Wide-ranging Safety Discussion...?

On Jun 27, 7:22*am, cernauta wrote:
On Tue, 26 Jun 2012 23:56:22 -0700 (PDT), Marc
wrote:



One group of pilots here in the US believe that they are sufficiently
trained to avoid making the stupid errors[.....]
result in soaring being safer than any other form of aviation, at
least for the 100 or so pilots left.
[...]
The obvious solution, of course, is for the pilots in the first group
to convince the pilots in the second group to retire from soaring ;^)

Occasionally, also some of the most experienced and safest pilots
(based on a long, immaculate safety record), crash.
Too much confidence, too small safety margins (margins? doh!), or just
a plain, simple lapse of the moment.
This can happen to anyone, and that's when we need margins. Most
probably, we will not be grateful to those safety margins, as we won't
recognize they saved us on that occasion.

aldo cernezzi

Aldo is right. It's those margins which give us the opportunity to
recover from a "whoops" moment. Those experienced pilots who do crash
seem to have made an unconscious decision they no longer need safety
margins. That's a subtle but deadly decision we all need to avoid.
The absence of a 'Plan B' is clue to understanding what happened.

On 6/27/2012 12:56 AM, Marc wrote:
On Jun 26, 9:11 pm, Ramy wrote:
Agh, I give up. Every attempt to try to say something about the need for
better safety culture will encounter resistant from those who claim there
is nothing wrong with the system and the only problem is the pilots. I
guess this is their way of convincing themselves they safe since they
will never do such mistakes themselves. Good luck.

Ramy ( who does NOT need anyone to look after him)

One group of pilots here in the US believe that they are sufficiently
trained to avoid making the stupid errors that cause others to end up in
the accident reports. Any pilot who makes this sort of error and crashes,
obviously did not have the skills necessary to be safe in this sport. A
rigorous training regimen, taught only by elite instructors, will provide
training to levels sufficient to address all possible circumstances
encountered during soaring flight. This will result in soaring being safer
than any other form of aviation, at least for the 100 or so pilots left.

A second group of pilots likely remember times when they were lucky to
recover from situations in which their skill and experience levels were
nearly overwhelmed. Say, things that sometimes happened at the ends of
long days of flying, perhaps aided by a bit of dehydration or hypoxia, a
bit distracted by encountering something unexpected, or just a touch of
complacency because they have final glide nailed. Add a momentary lapse of
situational awareness, missing the clue that suggests things aren't going
to work out quite as expected, etc., and suddenly one is staring into the
abyss. A greater willingness in the community to talk honestly talk about
mistakes that they and others make, would lead to increased levels of
safety. There is always going to be some amount of risk, as humans are not
perfect.

The obvious solution, of course, is for the pilots in the first group to
convince the pilots in the second group to retire from soaring ;^)

Marc


Great discussion! (Yeah, I know - as the one who started this thread - I can
be accused of 'priming the pump' or 'self promotion' or something else
disparaging, but I don't care.)
- - - - - -

Ramy - I think I can understand "where you're coming from" insofar as wanting
to see "a better safety culture" within our amazing sport. Brad's observations
seem to me to bear out the - not universal, to be sure, but IMHO undoubtedly
real - need.

I also think I understand where Bill D. and Kirk are coming from, which is to
say (without intending to put words in their mouths) both seem to me to be
opining from the perspective of people who've already concluded "it's obvious
Joe PIC is the fundamental problem (a perspective with which I agree)...(and
by implication,) hasn't everyone else already concluded the same?" Clearly
that latter can never be the case, as provable to every reader who can
remember their original ignorance about flying and safety.

IOW, in this thread-to-date I haven't detected a fundamental disagreement as
to individual attitudes toward "the heart of piloting safety" so much as I
sense (unsurprising) differences in assessments of what might "best be done to
improve soaring's safety stats."

FWIW, I always encourage everyone who feels strongly about something to do
their best to change/improve things. My rationale is the effort might in time
prove to have zero effect, but if no effort is put out at all, then you're
*guaranteed* of having no effect. Shoot, this very thread reflects application
of my rationale! :-)
- - - - - -

Marc - Chortle! Pretty darned accurate simplification, methinks.
- - - - - -

Everyone - thanks for chiming in! Any silent fence-sitters? Please!! Share
your thoughts, too.

Bob W.

On 6/26/2012 5:39 PM, Brad wrote:
On Jun 26, 4:05 pm, son_of_flubber wrote:
On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 12:54:09 PM UTC-4, soartech wrote:
So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without a
single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!

The way it works over time is this: 1)you get hooked on the sport, 2)you
become vaguely aware that it's dangerous and that you need to be careful,
3)you come to terms with the fact that it can kill you. 4)A friend or
acquaintance gets killed or maimed.

Think about it. If the first thing you learned about soaring was that it
can kill you, what would happen? You'd probably plow your thousands of
dollars into some really nifty RC model gliders. My copy of Soaring goes
to my local library. Maybe somebody will pick it up and take up soaring.
Don't list the departed souls.

Soaring Magazine has a lot in it every month about the hazards of
soaring, but it's almost always hypothetical. A simple tally sheet of
crashes and injuries would drive the point home without anyone getting
sued. But the SSA chooses to not do that. Why? It's a glaring omission.
THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES. When you suggest that there is something
wrong with this picture, you get a knee-jerk reaction. Wierd.

Someone tell me why there is never a tally of accidents in Soaring
Magazine.

When we had 2 of our club members collided in a mid-air the result was
finger pointing at the pilots (non-CFIG) who mentored them. It was
intimated that they were not ready for this kind of activity and that those
of us that actively flew in the mountains were somehow responsible for
encouraging them to do something they were not "ready" for. Ironically some
of those who criticized the most were the ones who never left the vicinity
of the airport, unless they were flying a motorglider.

Another club member spun his motorglider into an unfamiliar field. He was a
low time pilot in a brand new ship with less than 20 hours on
it............he felt the need to try flying a "new" site, took a check
ride in that clubs Blanik (a sailplane he was very familiar with) and did a
great job. After soaring his TST-Atlas for several hours he came back, did
a Blanik approach in a 40:1 ship, realized at mid-field he was to high and
tried to do either a 360 or a 180, we'll never know because he spun it in
and killed himself.

Last year one of our CFIG's died during the filming of the "Cadillac"
commercial. There was a "list" of incidents that took place that made it
out thru the gossip channels that raised some eyebrows. None of that was
shared publicly (as far as I know) and none was shared within the clubs
official channels.

I'm pretty sure that some open, honest and heartfelt discussions about all
these accidents could have really benefited our club. Instead all that was
mentioned was how great these pilots all were, how careful they were and
how they had tons of experience....................which was seen as
somewhat ironic by those of us that personally knew them.

This is the culture we need to change.

Brad

"What Brad said!!!" Certain micro-cultures are "obviously sub-optimum."

I've been a member of the same soaring club for 20+ years, and varyingly
intimately familiar with it for over 36 years. In that time I've watched its
"personality" (culture, if you will) evolve. Historically, my club's
personality change has occurred slowly over time...except when
(safety-related) issues arose which simply could not be ignored. I can recall
at least twice when (poor/ugly) safety-related issues "forced
introspection/change". Actually, all it "forced" was "cheap talk", but a
topical part of the cheap talk quickly became the need (or not) for cultural
change.

In neither case was the club seriously at risk of folding...but in both cases
it was a painful, protracted (in the pain sense) yet brief (in the objective
passage of time sense), process that resulted in years' long "cultural change"
that benefited the club and arguably prevented it from continuing to add
incidents/accidents to national stats. In any event, the club's stats clearly
reflected a before-change/after-change effect, when measured over multi-year
periods.

The second instance's effects still appear to be part of the club's normal
culture more than a decade after the need for change became unignorable...and
(IMHO) that's a good thing!

Perfection? Not a chance. Improvement (stats and culture)? Darn tootin'!
- - - - - -

While making no claims for having a guaranteed recipe for "change success,"
the analytical part of me thinks it saw in both instances some things that may
have been crucial in overcoming varied and obvious obstacles to change, e.g.:
personalities; hurt feelings; inertia; denial; personality-based cliques; etc.

These include: persistence; discussionally remaining (as in relentlessly
returning to being) "on topic"; patience (letting people speak, willingness to
not settle everything in a single meeting or night or session); mutual respect
(agreeing to disagree; calling out/cutting off ad-hominem arguments the
instant they appeared).

But perhaps THE crucial element in both instances was having at least one
"club leader" (officer, board member, etc.) sufficiently motivated to
"oversee"/push the process forward until the consensus was a consensus had
been reached. None of this "fizzling out" nonsense allowed.

I've also some first hand experience with a club which could benefit itself,
the sport of soaring, and probably its safety record if "it effected some sort
of internal cultural change(s?)" but which has been "board resistant" to such
change over decades. Terribly unfortunate. IMO.

Bob W.

Why do high time pilots have accidents?

Some would say this proves the sport itself is dangerous. Some might
say it's arrogance.

I would disagree with both. I think it's a subtle, unconscious
reduction in safety margins as experience is gained. If it were a
conscious decision to cut margins, it could be addressed with
counseling and additional training. If the pilot doesn't realize his
safety margins are thinning, it can be hard to deal with.

The key starting point for all of us is to realize experience itself
is not a safety margin. Safety margins are things like speed,
altitude and options in hand - in other words, they're quantifiable.

An example might be consistent low and slow approaches perhaps because
the pilot wants to stop in front of his trailer. Having been
successful for a season or two, this has become the new normal
approach. As long as he doesn't encounter unexpected severe sink, it
will continue to work - but there's no safety margin, no Plan B, no
self-questioning, "What if this doesn't work?"

If you always fly with generous safety margins, you control your own
destiny. The thinner the safety margins get, the more you gamble.
"It's like playing Russian Roulette" a friend said over lunch, "Note
there are no world class Russian Roulette players."


On Jun 27, 2:18*pm, Bob Whelan wrote:
On 6/26/2012 5:39 PM, Brad wrote:









On Jun 26, 4:05 pm, son_of_flubber wrote:
On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 12:54:09 PM UTC-4, soartech wrote:
So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without a
single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!

The way it works over time is this: 1)you get hooked on the sport, 2)you
become vaguely aware that it's dangerous and that you need to be careful,
3)you come to terms with the fact that it can kill you. *4)A friend or
acquaintance gets killed or maimed.

Think about it. *If the first thing you learned about soaring was that it
can kill you, what would happen? *You'd probably plow your thousands of
dollars into some really nifty RC model gliders. *My copy of Soaring goes
to my local library. *Maybe somebody will pick it up and take up soaring.
Don't list the departed souls.

Soaring Magazine has a lot in it every month about the hazards of
soaring, but it's almost always hypothetical. *A simple tally sheet of
crashes and injuries would drive the point home without anyone getting
sued. *But the SSA chooses to not do that. *Why? It's a glaring omission.
THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES. *When you suggest that there is something
wrong with this picture, you get a knee-jerk reaction. Wierd.

Someone tell me why there is never a tally of accidents in Soaring
Magazine.

When we had 2 of our club members collided in a mid-air the result was
finger pointing at the pilots (non-CFIG) who mentored them. It was
intimated that they were not ready for this kind of activity and that those
of us that actively flew in the mountains were somehow responsible for
encouraging them to do something they were not "ready" for. Ironically some
of those who criticized the most were the ones who never left the vicinity
of the airport, unless they were flying a motorglider.

Another club member spun his motorglider into an unfamiliar field. He was a
low time pilot in a brand new ship with less than 20 hours on
it............he felt the need to try flying a "new" site, took a check
ride in that clubs Blanik (a sailplane he was very familiar with) and did a
great job. After soaring his TST-Atlas for several hours he came back, did
a Blanik approach in a 40:1 ship, realized at mid-field he was to high and
tried to do either a 360 or a 180, we'll never know because he spun it in
and killed himself.

Last year one of our CFIG's died during the filming of the "Cadillac"
commercial. There was a "list" of incidents that took place that made it
out thru the gossip channels that raised some eyebrows. None of that was
shared publicly (as far as I know) and none was shared within the clubs
official channels.

I'm pretty sure that some open, honest and heartfelt discussions about all
these accidents could have really benefited our club. Instead all that was
mentioned was how great these pilots all were, how careful they were and
how they had tons of experience....................which was seen as
somewhat ironic by those of us that personally knew them.

This is the culture we need to change.

Brad

"What Brad said!!!" Certain micro-cultures are "obviously sub-optimum."

I've been a member of the same soaring club for 20+ years, and varyingly
intimately familiar with it for over 36 years. In that time I've watched its
"personality" (culture, if you will) evolve. Historically, my club's
personality change has occurred slowly over time...except when
(safety-related) issues arose which simply could not be ignored. I can recall
at least twice when (poor/ugly) safety-related issues "forced
introspection/change". Actually, all it "forced" was "cheap talk", but a
topical part of the cheap talk quickly became the need (or not) for cultural
change.

In neither case was the club seriously at risk of folding...but in both cases
it was a painful, protracted (in the pain sense) yet brief (in the objective
passage of time sense), process that resulted in years' long "cultural change"
that benefited the club and arguably prevented it from continuing to add
incidents/accidents to national stats. In any event, the club's stats clearly
reflected a before-change/after-change effect, when measured over multi-year
periods.

The second instance's effects still appear to be part of the club's normal
culture more than a decade after the need for change became unignorable....and
(IMHO) that's a good thing!

Perfection? Not a chance. Improvement (stats and culture)? Darn tootin'!
- - - - - -

While making no claims for having a guaranteed recipe for "change success,"
the analytical part of me thinks it saw in both instances some things that may
have been crucial in overcoming varied and obvious obstacles to change, e..g.:
personalities; hurt feelings; inertia; denial; personality-based cliques; etc.

These include: persistence; discussionally remaining (as in relentlessly
returning to being) "on topic"; patience (letting people speak, willingness to
not settle everything in a single meeting or night or session); mutual respect
(agreeing to disagree; calling out/cutting off ad-hominem arguments the
instant they appeared).

But perhaps THE crucial element in both instances was having at least one
"club leader" (officer, board member, etc.) sufficiently motivated to
"oversee"/push the process forward until the consensus was a consensus had
been reached. None of this "fizzling out" nonsense allowed.

I've also some first hand experience with a club which could benefit itself,
the sport of soaring, and probably its safety record if "it effected some sort
of internal cultural change(s?)" but which has been "board resistant" to such
change over decades. Terribly unfortunate. IMO.

Bob W.

At 20:18 27 June 2012, Bob Whelan wrote:
On 6/26/2012 5:39 PM, Brad wrote:
On Jun 26, 4:05 pm, son_of_flubber wrote:
On Tuesday, June 26, 2012 12:54:09 PM UTC-4, soartech wrote:
So the next issue of Soaring magazine will come off the press without

a
single word about this horrible accident... like it never happened!!

The way it works over time is this: 1)you get hooked on the sport,
2)you
become vaguely aware that it's dangerous and that you need to be
careful,
3)you come to terms with the fact that it can kill you. 4)A friend or
acquaintance gets killed or maimed.

Think about it. If the first thing you learned about soaring was that
it
can kill you, what would happen? You'd probably plow your thousands
of
dollars into some really nifty RC model gliders. My copy of Soaring
goes
to my local library. Maybe somebody will pick it up and take up
soaring.
Don't list the departed souls.

Soaring Magazine has a lot in it every month about the hazards of
soaring, but it's almost always hypothetical. A simple tally sheet of
crashes and injuries would drive the point home without anyone getting
sued. But the SSA chooses to not do that. Why? It's a glaring
omission.
THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES. When you suggest that there is
something
wrong with this picture, you get a knee-jerk reaction. Wierd.

Someone tell me why there is never a tally of accidents in Soaring
Magazine.

When we had 2 of our club members collided in a mid-air the result was
finger pointing at the pilots (non-CFIG) who mentored them. It was
intimated that they were not ready for this kind of activity and that
those
of us that actively flew in the mountains were somehow responsible for
encouraging them to do something they were not "ready" for. Ironically
some
of those who criticized the most were the ones who never left the
vicinity
of the airport, unless they were flying a motorglider.

Another club member spun his motorglider into an unfamiliar field. He
was
a
low time pilot in a brand new ship with less than 20 hours on
it............he felt the need to try flying a "new" site, took a check
ride in that clubs Blanik (a sailplane he was very familiar with) and
did
a
great job. After soaring his TST-Atlas for several hours he came back,
did
a Blanik approach in a 40:1 ship, realized at mid-field he was to high
and
tried to do either a 360 or a 180, we'll never know because he spun it
in
and killed himself.

Last year one of our CFIG's died during the filming of the "Cadillac"
commercial. There was a "list" of incidents that took place that made
it
out thru the gossip channels that raised some eyebrows. None of that
was
shared publicly (as far as I know) and none was shared within the clubs
official channels.

I'm pretty sure that some open, honest and heartfelt discussions about
all
these accidents could have really benefited our club. Instead all that
was
mentioned was how great these pilots all were, how careful they were
and
how they had tons of experience....................which was seen as
somewhat ironic by those of us that personally knew them.

This is the culture we need to change.

Brad

"What Brad said!!!" Certain micro-cultures are "obviously sub-optimum."

I've been a member of the same soaring club for 20+ years, and varyingly
intimately familiar with it for over 36 years. In that time I've watched
its
"personality" (culture, if you will) evolve. Historically, my club's
personality change has occurred slowly over time...except when
(safety-related) issues arose which simply could not be ignored. I can
recall
at least twice when (poor/ugly) safety-related issues "forced
introspection/change". Actually, all it "forced" was "cheap talk", but a
topical part of the cheap talk quickly became the need (or not) for
cultural
change.

In neither case was the club seriously at risk of folding...but in both
cases
it was a painful, protracted (in the pain sense) yet brief (in the
objective
passage of time sense), process that resulted in years' long "cultural
change"
that benefited the club and arguably prevented it from continuing to add
incidents/accidents to national stats. In any event, the club's stats
clearly
reflected a before-change/after-change effect, when measured over
multi-year
periods.

The second instance's effects still appear to be part of the club's normal

culture more than a decade after the need for change became
unignorable...and
(IMHO) that's a good thing!

Perfection? Not a chance. Improvement (stats and culture)? Darn tootin'!
- - - - - -

While making no claims for having a guaranteed recipe for "change
success,"

the analytical part of me thinks it saw in both instances some things
that
may
have been crucial in overcoming varied and obvious obstacles to change,
e.g.:
personalities; hurt feelings; inertia; denial; personality-based cliques;
etc.

These include: persistence; discussionally remaining (as in relentlessly
returning to being) "on topic"; patience (letting people speak,
willingness
to
not settle everything in a single meeting or night or session); mutual
respect
(agreeing to disagree; calling out/cutting off ad-hominem arguments the
instant they appeared).

But perhaps THE crucial element in both instances was having at least one

"club leader" (officer, board member, etc.) sufficiently motivated to
"oversee"/push the process forward until the consensus was a consensus
had
been reached. None of this "fizzling out" nonsense allowed.

I've also some first hand experience with a club which could benefit
itself,
the sport of soaring, and probably its safety record if "it effected some
sort
of internal cultural change(s?)" but which has been "board resistant" to
such
change over decades. Terribly unfortunate. IMO.

Bob W.


A lot is down to personal commitment if you see something that is dangerous

,either stop them doing it or if it you just don't fly.To elaborate ,I once

refused to launch a far better qualified instructor than me because he had
a
child on his wife's knee ,it did not make me popular but he wasn't doing
that
on my watch.I have ,and am sure so have many other,refused
launches,because I thought the child was to young,or they had a drink first
or
there was a storm too close lots of reasons but just say NO if you think
it's
not safe.It won't make you popular but that's not what safety is about.
You asked for it and that's my 2 pence worth

Culture change works by means of advocacy. Often times a single
individual can make the difference. It can be an effective way of
dealing with procedural issues and establishing best (or at least
better) practices. Towing, signals, checklists (multiple), oxygen
systems, electrical systems, parachutes, radio procedures, patterns
and suchlike are examples of areas in which best practices and
advocacy of same can be a huge benefit to safe operation. All of
these areas have all been the subject of articles in Soaring Mag,
etc. Plenty of resources. Add will power and advocacy, stir well.

I picked out an issue with my club last year that was so appalling I
can't bear to repeat it here. I mentioned it to a couple of "wheels"
and got zero traction, so I appointed myself the advocate and charged
ahead. People whined: I was asking them to spend money on stuff they
didn't think they needed. Less than $200 a head, I might add. But
mostly they gave in and bought the stuff they needed and those that
did later commented along the lines of "you know, that was smart, it
worked". So this year, I have some help and I expect the advocacy to
become self perpetuating.

I've got my next issue picked out. I'm not going to act on that one
until I am certain that the first is well and truly fixed. Only so
much "political capital" to spend, y'know.

But at best, this is a partial solution. As Kirk points out, we have
a pretty serious safety culture in contest soaring, and it mostly
works at preventing what can be prevented by good procedures. It's
been a long time since we had a take off crash due to improper
rigging. We've fiddled the rules semi-endlessly to try to reduce
hazards associated with starts, finishes and turnpoints and it's
pretty much worked as expected. We still have way too many crashes,
but they seem related to judgement, not to crappy procedure. Can my
supposed good judgement keep me safe? I'm not as certain as I used to
be. I have two dead friends *this month* that seemed to me to have
been serious, safety conscious, conservative pilots, arguably better
examples of safety mindedness than myself. One spins in from pattern
altitude over the airport, the other hits trees on final to what
should have been a routine off field landing in what looks (from
satellite pics and terrain map) to be the friendliest, easiest, most
landable task area in North America. The only semi-unusual factor in
both cases happens to be high wind (25 - 30 kts). These are serious
WTF moments for me. And my family. I'd really like to figure this
out.

-Evan Ludeman / T8

On Wednesday, June 27, 2012 5:47:28 PM UTC-4, Evan Ludeman wrote:
Culture change works by means of advocacy. Often times a single
individual can make the difference.

Right on Evan! I'm really glad to see someone (like yourself) who has soaring cred press for resolution of obvious problems. The big wheels can be hooked on "the good enough way that we've always done things". We need more squeaky wheels. More people need to rock the boat. The sport gets safer by fixing one problem at one club at a time. Safety Advocacy. I like that..

On 6/27/2012 3:21 PM, Jonathon May wrote:

Major snip...
A lot is down to personal commitment if you see something that is dangerous
,either stop them doing it or if it you just don't fly.To elaborate ,I once
refused to launch a far better qualified instructor than me because he had
a child on his wife's knee ,it did not make me popular but he wasn't doing
that on my watch.I have ,and am sure so have many other,refused
launches,because I thought the child was to young,or they had a drink first
or there was a storm too close lots of reasons but just say NO if you think
it's not safe.It won't make you popular but that's not what safety is about.
You asked for it and that's my 2 pence worth

Like you, I've refused to help launch people over the years who - for various
reasons - I thought shouldn't be launching...always tried to put things in a
light that didn't offend the other party. Can't remember if bruised egos were
ever a part of the situations, which I suppose suggests they were not, or, I'm
pretty good at burying traumatic events!

The situation you mention is definitely one fraught with human ego. Best to
not be caught by surprise.

If you're less experienced than the the would-be launchee, I'd suggest a
possible approach might be to put "the blame" on your own inexperience. ("I'm
not comfortable launching someone into conditions I'm uncomfortable flying
in.) Humor might be sufficiently deflective.

As noted, forewarned (as to the possibility of encountering such a situation)
is forearmed.

Thanks for chiming in!

Bob W.

On Jun 28, 11:42*am, BobW wrote:
On 6/27/2012 3:21 PM, Jonathon May wrote:

Major snip...

A lot is down to personal commitment if you see something that is dangerous
,either stop them doing it or if it you just don't fly.To elaborate ,I once
refused to launch a far better qualified instructor than me because he had
a child on his wife's knee ,it did not make me popular but he wasn't *doing
that on my watch.I have ,and am sure so have many other,refused
launches,because I thought the child was to young,or they had a drink first
or there was a storm too close lots of reasons but just say NO if you think
it's not safe.It won't make you popular *but that's not what safety is about.
You asked for it and that's my 2 pence worth

Like you, I've refused to help launch people over the years who - for various
reasons - I thought shouldn't be launching...always tried to put things in a
light that didn't offend the other party. Can't remember if bruised egos were
ever a part of the situations, which I suppose suggests they were not, or, I'm
pretty good at burying traumatic events!

The situation you mention is definitely one fraught with human ego. Best to
not be caught by surprise.

If you're less experienced than the the would-be launchee, I'd suggest a
possible approach might be to put "the blame" on your own inexperience. ("I'm
not comfortable launching someone into conditions I'm uncomfortable flying
in.) Humor might be sufficiently deflective.

As noted, forewarned (as to the possibility of encountering such a situation)
is forearmed.

Thanks for chiming in!

Bob W.

I don't think this would work in a contest environment. I flew my
first contest a few weeks ago and there were a few days that we
launched that if I was free-flying I would not have taken off. Not
that I considered the conditions as "un-safe" but they were not what I
would choose to take off in for purely recreational flying. I was not
alone in my assessment of the conditions either; at the end of the day
there was some talk about the wind and how cross and strong it was.

Perhaps the caliber of pilot flying in contests allows for trickier
margins? I don't know.............but there were no incidents or
accidents and everyone went home with good stories to tell.

Brad

Bert, Excellent article. I'm very concerned about the adrenaline tunnel vision issue and believe it's possibly a bigger factor than we may think. This would explain a lot toward what seems to be a disconnect between highly experienced pilots and accidents rates. I also think it's believable that some experienced pilots may relax their safety margins over time. Fine, untill the day they really need them.

I believe that much discussed Buffalo commuter accident of 2009? showed that the pilot held the yoke full back most of the descent. Could very well be this adrenaline issue.

It won't work in a contest environment very well, but I don't thermal below 1500 AGL, this is the altitude where I concentrate on raising and monitoring my airspeed, staying coordinated and scanning for traffic. I think all this relaxed attitude toward low altitude saves and landouts is not for me. I hear a fair bit of bragging about landouts and how it's no big deal. Read the accident reports for the truth. Not always fatalities, but lot of accidents. ... Aaron