The Swearingen-TEB incident: control issues with twins

Even better rule...don't try to go around on one engine. Put it on a
taxiway, on the grass, whatever, but don't try to go around on one. IMHO it
is bad training practice to even suggest to a MEL student that waving off is
a practical alternative.

Bob Gardner

"Cockpit Colin" wrote in message
...
I'm a ASEL primary student. What's the skinny on multi-engine control
issues
when one engine fails on approach?

As you would expect, there is a tendency for the aircraft to yaw towards
the
failed engine which then creates a roll in the same direction (secondary
effect of yaw). It's countered with rudder - but the amount required
depends
on how much power the engine is producing, and how much airspeed you have.

Multi-engine aircraft have a minimum asymetric control speed (Vmca) (Vmc
in
some parts) - below this speed you won't have sufficient rudder authority
to
stop the yaw/roll unless you reduce power on the good engine -
unfortunately
it's all too common for pilots of twins to get low and slow on one engine,
and then go below Vmca whilst trying to go around on 1 engine - at which
point the aircraft slowly rolls on it's back and everyone dies.

So - the lessons are ...

1. Don't get low and slow on 1 engine, and

2. If you ABSOLUTLELY have to go around on 1 engine, make the decision as
early as possible.

3. Practice these things with an instructor on a regular basis (every 90
days is good)

As previously noted by Bob, on the approach it's often so subtle you don't
even know one has failed.

wrote:
My understanding is that the aircraft will tend to roll due to the side
with the failed engine having less lift. My CFI was explaining this to me
some time ago.


Bull****. If the engine failed on approach when you were already on
final, you wouldn't even notice.
It's the asymetrical thrust that causes the problem..
Not an isste at low RPM. Now if you had to firewall it for a go
around..... that would be a different story.

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...
On 01 Jun 2005 14:44:19 GMT, wrote in
::

I can't imagine how one could manage to get the airplane so out of
control as to roll it over 180 and nose it in, but I have zero multi
hours too...

The slower you fly the less effective the flight controls are,
eventually
they can't ovecome the torque on the operating engine.

Ah.... Bingo! That is it, now it makes sense. Torque is a bigger player
than the increased drag and decreased lift. I can see it now. It sounds
like once the aircraft gets near that point, there isn't much you could
do.

Some twin aircraft cannot be banked into the dead engine without
becoming unrecoverable at low altitude. That is why many are flown
with the wing of the good engine 5 degrees low during single engine
operation. Consider this engin-outage during approach to Van Nuys,
KVNY: http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...14X35941&key=1

The pilot was so confident he could land safely with the left engine
feathered, he declined standby fire equipment. During his entry to
the righthand pattern, he lost control on final approach with full
power on the right engine and landing gear extended.

My friend Lew Brody had flown F-4s and C-130s in Viet Nam. He was a
bright mechanical engineer and aviation attorney who found the
Aerostar unmanageable on his last flight. Tragic.



Any twin can be banked into the dead engine and controlled, it is only a
matter of airspeed. If memory serves, the Aerostar has only one hydraulic
pump and won't climb with the gear down.

Mike
MU-2

On Wed, 01 Jun 2005 15:03:52 GMT, "Mike Rapoport"
wrote:

It is not quite as bad as all that. NTS failures on takeoff are saveable at
least in the simulator but immediate feathering is required. The airplane
will not yaw or roll 90 deg.

Mike
MU-2
Speaking of difficult to handle twins.

In 1939, the Martin Co. responded to a request for a high speed medium
twin engined bomber with a submission that was named the "Marauder"
and designated the 26th such commissioned design, or B-26.

Martin assigned a young aerodynamics engineer to the task of designing
the airplane. The specifications called for a top speed of 300 mph or
better, but DID NOT specify a landing speed. The designer responded
by installing the two biggest engines in production at the time, the
Pratt and Whitney R-2800, coupled with an enormous four bladed Curtiss
electric prop, and giving the B-26 very short wings which gave it the
top speed he wanted, at the expense of a landing speed that topped 130
mph.

There was never a prototype, the Army needed the bomber and flight
testing was conducted with the first production models.

A series of circumstances and misfortunes dogged the Marauder crews
during it's workup and training, causing so many accidents (almost
exclusively on takeoff and landing) that it was investigated 4 times
by Congress.

The initial problems were the result of assigning pilots to train in
the B-26, most of whom had not flown twins. Those who had trained for
twins, flew the "Bamboo Bomber" a small Cessna twin with a cruise
speed slower than the B-26 stalled.

To say that they were intimidated is an understatement. The
inexperienced pilots had many difficulties landing the Marauder.

Then there were the operational problems: The training command
switched fuels and the new 100 octane aeromatic fuel disintegrated the
diaphrams in the carburators. The ground crews were unfamiliar with
the engine and the prop and maintenance was minimal or improperly
conducted. The result was a near total disaster as the training crews
suffered numerous engine failures during takeoff, or the prop went
into flat pitch, also during takeoff.

Many of the training flights involved takeoff at max gross. At that
weight during takeoff, the loss of an engine or having the prop slip
to flat pitch was disasterous. The bomber rolled into the dead engine
virtually instantaneously and pitched into Tampa Bay, or impacted the
ground upside down. "One a day in Tampa Bay" became the bitter
refrain.

Experienced combat crews did not have the problem the green training
crews had though, they liked the airplane.

The Army decided it needed the airplane for the war effort and sent it
to Europe (as well as to the South Pacific Theater). By the time it
was headed for England, the training accidents had been reduced
greatly due to better understanding of the airplane and better
training.

I have a video at home about the B-26. In it a veteran instructor was
interviewed and he spoke of being sent to Tampa to investigate the
very high accident rate. He arrived, spoke with the commanding
officer and requested their very best B-26 pilot trainee. They took
off and climbed to 8,000 feet (I think, could have been 12,000) where
the instructor told the pilot to configure the bomber as if he were
taking off. So the pilot slowed down, dropped flaps and gear, pitched
up and advanced power to takeoff settings. At that point the
instructor told the pilot he was going to chop power to one of the
engines, and told him which engine it would be. Then he cut the
power.

The bomber flipped over inverted and immediately went into a spin.
The instructor waited a bit while the pilot struggled to get out of
the spin, then announced that they were in a standard inverted spin
and proceeded to recover. By the time they pulled out they had lost
many thousands of feet of altitude.

Martin eventually relented it's stance in regards the wing and made
the follow up models with much larger wings and tail surfaces.

In the event, the Marauder had an almost charmed combat career,
suffering one of, if not the, lowest rates of combat lost of any
bomber.

The reason for this was due less to the robust construction of the
bomber or it's flight characteristics than to the Luftwaffe's orders
to concentrate on the heavy bombers at the expense of all other
operations. When the heavies were up, it was usually because the
weather favored visual bombing. That being the case, all other
bombers were usually also flying missions. The Luftwaffe did not have
the numbers to respond to each and every type of enemy incursion, so
they concentrated on the heavies.

So the Marauders kind of drew a bye when they flew on bombing
missions. They even got lucky with the AA artillery because most of
it was removed from the fronts to surround the cities in defense
against the heavy bomber attacks. But the missions were not a piece
of cake as any B-26 combat veteran can tell you, there was plenty
enough AAA still around to make missions harrowing.

Corky Scott

"Corky Scott" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 01 Jun 2005 15:03:52 GMT, "Mike Rapoport"
wrote:


Snip Great History Lesson

I have a video at home about the B-26. In it a veteran instructor was
interviewed and he spoke of being sent to Tampa to investigate the
very high accident rate. He arrived, spoke with the commanding
officer and requested their very best B-26 pilot trainee. They took
off and climbed to 8,000 feet (I think, could have been 12,000) where
the instructor told the pilot to configure the bomber as if he were
taking off. So the pilot slowed down, dropped flaps and gear, pitched
up and advanced power to takeoff settings. At that point the
instructor told the pilot he was going to chop power to one of the
engines, and told him which engine it would be. Then he cut the
power.


Snip More Great History Lesson

Corky,

IIRC, the "instructor" they sent down was Jimmie Doolittle, was it not?

Jay B

There is no doubt that many military aircraft have narrow envelopes and
require extreme precision to fly. The same is not true of certified
civilian airplanes and thankfully so.

Mike
MU-2

"Corky Scott" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 01 Jun 2005 15:03:52 GMT, "Mike Rapoport"
wrote:

It is not quite as bad as all that. NTS failures on takeoff are saveable
at
least in the simulator but immediate feathering is required. The airplane
will not yaw or roll 90 deg.

Mike
MU-2
Speaking of difficult to handle twins.

In 1939, the Martin Co. responded to a request for a high speed medium
twin engined bomber with a submission that was named the "Marauder"
and designated the 26th such commissioned design, or B-26.

Martin assigned a young aerodynamics engineer to the task of designing
the airplane. The specifications called for a top speed of 300 mph or
better, but DID NOT specify a landing speed. The designer responded
by installing the two biggest engines in production at the time, the
Pratt and Whitney R-2800, coupled with an enormous four bladed Curtiss
electric prop, and giving the B-26 very short wings which gave it the
top speed he wanted, at the expense of a landing speed that topped 130
mph.

There was never a prototype, the Army needed the bomber and flight
testing was conducted with the first production models.

A series of circumstances and misfortunes dogged the Marauder crews
during it's workup and training, causing so many accidents (almost
exclusively on takeoff and landing) that it was investigated 4 times
by Congress.

The initial problems were the result of assigning pilots to train in
the B-26, most of whom had not flown twins. Those who had trained for
twins, flew the "Bamboo Bomber" a small Cessna twin with a cruise
speed slower than the B-26 stalled.

To say that they were intimidated is an understatement. The
inexperienced pilots had many difficulties landing the Marauder.

Then there were the operational problems: The training command
switched fuels and the new 100 octane aeromatic fuel disintegrated the
diaphrams in the carburators. The ground crews were unfamiliar with
the engine and the prop and maintenance was minimal or improperly
conducted. The result was a near total disaster as the training crews
suffered numerous engine failures during takeoff, or the prop went
into flat pitch, also during takeoff.

Many of the training flights involved takeoff at max gross. At that
weight during takeoff, the loss of an engine or having the prop slip
to flat pitch was disasterous. The bomber rolled into the dead engine
virtually instantaneously and pitched into Tampa Bay, or impacted the
ground upside down. "One a day in Tampa Bay" became the bitter
refrain.

Experienced combat crews did not have the problem the green training
crews had though, they liked the airplane.

The Army decided it needed the airplane for the war effort and sent it
to Europe (as well as to the South Pacific Theater). By the time it
was headed for England, the training accidents had been reduced
greatly due to better understanding of the airplane and better
training.

I have a video at home about the B-26. In it a veteran instructor was
interviewed and he spoke of being sent to Tampa to investigate the
very high accident rate. He arrived, spoke with the commanding
officer and requested their very best B-26 pilot trainee. They took
off and climbed to 8,000 feet (I think, could have been 12,000) where
the instructor told the pilot to configure the bomber as if he were
taking off. So the pilot slowed down, dropped flaps and gear, pitched
up and advanced power to takeoff settings. At that point the
instructor told the pilot he was going to chop power to one of the
engines, and told him which engine it would be. Then he cut the
power.

The bomber flipped over inverted and immediately went into a spin.
The instructor waited a bit while the pilot struggled to get out of
the spin, then announced that they were in a standard inverted spin
and proceeded to recover. By the time they pulled out they had lost
many thousands of feet of altitude.

Martin eventually relented it's stance in regards the wing and made
the follow up models with much larger wings and tail surfaces.

In the event, the Marauder had an almost charmed combat career,
suffering one of, if not the, lowest rates of combat lost of any
bomber.

The reason for this was due less to the robust construction of the
bomber or it's flight characteristics than to the Luftwaffe's orders
to concentrate on the heavy bombers at the expense of all other
operations. When the heavies were up, it was usually because the
weather favored visual bombing. That being the case, all other
bombers were usually also flying missions. The Luftwaffe did not have
the numbers to respond to each and every type of enemy incursion, so
they concentrated on the heavies.

So the Marauders kind of drew a bye when they flew on bombing
missions. They even got lucky with the AA artillery because most of
it was removed from the fronts to surround the cities in defense
against the heavy bomber attacks. But the missions were not a piece
of cake as any B-26 combat veteran can tell you, there was plenty
enough AAA still around to make missions harrowing.

Corky Scott

On Wed, 1 Jun 2005 11:59:45 -0700, "Jay Beckman"
wrote:

IIRC, the "instructor" they sent down was Jimmie Doolittle, was it not?

Doolittle was put in charge of demonstrating the airplane to prove
that it could be flown safely, but he wasn't the guy who did most of
the flying. According to my information:" General Doolittle sent his
technical adviser, Captain Vincent W. "Squeak" Burnett" to do the
demo flying.

I watched in the video as he (I assume it was he) brought in a B-26 on
one engine. The final approach was incredibly steep, and the pilot
pulled the nose up at the last second and greased it on. From what I
could see, this was a do or die type of landing (given the approach
speed): pull up too late and the landing gear is history (given the
rate of descent I saw), pull up too early and the airplane would
instantly stall to the runway wiping out the gear again.

Corky Scott

wrote

Ah.... Bingo! That is it, now it makes sense. Torque is a bigger player
than the increased drag and decreased lift. I can see it now. It sounds
like once the aircraft gets near that point, there isn't much you could
do.

Every certified twin has a "V" speed, of minimum controllable airspeed with
one engine out. If you are above it, you can add full power for a go
around, or 1 engine takeoff, or whatever. It is the speed at which a
competent pilot will have enough air going past the controls to counter the
torque, and off center thrust, and increased drag, and any other thing you
want to throw in.

If you are going to have to decide on aborting a takeoff or go-round because
of engine or prop failure, you should do so (even if it means putting it on
the ground somewhere off runway) if your speed is lower than that magic
number. Landing under control in trees, is even better than hitting the
ground out of control.

To ignore minimum controllable airspeed with an engine out, means you might
get to take a long dirt nap. :-(

Even better rule...don't try to go around on one engine. Put it on a
taxiway, on the grass, whatever, but don't try to go around on one. IMHO it
is bad training practice to even suggest to a MEL student that waving off is
a practical alternative.

Given the brutally minimal training most multiengine students get these
days, you may well be right for most cases. A single engine go-around
is most certainly within the capability of even the most minimally
powered twins under some circumstances (none can do it under all
circumstances) and with proper pilot technique, but the scope of the
typical multi rating course allows for neither the flight training to
properly teach and reinforce the pilot technique nor the indepth
analysis of options that would allow the pilot to competently decide
when a single engine go-around can or should be done, and how to tailor
his operating procedures to keep that option open. I suppose it is for
this reason that it is not part of the private or commercial multi
syllabus.

For someone who is going to actually fly a twin on a regular basis, I
think the suggestion that a single engine go-around and missed approach
should not be taught (or even discussed) is basically irresponsible.
It's a procedure that may one day become necessary. Suppose you reach
the bottom end of a non-precision approach without breaking out, push
the throttles forward to level off, and one engine won't come up (or
flat-out dies). Now what? I had to demonstrate exactly that scenario
on my ATP ride, which requires (in the PTS) both a failure inside the
marker and a single engine missed approach.

I was trained in the procedure prior to my private multi checkride, but
(a) I was not getting a 10-hour multi course that gives you an FAA
rating but won't get you insurance in any twin, anywhere and (b) I was
trained by a 12,000+ hour airline training captain, not an MEI trying
to rack up his 100 multi for the airlines.

My experience is that the average multiengine student these days is an
airline wannabe. He will accumulate only about 100-200 hours of multi
time before he goes to the commuters, where they WILL teach him to do
single engine go-arounds and missed approaches. He will accumulate
those hours sporadically, and in the training environment. He has
neither the exposure to justify the training that would make him
proficient in single engine go-arounds and missed approaches, nor the
opportunity to keep that training current, and in this situation your
advice is good since the situation I described will almost certainly
not happen to him, and if it did he wouldn't have much chance of
pulling it out anyway.

However, if what you're dealing with is someone who flies a twin
because he flies so much night/IFR/hostile terrain/overwater that he's
not comfortable with the risks of doing all that flying single engine,
then your advice is downright dangerous. The RIGHT advice for someone
who is actually going to fly a twin on a regular basis is to get proper
training in how to make a competent single engine go-around, from
someone who knows how - and that includes the training necessary to
understand when it can and can't be done.

Michael

On Wed, 01 Jun 2005 18:22:00 GMT, "Mike Rapoport"
wrote in
t::

Any twin can be banked into the dead engine and controlled, it is only a
matter of airspeed.

At low altitude, that becomes problematic.

If memory serves, the Aerostar has only one hydraulic
pump and won't climb with the gear down.

Have you any idea which engine powers the hydraulic pump?

Thanks for the information, Mike.