Co-pilot error caused AA 587 crash

Pete wrote:

Remember that it was an AA
DC-10 that lost an engine at ORD, and AA's maintenance practice
of removing engines with a forklift was the culprit, contrary to
McDonnell Douglas' advice.



That sounds interesting. How was it that removing them with the
forklift caused a problem, and how were they supposed to do it? Just
curious.

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On Wed, 27 Oct 2004 00:56:43 +0000, Pete wrote:


But to start another flame war, maybe AA has a culture problem
of ignoring manufacturers' advice. Remember that it was an AA
DC-10 that lost an engine at ORD, and AA's maintenance practice
of removing engines with a forklift was the culprit, contrary to
McDonnell Douglas' advice.


Correct. Still was a poor design though.

Morgans wrote:
Seems to me that Airbus is, if not criminally responsible, morally and
legally responsible.

Then Boeing would also be guilty because the NTSB, very early in the
investigation, found that Boeing planes were also liable to lose tailfin upon
misused of rudder during flight.

Also early on, it had been revealed that AA stood out amongst all other
airlines with regards to rudder usage while in flight (training issue). If
the rest of airlines told pilots not to use Rudder to such an extent, then AA
stands out.

Airbus insists it has sent warnings about misused of rudder while in flight.
The question is whether a maufacturer (Airbus , Boeing etc) needs to approve
an airline's training programme for a specific plane. If so, the Airbus could
be held responsible for not forcing AA to change training to avoid misused of
Rudder. But if Airbus did not need to approve AA's training programme, then
why should it be held responsible ?

"nobody" wrote in message
...
Morgans wrote:
Seems to me that Airbus is, if not criminally responsible, morally and
legally responsible.

Then Boeing would also be guilty because the NTSB, very early in the
investigation, found that Boeing planes were also liable to lose tailfin
upon
misused of rudder during flight.


Note that I was under the ASSumption that the Airbus was FBW. If that was
the case, programming should have been such that it was impossible to make
the tail fall off.

Has this programming tidbit been taken care of? I hope so.
--
Jim in NC


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"nobody" wrote in message
...
Morgans wrote:
Seems to me that Airbus is, if not criminally responsible, morally and
legally responsible.

Then Boeing would also be guilty because the NTSB, very early in the
investigation, found that Boeing planes were also liable to lose tailfin
upon
misused of rudder during flight.

Also early on, it had been revealed that AA stood out amongst all other
airlines with regards to rudder usage while in flight (training issue).
If
the rest of airlines told pilots not to use Rudder to such an extent, then
AA
stands out.

Airbus insists it has sent warnings about misused of rudder while in
flight.
The question is whether a maufacturer (Airbus , Boeing etc) needs to
approve
an airline's training programme for a specific plane. If so, the Airbus
could
be held responsible for not forcing AA to change training to avoid misused
of
Rudder. But if Airbus did not need to approve AA's training programme,
then
why should it be held responsible ?

Seems to me if Airbus or any other manufacturer was aware AA was training
it's pilots to fly/operate its products in a manner it was not engineered to
be operated the manufacturer would be responsible for saying so "LOUD &
CLEAR" in a manner that could not be construed as ambiguous.
Ralph Nesbitt
Professional FD/CFR/ARFF Type

Ralph Nesbitt wrote:
Seems to me if Airbus or any other manufacturer was aware AA was training
it's pilots to fly/operate its products in a manner it was not engineered to
be operated the manufacturer would be responsible for saying so "LOUD &
CLEAR" in a manner that could not be construed as ambiguous.


In principle, probably correct. But legally, wouldn't it be the FAA that would
be in charge of ensuring that AA's training adheres to both its own as well as
manufacturer's standards ?

Airbus says it sent letters of concern to AA. Perhaps it should have sent
those letters with a CC to the FAA and let the FAA ensure AA fixes the
problem. Not sure Airbus has any authority on ist customers, but FAA has
authority over US airlines.

nobody wrote:
Ralph Nesbitt wrote:

Seems to me if Airbus or any other manufacturer was aware AA was training
it's pilots to fly/operate its products in a manner it was not engineered to
be operated the manufacturer would be responsible for saying so "LOUD &
CLEAR" in a manner that could not be construed as ambiguous.

In principle, probably correct. But legally, wouldn't it be the FAA that would
be in charge of ensuring that AA's training adheres to both its own as well as
manufacturer's standards ?

Airbus says it sent letters of concern to AA. Perhaps it should have sent
those letters with a CC to the FAA and let the FAA ensure AA fixes the
problem. Not sure Airbus has any authority on ist customers, but FAA has
authority over US airlines.

In the time-honored tradition of Usenet, you two are essentially jerking
each other off speculating about this when you could very simply go read
the primary sources. The letter from Airbus and Boeing to American
Airlines, together with AA's chief pilot's rather arrogant response, are
both in the public record of the investigation and can be read right he

http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2001/AA58...its/239998.pdf

Among other things, you'll see that the letter was signed not only by
representatives of both airlines but by an FAA employee, who also was
addressed in AA's reply. Clearly the FAA was aware of the training issues.

Sylvia Else wrote:
There have been incidents where airliners have been stressed well
beyound their design limits to recover from extreme upsets, and the
passengers and crew have survived to fly another day,

"design limits" is the real keyword here. And it applies to bridges as well as buildings.

The empire state building was built with tons of extra strength into it
because at the time, the knowledge of structural aspects of materials was not
very good. So you end up with a big fat heavy building that is very strong.
More recent buildings are built with much better knowledge of materials and
thus are built with more exact strength, much lighter materials and much
thinner structure.

Similarly, modern aircraft are built with much better knowledge of material
properties as well as aerodynamics. So the difference between the stated
limits and the actual physical limits are far less than planes built in the
1960s. So breaking the "limits" today may in fact be far more dangerous than
breaking the much less well known limits of the 1960s.



The A300 crash is a perfect example of why FBW is a good thing. had there been
FBW on that system, the pilot could have commanded the rudder to the max, and
the computer would have ensured that it only moved as far as was safe,
allowing pilot to concentrate on flying the aircraft instead of guessing what
the limits would be in that flight regime.

From what I have been told, the 320 330 and 340s do not have computer
authority on the rudder, one reason being that the rudder is so rarely used in
flight. (AA being the odd airline out).

However, I suspect that the 380 and 350 will have computer authority on the rudder.

On Wed, 27 Oct 2004 at 01:02:58 in message
, nobody wrote:

The A300 crash is a perfect example of why FBW is a good thing. had there been
FBW on that system, the pilot could have commanded the rudder to the max, and
the computer would have ensured that it only moved as far as was safe,
allowing pilot to concentrate on flying the aircraft instead of guessing what
the limits would be in that flight regime.

Surely maximum deflection is not the issue? It is reversing from the
maximum one way to the other and perhaps back again that is the issue.
On the other hand maybe FBW may not have touched the rudder? Many
aircraft have had the maximum deflection automatically reduced after the
speed passes a certain point. Did the A300 have this? I think it did but
I am not sure of my recollection.
--
David CL Francis

"nobody" wrote in message
...
Sylvia Else wrote:
There have been incidents where airliners have been stressed well
beyound their design limits to recover from extreme upsets, and the
passengers and crew have survived to fly another day,

"design limits" is the real keyword here. And it applies to bridges as
well as buildings.

The empire state building was built with tons of extra strength into it
because at the time, the knowledge of structural aspects of materials was
not
very good. So you end up with a big fat heavy building that is very
strong.
More recent buildings are built with much better knowledge of materials
and
thus are built with more exact strength, much lighter materials and much
thinner structure.

Similarly, modern aircraft are built with much better knowledge of
material
properties as well as aerodynamics. So the difference between the stated
limits and the actual physical limits are far less than planes built in
the
1960s. So breaking the "limits" today may in fact be far more dangerous
than
breaking the much less well known limits of the 1960s.

Johnson's flight demonstration of a early 707 being a prime example. Modern
day commercial A/C would never probably not survive, but if it did to the
scrap heap it would go.
Ralph Nesbitt
Professional FD/CFR/ARFF Type