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#61
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"Hilton" wrote in message news:Li_ee.8399
Tom Fleischman wrote: 3 - There was nothing wrong with the major aircraft systems that could be evaluated on the preliminary report suggesting that a mechanical problem was not a likely cause. Exactly - nothing on the *preliminary* report - that's why they don't stop there. This does not suggest that "mechanical problem was not likely the cause". All it says is that the preliminary report showed nothing wrong with the major aircraft systems. Do you know that his static port wasn't blocked, that his altimeter was set correctly and reading correctly, that he didn't suffer a heart attack, that the student didn't committed suicide, ... He had an opportunity (and responsibility) to verify his altimeter reading when crossing the FAF. And when he acknowledged the low-altitude alert, the altitude he reported was consistent with ATC's radar. And regardless of his altimeter reading, he would've been well below the glideslope. He was already inexplicably low; he acknowledged a low-altitude alert while continuing to descend, taking the time to report his altimeter setting and his indicated altitude, but without mentioning any mechanical or medical problems; and then he had a heart attack, or his student carried out a murder-suicide? I think Tom is justified to conclude that such a sequence is unlikely. --Gary |
#62
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"Judah" wrote in message
. .. If you go back to about 15:10 and set the window to 20 miles you can pick him up as low as 1600' just south of Yorktown Heights over 134, which I believe is inside the FARAN intersection, but clearly outside the Outer Marker - ie: Minimum Safe Altitude is 2000', and he is 400' low... Just a point of terminology--2000' is the minimum altitude there, but it's not the MSA. The MSA there is 2900', and wouldn't be relevant. (As is often the case, the FAA has violated a cardinal rule of clear naming: when two names are similar, the difference between them should reflect the difference in their meanings. The MSA differs from the minimum altitude not with regard to being safe, but with regard to applying when off-course.) It's tough to say how accurate and to-scale the Passur site is, but if you set the scale to 5 miles and watch as he enters the area, it would imply that he passed the Outer Marker at around 1200'... Maybe he was tracking a harmonic? Is it possible to pick up a false GS a few hundred feet *below* the proper altitude? --Gary |
#63
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"Gary Drescher" wrote in
: "Judah" wrote in message . .. snip Just a point of terminology--2000' is the minimum altitude there, but it's not the MSA. The MSA there is 2900', and wouldn't be relevant. (As is often the case, the FAA has violated a cardinal rule of clear naming: when two names are similar, the difference between them should reflect the difference in their meanings. The MSA differs from the minimum altitude not with regard to being safe, but with regard to applying when off-course.) A valid point. The MSA for the northeastern region within 25 NM is 2900', though the published minimum allowable (and presumably safe) altitude while flying the ILS inside Faran is 2000'. Is there a name for that published altitude? snip Maybe he was tracking a harmonic? Is it possible to pick up a false GS a few hundred feet *below* the proper altitude? According to the document published at http://afsafety.af.mil/magazine/htdo...8/dontneed.htm if a heavy was holding inside the ILS Hold Short Line it could generate interference that could cause the glideslope to fail high or low... Not really a harmonic, I guess, but apparently a possibility. |
#64
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"Hilton" wrote in
ink.net: snip 3 - There was nothing wrong with the major aircraft systems that could be evaluated on the preliminary report suggesting that a mechanical problem was not a likely cause. Exactly - nothing on the *preliminary* report - that's why they don't stop there. This does not suggest that "mechanical problem was not likely the cause". All it says is that the preliminary report showed nothing wrong with the major aircraft systems. Do you know that his static port wasn't blocked, that his altimeter was set correctly and reading correctly, that he didn't suffer a heart attack, that the student didn't committed suicide, ... snip The whole situation is unfortunate, and it is impossible for anyone to accurately state what happened. However, on an ILS approach, I don't believe a failed PitotStatic System would prevent the glideslope from reading fully deflected at 1 mile and 300' low. If I'm not mistaken, at 5 miles, the reading is about 50' per dot, and at 1 mile the reading is about 8' per dot. Furthermore, the fact that he is reported to have read back his altitude in response to the warning and it was within 100' of what they told him during a descent strongly implies that he did not have a blocked static port... Additionally, the fact that he was as much as 400' low outside the FAF implies that he was not properly managing the airplane for a significant amount of time. While it is not clear what exactly went wrong, there seems to be evidence that the instructor may not have been very conservative or attentive. Whether or not that was the cause of the accident or even contributed to it is impossible to say. |
#65
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Gary Drescher wrote:
Hilton wrote: Tom Fleischman wrote: 3 - There was nothing wrong with the major aircraft systems that could be evaluated on the preliminary report suggesting that a mechanical problem was not a likely cause. Exactly - nothing on the *preliminary* report - that's why they don't stop there. This does not suggest that "mechanical problem was not likely the cause". All it says is that the preliminary report showed nothing wrong with the major aircraft systems. Do you know that his static port wasn't blocked, that his altimeter was set correctly and reading correctly, that he didn't suffer a heart attack, that the student didn't committed suicide, ... He had an opportunity (and responsibility) to verify his altimeter reading when crossing the FAF. And when he acknowledged the low-altitude alert, the altitude he reported was consistent with ATC's radar. And regardless of his altimeter reading, he would've been well below the glideslope. He was already inexplicably low; he acknowledged a low-altitude alert while continuing to descend, taking the time to report his altimeter setting and his indicated altitude, but without mentioning any mechanical or medical problems; and then he had a heart attack, or his student carried out a murder-suicide? I think Tom is justified to conclude that such a sequence is unlikely. I absolutely agree that it *appears* that the CFI messed up. Most accident sequences are pretty 'obvious', this one included. But just when you think the cause is obvious, it turns out to be something else. I've just seen too many accident reports like this to state absolutely what happened only a few days after the accident with minimal investigation. Perhaps some guy taxied into the ILS critical area by mistake? Heck, I don't know. While the 'obvious' conclusion is that the CFI screwed up, let's not trash the guy's name too early in the investigation. Hilton |
#66
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"Judah" wrote in message
. .. "Gary Drescher" wrote in : Just a point of terminology--2000' is the minimum altitude there, but it's not the MSA. The MSA there is 2900', and wouldn't be relevant. (As is often the case, the FAA has violated a cardinal rule of clear naming: when two names are similar, the difference between them should reflect the difference in their meanings. The MSA differs from the minimum altitude not with regard to being safe, but with regard to applying when off-course.) A valid point. The MSA for the northeastern region within 25 NM is 2900', though the published minimum allowable (and presumably safe) altitude while flying the ILS inside Faran is 2000'. Is there a name for that published altitude? The NACO approach-plates legend just calls it the "minimum altitude". --Gary |
#67
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"Hilton" wrote in message
news I absolutely agree that it *appears* that the CFI messed up. Most accident sequences are pretty 'obvious', this one included. But just when you think the cause is obvious, it turns out to be something else. I've just seen too many accident reports like this to state absolutely what happened only a few days after the accident with minimal investigation. Agreed. But Tom merely stated conservatively that mechanical failure was not a "likely cause", based on the available evidence. If anything, I think that's an understatement. Perhaps some guy taxied into the ILS critical area by mistake? Heck, I don't know. Even if that happened, and went unnoticed at the time, and remains unknown to the NTSB so far, the CFI should have gone missed upon reaching the DA (according to topographic maps, the terrain at the crash site was at most a few feet higher than the TDZE). And even if his altimeter or static system *also* failed--which it didn't, given the agreement of ATC's radar with the altitude the CFI reported moments before crashing--he should have gone missed when he received the low-altitude alert. Even with latitude to speculate freely, no one here has proposed a plausible scenario consistent with the available facts that doesn't include a major blunder by the CFI during the approach. While the 'obvious' conclusion is that the CFI screwed up, let's not trash the guy's name too early in the investigation. As opposed to suggesting that his student committed a murder-suicide? In any case, to propose that the CFI made a critical mistake while flying is not to accuse him of negligence or other moral culpability; I don't think it "trashes" him. Aside from the apparent in-flight mistake, Tom also impugns the CFI's judgment in undertaking the flight at all, given the reported and forecast weather conditions. I disagree with Tom's assessment there, but that's a different question--the actual cause of the crash, whatever it turns out to be, isn't relevant to whether the decision to fly was warranted by the information available to the CFI at that time; there's no need to await a final report before debating *that* question. --Gary |
#68
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wrote in message ... On Fri, 6 May 2005 17:03:31 -0600, "Michael 182" Well, different strokes for different folks, but there is no way I am doing an IPC in IMC with someone I've never flown with in an aircraft I've never been in. Really, why not? I can see saying you want to check out the plane (which is maintained by the same FBO the CFI works from - he can simply talk to the head mechanic) and see my log book. The plane has dual controls. Unless I'm suicidal what is the concern? Michael |
#69
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I guess you might call it "instructional personal minimums".
I won't launch into IMC in an aircraft I've never been in in any event, even to do an x/c. I fly in lots of different aircraft, and every one needs familiarization to some extent, since no two panels are alike, and they all have their own idiosyncracies, which I don't like discovering for the first time while IMC. Yesterday I flew in one that wouldn't register below 13" MP once power went below that number. I just don't like discovering that sort of thing the first time I try to set power for an ILS descent in actual conditions and discover it from curious and unusual aircraft performance. As a practical matter, one needs to do partial panel approaches and partial panel unusual attitudes during an IPC. I'm not about to discover that the guy is not real good in recovering from steep spirals or imminent stalls while IMC with instruments covered. It's also sometimes difficult getting a block of atltitude from ATC to do them in, even if I wanted to. One other matter is the question of being PIC. I once asked an examiner if he would be willing to conduct a practical test in IMC. "Not on my ticket", he told me. Mine either. On Sat, 7 May 2005 21:44:06 -0600, "Michael 182" wrote: wrote in message .. . On Fri, 6 May 2005 17:03:31 -0600, "Michael 182" Well, different strokes for different folks, but there is no way I am doing an IPC in IMC with someone I've never flown with in an aircraft I've never been in. Really, why not? I can see saying you want to check out the plane (which is maintained by the same FBO the CFI works from - he can simply talk to the head mechanic) and see my log book. The plane has dual controls. Unless I'm suicidal what is the concern? Michael |
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