Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?

(Michael) wrote in message . com...
Cub Driver wrote in message . ..
On Thu, 12 Feb 2004 12:46:20 -0500, Stephen Harding
wrote:

It's not yet clear to me that the tactic of "sticking with
the bombers" was not known as the *wrong* tactic by early 1944.

As I recall the Battle of Britain, the German fighters were difficult
to cope with because they did *not* stick with the bombers --

As I understand it, they were most successful when they were permitted
a "frie jagd", where a gruppe would sweep out ahead of the bombers
they were escorting. The powers that be incorrectly thought close
support was the way to go and reined the fighters in, taking the
initiative and advantage away from them and helping the RAF.


This may have much to do with the characteristics of the 109s vs
the Hurricans and Spitfires. The 109 was faster, and from the
E-4 (I think) onward had cannons. But the British planes
had a much tighter turning radius, that is they were better dog
fighters. The sucessful German tactic was to come in fast, rely
on deflection firing, and bug out. Hanging out with the bombers
would lead them into a turning contest where they would be at
a disadvantage.

--

FF

Subject: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
From: (Fred the Red Shirt)
Date: 2/13/04 11:11 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

(Michael) wrote in message
.com...
Cub Driver wrote in message
...
On Thu, 12 Feb 2004 12:46:20 -0500, Stephen Harding
wrote:

It's not yet clear to me that the tactic of "sticking with
the bombers" was not known as the *wrong* tactic by early 1944.

As I recall the Battle of Britain, the German fighters were difficult
to cope with because they did *not* stick with the bombers --

As I understand it, they were most successful when they were permitted
a "frie jagd", where a gruppe would sweep out ahead of the bombers
they were escorting. The powers that be incorrectly thought close
support was the way to go and reined the fighters in, taking the
initiative and advantage away from them and helping the RAF.


This may have much to do with the characteristics of the 109s vs
the Hurricans and Spitfires. The 109 was faster, and from the
E-4 (I think) onward had cannons. But the British planes
had a much tighter turning radius, that is they were better dog
fighters. The sucessful German tactic was to come in fast, rely
on deflection firing, and bug out. Hanging out with the bombers
would lead them into a turning contest where they would be at
a disadvantage.

--

FF


In my expeirence, whe n we goit Spitfire fighter cover they would sock in
around us like a clam shell. But at the first bust of flak one would pull out
and dive down and go after that flak gun. Made me feel good all over. The
others would hang in tight all around us. We were never uncovered as long as
the Spits were around. There will always be an England.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

In message , Cub Driver
writes
As I recall the Battle of Britain, the German fighters were difficult
to cope with because they did *not* stick with the bombers -- at least
in the sense that they flew nearby. Instead they flew at a much higher
altitude. That's what caused the Brits to adopt the strategy of
sending the Hurricanes after the bombers and the Spitfires after the
fighters.

Correct, until bomber losses led to complaints about the fighters
"failing to escort": so instead of operating to maximise attrition
against the RAF, the Luftwaffe fighters were ordered into close escort
of the bombers.

Doubtless reassuring, to see 109s flying S-curves alongside you: but
they've got a lot less speed and height to use when the RAF comes in to
play.




--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

Stephen Harding wrote:
Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.

However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
"Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
doing by 1944.

History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.

History is a wonderful thing and everything might seem the right thing to do
at that time. Sadly, hindsight is no use to the past.

Still, it keeps this group busy!

Richard.