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#41
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Dave Eadsforth wrote:
In article , Guy Alcala writes snip As to the technique of individual bombers aiming and bombing a target in a stream, AFAIK that was only practised by the RAF at night, from 1944 or so on (for precision attacks, that is). This appears to have been adopted because Churchill was worried about French civilian casualties from collateral damage if the transportation plan was adopted. However, it was found that Bomber Command (well, 5 Group anyway, usually led by 617 as target markers), was able to bomb marshalling yards accurately and keep the collateral damage down, by bombing individually instead of in formation. Using large formations would have caused too much spillover damage -- even with a 100% accurate MPI, the bomb coverage area of a big formation was so large that numerous bombs were bound to hit outside the target area. With individual bombers, even the occasional gross aiming error resulted in fewer bombs hitting civilian areas. Note that this technique was only considered possible in areas where the defenses were rather light, i.e. over France at night, because the bombers lacked mutual support for defense. It's also true that such a risk was considered politically necessary to avoid allied civilian causualties, whereas by 1944 (at least), none of the allied commanders cared all that much if collateral damage from spillover due to bombing in formation killed large numbers of German civilians. That's a huge thumbnail, Guy - thanks very much for devoting the time to writing it. Archived and backed up already... You're welcome. Oh, I forgot to mention the single most important factors that made these Bomber Command missions possible - the targets had to be in Oboe range for accurate marking, and the bombers had to be able to bomb visually on ground markers. With an properly marked target and adequate visibility, accuracy could be quite high. Of course, ocasionally the Luftwaffe would put up a decent defense in France -- prior to the mission to Mailly-Le-Camp, tactical targets in France only counted for partial mission credit (I think it was 1/3rd), like minelaying missions which didn't go east of a certain longitude. The bombers suffered heavy casualties on that raid owing to delayed marking, http://www.raf.mod.uk/dday/timeline_may.html See May 3-4, and that was the end of only part mission credit for French targets. Oh, for an example of an RAF heavy bomber bombing "formation", see the first photo on the same page. I'd like to know what the target was; with that kind of spread and that amount of undercast it pretty much had to be a German city, with the drop made by radar. Guy |
#42
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In article , Guy Alcala
writes Guy Alcala wrote: snip That reminds me, if you can you might want to find a copy of Martin Middlebrook's "The Schweinfurt-Regensburg Raid", as it describes the wing shift into bombing formation by groups in trail and group bombing accuracy, as well as many other tactical matters pertaining to mid-1943 era (and largely for the rest of the war) 8th Bomber Command missions. Guy Thanks once again... Dave -- Dave Eadsforth |
#43
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In article , Guy Alcala
writes Dave Eadsforth wrote: In article , Guy Alcala writes SNIP That's a huge thumbnail, Guy - thanks very much for devoting the time to writing it. Archived and backed up already... You're welcome. Oh, I forgot to mention the single most important factors that made these Bomber Command missions possible - the targets had to be in Oboe range for accurate marking, and the bombers had to be able to bomb visually on ground markers. With an properly marked target and adequate visibility, accuracy could be quite high. Of course, ocasionally the Luftwaffe would put up a decent defense in France -- prior to the mission to Mailly-Le-Camp, tactical targets in France only counted for partial mission credit (I think it was 1/3rd), like minelaying missions which didn't go east of a certain longitude. That must have gone down well with the crews - like a bomb, in fact... The bombers suffered heavy casualties on that raid owing to delayed marking, http://www.raf.mod.uk/dday/timeline_may.html Just checked it out - very interesting page. See May 3-4, and that was the end of only part mission credit for French targets. Oh, for an example of an RAF heavy bomber bombing "formation", see the first photo on the same page. I'd like to know what the target was; with that kind of spread and that amount of undercast it pretty much had to be a German city, with the drop made by radar. Hmm - probably an archive picture of a drop over a range in the Scottish highlands - only sheep around to criticise the accuracy... Guy Cheers, Dave -- Dave Eadsforth |
#44
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In article q1QWc.1359$OP2.420@trnddc01, Jack G remove.jack.grouell@ve
rizon.net writes Another excellent reference is "The Mighty Eighth War Manual" by Roger A. Freeman. Jack G. Thanks! Dave -- Dave Eadsforth |
#45
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Dave Eadsforth wrote:
In article , Guy Alcala writes Dave Eadsforth wrote: In article , Guy Alcala writes SNIP That's a huge thumbnail, Guy - thanks very much for devoting the time to writing it. Archived and backed up already... You're welcome. Oh, I forgot to mention the single most important factors that made these Bomber Command missions possible - the targets had to be in Oboe range for accurate marking, and the bombers had to be able to bomb visually on ground markers. With an properly marked target and adequate visibility, accuracy could be quite high. Of course, ocasionally the Luftwaffe would put up a decent defense in France -- prior to the mission to Mailly-Le-Camp, tactical targets in France only counted for partial mission credit (I think it was 1/3rd), like minelaying missions which didn't go east of a certain longitude. That must have gone down well with the crews - like a bomb, in fact... As far as the "gardening" (mining) missions went, it fairly accurately reflected the relative risks, and the same was generally true for shallow French targets, once the Reich's defenses had been strengthened. I think the dividing line between part and full credit for mining missions was either 4 or 6 deg. E. longitude -- pretty much were you just nipping over to the French/Belgian/Dutch coasts, or were you dropping in German waters (including the Baltic). ISTR either Middlebrook's "The Nuremburg Raid" or Max Hastings' "Bomber Command" has the details; probably the former. Many of the crews were apparently happy to get mining missions as they were considered milk runs, although IIRR by late 1943 or early 1944 they tended to be given to a/c which were no longer considered capable of first-line service; first the Wellington squadrons and then the Stirling units. Early model Halifax units may also have drawn these assignments from 1944 on. It does show that the nominal heavy bomber main force crew's first combat tour of 30 missions might well involve considerably more than that. Guy |
#46
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"ArtKramr" wrote in message
... Subject: Fly tight for tight bomb patterns on the ground. From: (B2431) Date: 8/24/2004 12:05 PM Pacific Standard Time Art, of the two of us YOU are the only one bragging about his combat experience. I don't like to discuss mine since it still hurts. Please accept that my war was just as real as yours. Just stop bashing those who haven't seen combat, the served just as honourably as you. Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired I am sharing my experiences, not bragging. Since you share nothing I assume you have nothing to share. Sharing experiences is what a NG is all about. Anyone not willing to share their experiences should get off this NG and not clutter it with boring crap, which is all many have to offer. They use it as a diversion from their lack of experience. Do you have experiences to share? Well, where the hell are they? . Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer Art defines NGs for us - apparently they're ALL about sharing experiences. So the medieval and ancient history groups can all wind up now. It's *partly* about sharing experiences. It's also partly about sharing knowledge gained through reading and discussion. It's about sharing well-thought out opinions. |
#47
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![]() "Mike" wrote in message ... "ArtKramr" wrote in message ... Subject: Fly tight for tight bomb patterns on the ground. From: (B2431) Date: 8/24/2004 12:05 PM Pacific Standard Time Art, of the two of us YOU are the only one bragging about his combat experience. I don't like to discuss mine since it still hurts. Please accept that my war was just as real as yours. Just stop bashing those who haven't seen combat, the served just as honourably as you. Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired I am sharing my experiences, not bragging. Since you share nothing I assume you have nothing to share. Sharing experiences is what a NG is all about. Anyone not willing to share their experiences should get off this NG and not clutter it with boring crap, which is all many have to offer. They use it as a diversion from their lack of experience. Do you have experiences to share? Well, where the hell are they? . Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer Art defines NGs for us - apparently they're ALL about sharing experiences. So the medieval and ancient history groups can all wind up now. It's *partly* about sharing experiences. It's also partly about sharing knowledge gained through reading and discussion. It's about sharing well-thought out opinions. Well said! |
#48
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Mike Dargan wrote:
ArtKramr wrote: The tighter the formation you fly the tighter the bomb pattern on the ground and the more damage you do to the enemy. If you're trying to wreck fresh bomb craters, the tighter the better. Nicely put, Mike. |
#49
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Guy Alcala wrote:
However, it was found that Bomber Command (well, 5 Group anyway, usually led by 617 as target markers), was able to bomb marshalling yards accurately and keep the collateral damage down, by bombing individually instead of in formation. Of course, an extreme case of the need for individual accuracy was the operation for which 617 was formed. |
#50
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Subject: Fly tight for tight bomb patterns on the ground.
From: Robert Briggs UCKET Date: 8/25/2004 11:24 AM Pacific Standard Time Message-id: Mike Dargan wrote: ArtKramr wrote: The tighter the formation you fly the tighter the bomb pattern on the ground and the more damage you do to the enemy. If you're trying to wreck fresh bomb craters, the tighter the better. Nicely put, Mike. Is that that the result of the many missions you flew and your experience with formation variations and the effect on bomb patterns? BTW, how many missions did you fly? Could you give us details? Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
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