Commanche alternatives?

"Andrew C. Toppan" wrote in message
...
On Thu, 26 Feb 2004 03:07:03 GMT, R. David Steele
wrote:

Now does the AF use the nomenclature of MH-60 as well?

As far as I know, they always have used either HH-60 or MH-60.

As does the Army use the MH-60K, for its special operations versions
assigned to 160th SOAR. The failure to follow a unified nomenclature across
the four services is a bit troubling. The USMC is going to field the MV-22
for general lift requirements...while the USAF fields the CV-22 for special
operations use (even though their current special operations troop carriers
all carry "M" prefixes). Hopefully we'll confuse the opposition more than we
do ourselves...

Brooks



--
Andrew Toppan --- --- "I speak only for myself"
"Haze Gray & Underway" - Naval History, DANFS, World Navies Today,
Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more - http://www.hazegray.org/

John Hairell wrote:
On Wed, 25 Feb 2004 04:46:01 GMT, "Thomas Schoene"
wrote:

CH-46 is not a heavy-lift helo and is only slightly related to the
-47. (they came from the same company, and are both twin rotor
designs. That's about it.)


I'd argue with that - the CH-47A was originally the YCH-1B, which was
a derivative of the YCH-1A, which was the Vertol 107 (militarized into
the CH-46). I'd say there's more similarities than there are
differences. You can see at a glance that the designs are related,
and they both relate to their predecessor, the CH-21.

I'll grant there is a family resemblance (as one woudl expect from the same
company at about the same time), but they are *very* different in size and
lift capacity.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
. ..

"Chad Irby" wrote
"Keith Willshaw" wrote:

"Rune Børsjø" wrote
How the hell is gonna tell friendly from enemy? Civilian from
combatant? The only thing it'll be good for is knocking out armor.
Attack helos still present a flexibility and presence that you can't
get out of a glorified model airplane kit.

You havent heard of IFF I take it

You mean like the IFF that fails from time to time, or that can be
spoofed and jammed quite easily?

You have some of the following problems:

IFF jammed, UCAV won't shoot.
IFF jammed, UCAV shoots down anything in front of it.
IFF spoofed, UCAV hunts down friendly targets.

IFF is easy enough, but "robust" IFF is a real pain.

BFT (Blue-force tracking) is going to revolutionize IFF. Because it
depends
on geo-location knowledge, that's tough to spoof or jam. Spoofing requires
breaking encryption in real-time and jamming has to be done continuously
into multiple aperatures.

Gee, how many times did we hear that, "Product X is going to revolutionize
the way you do process Y!", only to spend the next ten years doing process Y
the same way we always did because Product X never quite lived up to its
promises, or ran way over budget and got the axe, etc.? The Navy's A-12
Avenger, the Air Force's AMST, the Army's DIVADS, Grizzly, Wolverine, M180,
various digital command and control packages, the laughable attempt to field
those original big honking green monster boxes (TACS computers)... A good,
reliable, and discrete IFF for ground units will be wonderful, but I am not
holding my breath while waiting for it to be fielded. Till then I'll take
the manned shooters in the close fight.

Brooks

Guy Alcala wrote:
The article noted a total
requirement of some 300 airframes to replace the older Kiowas and
the remaining Hueys in the ARNG, and I would not rule the 412 out
as a competitor.

From my reading of the transcript, it seems pretty clear that they're
getting rid of the Hueys entirely (did you see the slides?),
replacing them with UH-60s, and putting a new OH out for bid.

I read the transcript and slides pretty much the same way Kevin does:

1) 368 armed reconaissance helos (apparently manned).

2) 303 light utility helicopters to replace the Huey and OH-58 in the Guard
(apparently this is a Guard-only aircraft)

3) 80 more Blackhawks (on top of the 100 in the current POM), some for the
Guard, some to replace AC losses.



--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

In article , Henry J Cobb
wrote:

R. David Steele wrote:
The Navy is looking to end the CH-46 while the Army is still
funding the CH-47. We will need to have a replacement for the
46/47 as we really do not have a heavy helo without them.

If the Army went for the V-22 would the AF object that it's "fixed wing"?

Why ever would they care? It's not a jet.

In article . net,
on Thu, 26 Feb 2004 04:09:09 GMT,
Thomas Schoene lid attempted to say .....

Guy Alcala wrote:
The article noted a total
requirement of some 300 airframes to replace the older Kiowas and
the remaining Hueys in the ARNG, and I would not rule the 412 out
as a competitor.

From my reading of the transcript, it seems pretty clear that they're
getting rid of the Hueys entirely (did you see the slides?),
replacing them with UH-60s, and putting a new OH out for bid.

I read the transcript and slides pretty much the same way Kevin does:

1) 368 armed reconaissance helos (apparently manned).

2) 303 light utility helicopters to replace the Huey and OH-58 in the Guard
(apparently this is a Guard-only aircraft)

A significant problem now is that the Guard is using equipment, both
aircraft and radio's that are not standard with the active forces. So when
the Guard unit deploys they can't operate as effeciently as they might.

Our AA unit that deployed last year to Iraq and Afganistan had to un-
install and ship out radios (-106 radios, IIRC) after returning to CONUS.
Seems the radios are in short supply...



3) 80 more Blackhawks (on top of the 100 in the current POM), some for the
Guard, some to replace AC losses.







--
When dealing with propaganda terminology one sometimes always speaks in
variable absolutes. This is not to be mistaken for an unbiased slant.

Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

snip

From my reading of the transcript, it seems pretty clear that they're
getting
rid of the Hueys entirely (did you see the slides?), replacing them with
UH-60s,
and putting a new OH out for bid.

I did not come away with the same interpretation, and neither did the
following media source:

"Among the new buys will be 368 new reconnaissance helicopters to replace
the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior, 303 new light utility helicopters to replace aging
Hueys, and roughly 25 new fixed-wing cargo aircraft that would replace the
C-23 for intra-theater transport. The cancellation of Comanche **also**
[emphasis added] will allow for the purchase of an additional 80 UH-60 Black
Hawk helicopters and another 50 CH-47 Chinooks, according to Cody."
http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/new...s/inc02254.xml

The plan appears to be to purchase new aircraft to replace both the OH's
*and* the Hueys (may not be the same aircraft, obviously), and the
additional Blackhawk order is not going to impinge upon those plans (note
the use of "also", as in "in addition to").

The tranxript and slides appear to be somewhat contradictory. One of the slides shows the
proposed TO&E for AC/RC Multi-function Aviation Brigades, NG Brigades, and brigades for the
Light divisions. The NG brigade lists the scout battalion as follows: 3 x 8 OH (LUH), which
to me implies that they're the same a/c. This is the a/c for which the 303 applies. At the
same time it lists 3 x 10 UH companies for the assault battalion, and the UH definitely seems
to be the UH-60, as it is in the AC/Reserve components, while the OH for the attack battalions
in the Light Divisions (the 368) appears to be the same a/c as that for the NG (but armed).
OTOH, it may not be. The AC/RC brigades don't show a scout battalion at all, the Block III
AH-64s apparently taking on this role. Maybe the slide is incorrect to make this distinction,
but then there's the following exchange in the transcript:
-----------------------------------------------------------------

Cody: Okay. We have spent about $6.9 billion on Comanche, most of that in our RDT&E
account. We've had nine confirmed helicopters shot down with the loss of 32 lives. And
I'll refer
to Steve Blum or Ron Helmly on the Guard and Reserve questions. Steve?

Q: How many are short?

Blum: Well, it really depends. If we're going to look exactly like the Army, and we
move to
modularity, so that we have the exact same capability on the battlefield, whether we're an
Army
National Guard unit or an Army Reserve unit or an active Army unit --

Q: Could you move to the lectern?

Blum: Sure. As we move to modularity, which is exactly where we should go, so that
all
components of your United States Army have the exact same capabilities on the battlefield,
so that
they're interchangeable, plug-and-play parts, as we're using the Reserve component as an
operational Reserve today and in the foreseeable future, this is an essential move for us.

So you can see that the organizations now, while they today don't match, they're not
plug-and-play, they're not interoperable, and they're certainly not interchangeable, we
insisted --
and the Army has come up with an organization that makes us look exactly alike, we'll be
equipped exactly alike, and we'll be -- we will fight exactly like our active-duty
counterparts, as
soon as the same modules that you see here are resident in the Reserve component as they are
in
the active duty, and the same numbers apply.


So we will take the current fleet that we have, reapportion it against the new
modularity model,
and then this new initiative with Comanche will enable us to have modernized aircraft, new
aircraft,
relevant and ready aircraft for homeland defense and overseas.

Q: How much of an increase in aircraft numbers is that? How many more aircraft --

Blum: Well, we don't know until we apply what we have currently against this
modularity force
and then buy what we need and recapitalize what we have to --


Cody: It will not be a one-for-one of the 880 we're cascading out, because, as you
know, a
Black Hawk is much more capable than a UH-1.

Q: Right.


Cody: So if you're looking for a one-to-one, it won't be that way. I don't have the
absolute
numbers. I used to have them. We'll get that to you. But there is a sizable amount of new
acquisitions going to the National Guard.
--------------------------------------------------------------

The Guard Hueys are going away, no question, to be replaced by the new LUH, but per the slide
that will serve as the Guard's OH. But the 6 Guard brigades are getting at least 30 and maybe
38 Blackhawks each as well as the 24 OH (LUH). The new recon helos for the LDs are apparently
going to be a new design entirely.

A 412 seems much too big, noisy and lacking in maneuverability to make a good OH, and too close
to the UH-60 in capability to be worth buying as a utility helo, so what would be its job?


As you note, they are indeed buying more Blackhawks. But Blackhawks are
pretty pricey compared to the 412. With the increased emphasis on
homeland
defense and the Guard's role in that respect, taking X amount of money
and
buying more 412's than you could buy UH-60's with the same money would
appear to be a doable solution to me. I doubt the Army wants to blow any
more money than it has to on aircraft that it can't, or would prefer not
to,
integrate into its warfighting plans across the board; if you bought
only
UH-60's, then the tendancy would be to identify them with contingency
plan
force development requirements. They'd be a bit less likely to want to
integrate a low density platform like the 412 would be. But hey, its
early--who knows?

At least how I understand it, they're not willing to do that,

That is not what AvLeak is saying.

I know, but that assumes they understand the briefing and slides any better than I do;-)

and want the Guard
to be seamlessly able to integrate with the active component, which means
they've pretty much got to have the same equipment.

Not necessarily. That has BEEN the way they have thought for decades, but
9-11, and the resultant load upon the Guard in terms of mobilizations for
overseas deployment, coupled with the less-than-timely drawdown on the Huey
and Cobra fleets, got some folks (including Governors and likely now the
DHS) to talking about the desirability of having some aircraft primarily
oriented towards the domestic requirement.

See Blum's comments above.

NGB has even begun talking about
the MV-22 as being a good match for some domestic requirements, especially
for such roles as transporting the NG's NBC response teams. The desire to
get an off-the-shelf utility bird specifically for the ARNG has also been
discussed previously, which is why the plan to actually do that is not that
surprising to me. And as the interest is towards a dedicated (or close to
that term) domestic support aircraft, the need for interoperability with
active component systems is not as important. If such interoperability was
such a key concern, why does the ARNG often find itself operating equipment
(from trucks to helicopters) that the active component no longer operates,
and sometimes won't even support?

Again, see Blum's comments. BTW, I'm having some problems with the numbers. They say they
want 303 LUHs for the Guard. The 6 Guard MF AV BDEs each show 24 OH (LUH), or 144 a/c.
That's 159 a/c for training, pipeline, and attrition. For the sake of argument, let's assume
that the 8 C2 a/c per BDE are also LUHs, i.e. 48 more for a total of 192. That's still 111 a/c
for T/P/A. Seems excessive given the loss rates nowadays. 1960s, sure.

While a 412 probably costs
less per hour to operate than a -60, when you add in the costs of the
separate
training, maintenance and spares support I suspect it just doesn't make
sense
economically. Otherwise the USMC could have just bought UH-60s and
modified
AH-64s instead of staying all common with the UH-1Y/AH-1Z.

Well Guy, in this case it appears the Army disagrees with you. Eighty
UH-60's are a drop in the bucket compared to the needs in terms of replacing
the UH-1's that have been lost, and I have to tell you that I think AvLeak
is generally a rather reliable source, and they do indeed indicate that a
*new* light utility airframe is in the works (and the UH-60 is a bit on the
chunky side (both in terms of size and payload) to be called "light").

So's the Huey;-)

I
doubt the amount of training required to prepare those Huey wrench turners
for a platform like the 412 is any different from what is required to
prepare them for the UH-60, and unlike the AC side, those wrench turners
often spend their entire career in the same unit, so turnover won't be as
big an issue. Crew training is not likely to be a major issue, either--the
ARNG already manages C-23 training, just as the ANG is heavily involved in
pilot training for the F-16 and F-15. Doing an in-house qualification course
at either or both the eastern or western ARNG aviation training sites (AZ
and PA, IIRC) would be no biggie as they have run crew training programs for
years now on Cobras, Chinooks, and even Blackhawks and Apaches.

snip

If the idea is to neck down the the minimum number of systems, why even put up with the hassle
of the extra pipeline?

Guy

"Tank Fixer" wrote in message
k.net...
In article . net,
on Thu, 26 Feb 2004 04:09:09 GMT,
Thomas Schoene lid attempted to say .....

Guy Alcala wrote:
The article noted a total
requirement of some 300 airframes to replace the older Kiowas and
the remaining Hueys in the ARNG, and I would not rule the 412 out
as a competitor.

From my reading of the transcript, it seems pretty clear that they're
getting rid of the Hueys entirely (did you see the slides?),
replacing them with UH-60s, and putting a new OH out for bid.

I read the transcript and slides pretty much the same way Kevin does:

1) 368 armed reconaissance helos (apparently manned).

2) 303 light utility helicopters to replace the Huey and OH-58 in the
Guard
(apparently this is a Guard-only aircraft)

A significant problem now is that the Guard is using equipment, both
aircraft and radio's that are not standard with the active forces. So when
the Guard unit deploys they can't operate as effeciently as they might.

But as I understand it the real driver behind the LUH program is the
domestic defense role, not deployed warfighting. Folks are starting to
realize that the Guard still has that significant role to play in the
homeland defense arena, and we can't strip it bare. My guess is that the
LUH's will be the primary homeland defense contribution of the ARNG aviation
fleet, while the Blackhawks, Chinooks, and Apaches, along with some of those
new armed scouts, will be its deployable force.


Our AA unit that deployed last year to Iraq and Afganistan had to un-
install and ship out radios (-106 radios, IIRC) after returning to CONUS.
Seems the radios are in short supply...

From what I picked up in the transcripts, the savings from the Commanche
program will also be used to get the existing fleet up to standards.

Brooks

snip

Thomas Schoene wrote:

Guy Alcala wrote:
Thomas Schoene wrote:
The CH-46's replacement in the Navy
is also clear: the MH-60S (formerly CH-60S).

Nitpick. The Navy has the UH/HH-46, Tom. Sure, they're the same
basic airframe.

I shouldn't like to argue, but a lot of Navy webpages, including sites like
HC-8 homepage, say the Navy flies CH-46Ds.

http://www.navy.mil/homepages/hc8/

So they do.

Comparatively few mention the UH-46 designation. OTOH, there are a lot of
mentions these days that simply say H-46; I think they gave up trying to
keep the different designations straight.

You may be right;-)

Guy

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

snip

From my reading of the transcript, it seems pretty clear that they're
getting
rid of the Hueys entirely (did you see the slides?), replacing them
with
UH-60s,
and putting a new OH out for bid.

I did not come away with the same interpretation, and neither did the
following media source:

"Among the new buys will be 368 new reconnaissance helicopters to
replace
the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior, 303 new light utility helicopters to replace
aging
Hueys, and roughly 25 new fixed-wing cargo aircraft that would replace
the
C-23 for intra-theater transport. The cancellation of Comanche **also**
[emphasis added] will allow for the purchase of an additional 80 UH-60
Black
Hawk helicopters and another 50 CH-47 Chinooks, according to Cody."

http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/new...s/inc02254.xml

The plan appears to be to purchase new aircraft to replace both the OH's
*and* the Hueys (may not be the same aircraft, obviously), and the
additional Blackhawk order is not going to impinge upon those plans
(note
the use of "also", as in "in addition to").

The tranxript and slides appear to be somewhat contradictory. One of the
slides shows the
proposed TO&E for AC/RC Multi-function Aviation Brigades, NG Brigades, and
brigades for the
Light divisions. The NG brigade lists the scout battalion as follows: 3
x 8 OH (LUH), which
to me implies that they're the same a/c. This is the a/c for which the
303 applies. At the
same time it lists 3 x 10 UH companies for the assault battalion, and the
UH definitely seems
to be the UH-60, as it is in the AC/Reserve components, while the OH for
the attack battalions
in the Light Divisions (the 368) appears to be the same a/c as that for
the NG (but armed).
OTOH, it may not be. The AC/RC brigades don't show a scout battalion at
all, the Block III
AH-64s apparently taking on this role. Maybe the slide is incorrect to
make this distinction,
but then there's the following exchange in the transcript:

Look at the timeline slide--it shows the LUH and OH programs as being
separate and distinct. The slide you are referring to is confusing as all
get out--what the hell is "AER"? And where are the non-divisional units?
What about the DIV CAV SQDN; does it retain any helos? Whoever the guy was
who prepared this set of briefing slides needs to be divested of his
"PowerPoint Ranger" tab immediately!

snip lots of gobbledygook from Blum, et al

"Modularity model"??! I met Blum when he was a one-star--he walked into the
work area outside our (my SGM's and my own) offices, picked up a tootsie pop
off the table while we stood there, and walked back out--not a "May I" or a
"thank you" muttered. If he is going to spout this kind of doublespeak
claptrap, he needs to steal some more tootsie pops to keep his mouth
otherwise engaged.


The Guard Hueys are going away, no question, to be replaced by the new
LUH, but per the slide
that will serve as the Guard's OH.

Well, not so sure about that. That slide, and the way it does not
necessarily agree with the later slide, is kind of questionable in terms of
its detail. Then again, they were prepared to allow the briefing of a bunch
of media wonks, most of whom could not tell the difference between an AH-58D
and AH-1 if they tried.

But the 6 Guard brigades are getting at least 30 and maybe
38 Blackhawks each as well as the 24 OH (LUH). The new recon helos for
the LDs are apparently
going to be a new design entirely.

That is not adding up either. I have not heard anything yet about drawing
the Guard division strength down that far (they are only showing two heavy
divs and (presumably) one light div in the ARNG). There are eight divisions
in the ARNG right now, and the plan was to redesignate two of them as CS/CSS
unit sources. That leaves six, of which one is a light division. See the
disconnect on the slide?


A 412 seems much too big, noisy and lacking in maneuverability to make a
good OH, and too close
to the UH-60 in capability to be worth buying as a utility helo, so what
would be its job?

Cheaper unit cost than the UH-60 plus cheaper operating cost, with a
somewhat reduced payload and range. The ARNG needs LUH's for the homeland
defense role, especially if/when their UH-60 elements are deployed
elsewhere. Disaster response, MEDEVAC, terrorist incident response, to
include mobility support for the NBC response teams springing up around the
country, customs/law enforcement support, firefighting support with bambi
buckets--a myriad of uses. Nothing says that the 412 can't serve the same
role as the current OH-58's do in the drug interdiction recon role, though a
ligheter and even less costly operating aircraft might be better in that
role. And again, if you look at that later slide, the apparent requirement
is for two different platforms--one LUH and one OH. I fully expect some of
the "UH" units on the ARNG side to be equipped with "LUH".



As you note, they are indeed buying more Blackhawks. But Blackhawks
are
pretty pricey compared to the 412. With the increased emphasis on
homeland
defense and the Guard's role in that respect, taking X amount of
money
and
buying more 412's than you could buy UH-60's with the same money
would
appear to be a doable solution to me. I doubt the Army wants to blow
any
more money than it has to on aircraft that it can't, or would prefer
not
to,
integrate into its warfighting plans across the board; if you bought
only
UH-60's, then the tendancy would be to identify them with
contingency
plan
force development requirements. They'd be a bit less likely to want
to
integrate a low density platform like the 412 would be. But hey, its
early--who knows?

At least how I understand it, they're not willing to do that,

That is not what AvLeak is saying.

I know, but that assumes they understand the briefing and slides any
better than I do;-)

I don't know how much credibility we can put in these slides, or for that
matter in some of the ridiculous verbage in the transcript--I can just see
junior/midgrade staff weenies lstening to their bosses in those confusing
exchanges cringing and saying to themselves, "No, you idiot! That is NOT
what that means!"


and want the Guard
to be seamlessly able to integrate with the active component, which
means
they've pretty much got to have the same equipment.

Not necessarily. That has BEEN the way they have thought for decades,
but
9-11, and the resultant load upon the Guard in terms of mobilizations
for
overseas deployment, coupled with the less-than-timely drawdown on the
Huey
and Cobra fleets, got some folks (including Governors and likely now the
DHS) to talking about the desirability of having some aircraft primarily
oriented towards the domestic requirement.

See Blum's comments above.

See the bullet comment about improving the homeland defense capabilities,
and see the recent comments from governors and congress critters concerned
over the gap in capabilities left when all of the high priority Guard units
are mobilized. See what the NGAUS has been harping about for a few years
now. And then remember that this presentation apprantly did NOT address the
entire Guard aviation force structure, for whatever reasons.


NGB has even begun talking about
the MV-22 as being a good match for some domestic requirements,
especially
for such roles as transporting the NG's NBC response teams. The desire
to
get an off-the-shelf utility bird specifically for the ARNG has also
been
discussed previously, which is why the plan to actually do that is not
that
surprising to me. And as the interest is towards a dedicated (or close
to
that term) domestic support aircraft, the need for interoperability with
active component systems is not as important. If such interoperability
was
such a key concern, why does the ARNG often find itself operating
equipment
(from trucks to helicopters) that the active component no longer
operates,
and sometimes won't even support?

Again, see Blum's comments. BTW, I'm having some problems with the
numbers. They say they
want 303 LUHs for the Guard. The 6 Guard MF AV BDEs each show 24 OH
(LUH), or 144 a/c.
That's 159 a/c for training, pipeline, and attrition. For the sake of
argument, let's assume
that the 8 C2 a/c per BDE are also LUHs, i.e. 48 more for a total of 192.
That's still 111 a/c
for T/P/A. Seems excessive given the loss rates nowadays. 1960s, sure.

Like I said earlier, this slide show ain't complete. There is too big a hole
in it in regards to the Guard aviation force structure. Where are the ARNG
counter drug aviation assets that reside in each state? Where are the other
divisional brigades?


While a 412 probably costs
less per hour to operate than a -60, when you add in the costs of the
separate
training, maintenance and spares support I suspect it just doesn't
make
sense
economically. Otherwise the USMC could have just bought UH-60s and
modified
AH-64s instead of staying all common with the UH-1Y/AH-1Z.

Well Guy, in this case it appears the Army disagrees with you. Eighty
UH-60's are a drop in the bucket compared to the needs in terms of
replacing
the UH-1's that have been lost, and I have to tell you that I think
AvLeak
is generally a rather reliable source, and they do indeed indicate that
a
*new* light utility airframe is in the works (and the UH-60 is a bit on
the
chunky side (both in terms of size and payload) to be called "light").

So's the Huey;-)

Watch it! Lightning has been known to strike those who speak ill of the old
washing machine with rotor attached! It had to have Divine approval, 'cause
it would never have flown without it.


I
doubt the amount of training required to prepare those Huey wrench
turners
for a platform like the 412 is any different from what is required to
prepare them for the UH-60, and unlike the AC side, those wrench turners
often spend their entire career in the same unit, so turnover won't be
as
big an issue. Crew training is not likely to be a major issue,
either--the
ARNG already manages C-23 training, just as the ANG is heavily involved
in
pilot training for the F-16 and F-15. Doing an in-house qualification
course
at either or both the eastern or western ARNG aviation training sites
(AZ
and PA, IIRC) would be no biggie as they have run crew training programs
for
years now on Cobras, Chinooks, and even Blackhawks and Apaches.

snip

If the idea is to neck down the the minimum number of systems, why even
put up with the hassle
of the extra pipeline?

Guy, face it, even the slide show is kind of clear in that a new line of
utility helos is coming.

Brooks


Guy