THE DEADLY RAILROAD BRIDGES

In article ,
(ArtKramr) wrote:

Some bridges had to be taken out no matter the the cost. This bridge was used
to resupply German forces attacking Omah beach. Our losses were the price we
paid to protect the attacking infantry. Go to my website and see, "DEATH OF A
BRIDGE". Look at the two photos carefully. Very carefuly Then read the caption
at the bottom of the page. Results like this are the sort of attacks I lived
for. Made my day.

Art,

How much did the Air Corps briefers tell you about the purpose behind
the selection of a particular target? Did most aircrew members have a
good understanding of target selection so that most/all targets were
chosen for obvious reasons? Did all the aircrew go to the pre-flight
breif or just pilots/BNs? Different briefs for different crew positions?

Ed, et al,

I agreed with the 1000 mile standoff. I sometimes roll around different
alternatives of how we could get the AGM-130 to fly to the full range of
the weapon data link. In Bosinia, I hear that a major problem was that
many targets were close to national borders and the ROE prevented
release of the weapons until closer than was preferred.

I like to understand how the weapons I work on are employed and how they
impact the battle. By taking out a bridge or command center you take
the enemies ability to put troops/equipment at the right place at the
right time.

--
Dana Miller

Subject: THE DEADLY RAILROAD BRIDGES
From: Dana Miller
Date: 2/4/04 7:51 PM

How much did the Air Corps briefers tell you about the purpose behind
the selection of a particular target? Did most aircrew members have a
good understanding of target selection so that most/all targets were
chosen for obvious reasons? Did all the aircrew go to the pre-flight
breif or just pilots/BNs? Different briefs for different crew positions?

Ed, et al,


They told us only what we had to know,sometimes almost nothing, Some things we
only learned after the mission such as the time we hit the bridge at Arnhem.
They were careful not to give us information of use to the enemy in case we
were shot down and captured. In most cases what we knew, so did the enemy.

Pre flight breifings included only pilots, copilots and bombardier navigators.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

On Thu, 05 Feb 2004 03:51:01 GMT, Dana Miller
wrote:

How much did the Air Corps briefers tell you about the purpose behind
the selection of a particular target? Did most aircrew members have a
good understanding of target selection so that most/all targets were
chosen for obvious reasons? Did all the aircrew go to the pre-flight
breif or just pilots/BNs? Different briefs for different crew positions?

Ed, et al,

In the North Vietnam campaigns, the ROE were spelled out, so there was
an overall framework for operations. Before you flew your first
mission, you had to read and pass a test on the ROE. Big issue was
prohibited areas and buffer zones, such as the China border. Also
questions of allowable targets--no dams, dikes, hospitals, schools,
etc. At some periods no airfields or SAM sites until they fired. That
changed later in the war.

Large package briefings for Pack VI strikes has all tactical aircrews
present--F-4, F-105 with nosegunners and back-seaters. The EB-66,
EC-121, tankers, recce briefed elsewhere. Several bases participated
so there were briefings and timing sequences involved at all
locations.

Typically, you assembled half an hour before mass brief to review
maps, prepare line-up cards, get code-words for the day. Mass brief
covered weather, intel, operations sequence, SAR plan. Then break up
into four-ship flight briefing by flight lead for tactics,
ingress/egress formations, emergency handling. Finally break to
individual airplane crew where front and back seater coordinate their
duties.

Targets were pretty familiar and the objectives were obvious. Cut
railroad bridges, interdict supplies, destroy POL, etc. No great
strategies involved. Small area, limited number of targets.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8