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#51
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#52
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"buf3" wrote in message (BUFDRVR) wrote in message I went to AOB(Air Observer, Bombardier) School at James Connally AFB, TX in 1957 on my way from pilot training to a co-pilot position in RB-47s at Little Rock AFB. It was a six month school with training in dead reckoning, celestial navigation, radar navigation and radar bombing. We picked up an additional rating, another set of wings and were called "Triple-Headed-Monsters". Gene Myers That was late in the game, in 1950 through 1954, they were sent to Ellington, graduating as a Navigator w/ a set of Navigator Wings, then Mather for Bombardier, graduating as a Bombardier w/ a set of Bombardier Wings, then stayed at Mather for Aerial Observer School(Radar) ,graduating with a set of AOB wings, these 3 in addition to Senior Pilot or Command Pilot wings in their possession, since all AC candidates in the beginning were the high time men on each Base they came from. Thus 4 sets of wings = 4-headed Monsters! |
#53
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"buf3" wrote in message We picked up an additional rating, another set of wings and were called "Triple-Headed-Monsters". Gene Myers If you only picked up an additional set of wings to complement your Pilot wings, one woudl think you would be called 2 - headed Monsters? Your predecessors in the program had 4 sets of wings. |
#55
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I think that is painting with too broad a brush.
Yes, it was, but Michel's anti-SAC bias shines throughout the book and is the only negative aspect to his writing. I felt he could drop the anti-SAC attitude and still make his point. And, Marsh points out, the unresponsiveness of the SAC leadership to the requests of the local commanders cost a lot of B-52 crews their lives or freedom on day 1 through 6 of LB II. Absolutely agree. They had previously been able to take strikes and bring their significant manpower to bear in restoring operations in days or even hours. With LB II, the round-the-clock intensity meant that couldn't be done. Ed, the railyard at Kihn No was still out of action from strikes in November, same holds true for the Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant. I don't disagree that some significant damage was inflicted, but it was not significant enough to impact the political leadership in NVN. They returned to Paris because congress never went into session (most likely because they had recessed for Christmas) and voted to suspend military funding. The NVN looked out the window, heard the air raid sirons and said; "we're not getting anything for this". They didn't look out the window and say; "my God, the damage is so horrible if it continues we'll be destroyed, we must stop it." But, in LB II, we escalated to a previously unused level of force and in a very short period restruck almost every significant target in the area. and struck them again and again and again.... I've got to state that while participation doesn't guarantee understanding, it does provide insight and a level of detail that can't be gleaned from poring through micro-fiche archives of op-rep 4s and unit histories written by a squadron Lt as an additional duty. How about most of the sources Michel used (I even included his work)? Michel did the same thing I did (plus conduct interviews). Are you saying his work is suspect or does he get a pass "because he was there"? It contains a few stories about Linebacker I and II seen out the front window rather than from the back of the library. I'm sorry Ed, but I'm still going to have to disagree that "being there" is any more important to accurate fact collecting. In fact, in my case, and I've said this before, if someone writes a book on Iraqi Freedom, I'll be the first one to buy it, because I was so damn busy in my own little world that the big picture swept completely buy me. BUFDRVR "Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips everyone on Bear Creek" |
#56
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BUFDRVR wrote:
snip They had previously been able to take strikes and bring their significant manpower to bear in restoring operations in days or even hours. With LB II, the round-the-clock intensity meant that couldn't be done. Ed, the railyard at Kihn No was still out of action from strikes in November, same holds true for the Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant. I don't disagree that some significant damage was inflicted, but it was not significant enough to impact the political leadership in NVN. They returned to Paris because congress never went into session (most likely because they had recessed for Christmas) Correct. Nixon thought they would vote to deny funds as soon as they came back. and voted to suspend military funding. The NVN looked out the window, heard the air raid sirons and said; "we're not getting anything for this". They didn't look out the window and say; "my God, the damage is so horrible if it continues we'll be destroyed, we must stop it." Right. But, in LB II, we escalated to a previously unused level of force and in a very short period restruck almost every significant target in the area. and struck them again and again and again.... I've got to state that while participation doesn't guarantee understanding, it does provide insight and a level of detail that can't be gleaned from poring through micro-fiche archives of op-rep 4s and unit histories written by a squadron Lt as an additional duty. How about most of the sources Michel used (I even included his work)? Michel did the same thing I did (plus conduct interviews). Are you saying his work is suspect or does he get a pass "because he was there"? Ed seems to have a bit of a blind spot about this, even though you and I have given him numerous contemporary sources involving the direct participants in the negotiations, which he can check. Once again, I recommend a perusal of Nixon's "No More Vietnams," as well as The palace file / Nguyen Tien Hung and Jerrold L. Schecter. New York : Harper & Row, c1986. The former has Nixon's account of the negotiations and what he was trying to accomplish (and what he felt he could), the latter contains the photostats of the actual telegrams/letters Nixon was sending to Thieu throughout this period, as well as Thieu's handwritten comments on them. Nixon just barely manages to maintain his patience with Thieu as the latter keeps asking for changes (many for good reason), but finally just loses his temper and almost in so many words, tells Thieu to sign it or else. Thieu's delaying behavior continues up until well into January, and IIRR even into June or so of 1973 (when the final accord was signed). The deal was done in October 1972, Thieu's insisting on substantive changes (especially withdrawal of PAVN troops from the south) which the U.S. (in this context, Nixon and Kissinger) knew the DRVN would never accept, blew the deal, especially as the latter thought they had a shot at getting it all by just sitting back and waiting for congress to act, so they pulled out. Nixon started LB II mainly to convince Thieu that the U.S. would back the RVN with bombing and other support if the DRVN violated the accords (which Nixon fully expected would happen), the DRVN agreed to essentially the same terms (with a few cosmetic changes in wording) as they had agreed to in October, Nixon in effect then told Thieu he'd better sign if he wanted US support, as we were going to sign regardless of whether or not he did. Thieu signed, under protest, and did everything he could to hold up the process, because he felt (rightly, as it turned out) that the RVN was essentially being sold out. There is absolutely no support in the historical record, none, for Ed's belief that LB II somehow 'won' the war or even that it brought about significantly better terms, or that Nixon and Kissinger were even trying to accomplish that. Both men have denied that the final terms were substantially different from October's: "On November 20th . . . Kissinger presented Thieu's proposed changes, as well as some of our own . . . After several tough negotiating sessions , I concluded that if we were to reach an agreement, we would have to abandon most of Thieu's major demands. I instructed Kissinger to seek a settlement along the lines of the October agreement." Nixon, "No More Vietnams," pg. 156. Both men are clear about the limited goals they had for LB II, and getting a substantial improvement in the October terms wasn't one of them.. While neither of them are exactly known for their veracity when discussing their own actions, the paper record as well as the accounts of others (US, RVN and DRVN) who participated in the negotiating process backs up their account. "The Palace File" telexes show the various minor changes made in the terms throughout the negotiations, as Nixon (or sometimes Kissinger or Haig) inform Thieu of them. The DRVN refused to give in on the major changes that Thieu wanted, and as shown in the quote from Nixon above, the US accepted that they would not agree to them, and negotiated accordingly. Guy |
#57
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Guy Alcala wrote:
There is absolutely no support in the historical record, none, for Ed's belief that LB II somehow 'won' the war or even that it brought about significantly better terms, or that Nixon and Kissinger were even trying to accomplish that. Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the fact that LB II won the VN war: it - and it alone - convinced the N. Vietnamese that the gloves were coming off, for the very first time. They had a choice: return to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace, or return completely to the stone age at home. For the very first time, the N. Vietnamese approached the talks with something other than deceit and delay in mind: their continued survival. Academics can revise history as much as they want, as can bureaucrats and politicians write books glorifying their own involvement and marginalizing the contributions of others (best recent example: Richard Clarke's shameless book-marketing 09/11 committee) - but they cannot change the actual events that occurred. Far too many direct participants (and individuals extremely interested in then-current events) survive to permit them to push their "inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public. In fact, I was so impressed with the change in direction at that time, I returned to active duty back then... and became a "lifer". |
#58
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Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
fact that LB II won the VN war That same "historical record" says the 8th Air Force bombing missions into Germany destroyed the Germans war making capability. That "fact" has been disproven countless times. They had a choice: return to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace, or return completely to the stone age at home. You sound like LeMay. You do realize they already were in the stone age right? Tell me, what critical infastructure did we destroy during LB II that wasn't already operating at less than 25%? For the very first time, the N. Vietnamese approached the talks with something other than deceit and delay in mind: their continued survival. Wrong. They had already agreed to the same document in October '72 that they did in January '73. Linebacker I and the Freedom Porch missions proved to the NVN that ARVN ground forces and U.S. Air power could, quite effectively, prevent their conquest of SVN. The solution; sign a Peace Accord removing the U.S. from the picture, which they agreed to in October '72 and had it not been for SVN President Nguyen Van Thieu's refusal to publicly "ok" the deal (I don't believe he had to sign anything as SVN was not a participant in Paris), LB II would never have been required. NVN was not fighting for their survival *ever* during that conflict. Their industrial base was barely existant in 1964, they counted on imports from China and the Soviet Union for everything except rice and since we never took real measures to cut off their imports (mining of Haiphong harbor in 1972 was like closing the barn door after the horses got out), their existance was never threatened...even during LB II. Academics can revise history as much as they want There's no doubt that this does occur, but not in this case. You could prove your point simply by providing some sort of proof that the bombing during LB II was causing such damage that the NVN government feared they would be defeated if it did not stop. Far too many direct participants (and individuals extremely interested in then-current events) survive to permit them to push their "inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public. While I was only 4 at the time, you can consider me one of your; "individuals extremely interested in then-current events". In fact, nearly every one in the USAF should be interested in getting the real scoop on LB II, because learning the wrong lesson is often worse then not learning a lesson at all.... BUFDRVR "Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips everyone on Bear Creek" |
#59
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#60
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