If this is your first visit, be sure to check out the FAQ by clicking the link above. You may have to register before you can post: click the register link above to proceed. To start viewing messages, select the forum that you want to visit from the selection below. |
|
|
Thread Tools | Display Modes |
#81
|
|||
|
|||
"Steve Mellenthin" wrote in message ... They were getting the **** shot out of them every night as they flew planes with no belly turrets. And hey used the planes with belly turrrets, B-17's and B-24's for electronic jammimg? Brilliant. Just brilliant. Arthur Kramer Art, Going back to an earlier discussion on encountering AAA on a bomb run, I have always wondered if large formations all on the same run-in headig was an appropriate tactic for a medium (attack) bomber such as the B-26. It always seemed to me that smaller flights on different target approach headings might be more effective for and that the danger of a mid-air in between formations might be less than the danger of flak in a bomber stream on a predictable flight path. This is what the B-52s went to in Linebacker II to cut losses. There is a tacit assumption of a good measure of air superiority in my question. Steve The strategy of the bomber stream is the same as that used by birds and fish when they form dense flocks. Its much harder for a number of predators to pick off 10 from within the mass than 10 individuals. In the case of daylight ops the bombers were separated not only by distance but by elevation with high and low formations as well as leading and trailing ones. Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered in height to minimise flak damage. Keith |
#82
|
|||
|
|||
"Steve Mellenthin" wrote in message ... smartace11 wrote: I don't disagree at all, I am just asking the question. The B/A-26 was used in Vietnam as well and my question is whether using a medium bomber/attack aircraft was appropriately used in a heavy bomber role. There is no doubt that the heavies in War 2 were employed in what seems to have been the most logical tactic. The -26 is a bit of a different beast and its main advantage seems to have been speed and maneuverability, not payload. Thats a different aircraft than the one Art flew The B-26 of WW2 was the Martin Marauder, that of Vietnam was the Douglas Invader which was originally designated A-26 and was a later design largely replacing the B-26. Keith |
#83
|
|||
|
|||
"WalterM140" wrote in message ... Probably because its untrue The simple fact is that during March 1944 bomber command flew a total of 9031 sorties with a loss rate of under 4%. Nuremburg was indeed a disaster but an isolated one. The RAF definitely was defeated over Germany by the Luftwaffe in the Spring of 1944. Being put onto invasion targets has obscured this fact. "Bomber Command had lost 4,160 aircraft missing and crashed in England. Harris's failure to bring Germany to her knees, and the cost of his failure, had become embarrassingly evident to every man but himself. Bull**** - losses in the first 4 months of 1944 were as follows Month Lost Crashed %Loss January 314 38 5.6 Febuary 199 21 5.2 March 283 39 3.6 April 214 25 2.4 During this period the B-17's of US 8th AF were suffering very similar loss rates. So what? What has that got to do with the RAF? It shows the RAF were doing no worse than the USAF And during the first 4 months of 1944, the USAAF was seriously attriting the Luftwaffe. The RAF was not. The Spitfires didn't have the range to help out over Germany. That's where the Luftwaffe was. And in a letter to the Air Ministry on April 7, 1944, he came as close as ever in his life to conceding that he was in deep trouble: 'The strength of the German defenses [he wrote] would in time reach a point at which night-bombing attacks by existing methods and types of heavy bombers would involve percentage casualty rates which in the long run could not be sustained...we have not yet reached that point, but tactical innovations which have so far postponed it are now practically exhausted....' So in fact in the spring of 1944 he is saying he has NOT been defeated, Harris was in denial. As Hastings points out, he was the only one not saying that. If you watch the World At War episode, "Whirlwind", you'll hear Harris say that the Battle of Berlin was not a defeat. But it was, and a bad one. The Battle of Berlin was indeed a defeat, that was not the entirety of the air war over Germany however and its provably untrue to claim that ai operations over Germany were suspended. Keith |
#84
|
|||
|
|||
"ArtKramr" wrote in message ... Subject: Night bombers interception.... From: Guy Alcala Date: 7/15/2004 10:04 PM Pacific Standard Time Message-id: Jack wrote: ArtKramr wrote: We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret. They wouldn't take them. Big mistake. I presume they did so because they preferred some other aircraft (or weapon system) which we also offered. Do you know what the preferred alternative might have been? Perhaps they wished to avoid large manning requirements and sought aircraft with fewer required crew positions. The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs which were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful. Contrary to Art's assertion, Bomber Command did operate some B-17Gs, but they were used by 100 Group (electronic countermeasures), not as part of the main force. Coastal Command also used them, but the B-17 was less suited to night bombing than the British a/c, barring considerable modifications. Given that the B-17 was preferred by the 8th AF for daytime missions over the B-24, and the B-24 was preferred in the Pacific and for various other roles, there was no good reason for RAF Bomber Command to use them in preference to the Lancaster and Halifax. Guy They never used them where they really needed them against night fighter attack with their big fat 50 caliber Browning heavy machine guns. The German planes were never well armored enough to withstand the American 50's. You are incorrect. The RAF operated B-17's in action in daylight long before the USA even entered the war. The results were heavy losses and poor results. By the September of 1941, RAF Fortresses had flown 22 attacks against targets such as Bremen, Brest, Emden, Kiel, Oslo, and Rotterdam, loss rates on these missions averaged 20% and little damage was done. The concept of self defense was flawed. This was a lesson the USAAF would learn the hard way in 1943. Keith |
#85
|
|||
|
|||
"WalterM140" wrote in message ... The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs which were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful. The Brits ignored American advice on how to use the B-17. Admittedly, the B-17C was not ready for the big leagues. The USA had zero combat experiencewith the B-17 in 1941 and sold the B-17 on the basis of the self defending bomber. It failed in 1941 and again when the USAAF tried it in 1943. Keith |
#86
|
|||
|
|||
Guy Alcala wrote:
WalterM140 wrote: It would have been quite easy to stop P-38 escorts in 1943, just attack them early, and force them to jettison their external tanks, they were carrying about as much or more fuel externally than internally. It was -shown- that even a few dozen P-38's had a very delerious effect on the tactics of the German day fighters. There's no "it would have been quite easy to..." to it. What you suggest was not a factor. Only because the Germans rarely did so. U.S. fighter commanders were surprised that they didn't try it more often, because it was so obviously a good idea. Indeed, the Luftwaffe had tried to do so for a while, but heavy singl-engine fighter losses (against P-47s) had resulted in an order from either Goring or Schmidt (I forget which) sometime in the late-43 early '44 period (I forget) to cease such attacks and move the fighters back. A bad decision. BTW, ISTR for Geoffrey's info that the early J models were all retrofitted with leading edge tanks either shortly before or shortly after achieving IOC in the ETO. Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF deployed against Germany and include reserves etc. Thanks for the minutia. Not minutia in this case, but very germane, as the lack of P-38 numbers was a factor. Production was very limited at the time. Then there's the extra training time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting units operational/providing replacement pilots. The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively could have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available in England in 1942. Eaker and Hunter didn't do that. While Eaker and Hunter were doctrinally blind to the need for far too long, the need for a long-range fighter in the ETO in 1942 was hardly obvious given the shallow penetrations we were making at the time. Arnold ordered Giles to increase the internal fuel of the fighters around June '43 IIRR (don't have the reference, "To Command The Sky" by McFarland and Newton, handy), giving him six months to achieve it. Besides the P-38 was only in the ETO for a couple of months before they were all sent to the Med. I consider one of the great historical "what ifs" to be what if at least some P-38s had remained in the 8th from November 1942 until September '43 (we'd have to assume that P-38 production was sufficient that the 78th FG wouldn't have had its P-38s stripped from it and sent to the Med as attrition replacements, so they weren't forced to transition to the P-47). Would we have been able to fix the P-38's high altitude/cold and wet climate problems prior to the availability of the P-51? As it is, we know from Zemke that turbosupercharger control freeze-up was still an issue in August _1944_ (IIRR he was flying a J-15), despite the problem being identified no later than when the 55th FG had gone operational in mid-October '43. Even assuming that the problems (engines, turbo controls, cockpit heat, dive flaps; the boosted ailerons were a 'nice to have') had been fixed earlier, was it possible to produce enough P-38s in that period to supply the needs of the PTO, MTO _and_ ETO? It seems unlikely, given the relatively low production totals of the P-38 compared to the single-engine a/c, and cost -- both the P-47 and P-38 cost about double the P-51 to build in money, materiel and man-hours; fuel requirements were also about double. Given the production totals achieved with other aircraft, the US COULD have ramped up production of the P-38, but the war production board didn't approve second source production until very late (IIRC about 120 P-38s were eventually produced by Vultee-Nash, but likely none of them ever made it to the combat theaters). If the engines had been swapped out for two-stage Merlins, the turbo and early intercooler problems would have been eliminated, at the cost of some fuel efficiency, and Lockheed submitted a proposal for this, although politics prevented this. That the P-38 was developed to US specifications before the war resulted in the Allison engine use, and the US focused on turbosupercharging for inline engines. Of course, at that time, the Merlin didn't have two-stage supercharging either, so the turbo was really the only practical way to go for high altitude performance at the time. The Allies had their share of bad production decisions, but the greater industrial capability tended to make these decisions less than critical to the final outcome and not as noticed in the overall picture. Mike Williamson |
#87
|
|||
|
|||
The B-26 of WW2 was the Martin Marauder, that of
Vietnam was the Douglas Invader which was originally designated A-26 and was a later design largely replacing the B-26. I stand corrected. Lack of familiarity with the earlier B-26. |
#88
|
|||
|
|||
Keith Willshaw wrote:
"ArtKramr" wrote in message ... Subject: Night bombers interception.... From: Guy Alcala Date: 7/15/2004 10:04 PM Pacific Standard Time Message-id: Jack wrote: ArtKramr wrote: We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret. They wouldn't take them. Big mistake. I presume they did so because they preferred some other aircraft (or weapon system) which we also offered. Do you know what the preferred alternative might have been? Perhaps they wished to avoid large manning requirements and sought aircraft with fewer required crew positions. The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs which were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful. Contrary to Art's assertion, Bomber Command did operate some B-17Gs, but they were used by 100 Group (electronic countermeasures), not as part of the main force. Coastal Command also used them, but the B-17 was less suited to night bombing than the British a/c, barring considerable modifications. Given that the B-17 was preferred by the 8th AF for daytime missions over the B-24, and the B-24 was preferred in the Pacific and for various other roles, there was no good reason for RAF Bomber Command to use them in preference to the Lancaster and Halifax. Guy They never used them where they really needed them against night fighter attack with their big fat 50 caliber Browning heavy machine guns. The German planes were never well armored enough to withstand the American 50's. You are incorrect. The RAF operated B-17's in action in daylight long before the USA even entered the war. The results were heavy losses and poor results. To be sure, IIRR the RAF never operated their Fortess Is (B-17Cs) in a group of more than six, usually three or less, and often from altitudes above 30,000 feet. They just didn't have that many (only 20 in a single squadron), and the reliability was pretty poor. RAF usage amounted to not much more than a 2 month live fire operational test program. After all, they only dispatched 39 sorties in those 22 missions. Still, the RAF usage was helpful in pointing out to the US problems which needed fixing. By the September of 1941, RAF Fortresses had flown 22 attacks against targets such as Bremen, Brest, Emden, Kiel, Oslo, and Rotterdam, loss rates on these missions averaged 20% and little damage was done. The concept of self defense was flawed. This was a lesson the USAAF would learn the hard way in 1943. To be fair, the RAF experience didn't prove or disprove the US tactical doctrine, because their practice didn't reflect it. It had to wait until 1943 for that doctrine to be _proven_ unsound, because only then was it able to be properly tested. It's a shame that Eaker persisted in believing the doctrine was correct for as long as he did (in the face of all the evidence to the contrary), but then he apparently believed the kill claims by the bomber gunners were reasonably accurate. We know better. Guy |
#89
|
|||
|
|||
In the case of daylight ops the bombers were separated
not only by distance but by elevation with high and low formations as well as leading and trailing ones. Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered in height to minimise flak damage. Keith That is where I was headed with the question. Thanks for the response. It has been my impression, perhaps erroneous, that the choice of the stream stragegy was not the best decision at times when a loose gaggle and varying run-in headings and altitudes between the 2-4 airgraft groupings would have been more effective. As I said, only an impression not backed up by much research or fact. Steve |
#90
|
|||
|
|||
Mike Williamson wrote:
Guy Alcala wrote: snip Even assuming that the problems (engines, turbo controls, cockpit heat, dive flaps; the boosted ailerons were a 'nice to have') had been fixed earlier, was it possible to produce enough P-38s in that period to supply the needs of the PTO, MTO _and_ ETO? It seems unlikely, given the relatively low production totals of the P-38 compared to the single-engine a/c, and cost -- both the P-47 and P-38 cost about double the P-51 to build in money, materiel and man-hours; fuel requirements were also about double. Given the production totals achieved with other aircraft, the US COULD have ramped up production of the P-38, but the war production board didn't approve second source production until very late (IIRC about 120 P-38s were eventually produced by Vultee-Nash, but likely none of them ever made it to the combat theaters). that production could havebeen increased I dont deny. that it could have been increased to the extent posible with the p-51 and to a lesser extent the P-47 seems unlikely, given that the P-38 wasnt originally designed for mass production. I realize that Lockheed had done considerable re-design to improve its mass producibility, but the a/c manhours required are still far higher than a single. The P-47 being an exception, but then Republic never seems to have had management as good as their designers - their a/c were always expensive, heavy and late, but generally excellent. If the engines had been swapped out for two-stage Merlins, the turbo and early intercooler problems would have been eliminated, at the cost of some fuel efficiency, and Lockheed submitted a proposal for this, although politics prevented this. Assuming the Merlin swap would have solved the major problems, it still would have taken considerable time to do. Look how long it took between the Mustang X and the P-51B achieving IOC. That the P-38 was developed to US specifications before the war resulted in the Allison engine use, and the US focused on turbosupercharging for inline engines. Of course, at that time, the Merlin didn't have two-stage supercharging either, so the turbo was really the only practical way to go for high altitude performance at the time. The Allies had their share of bad production decisions, but the greater industrial capability tended to make these decisions less than critical to the final outcome and not as noticed in the overall picture. True, although in this case the lack of sufficient numbers of long-range escorts available earlier was most definitely noticeable. Guy |
Thread Tools | |
Display Modes | |
|
|
Similar Threads | ||||
Thread | Thread Starter | Forum | Replies | Last Post |
regaining night currency but not alone | Teacherjh | Instrument Flight Rules | 11 | May 28th 04 02:08 PM |
Did the Germans have the Norden bombsight? | Cub Driver | Military Aviation | 106 | May 12th 04 07:18 AM |
Why was the Fokker D VII A Good Plane? | Matthew G. Saroff | Military Aviation | 111 | May 4th 04 05:34 PM |
Night of the bombers - the most daring special mission of Finnishbombers in WW2 | Jukka O. Kauppinen | Military Aviation | 4 | March 22nd 04 11:19 PM |
Why did Britain win the BoB? | Grantland | Military Aviation | 79 | October 15th 03 03:34 PM |