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#21
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I think if you can't get the GS then you go missed and start over. Trying to
re-brief a new approach chart on final is a bad plan. "Guillermo" wrote in message ... If you cannot get the GS in an ILS apporach, then it turns into a localizer approach, which has higher minimums. |
#22
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On 2005-05-05, Gary Drescher wrote:
Third, if the controller's radar shows your altitude, you can get an altitude alert (as the HPN pilots did). Except the report made it sound like they acknowledged it and kept going. Hard to believe a CFII wouldn't know offhand from that comment that they were in trouble (being at a familiar airport). -- Ben Jackson http://www.ben.com/ |
#23
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CFI's last medical was on Mar 7, 2003 which means it was expired.
Neither of the pilots was licensed to be up there. Any medical issued to a pilot under 40 (which the CFI was) is good for 3rd class privileges for 3 years, which is all that is required for flight instruction. The CFI was instrument rated, and presuming he was current he had a legal right to be up there. Michael |
#24
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"Ben Jackson" wrote in message
... On 2005-05-05, Gary Drescher wrote: Third, if the controller's radar shows your altitude, you can get an altitude alert (as the HPN pilots did). Except the report made it sound like they acknowledged it and kept going. Hard to believe a CFII wouldn't know offhand from that comment that they were in trouble (being at a familiar airport). Yes, he had to know by then that they were too low. --Gary |
#25
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#26
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Is there something specific that is disturbing, or are you referring
to the entire report? I read through it and, while it is always disturbing when an accident results in fatalities, I honestly didn't see anything that stuck out as *really disturbing* such as drugs, alcohol, or a blatant mistake. What did I miss? I think that's pretty much the point. This is the reality of most accidents. The pilot is qualified (at least on paper) and there are no red flags likel buzzing, running out of fuel, drugs, alcohol, or a blatant mistake or disregard for the regulations. There is simple mishandling of the airplane in the takeoff/climb or approach/landing phase of flight. That's what accounts for most accidents and fatalities. The last reported weather was 200 and 1/2 - not great, but certainly legal and acceptable on an ILS. I've shot that particular ILS into HPN, and there's nothing special or tricky about it - it's a garden variety approach. The airplane was new, well equipped for IFR, and very simple, slow, and stable. So how could something like this happen? It's important to remember that just because someone is qualified on paper doesn't mean he is qualified in reality. There is a huge difference between giving instrument dual in actual and instrument dual under the hood. And while 900 hours sounds like a lot of experience (and it can be), it's not much at all if it consists of 300 hours of preparing for checkrides and 600 hours of sitting in the right seat of a trainer preparing other people for checkrides. Let me tell you a story. Imagine a student pilot, getting close to the checkride, who already has some hood time. The student already meets the PTS standards for emergency instrument flight, and there's still well over an hour of instrument time to go, since 3 hours are now required. The CFI is also a CFII. An IFR-certified C-172 is available, and the student already has about 6 hours of C-172 time, VFR. And the CFI/CFII is not comfortable. The student can't understand why, and keeps pushing. Eventually, the CFII runs out of excuses. After months of waiting, there is benign IMC - ceilings in the 1000 ft range, good vis underneath, high freezing levels (well above what a 172 will cruise), no convective activity, and the weather is only forecast to improve. So he grits his teeth, files IFR, and off they go. The student does a reasonable job in IMC - gets vertigo, but keeps the plane upright and keeps on trucking. In the meantime, the transponder fails. ATC pressures the CFI to cancel IFR (which he can't - they're IMC) and he gets further and further behind the ball. The student is flying the LOC BC approach and botches it badly. The needle is pegged, and as the CFI sits there muttering to himself "We shouldn't be doing this" the student descends below minimums with the needle pegged and the runway not in sight. Fortunately they don't hit anything, the student is familiar with the area, identifies a water tower, turns towards the airport, and lands. Had the conditions been worse, we would have read about the fatality. So how does this sort of thing happen? More importantly, why? The CFI/CFII in question had made ONE flight in actual IMC prior to this. This was his second, and he was attempting to teach. According to the FAA, he was well qualified to make this instructional flight - but there's a big difference between a pilot who has just read the books and gone through the motions, and one who has real experience. A real instrument pilot would have told ATC to deal - a transponder is not required outside Class B/C airspace below 10,000 ft, and in any case it had failed in flight. A real instrument pilot would have recognized that the approach was being botched, and either talked the student through a recovery or missed approach, or done those things himself. A real instrument pilot would certainly not have permitted descent below minimums with the needle pegged and the runway not in sight. In the end, it was the student's local knowledge and level headed action that saved the flight. The instructor became a passenger. The CFI has gone on to bigger and better things years ago, has thousands of hours, and from all reports has become quite a good pilot. The student went on to complete the private (with another instructor), and is now considered a very good pilot, quite capable on instruments - but did not get an instrument rating for many years, until the fear of IMC wore off. Those two were lucky. As this accident shows, it could have been much worse. Michael |
#27
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On 5 May 2005 11:48:24 -0700, "Michael"
wrote: CFI's last medical was on Mar 7, 2003 which means it was expired. Neither of the pilots was licensed to be up there. Any medical issued to a pilot under 40 (which the CFI was) is good for 3rd class privileges for 3 years, which is all that is required for flight instruction. The CFI was instrument rated, and presuming he was current he had a legal right to be up there. Michael Actually, no medical is required for flight instruction. The only requirement is to be pilot in command, which he obviously had to be in this case. |
#28
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In article 2005050421420215925%bodhijunkoneeightyeightjunkat macdotcom@junkjunk, Tom Fleischman wrote:
If you want to read something really disturbing, this is it. * http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=NYC05FA075&rpt=p I had an Angel Flight mission scheduled last the week. Night before, looking at the forecast, I was thinking the flight was doable but a bit below my comfort level. I called my instructor to ask if he'd come along. Didn't need him as an instructor, but as an extra pair of eyes and hands to shed that critical workload. Conditions were forcast for near minima, but better at the destination and scheduled to improve. He looked at the forecast and said he wouldn't do it without a second engine, second alternator, second vac, ... What he said was particularly articulate. It would be a doable flight *if* nothing went wrong. Wound up cancelling the trip, despite the self-induced pressure to go. Next morning, when the actual conditions were reported, I knew it was the right decision. Morris |
#29
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Matt Whiting wrote:
To show him what an instrument approach looks like? If the instructor was qualified and current, this shouldn't have been a problem. Descending below minimums is the problem, it doesn't matter who is flying or who is in the right seat. Matt He may not have been far from his minimums if he was flying the ILS. DA for the ILS was 639 MSL, and based on the accident report, combined with terrain elevations north of the approach end, and 75' tree height, he may have impacted the tree at about 610 MSL. This would have been possible if he was below glideslope, and then initiated go-around at his DA (DH). He would have had some height loss expected before the aircraft responded. JPH |
#30
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"J Haggerty" wrote in message
news:sQzee.4525$Ri4.3415@okepread07... Matt Whiting wrote: To show him what an instrument approach looks like? If the instructor was qualified and current, this shouldn't have been a problem. Descending below minimums is the problem, it doesn't matter who is flying or who is in the right seat. Matt He may not have been far from his minimums if he was flying the ILS. DA for the ILS was 639 MSL, and based on the accident report, combined with terrain elevations north of the approach end, and 75' tree height, he may have impacted the tree at about 610 MSL. This would have been possible if he was below glideslope, and then initiated go-around at his DA (DH). He would have had some height loss expected before the aircraft responded. But he was still a mile out when he crashed. Well above the DA, he'd have to have been fully below the glideslope, which calls for an immediate missed-approach execution. The DA has no relevance in that situation. --Gary |
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