CRJ crash at KLEX:

§ 121.443 Pilot in command qualification: Route and
airports.
(a) Each certificate holder shall provide a system
acceptable to the Administrator for disseminating the
information required by paragraph (b) of this section to the
pilot in command and appropriate flight operation personnel.
The system must also provide an acceptable means for showing
compliance with §121.445.

(b) No certificate holder may use any person, nor may any
person serve, as pilot in command unless the certificate
holder has provided that person current information
concerning the following subjects pertinent to the areas
over which that person is to serve, and to each airport and
terminal area into which that person is to operate, and
ensures that that person has adequate knowledge of, and the
ability to use, the information:

(1) Weather characteristics appropriate to the season.

(2) Navigation facilities.

(3) Communication procedures, including airport visual aids.

(4) Kinds of terrain and obstructions.

(5) Minimum safe flight levels.

(6) En route and terminal area arrival and departure
procedures, holding procedures and authorized instrument
approach procedures for the airports involved.

(7) Congested areas and physical layout of each airport in
the terminal area in which the pilot will operate.

(8) Notices to Airmen.

[Doc. No. 17897, 45 FR 41594, June 19, 1980; Amdt. 121-159,
45 FR 43154, June 26, 1980]



Note paragraph b and b7.

§ 121.542 Flight crewmember duties.
(a) No certificate holder shall require, nor may any flight
crewmember perform, any duties during a critical phase of
flight except those duties required for the safe operation
of the aircraft. Duties such as company required calls made
for such nonsafety related purposes as ordering galley
supplies and confirming passenger connections, announcements
made to passengers promoting the air carrier or pointing out
sights of interest, and filling out company payroll and
related records are not required for the safe operation of
the aircraft.

(b) No flight crewmember may engage in, nor may any pilot in
command permit, any activity during a critical phase of
flight which could distract any flight crewmember from the
performance of his or her duties or which could interfere in
any way with the proper conduct of those duties. Activities
such as eating meals, engaging in nonessential conversations
within the cockpit and nonessential communications between
the cabin and cockpit crews, and reading publications not
related to the proper conduct of the flight are not required
for the safe operation of the aircraft.

(c) For the purposes of this section, critical phases of
flight includes all ground operations involving taxi,
takeoff and landing, and all other flight operations
conducted below 10,000 feet, except cruise flight.

Note: Taxi is defined as "movement of an airplane under its
own power on the surface of an airport."

[Doc. No. 20661, 46 FR 5502, Jan. 19, 1981]





"Dan Luke" wrote in message
...
|
| "Dice" wrote:
|
| Before you start blaming the crew, look at how the
plane would taxi from
| the terminal building on taxiway alpha to the departure
end of either 22
| or 26.
| http://avn.faa.gov/d-tpp/0608/00697AD.PDF
|
| A simple heading check before throttle up would have
caught the error. I
| wonder if that is on the checklist.
|
| Looking at the diagram, can you imagine the confusing
array of signage
| that you'd have to negotiate to figure out taxiing from
the terminal
| whether you'd be at the departure end of 22 or 26?
|
| Yes, I can. It would probably prompt me to extra caution.
Were these
| pilots regulars at this airport, or newbies?
|
| One sign that probably should have been at the departure
end of 26 and
| wasn't: "Caution, short runway, no jets"
|
|
| It wouldn't be surprising to see this accident produce
some such regulation.
|
| --
| Dan
| C172RG at BFM
|
|

Kev wrote:


I haven't looked yet, but probably the sat images are way out of date.
Didn't they mention in the news that they just extended that runway 26
by 600' on both ends?



Here's a diagram dated 08/03/2006:

http://www.naco.faa.gov/d-tpp/0608/00697AD.PDF

I also fly Regional Jets for another carrier. As to "Jees they let
anyone fly them" ...thats an apalling statement and totally uncalled
for.

We are required by company policy to have the airport diagram open and
in view at all times on the ground. Checking taxiway signage and the
red and white runway numbering signs is common practice for both
crewmembers. We are required to read back all taxi and hold short
clearances. I am surprised that such an experienced crew made that
fatal mistake.

We are also required to verify adequate performance from any runway we
are going to use. Do we have enough runway and do we have climb
performance based on our weight, temperature and runway length?

I have made my share of mistakes as a pilot but thanks to some great
Captains and very comprehensive training it always turned out well.

There but for the grace of God go I.

Hank


Bush wrote:
6:10 PM the National Transportation Safety Board confirmed that
the Comair flight was assigned departure from runway 22, however
departed runway 26 (3500 ft.) since it was closer to the terminal.
Accelerate-stop for this A/C at this weight should be some 5356 feet.
Jees they'll let anyone fly them.

"It is that large chain of events, with no intervening variable, that
produces the accident"

Bush

Dice wrote:

Before you start blaming the crew, look at how the plane would taxi from
the terminal building on taxiway alpha to the departure end of either 22 or
26.

Or, better yet, take a direct look with Google earth. The picture
quality is very detailed for this area. When I looked at the picture and
imagined the situation of the pilots, I *have* understood how such an
error can occur. Note: I say understand, I don't say excuse.

Now my speculation, how such a confusion could happen. (I don't say it
happened this way, I just think of possibilities. Hopefully the CVR will
put more light on it.)

- The airport is pretty small, the runway is next to the apron, no "taxi
via...". So the pilots are tempted not to bother with the airport chart.
Lazyness, yes. But have *you* never done this?

- As there is only one runway large enough for jets, they maybe even
forgot that there was a second runway at all.

- The "narrow" runway is not narrower than the "wide" one, they are both
the same. There are just painted markings. And remember, as far as I
know, it was night and it rained.

- So they taxied by heart und lined up when they reached "the" runway.
The first one, that is, which happened to be rwy 26, unfortunately.

- When lined up, the pilots can't see the runway numbers. Certainly not
at rwy 26, because the numbers are *behind* them.

- Sure, they would have caught the error at this moment if they had
checked the compass. Again, lazyness. Again, have you never done this?
And maybe, they didn't even stop between taxi and take off but just
continued accelerating after the turn.

As it seems to me, this is just another example why we should strictly
and always adhere to the procedures, as annoying and superfluous as they
sometimes may seem. Because most of them are written with blood.

Hmmm... Thinking of it, this somehow reminds me of those discussions
about the benefit of using standard phraseology...

Stefan

Bob Noel wrote:
In article ,
Emily wrote:

Blaming doesn't keep it from happening again.

Reducing the risk of it happening again isn't the only objective.
Somtimes people need to take responsibility.

It's not a criminal act. It was a horrible mistake. Get over yourself.

Stefan wrote:
Dice wrote:

Before you start blaming the crew, look at how the plane would taxi
from the terminal building on taxiway alpha to the departure end of
either 22 or 26.

Or, better yet, take a direct look with Google earth. The picture
quality is very detailed for this area. When I looked at the picture and
imagined the situation of the pilots, I *have* understood how such an
error can occur. Note: I say understand, I don't say excuse.


Here's where a well equipped GA aircraft trumps the airlines (possibly).
When I'm on the ground at an airport with an approach, I get my position
superimposed over the aircraft diagram. I'm surprised though. Close
to 20 years ago I was in the cockpit of one of UPS's 767's. Their
inertial nav system displayed the position we were on the cargo ramp
to the programmed departure runway as well.

Emily wrote:

It's not a criminal act. It was a horrible mistake.

Negligence may be a criminal act. Omissions in staff training may also
be accounted as criminal. (I'm not saying it was in this case, I only
say it might be.)

In article ,
"Dan Luke" wrote:

One sign that probably should have been at the departure end of 26 and
wasn't: "Caution, short runway, no jets"


It wouldn't be surprising to see this accident produce some such regulation.

If they missed the runway sign, why should it be assumed that they
wouldn't miss a warning sign?

This airport isn't that complex. If you have the airport diagram opened
and are paying attention, you shouldn't end up at the wrong runway.
Mistakes do happen, but there should have been several clues (heading,
runway width, missing runway markings, poor condition of runway, etc.)
that should have tipped them off.

Finally, it's possible that they realized they were on the wrong runway
into the takeoff roll, and chose to continue rather than stop and roll
off the end (which would probably have resulted in a better outcome).
Only time and the full NTSB report will answer some of the many
outstanding questions.



JKG

Ron Natalie wrote:

Here's where a well equipped GA aircraft trumps the airlines (possibly).
When I'm on the ground at an airport with an approach, I get my position
superimposed over the aircraft diagram.

A guy I know who flies CRJ's for Pinnacle tells me they all have glass
cockpits. The accident plane was delivered in 2001 (according to CNN),
so I don't think it would have steam guages.

I would imagine they'd have the same or better capabilities as you.

Emily wrote:

Ron Lee wrote:
Can't agree with you Emily. If the pilots took off on too short a
runway they screwed up royally and they alone are to blame.

Ron Lee



Blaming doesn't keep it from happening again.

And what kept it from happening this time?

Ron Lee

You know, I'm not even going to dignify this with another post after
this. Fine, blame two people, one of whom is dead. I'm not going to
join you. I'm glad that you've never made such a mistake, and I hope
you never do, but keep in mind that it does happen, and it COULD happen
to you.

You are right Emily. I never made a mistake that resulted in 49
deaths. FACT is that a significant percentage of aircraft accidents
are due to pilot error. That a person is dead does not mean that they
can't be blamed IF they caused the accident.

Ron Lee