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#61
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"Andrew C. Toppan" wrote in message ... On Thu, 26 Feb 2004 03:07:03 GMT, R. David Steele wrote: Now does the AF use the nomenclature of MH-60 as well? As far as I know, they always have used either HH-60 or MH-60. As does the Army use the MH-60K, for its special operations versions assigned to 160th SOAR. The failure to follow a unified nomenclature across the four services is a bit troubling. The USMC is going to field the MV-22 for general lift requirements...while the USAF fields the CV-22 for special operations use (even though their current special operations troop carriers all carry "M" prefixes). Hopefully we'll confuse the opposition more than we do ourselves... Brooks -- Andrew Toppan --- --- "I speak only for myself" "Haze Gray & Underway" - Naval History, DANFS, World Navies Today, Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more - http://www.hazegray.org/ |
#62
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John Hairell wrote:
On Wed, 25 Feb 2004 04:46:01 GMT, "Thomas Schoene" wrote: CH-46 is not a heavy-lift helo and is only slightly related to the -47. (they came from the same company, and are both twin rotor designs. That's about it.) I'd argue with that - the CH-47A was originally the YCH-1B, which was a derivative of the YCH-1A, which was the Vertol 107 (militarized into the CH-46). I'd say there's more similarities than there are differences. You can see at a glance that the designs are related, and they both relate to their predecessor, the CH-21. I'll grant there is a family resemblance (as one woudl expect from the same company at about the same time), but they are *very* different in size and lift capacity. -- Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail "If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed) |
#63
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"Paul F Austin" wrote in message . .. "Chad Irby" wrote "Keith Willshaw" wrote: "Rune Børsjø" wrote How the hell is gonna tell friendly from enemy? Civilian from combatant? The only thing it'll be good for is knocking out armor. Attack helos still present a flexibility and presence that you can't get out of a glorified model airplane kit. You havent heard of IFF I take it You mean like the IFF that fails from time to time, or that can be spoofed and jammed quite easily? You have some of the following problems: IFF jammed, UCAV won't shoot. IFF jammed, UCAV shoots down anything in front of it. IFF spoofed, UCAV hunts down friendly targets. IFF is easy enough, but "robust" IFF is a real pain. BFT (Blue-force tracking) is going to revolutionize IFF. Because it depends on geo-location knowledge, that's tough to spoof or jam. Spoofing requires breaking encryption in real-time and jamming has to be done continuously into multiple aperatures. Gee, how many times did we hear that, "Product X is going to revolutionize the way you do process Y!", only to spend the next ten years doing process Y the same way we always did because Product X never quite lived up to its promises, or ran way over budget and got the axe, etc.? The Navy's A-12 Avenger, the Air Force's AMST, the Army's DIVADS, Grizzly, Wolverine, M180, various digital command and control packages, the laughable attempt to field those original big honking green monster boxes (TACS computers)... A good, reliable, and discrete IFF for ground units will be wonderful, but I am not holding my breath while waiting for it to be fielded. Till then I'll take the manned shooters in the close fight. Brooks |
#64
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Guy Alcala wrote:
The article noted a total requirement of some 300 airframes to replace the older Kiowas and the remaining Hueys in the ARNG, and I would not rule the 412 out as a competitor. From my reading of the transcript, it seems pretty clear that they're getting rid of the Hueys entirely (did you see the slides?), replacing them with UH-60s, and putting a new OH out for bid. I read the transcript and slides pretty much the same way Kevin does: 1) 368 armed reconaissance helos (apparently manned). 2) 303 light utility helicopters to replace the Huey and OH-58 in the Guard (apparently this is a Guard-only aircraft) 3) 80 more Blackhawks (on top of the 100 in the current POM), some for the Guard, some to replace AC losses. -- Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail "If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed) |
#65
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In article , Henry J Cobb
wrote: R. David Steele wrote: The Navy is looking to end the CH-46 while the Army is still funding the CH-47. We will need to have a replacement for the 46/47 as we really do not have a heavy helo without them. If the Army went for the V-22 would the AF object that it's "fixed wing"? Why ever would they care? It's not a jet. |
#66
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#67
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Kevin Brooks wrote:
"Guy Alcala" wrote in message . .. Kevin Brooks wrote: snip From my reading of the transcript, it seems pretty clear that they're getting rid of the Hueys entirely (did you see the slides?), replacing them with UH-60s, and putting a new OH out for bid. I did not come away with the same interpretation, and neither did the following media source: "Among the new buys will be 368 new reconnaissance helicopters to replace the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior, 303 new light utility helicopters to replace aging Hueys, and roughly 25 new fixed-wing cargo aircraft that would replace the C-23 for intra-theater transport. The cancellation of Comanche **also** [emphasis added] will allow for the purchase of an additional 80 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters and another 50 CH-47 Chinooks, according to Cody." http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/new...s/inc02254.xml The plan appears to be to purchase new aircraft to replace both the OH's *and* the Hueys (may not be the same aircraft, obviously), and the additional Blackhawk order is not going to impinge upon those plans (note the use of "also", as in "in addition to"). The tranxript and slides appear to be somewhat contradictory. One of the slides shows the proposed TO&E for AC/RC Multi-function Aviation Brigades, NG Brigades, and brigades for the Light divisions. The NG brigade lists the scout battalion as follows: 3 x 8 OH (LUH), which to me implies that they're the same a/c. This is the a/c for which the 303 applies. At the same time it lists 3 x 10 UH companies for the assault battalion, and the UH definitely seems to be the UH-60, as it is in the AC/Reserve components, while the OH for the attack battalions in the Light Divisions (the 368) appears to be the same a/c as that for the NG (but armed). OTOH, it may not be. The AC/RC brigades don't show a scout battalion at all, the Block III AH-64s apparently taking on this role. Maybe the slide is incorrect to make this distinction, but then there's the following exchange in the transcript: ----------------------------------------------------------------- Cody: Okay. We have spent about $6.9 billion on Comanche, most of that in our RDT&E account. We've had nine confirmed helicopters shot down with the loss of 32 lives. And I'll refer to Steve Blum or Ron Helmly on the Guard and Reserve questions. Steve? Q: How many are short? Blum: Well, it really depends. If we're going to look exactly like the Army, and we move to modularity, so that we have the exact same capability on the battlefield, whether we're an Army National Guard unit or an Army Reserve unit or an active Army unit -- Q: Could you move to the lectern? Blum: Sure. As we move to modularity, which is exactly where we should go, so that all components of your United States Army have the exact same capabilities on the battlefield, so that they're interchangeable, plug-and-play parts, as we're using the Reserve component as an operational Reserve today and in the foreseeable future, this is an essential move for us. So you can see that the organizations now, while they today don't match, they're not plug-and-play, they're not interoperable, and they're certainly not interchangeable, we insisted -- and the Army has come up with an organization that makes us look exactly alike, we'll be equipped exactly alike, and we'll be -- we will fight exactly like our active-duty counterparts, as soon as the same modules that you see here are resident in the Reserve component as they are in the active duty, and the same numbers apply. So we will take the current fleet that we have, reapportion it against the new modularity model, and then this new initiative with Comanche will enable us to have modernized aircraft, new aircraft, relevant and ready aircraft for homeland defense and overseas. Q: How much of an increase in aircraft numbers is that? How many more aircraft -- Blum: Well, we don't know until we apply what we have currently against this modularity force and then buy what we need and recapitalize what we have to -- Cody: It will not be a one-for-one of the 880 we're cascading out, because, as you know, a Black Hawk is much more capable than a UH-1. Q: Right. Cody: So if you're looking for a one-to-one, it won't be that way. I don't have the absolute numbers. I used to have them. We'll get that to you. But there is a sizable amount of new acquisitions going to the National Guard. -------------------------------------------------------------- The Guard Hueys are going away, no question, to be replaced by the new LUH, but per the slide that will serve as the Guard's OH. But the 6 Guard brigades are getting at least 30 and maybe 38 Blackhawks each as well as the 24 OH (LUH). The new recon helos for the LDs are apparently going to be a new design entirely. A 412 seems much too big, noisy and lacking in maneuverability to make a good OH, and too close to the UH-60 in capability to be worth buying as a utility helo, so what would be its job? As you note, they are indeed buying more Blackhawks. But Blackhawks are pretty pricey compared to the 412. With the increased emphasis on homeland defense and the Guard's role in that respect, taking X amount of money and buying more 412's than you could buy UH-60's with the same money would appear to be a doable solution to me. I doubt the Army wants to blow any more money than it has to on aircraft that it can't, or would prefer not to, integrate into its warfighting plans across the board; if you bought only UH-60's, then the tendancy would be to identify them with contingency plan force development requirements. They'd be a bit less likely to want to integrate a low density platform like the 412 would be. But hey, its early--who knows? At least how I understand it, they're not willing to do that, That is not what AvLeak is saying. I know, but that assumes they understand the briefing and slides any better than I do;-) and want the Guard to be seamlessly able to integrate with the active component, which means they've pretty much got to have the same equipment. Not necessarily. That has BEEN the way they have thought for decades, but 9-11, and the resultant load upon the Guard in terms of mobilizations for overseas deployment, coupled with the less-than-timely drawdown on the Huey and Cobra fleets, got some folks (including Governors and likely now the DHS) to talking about the desirability of having some aircraft primarily oriented towards the domestic requirement. See Blum's comments above. NGB has even begun talking about the MV-22 as being a good match for some domestic requirements, especially for such roles as transporting the NG's NBC response teams. The desire to get an off-the-shelf utility bird specifically for the ARNG has also been discussed previously, which is why the plan to actually do that is not that surprising to me. And as the interest is towards a dedicated (or close to that term) domestic support aircraft, the need for interoperability with active component systems is not as important. If such interoperability was such a key concern, why does the ARNG often find itself operating equipment (from trucks to helicopters) that the active component no longer operates, and sometimes won't even support? Again, see Blum's comments. BTW, I'm having some problems with the numbers. They say they want 303 LUHs for the Guard. The 6 Guard MF AV BDEs each show 24 OH (LUH), or 144 a/c. That's 159 a/c for training, pipeline, and attrition. For the sake of argument, let's assume that the 8 C2 a/c per BDE are also LUHs, i.e. 48 more for a total of 192. That's still 111 a/c for T/P/A. Seems excessive given the loss rates nowadays. 1960s, sure. While a 412 probably costs less per hour to operate than a -60, when you add in the costs of the separate training, maintenance and spares support I suspect it just doesn't make sense economically. Otherwise the USMC could have just bought UH-60s and modified AH-64s instead of staying all common with the UH-1Y/AH-1Z. Well Guy, in this case it appears the Army disagrees with you. Eighty UH-60's are a drop in the bucket compared to the needs in terms of replacing the UH-1's that have been lost, and I have to tell you that I think AvLeak is generally a rather reliable source, and they do indeed indicate that a *new* light utility airframe is in the works (and the UH-60 is a bit on the chunky side (both in terms of size and payload) to be called "light"). So's the Huey;-) I doubt the amount of training required to prepare those Huey wrench turners for a platform like the 412 is any different from what is required to prepare them for the UH-60, and unlike the AC side, those wrench turners often spend their entire career in the same unit, so turnover won't be as big an issue. Crew training is not likely to be a major issue, either--the ARNG already manages C-23 training, just as the ANG is heavily involved in pilot training for the F-16 and F-15. Doing an in-house qualification course at either or both the eastern or western ARNG aviation training sites (AZ and PA, IIRC) would be no biggie as they have run crew training programs for years now on Cobras, Chinooks, and even Blackhawks and Apaches. snip If the idea is to neck down the the minimum number of systems, why even put up with the hassle of the extra pipeline? Guy |
#68
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"Tank Fixer" wrote in message k.net... In article . net, on Thu, 26 Feb 2004 04:09:09 GMT, Thomas Schoene lid attempted to say ..... Guy Alcala wrote: The article noted a total requirement of some 300 airframes to replace the older Kiowas and the remaining Hueys in the ARNG, and I would not rule the 412 out as a competitor. From my reading of the transcript, it seems pretty clear that they're getting rid of the Hueys entirely (did you see the slides?), replacing them with UH-60s, and putting a new OH out for bid. I read the transcript and slides pretty much the same way Kevin does: 1) 368 armed reconaissance helos (apparently manned). 2) 303 light utility helicopters to replace the Huey and OH-58 in the Guard (apparently this is a Guard-only aircraft) A significant problem now is that the Guard is using equipment, both aircraft and radio's that are not standard with the active forces. So when the Guard unit deploys they can't operate as effeciently as they might. But as I understand it the real driver behind the LUH program is the domestic defense role, not deployed warfighting. Folks are starting to realize that the Guard still has that significant role to play in the homeland defense arena, and we can't strip it bare. My guess is that the LUH's will be the primary homeland defense contribution of the ARNG aviation fleet, while the Blackhawks, Chinooks, and Apaches, along with some of those new armed scouts, will be its deployable force. Our AA unit that deployed last year to Iraq and Afganistan had to un- install and ship out radios (-106 radios, IIRC) after returning to CONUS. Seems the radios are in short supply... From what I picked up in the transcripts, the savings from the Commanche program will also be used to get the existing fleet up to standards. Brooks snip |
#69
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Thomas Schoene wrote:
Guy Alcala wrote: Thomas Schoene wrote: The CH-46's replacement in the Navy is also clear: the MH-60S (formerly CH-60S). Nitpick. The Navy has the UH/HH-46, Tom. Sure, they're the same basic airframe. I shouldn't like to argue, but a lot of Navy webpages, including sites like HC-8 homepage, say the Navy flies CH-46Ds. http://www.navy.mil/homepages/hc8/ So they do. Comparatively few mention the UH-46 designation. OTOH, there are a lot of mentions these days that simply say H-46; I think they gave up trying to keep the different designations straight. You may be right;-) Guy |
#70
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"Guy Alcala" wrote in message . .. Kevin Brooks wrote: "Guy Alcala" wrote in message . .. Kevin Brooks wrote: snip From my reading of the transcript, it seems pretty clear that they're getting rid of the Hueys entirely (did you see the slides?), replacing them with UH-60s, and putting a new OH out for bid. I did not come away with the same interpretation, and neither did the following media source: "Among the new buys will be 368 new reconnaissance helicopters to replace the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior, 303 new light utility helicopters to replace aging Hueys, and roughly 25 new fixed-wing cargo aircraft that would replace the C-23 for intra-theater transport. The cancellation of Comanche **also** [emphasis added] will allow for the purchase of an additional 80 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters and another 50 CH-47 Chinooks, according to Cody." http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/new...s/inc02254.xml The plan appears to be to purchase new aircraft to replace both the OH's *and* the Hueys (may not be the same aircraft, obviously), and the additional Blackhawk order is not going to impinge upon those plans (note the use of "also", as in "in addition to"). The tranxript and slides appear to be somewhat contradictory. One of the slides shows the proposed TO&E for AC/RC Multi-function Aviation Brigades, NG Brigades, and brigades for the Light divisions. The NG brigade lists the scout battalion as follows: 3 x 8 OH (LUH), which to me implies that they're the same a/c. This is the a/c for which the 303 applies. At the same time it lists 3 x 10 UH companies for the assault battalion, and the UH definitely seems to be the UH-60, as it is in the AC/Reserve components, while the OH for the attack battalions in the Light Divisions (the 368) appears to be the same a/c as that for the NG (but armed). OTOH, it may not be. The AC/RC brigades don't show a scout battalion at all, the Block III AH-64s apparently taking on this role. Maybe the slide is incorrect to make this distinction, but then there's the following exchange in the transcript: Look at the timeline slide--it shows the LUH and OH programs as being separate and distinct. The slide you are referring to is confusing as all get out--what the hell is "AER"? And where are the non-divisional units? What about the DIV CAV SQDN; does it retain any helos? Whoever the guy was who prepared this set of briefing slides needs to be divested of his "PowerPoint Ranger" tab immediately! snip lots of gobbledygook from Blum, et al "Modularity model"??! I met Blum when he was a one-star--he walked into the work area outside our (my SGM's and my own) offices, picked up a tootsie pop off the table while we stood there, and walked back out--not a "May I" or a "thank you" muttered. If he is going to spout this kind of doublespeak claptrap, he needs to steal some more tootsie pops to keep his mouth otherwise engaged. The Guard Hueys are going away, no question, to be replaced by the new LUH, but per the slide that will serve as the Guard's OH. Well, not so sure about that. That slide, and the way it does not necessarily agree with the later slide, is kind of questionable in terms of its detail. Then again, they were prepared to allow the briefing of a bunch of media wonks, most of whom could not tell the difference between an AH-58D and AH-1 if they tried. But the 6 Guard brigades are getting at least 30 and maybe 38 Blackhawks each as well as the 24 OH (LUH). The new recon helos for the LDs are apparently going to be a new design entirely. That is not adding up either. I have not heard anything yet about drawing the Guard division strength down that far (they are only showing two heavy divs and (presumably) one light div in the ARNG). There are eight divisions in the ARNG right now, and the plan was to redesignate two of them as CS/CSS unit sources. That leaves six, of which one is a light division. See the disconnect on the slide? A 412 seems much too big, noisy and lacking in maneuverability to make a good OH, and too close to the UH-60 in capability to be worth buying as a utility helo, so what would be its job? Cheaper unit cost than the UH-60 plus cheaper operating cost, with a somewhat reduced payload and range. The ARNG needs LUH's for the homeland defense role, especially if/when their UH-60 elements are deployed elsewhere. Disaster response, MEDEVAC, terrorist incident response, to include mobility support for the NBC response teams springing up around the country, customs/law enforcement support, firefighting support with bambi buckets--a myriad of uses. Nothing says that the 412 can't serve the same role as the current OH-58's do in the drug interdiction recon role, though a ligheter and even less costly operating aircraft might be better in that role. And again, if you look at that later slide, the apparent requirement is for two different platforms--one LUH and one OH. I fully expect some of the "UH" units on the ARNG side to be equipped with "LUH". As you note, they are indeed buying more Blackhawks. But Blackhawks are pretty pricey compared to the 412. With the increased emphasis on homeland defense and the Guard's role in that respect, taking X amount of money and buying more 412's than you could buy UH-60's with the same money would appear to be a doable solution to me. I doubt the Army wants to blow any more money than it has to on aircraft that it can't, or would prefer not to, integrate into its warfighting plans across the board; if you bought only UH-60's, then the tendancy would be to identify them with contingency plan force development requirements. They'd be a bit less likely to want to integrate a low density platform like the 412 would be. But hey, its early--who knows? At least how I understand it, they're not willing to do that, That is not what AvLeak is saying. I know, but that assumes they understand the briefing and slides any better than I do;-) I don't know how much credibility we can put in these slides, or for that matter in some of the ridiculous verbage in the transcript--I can just see junior/midgrade staff weenies lstening to their bosses in those confusing exchanges cringing and saying to themselves, "No, you idiot! That is NOT what that means!" and want the Guard to be seamlessly able to integrate with the active component, which means they've pretty much got to have the same equipment. Not necessarily. That has BEEN the way they have thought for decades, but 9-11, and the resultant load upon the Guard in terms of mobilizations for overseas deployment, coupled with the less-than-timely drawdown on the Huey and Cobra fleets, got some folks (including Governors and likely now the DHS) to talking about the desirability of having some aircraft primarily oriented towards the domestic requirement. See Blum's comments above. See the bullet comment about improving the homeland defense capabilities, and see the recent comments from governors and congress critters concerned over the gap in capabilities left when all of the high priority Guard units are mobilized. See what the NGAUS has been harping about for a few years now. And then remember that this presentation apprantly did NOT address the entire Guard aviation force structure, for whatever reasons. NGB has even begun talking about the MV-22 as being a good match for some domestic requirements, especially for such roles as transporting the NG's NBC response teams. The desire to get an off-the-shelf utility bird specifically for the ARNG has also been discussed previously, which is why the plan to actually do that is not that surprising to me. And as the interest is towards a dedicated (or close to that term) domestic support aircraft, the need for interoperability with active component systems is not as important. If such interoperability was such a key concern, why does the ARNG often find itself operating equipment (from trucks to helicopters) that the active component no longer operates, and sometimes won't even support? Again, see Blum's comments. BTW, I'm having some problems with the numbers. They say they want 303 LUHs for the Guard. The 6 Guard MF AV BDEs each show 24 OH (LUH), or 144 a/c. That's 159 a/c for training, pipeline, and attrition. For the sake of argument, let's assume that the 8 C2 a/c per BDE are also LUHs, i.e. 48 more for a total of 192. That's still 111 a/c for T/P/A. Seems excessive given the loss rates nowadays. 1960s, sure. Like I said earlier, this slide show ain't complete. There is too big a hole in it in regards to the Guard aviation force structure. Where are the ARNG counter drug aviation assets that reside in each state? Where are the other divisional brigades? While a 412 probably costs less per hour to operate than a -60, when you add in the costs of the separate training, maintenance and spares support I suspect it just doesn't make sense economically. Otherwise the USMC could have just bought UH-60s and modified AH-64s instead of staying all common with the UH-1Y/AH-1Z. Well Guy, in this case it appears the Army disagrees with you. Eighty UH-60's are a drop in the bucket compared to the needs in terms of replacing the UH-1's that have been lost, and I have to tell you that I think AvLeak is generally a rather reliable source, and they do indeed indicate that a *new* light utility airframe is in the works (and the UH-60 is a bit on the chunky side (both in terms of size and payload) to be called "light"). So's the Huey;-) Watch it! Lightning has been known to strike those who speak ill of the old washing machine with rotor attached! It had to have Divine approval, 'cause it would never have flown without it. I doubt the amount of training required to prepare those Huey wrench turners for a platform like the 412 is any different from what is required to prepare them for the UH-60, and unlike the AC side, those wrench turners often spend their entire career in the same unit, so turnover won't be as big an issue. Crew training is not likely to be a major issue, either--the ARNG already manages C-23 training, just as the ANG is heavily involved in pilot training for the F-16 and F-15. Doing an in-house qualification course at either or both the eastern or western ARNG aviation training sites (AZ and PA, IIRC) would be no biggie as they have run crew training programs for years now on Cobras, Chinooks, and even Blackhawks and Apaches. snip If the idea is to neck down the the minimum number of systems, why even put up with the hassle of the extra pipeline? Guy, face it, even the slide show is kind of clear in that a new line of utility helos is coming. Brooks Guy |
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