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Fly tight for tight bomb patterns on the ground.



 
 
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  #41  
Old August 25th 04, 03:24 AM
Guy Alcala
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Dave Eadsforth wrote:

In article , Guy Alcala
writes


snip

As to the technique of individual bombers aiming and bombing a target in a
stream,
AFAIK that was only practised by the RAF at night, from 1944 or so on (for
precision attacks, that is). This appears to have been adopted because
Churchill
was worried about French civilian casualties from collateral damage if the
transportation plan was adopted. However, it was found that Bomber Command
(well,
5 Group anyway, usually led by 617 as target markers), was able to bomb
marshalling
yards accurately and keep the collateral damage down, by bombing individually
instead of in formation. Using large formations would have caused too much
spillover damage -- even with a 100% accurate MPI, the bomb coverage area of a
big
formation was so large that numerous bombs were bound to hit outside the target
area. With individual bombers, even the occasional gross aiming error resulted
in
fewer bombs hitting civilian areas. Note that this technique was only considered
possible in areas where the defenses were rather light, i.e. over France at
night,
because the bombers lacked mutual support for defense. It's also true that such
a
risk was considered politically necessary to avoid allied civilian causualties,
whereas by 1944 (at least), none of the allied commanders cared all that much if
collateral damage from spillover due to bombing in formation killed large
numbers
of German civilians.


That's a huge thumbnail, Guy - thanks very much for devoting the time to
writing it. Archived and backed up already...


You're welcome. Oh, I forgot to mention the single most important factors that made
these Bomber Command missions possible - the targets had to be in Oboe range for
accurate marking, and the bombers had to be able to bomb visually on ground markers.
With an properly marked target and adequate visibility, accuracy could be quite
high. Of course, ocasionally the Luftwaffe would put up a decent defense in France
-- prior to the mission to Mailly-Le-Camp, tactical targets in France only counted
for partial mission credit (I think it was 1/3rd), like minelaying missions which
didn't go east of a certain longitude. The bombers suffered heavy casualties on that
raid owing to delayed marking,

http://www.raf.mod.uk/dday/timeline_may.html

See May 3-4, and that was the end of only part mission credit for French targets.
Oh, for an example of an RAF heavy bomber bombing "formation", see the first photo on
the same page. I'd like to know what the target was; with that kind of spread and
that amount of undercast it pretty much had to be a German city, with the drop made
by radar.

Guy


  #42  
Old August 25th 04, 06:42 AM
Dave Eadsforth
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In article , Guy Alcala
writes
Guy Alcala wrote:

snip

That reminds me, if you can you might want to find a copy of Martin
Middlebrook's "The
Schweinfurt-Regensburg Raid", as it describes the wing shift into bombing
formation by
groups in trail and group bombing accuracy, as well as many other tactical
matters
pertaining to mid-1943 era (and largely for the rest of the war) 8th Bomber
Command
missions.

Guy

Thanks once again...

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth
  #43  
Old August 25th 04, 06:53 AM
Dave Eadsforth
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Default

In article , Guy Alcala
writes
Dave Eadsforth wrote:

In article , Guy Alcala
writes


SNIP

That's a huge thumbnail, Guy - thanks very much for devoting the time to
writing it. Archived and backed up already...


You're welcome. Oh, I forgot to mention the single most important factors that
made
these Bomber Command missions possible - the targets had to be in Oboe range for
accurate marking, and the bombers had to be able to bomb visually on ground
markers.
With an properly marked target and adequate visibility, accuracy could be quite
high. Of course, ocasionally the Luftwaffe would put up a decent defense in
France
-- prior to the mission to Mailly-Le-Camp, tactical targets in France only
counted
for partial mission credit (I think it was 1/3rd), like minelaying missions
which
didn't go east of a certain longitude.


That must have gone down well with the crews - like a bomb, in fact...

The bombers suffered heavy casualties on
that
raid owing to delayed marking,

http://www.raf.mod.uk/dday/timeline_may.html


Just checked it out - very interesting page.

See May 3-4, and that was the end of only part mission credit for French
targets.
Oh, for an example of an RAF heavy bomber bombing "formation", see the first
photo on
the same page. I'd like to know what the target was; with that kind of spread
and
that amount of undercast it pretty much had to be a German city, with the drop
made
by radar.


Hmm - probably an archive picture of a drop over a range in the Scottish
highlands - only sheep around to criticise the accuracy...

Guy



Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth
  #44  
Old August 25th 04, 06:54 AM
Dave Eadsforth
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

In article q1QWc.1359$OP2.420@trnddc01, Jack G remove.jack.grouell@ve
rizon.net writes
Another excellent reference is "The Mighty Eighth War Manual" by Roger A.
Freeman.

Jack G.


Thanks!

Dave



--
Dave Eadsforth
  #45  
Old August 25th 04, 07:38 AM
Guy Alcala
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Posts: n/a
Default

Dave Eadsforth wrote:

In article , Guy Alcala
writes
Dave Eadsforth wrote:

In article , Guy Alcala
writes


SNIP

That's a huge thumbnail, Guy - thanks very much for devoting the time to
writing it. Archived and backed up already...


You're welcome. Oh, I forgot to mention the single most important factors that
made
these Bomber Command missions possible - the targets had to be in Oboe range for
accurate marking, and the bombers had to be able to bomb visually on ground
markers.
With an properly marked target and adequate visibility, accuracy could be quite
high. Of course, ocasionally the Luftwaffe would put up a decent defense in
France
-- prior to the mission to Mailly-Le-Camp, tactical targets in France only
counted
for partial mission credit (I think it was 1/3rd), like minelaying missions
which
didn't go east of a certain longitude.


That must have gone down well with the crews - like a bomb, in fact...


As far as the "gardening" (mining) missions went, it fairly accurately reflected the
relative risks, and the same was generally true for shallow French targets, once the
Reich's defenses had been strengthened. I think the dividing line between part and
full credit for mining missions was either 4 or 6 deg. E. longitude -- pretty much
were you just nipping over to the French/Belgian/Dutch coasts, or were you dropping
in German waters (including the Baltic). ISTR either Middlebrook's "The Nuremburg
Raid" or Max Hastings' "Bomber Command" has the details; probably the former. Many
of the crews were apparently happy to get mining missions as they were considered
milk runs, although IIRR by late 1943 or early 1944 they tended to be given to a/c
which were no longer considered capable of first-line service; first the Wellington
squadrons and then the Stirling units. Early model Halifax units may also have drawn
these assignments from 1944 on. It does show that the nominal heavy bomber main
force crew's first combat tour of 30 missions might well involve considerably more
than that.

Guy

  #48  
Old August 25th 04, 07:24 PM
Robert Briggs
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Mike Dargan wrote:
ArtKramr wrote:

The tighter the formation you fly the tighter the bomb pattern on
the ground and the more damage you do to the enemy.


If you're trying to wreck fresh bomb craters, the tighter the better.


Nicely put, Mike.
  #49  
Old August 25th 04, 07:32 PM
Robert Briggs
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Guy Alcala wrote:

However, it was found that Bomber Command (well, 5 Group anyway,
usually led by 617 as target markers), was able to bomb marshalling
yards accurately and keep the collateral damage down, by bombing
individually instead of in formation.


Of course, an extreme case of the need for individual accuracy was
the operation for which 617 was formed.
 




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