the end of the runway.
Since the ice would have melted by the time any investigators arrived it
would probably be attributed to the engine failing to develop sufficient
power, perhaps due to carb icing which would also likely have occurred but
also melted.

We took a Polaroid of the prop which severed as a cautionary notice on the
bulletin board for that season.

After some ground study and hangar flying the fog burned off and I had a
cavok day, proving again the old adage about bad weather, "IT WILL PASS"
The associated thought is that if you crash due to bad weather, your
funeral will be held on a sunny day.

Blue skies and best wishes to all
diver driver
CPL & student of flight

On Sat, 01 Jan 2005 05:02:43 GMT, Terry wrote:

3 people lost their life yesterday. The pilot was a very dear and wonderful
person, 72 years young and a pilot of 24 years. "Jean" Bible was never IFR
rated and only flew 30 minutes or so each flight in clear skies and
daylight. She was a very careful pilot and always used good judgement.

Hi Terry,

Sorry to hear such sad news.

How does something like this happen? Was it the pressure of not wanting to
deprive the young girl of her Christmas present? Not having to say come back
another time? Perhaps thinking she could maintain visual contact with the
ground and just to some touch and go's? Some way, some how, she "psyched"
herself into doing something that ended in a horrible tragedy.

Looking at the pictures provided at the link you gave in your post, I wish
we had answers. Snow cover and fog surely wasn't conducive of any type of
VFR work. I had met Jean when I lived in Morrow County. Very, very nice
down to earth lady.

I only hope we as pilots learn from prior people's mistakes and take them
to heart when we are tasked with a go / no go decision.

It's fresh in our minds now, but time tends to heal itself and we "forget"
our own vulnerabilities it seems as time rolls on.

Allen

How does something like this happen? Was it the pressure of not wanting to
deprive the young girl of her Christmas present? Not having to say come
back another time?

Awful, awful news.

As a newly minted private pilot, I had a similar opportunity to give a young
lad and his father their first airplane ride. As we pulled the rental plane
out of the hangar, the wind began to pick up substantially, and the sky
became covered with a low, scuddy layer.

Looking at the excited kid and his dad, the pressure to fly was tremendous.
The airport's single-runway was 90 degrees offset from the wind direction,
and the scud was clearly moving in off of Lake Michigan. If we were even
going to get to fly the pattern, it was now or never...

....and I chose never. As we pushed the plane back into the hangar, their
disappointment was palpable. Sadly, I never did get that kid in the air.

But I made the right choice. A man has got to know his limitations.

My condolences to the families.
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

Yes!!!!!!!

*You*... are a *pilot!*

Gene

Gene, you cited a 1954 Stonecipher report in an earlier post. Is this the
current Boeing chairman?

I admire your attitude regarding flying, and your remarks about this tragic
case. I'm a PP-ASEL with about 220 hrs and want to get my instrument
rating. What do you think of the accelerated programs? I'm thinking in
particular about PIC.

Joe,

I suspect the two Stoneciphers are not the same person, but they might
be related.

I have worked with several people that went thru PIC, and I was not
displeased with the results. You must be aware, however, that any 7-14
day instrument rating will have limitations. By that I mean that after
you get home, you should consider yourself an instrument-rated novice.
This is not a bad thing, I just think you want to build your experience
and confidence gradually after getting the rating.

There is another short course I can recommend, and that is Maury's West
Coast Adventures. A couple of clients of mine have gone through the
program, and they were very happy. This program takes a group of three
students in a T182RG on a cross-country IFR adventure that is kind of a
tour of the western US. In the process you get a lot of experience in
a variety of weather, terrain and ATC environments.

Maury's course requires that you have your attitude instrument flight
skills and your written test report before you report for the course.
I believe the PIC course requires only the written test done prior.

Those are the only two short courses I can recommend. There are a lot
of others, but I have not seen another that I had any confidence in.

I have done a fair amount of business taking some of the people that
come out of some of the other short courses and bringing their
(deficient) skills up to the point that they could actually use their
rating without scaring themselves to death...

In all cases, I find the weakest area in most instrument courses, and
the short ones in particular, is the basic attitude instrument flying
skills. They act like the foundation of a great pyramid; use weak
stones in the foundation and as you add weight onto the upper courses,
the foundation crumbles and it all falls down.

Regards,

Gene