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B-52 crew blamed for friendly fire death



 
 
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Old March 16th 04, 01:49 AM
Paul Hirose
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Default B-52 crew blamed for friendly fire death

On June 22 last year, during close air support training in Djibouti, a
B-52H flying out of Diego Garcia accidentally attacked the observation
post controlling the bomber. Nine M117 750-lb unguided bombs killed
one U.S. Marine and wounded seven Marines and a sailor. Both parked
CH-53E helicopters standing by on MEDEVAC duty were destroyed,
considerably delaying evacuation of the wounded.

The Air Force Times has posted part of the Central Command report on
the investigation. It concluded that mistakes by the B-52's instructor
radar navigator, radar navigator (bombardier), and navigator caused
the mishap. Someone apparently moved the radar crosshairs off target
and onto the radar beacon that marked the friendlies. It's not certain
who did it, since the three men declined to testify.

Since the report is too large for some to download, I'll quote the
most significant portions of the Investigating Officer's Statement of
Opinion.

"... In the Target Direct bomb mode, the B-52 OAS [offensive avionics
system] operates such that wherever the bombing crosshairs are placed
on the radar scope, the OAS will compute a weapons solution to deliver
ordnance on that point... Based on the physical evidence and witness
testimony, I determined the only plausible explanation for the release
of weapons on the wrong target is that a member of the MOC [mishap
offensive crew] moved the crosshairs from the intended target to a
position over the MCCT's [mishap combat controller team's] radar
beacon, then failed to return the crosshairs to the target. This
failure resulted in the OAS computing a weapons solution to the OP
[observation post] vice the intended target...

"The only means of moving the crosshairs off the target is via the
trackball on the MRN's [mishap radar navigator's] integrated keyboard.
The crosshairs should have been repositioned on the intended target by
zeroing out the buffers that were incorporated into the bombing
solution. Rotating the RNMP Fix Mode Switch to the Off position zeros
the buffers, thereby returning the crosshairs to the intended target.
The zeroing of the buffers should have been verified by observing, on
the radar screen, the replacement of the buffer values with zeros and
the movement of the crosshairs off of the radar beacon. The buffers
are digitaly displayed as range in feet and azimuth in degrees on the
bottom of the RN's multi-function display...

"In support of this conclusion, I have the sworn testimony of the MMC
[mishap mission commander] stating that the MIRN [mishap instructor
radar navigator] approached him after the mishap, while still
airborne, and showed him a hand-written note. The note indicated that
the crosshairs were rolled off the target and onto the beacon, and
that they were not rolled back. The note referred to by the MMC was
never recovered by the Interim Safety Investigation Board, the Safety
Investigation Board, or this Commander Directed Investigation.

"Rolling the crosshairs caused the OAS to compute a weapons release
solution on the radar beacon. However, this situation could have been
corrected had any of the MOC confirmed the proper placement of the
crosshairs. As specified in [tedious references to publications and
page numbers, deleted], the radar navigator is responsible for placing
the crosshairs on the intended target or OAP [offset aim point] and
the navigator is responsible for verifying that this has been
accomplished. Since the intended target was not radar significant,
offset aiming should have been used to verify the target's position.
In the event that no OAPs were visible, then the GPS with zero buffers
would have to be used, in conjunction with accurate target
coordinates, to aim at the target.

"Without testimony from the MOC, the only reason I could postulate for
rolling the crosshairs to the beacon would be to get a digital readout
of the bearing and range of the beacon from the intended target. The
MMC's testimony that the MRN used 4,300 or 4,400 feet to refer to the
distance between the beacon and the target leads me to believe the MRN
read this number from the buffers on the radar scope, as the MCCT had
provided their range in meters. Since the MCCT had provided their
location only in bearing and range from the target, rolling the
crosshairs would have provided additional assurance that the target
coordinates were accurately entered into the system.

"However, placing a bombing solution on a friendly position violates a
widely understood principle that you don't point a loaded weapon
anywhere but at a legitimate target. The technique of rolling the
crosshairs off the intended target and onto a friendly position, to
determine its distance and bearing from the intended target, was
judged to be unacceptable by my B-52 expert advisors and the
overwhelming majority of radar navigators with whom we spoke. One
Weapons School Graduate IRN went so far as to call the technique
'irresponsible'. My expert advisors, the RNs and IRNs who testified,
as well as an informal survey of RNs in the mishap unit, all agreed
that the accepted technique for verifying the beacon is to leave the
crosshairs on the intended target, confirm the buffers are zero (with
a good GPS), then use the radar scope display scale to estimate the
range between the intended target and the radar beacon..."

"In the final analysis, the mishap was caused by the unacceptable
technique of rolling crosshairs onto a friendly position and the
subsequent failure of the MOC to accomplish the T.O. [technical order]
step of ensuring the crosshairs were on the correct target. I
determined that responsibility for this accident lies squarely and
solely with the MOC.

"Although it is unclear which crewmember actually touched the
trackball, the MRN was most likely the one who rolled the crosshairs
to the OP. As the instructor supervising the MRN's training, the MIRN
should have been observing the MRN's actions and therefore should have
seen any movement of the crosshairs. Though unlikely, it is possible
the MIRN could have reached over the MRN's shoulder and performed this
action, in which case the MRN would have been in a position to see
this and intercede.

"It is unlikely that the MN [mishap navigator] rolled the crosshairs.
The trackball at his station would only have been functional had the
MRN made a switch action to activate it, something that my CDI B-52
advisors say would be highly unlikely on a bomb run. Also, while
strapped into his ejection seat, it would have been extrememly
uncharacteristic and physically difficult for the MN to reach the
MRN's trackball. Furthermore, the MN may have been performing other
duties when the crosshairs were rolled and thus never saw it happen.
All three MOC members are IRNs and all are experienced enough to
understand the implications of rolling the crosshairs to the beacon
and, if one of them saw it done, should have objected to the action...

[Accidental contact with the trackball will not move the crosshairs
unless the enable switch on the side of the keyboard is also held
down.]

"I believe the MIRN and MRN are equally and principally responsible.
No matter who moved the crosshairs, the other one of them should have
seen it and interceded. At the very least, both of these highly
experienced IRNs should have corrected the mistake by ensuring the
buffers were zeroed and the crosshairs were returned to the intended
target. I believe the MN may possibly bear less responsibility than
the MRN and MIRN, depending on what cues he had available. However,
given his experience I feel he must still be held accountable.

"I recommend this report be forwarded to the appropriate commanders of
the MIRN, MRN, and MN for disciplinary action."

(Brig. Gen. Gilmary Hostage, the Investigating Officer.)


Using a radar beacon to mark the observation post during a close air
support mission was unusual; none of the experienced B-52
investigation team members had ever seen that. Ironically, the combat
controllers began doing it to guard against friendly fire accidents.
But if they had not operated a beacon their position would have been
less obvious (may not have been identifiable on radar at all), so the
crosshairs might never have been rolled onto them.

All members of the B-52 nav team were highly experienced. The RN and
nav were both majors, senior navigators, and qualified as instructor
radar navigators. The IRN was a lieutenant colonel and a command
navigator, and of course was also qualified as an IRN.

One mission objective was to get the RN qualified as an instructor on
the LITENING electro-optical targeting pod. Although it wasn't being
used to aim the M117 bombs, the IRN and RN were busy training with it
on each bomb run. Their activity was recorded on video tape by the pod
system. The report says, "As the pod training intensified, the MRN and
MIRN seemed to become focused on the LITENING pod and isolated from
the rest of the crew and the bomb run. All of the required steps wre
verbally acknowledged, but it seems the MN was the only member of the
MOC who kept his focus on the bomb release. The volume of LITENING pod
instruction given by the MIRN does not seem excessive based on the
level of experience of the MRN. The MIRN seems to take great care not
to step on any of the normal bomb run communications during the course
of the bomb run. However, it does seem the MRN was devoting most of
his attention to the LITENING pod track handle and pod monitor as he
attempted to follow the MIRN's promptings about the placement of the
laser. The amount of prompting by the MIRN during the last two minutes
of the bomb run is evidence the MRN was 'behind the aircraft,' meaning
he was task-saturated and falling behind in his duties"


The document I quoted from is about 6 MB in size. The print quality is
poor, though readable.

http://www.airforcetimes.com/content.../030804b52.pdf

--

Paul Hirose
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