What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam

Scott Peterson wrote in message ...
(Kevin Brooks) wrote:

I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the
personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were
activated and flew in Vietnam, or to those "champagne unit" (your
description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam?
Methinks not...

You're absolutely correct. I would not. I have the utmost respect
for those people.

Then why make the comment in this forum? It has to be either safety
through remoteness, or a case of a really bad
slip-of-the-tongue(typing finger)--I'd hope it was the latter.


Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
last F-102's left active duty?

From what I have, the last ADC units in the Air Force were converted
in 1973. It was a unit in Iceland. In the Pacific, it was 1971. In
Alaska, it was 1970, Europe, 1970. Almost all ANG units were
converted to other aircraft by 1975. The last units, the 195th in the
Calif. ANG in 1975 and the 199th ANG in Hawaii, stopped flying them
in Jan, 1977.

Dates vary. The 57th FIS did indeed not give their last Deuces up
until July 73--meaning that by *any* definition they were in "first
line" service until then. The actual last use by the ANG is a bit more
murky from what I have read--the 77 date is floated, but at least one
source I ran into indicated that the HIANG actually conducted its last
operational Deuce flight in October 76.


FWIW, someone just posted a series of nice pictures of the 195th
planes just before they converted on alt.binaries.pictures.military.


Since you did not even have a ghostly
idea that they had served in Vietnam, how the heck are we supposed to
believe your assessment of their operational status? As to even the
definition of 'first line", have you ever looked at what the breakdown
in the old ADC force was during that period? Take a gander at how many
of those forces you call "second echelon", I presume, were standing
alert on a routine basis.

You got me on the Viet Nam part. I'd completely forgotten about that.
And yes, I have an idea of what the forces were like and what second
echelon means. They were second-line units with older, less capable
or even obsolete equipment.

And the 57th FIS would presumably not meet that criteria.



You had no idea that the TU-95 was armed?! Or that Bears routinely
trolled down the eastern seaboard, and into the Gulf? That the USSR
used Cuba as a refueling point for those Bears (even into the 90's
IIRC)?

Yes, I am aware of that. The problem is that you're so anxious to find
fault that you are misquoting me. I said " I'm not aware of any
'threats' that shot back". Operative word being shot, not armed.

Oh....so combat is not a realistic possibility unless it has already
occurred? I believe you were insinuating that US interceptors of that
period faced no real danger, right? I am having a bit of a problem
here, since the previous statements have been snipped.


I believe that in the sixties and seventies, the units were much more
tightly tied to the state than they are now.

Not really. The degree of state control has always been exaggerated by
those who have never served in a Guard unit, which number I am
guessing from your sneering tone you would be a part of.

It's sneering to say they were tied to a state?

No, the sneering bit was your snide little "Guard as a haven for
draftdodgers" crap in the earlier paragraph.

The rest of what you
say doesn't really make sense. which number what?

That you are one of the number who have never served in a Guard
unit--the meaning is rather clear if you actually read the wording.


Also, that's not how I understood it, but if you can expand on how the
NG units were not tied to a state, I'd appreciate your explaining how
it did work.

Nice try, but nope, that is not what I said. I seem to recall that you
were mumbling about the Guard being much more firmly state controlled
during the Vietnam era (hard to get your wording right, as it has been
snipped and I lack the resolve to dig back into the old posts). I
believe that is a much exaggerated claim--please show me what area(s)
the state exerted real control over? In fact, the states really have
their "control" limited to administrative matters (and then only IAW
federal guidelines and significant federal supervision). I am sure you
are harkening back to the sinister "GWB got appointed unfairly..."
stance, and envision this as being another example of Guard good ol'
boy operations (like we never saw good ol' boy action in the regular
services, right?). But the fact is that the federal side controlled
the appointment of officers--no officer could be appointed, or
promoted, without approval of a federal board.


Also since they were
flying aircraft that were not in first-line service, and fairly
high-maintenance, moving them to other bases not equipped to handle
them would have been a major logistical move that would be difficult
to justify.

Uhmmm...take a gander at when the F-102 retired from active service,
and recall that two NATO allies continued to fly them even after they
left ANG service--and you can't see where they might have been used?

What is your point? The real question seems to be when the Air Force
no longer considered the 102 to be a first line aircraft.I can't give
you a date for that. Although, it might be when they started giving
them to ANG units. But it's a fact that within 3 years of the time
we're talking about (1970) you could count the number of units still
flying F-102's on one hand and in 3 more, they were all gone except
for targets...and, of course, the Greeks and Turks.

That the demise was quick after it began is immaterial. That the AC
was replacing the F-102 with F-106's as quickly as possible is true,
and understandable. But from an operational standpoint, there is no
way you can claim that the F-102 was out-to-pasture while it was still
being flown by active duty squadrons (especially the 57th in Iceland,
where they ran a pretty regular Bear greeting service IIRC). The fact
is that while GWB was training and beginning his squadron service the
Deuce was not some has-been/never-going-nowhere player as you would
have us believe, but was still serving with both frontline units on
the AC side and was standing alert at various CONUS stations as well.


Too little, too late (in terms of backpeddling, that is). Go up and
read your first paragraph in *this* post and then come back and tell
me you were not "attacking".

I remember those years very well, and I knew a lot of people who were
able to get into the National Guard as an alternative to the draft. It
was a very popular option and every National Guard unit had waiting
lists with hundreds or even thousands of names. Joining those units
was not a crime or a black mark. The ones I have no respect for are
the ones who used their influence or their family's influence to get
into these units ahead of other people who were in line. I guess my
question is why you would want to defend people who would do that?

Because while I am sure it may have happened (just as I am equally
sure that Senator Shmedlap could have influenced the Army's decision
to have his son serve as a clerk on a rather short tour--or maybe
Senator Gore?), I am reluctant to smear folks without darned good
evidence (which apparently in the case of GWB has never been given,
even after journalists from such anti-GWB forums as the Boston Herald
and the Washington Post (or Washington Pravda as we used to refer to
it) spent considerable effort trying to do just that), for one.
Second, when you take that tack, you run the risk of smearing a lot of
other good folks, especially when you use wording such as that that
you chose in your earlier post--there were a lot of folks serving in
the Guard before the war ever began, for example, and more than a few
vets joined Guard units upon their return. Not to mention the fact
that, despite LBJ/McNamara's stupid mistake of not using Guard and
Reserve forces earlier, there were a significant number of both ANG
and ARNG folks mobilized during the conflict, and a number of other
ANG crews and personnel performed support missions as well (to include
transport runs into the RVN, IIRC). And BTW, are you sure that ALL of
the Guard units had those waiting lists? Rather definitive and
inclusive statement you are making there...

Brooks


Scott Peterson

In article ,
Cub Driver writes:

Dan, are the Good People still Up in Arms and Pointing With Alarm that
the resurgent Bear population

I haven't heard anything about bears lately, but most every year we
have a moose sighting.

Is there a plaque on Gasoline Alley to mark your birthplace?

Not yet. But someday, perhaps... My student days much later did have
a few distinguishing moments - Struggling back to Stoke Hole from the
McConnell Hall computer cluster during the Blizzard of '78, and having
to put into Smith Hall (a Women's Dorm at the time) to wait out the
storm. It was Hell I say! We were trapped for 3 days. (The tough part
was sheaking out * piling more snow in front of the door)

It was the brick place on the
corner - 2nd floor. Of course, I was rather young at the time, so my
memory could be a bit off, but I recall wanting to be near my mother.


--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

Juvat wrote:

Ed Rasimus posted:

In "Clashes" Michel is dealing with MiG engagements, not with air
defense alerts. Clashes has a lot of good research behind it and
Marshall has the experience to back up that of which he writes.

True...but wouldyou acknowledge that F-102s did fly CAPs and not
simply sitting cocked at the end of a runway? And can you agree that
the F-102 shot down by the MiG-21 in Feb 1968 was flying CAP?

I would acknowledge that F-102s flew. I would acknowledge that F-102s
even did some ersatz ground attack. I would assert that in 150 North
Vietnam missions in Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I & II, I never once
was supported by an F-102 CAP. Not once. I never was supported by and
F-102 escort, nor in a package with an F-102 sweep either. Never had
an F-102 participate in any NVN mission that I was on.

Certainly there were F-4s on alert at Udorn and absolutely they were
flying CAP, but CAP is a different mission than air defense and alert
can be for a number of mission options--I sat alert at Korat in 105's,
but that was SAR and ground attack alert. And, I sat alert at Korat in
F-4Es, but that also was for ground attack.

So taking this just a little bit farther...if they were still in place
at Udorn in 1972 they just might have flown CAPs, they might have even
practiced some ACM vs the local air-to-air sqdns (13th, 555th, and TDY
523d, etc). Yet when the F-8s came to town to play, no mention of
giving the F-102s a taste. No mention of using F-102s for DACM for the
benefit of the air-to-air guys. [FWIW, Ritchie does say that the 432d
selected crews for the air-to-air mission into RP-6.]

I doubt that they would have flown and briefed, scheduled ACM. It was
simply against AF policy to fly dissimilar in those days. And, it must
be considered that the mission was to fly combat, not to train locally
in theater. There was the occasional hassle during RTB, but no
scheduled, briefed, training objectives established DACM.

Certainly Ritchie is correct. In July of '72, the 7th AF DO toured the
Thai bases. He directed that since the Linebacker mission was
critical, each base would establish "primary Linebacker crews"--folks
who specialized in a particular mission, who would be first scheduled
for Pack VI every day and who would carry the load. That meant Udorn
established specialized A/A crews. It's the same policy that had me
assigned as a primary F-4 Hunter/Killer SEAD guy.

I honestly don't know what unit was deployed, but I'm fairly confident
in the recollection that 102s were still in SEA in '72.

I certainly like Thompson. His compilation of history in "To Hanoi and
Back" is excellent.

Fair enough...since I got you to acknowledge that Thompson just might
have his **** in one sock, look at page 309 of his book. Fourth entry
down...Udorn...number of F-102s there in 1967 = 6, number there in
July 1972 = ZERO. Number of F-102s in SEA in July 1972 = ZERO.

I'll concede. Could be. I'm working strictly from memory. A good
memory generally, but capable of error.

He could be mistaken, his data is from a HQ document and not an eye
witness account.

Still, I like to deal with people who actually
flew the missions more than folks who are familiar with the bowels of
the AU library and how to run a micro-fiche machine.

I resemble that remark...Fair enough...Idle --*Chaff* --*Flare* -- I'm
just having a problem wondering whose "there i was story" to believe.

T'was Ronaldus Maximus that said, "trust, but verify." Can't argue
with that.

If the 366th moved out of Danang in July of '72 at the peak of
Linebacker, it's a surprise to me.

Ummm, respectfully are you being sarcastic with the last part? See
Thompson page 223...talks about the movement of the 366th from Da Nang
to Takhli in June of 1972.

So I ask the question again, sincerely, who do we believe? And why am
I doing all the citations/research?

OK, I knew that Tahkli got the 4th deployment for S-J when the base
was re-activated. Didn't realize that the Gunfighters moved there as
well.

And, you're doing the research because you love it!


Juvat

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Juvat wrote:


Fair question, one I cannot answer. If the threat were that great,
then why not bring the superior interceptor (the F-106) in to replace
the F-102, I cannot answer that one either. I guess the F-102 was so
good at it's mission the AF only needed 24 or so in SEA (four 6 plane
Dets) and that might be proof of its effectiveness as an Interceptor.

Juvat

Simple answer to your question regarding why 106's weren't deployed
instead of 102's. During '66 to '69, there was a chronic shortage of
J-75s. Since the Deuce used the much more common J-57, it was more
readily deployable.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Juvat wrote in message . ..
I posted:
Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO.

Kevin Brooks posted:
No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in
their meaning and intent.

Kevin cool your jets pardner...the title of this thread is what?

"What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam"

What does "called up" mean to you? To me it means what non-active duty
units, Guard or Reserve were activated for duty. How do you "call up"
an active duty unit?

By deploying them into the theater of operations from their current
station would be one manner of "calling up" an AC unit. I note that
the other posters who anwered the initial question also did not take
the "this solely deals with the RC" approach--are all of us wrong?


It does NOT mean which Acitve Duty squadrons deployed. But I'd bet
that's how you're reading this thread.

I took it as a total force question.


No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong)

Actually he said "I don't think any were. This plane was strictly an
interceptor for shooting down bombers. No guns, no ground attack
capability."

I'm pretty sure history will confirm that F-102s were indeed
interceptors lacking a surface attack mission. I acknowledge the
kludged attempts to use it's IRST in a surface attack role, but that
was NOT it's mission (Air Defense as you acknowledge).

Take away the "strictly"; as it was indeed used in ground attack
missions, albeit not very effectively (I do believe a couple of their
three total losses occurred when performing this mission that they
supposedly could not even undertake). The Fairey Battle was by all
accounts a rather lousy ground attack aircraft, but it was indeed used
in that role; the F-104 was never originally intended to serve in the
CAS/BAI role, but that is the role it later found itself serving with
many NATO nations. Why put blinders on only in regards to the F-102's
history?


And history will confirm that no ANG unit was called up for active duty in SEA.

No ANG unit was called up for active duty in SEA?! I thought you
already acknowledged the fact that ANG units were indeed called up?


because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an
interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand
throughout the period of major US involvement).

Okay...you're absolutely right. He was incorrect WRT to the presence
of ANY F-102s.

Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought,
too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had
ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA
throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the
manning that supported them.

Come on Kevin...I'm sincerely trying to keep this on topic about ANG
F-102 sqdns and Scott's post.

Sorry to inform you of this, but this thread began to meander
(something that is rather common in Usenet) after Scott made his post
and tried to link it to an anti-GWB thrust. As others have commented,
the only folks who seem restricted to the ANG-only approach appear to
be you and Scott.


ZERO chance of an ANG F-102 pilot flying combat unless he volunteered.

Uhmmm...like when Bush reportedly volunteered for Palace Alert (but
did not meet the experience requirement, which according to one
responsible individual was a minimum of one thousand hours)?

The issue regarding the four ANG F-100 units that deployed, it's a
great display of what the citizen airman has been willing to do for
our country from the gitgo. The USAF was very pleased with that
deployment. (Not back pedaling...before you suggest that I am)

OK. So your earlier statement that no ANG units were deployed was
apparently misworded--I would assume that you mean no F-102 units were
activated? Which would be true enough--but that leaves one wondering
whether F-102 units would indeed have been activated if sufficient
*volunteers* had not stepped forward?


The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that
is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, ... They continued
in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC).

I guess you won't be surprised when I was hoping for a little more
detail, like last AD sqdn date and last ANG date. Guess I'll do the
reasearch [sigh].

Gee, I was unaware you were so picky, when the issue had meandered to
whether the F-102 was a viable go-to-war/get-activated asset while GWB
was boring holes in the sky during his training and with the 111th FIS
(which question has already been answered, as they were still serving
with AC units while he was flying). But...the 57th FIS ceased Deuce
operations out of Iceland in July 73, and the HIARNG unit reportedly
flew its last Deuce operational sortie in October 76. Good enough?


It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the
RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident,

You'd be hard pressed to make a case of "first" deployed after the
Gulf of Tonkin. Afterall, the 1st Air Commando (Farm Gate) guys were
already flying combat sorties from Bien Hoa before GoT, as were RF-101
guys (Able Mable) from Misawa (45th TRS) and Kadena (15th TRS). You
get the picture.

Well, the folks in Bien Hoa did not have to deploy into the theater of
operations after the Gulf resolution, now did they (see, this playing
with finite word definitions can work both ways)? Actually, I believe
I read where the first F-102's to enter the area preceeded this by a
few years (1962, when they apparently started running a det out of the
RVN). I did read where the 509th FIS claims to have been the first
unit to deploy into the RVN after the GT incident--is that wrong?


No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in
Vietnam, period.

Kevin, re-read the title of this thread. "What F-102 units were called
up for Viet Nam," not what F-102 units served in SEA. Sir you are in
error...but I bet you disagree with me.

As apparently do the other folks who took exception with Scott's post,
not to mention those who answered the original post with the data on
the AC F-102 units that did indeed find themselves flying combat
missions.


Scott was correct on this score even if he simply guessed.

Not really.

OK...I say tomato...you say cantalope.

I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier
example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG
fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same
decade.

Phew...uhhh my bad, I was trying to keep the discussion close to
topic, sorta, hoping to keep it on SEA deployments of ANG F-102s. I
mentioned the only activations during SEA.

If you wish I can cite every ANG squadron activated for Berlin and the
deployment location, but I don't think it is germaine to F-102s in
SEA.

But it is germane to the fact that the USAF already regarded the ANG
as a real, honest to goodness go-to-war asset well before the entry of
GWB into ANG service.


Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the
war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air
strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense?

Fair question, one I cannot answer. If the threat were that great,
then why not bring the superior interceptor (the F-106) in to replace
the F-102, I cannot answer that one either. I guess the F-102 was so
good at it's mission the AF only needed 24 or so in SEA (four 6 plane
Dets) and that might be proof of its effectiveness as an Interceptor.

I would suspect that, like happened during the Korean conflict, the
USAF was examining the degree of threat (admittedly not great in SEA,
but then again it could not be completely discounted, either) and
decided that the F-106's were better deployed against the more serious
threat and the F-102's could handle the threat posed by the North
Vietnamese.


Truly sorry for the bad blood. You have misconstrued my intent. That
being Scott was correct that no ANG F-102 unit was called up for Viet
Nam, and he was mistaken that no F-102 units served in SEA.

No bad blood. But I get a bit tired when folks like Scott traipse out
the old "the Guard was a bunch of draftdodgers" mantra, not to mention
why he had to even enter into the "bash GWB" mode in the first place.
The first is a gross exaggeration born of enough folks making the
claim in the past, so it must be true, right? The second was just
another attempt at a backhanded swipe at a guy who performed military
service and flew combat aircraft in the defense of this nation-- a
much better alternative to refusing to serve at all, and then
attacking those who did, as many of his then-compatriots did, and none
of which he should be ashamed of, IMO.

Brooks


Juvat

Scott Peterson wrote:

But he left the ballpark
when he tried to go political and engaged in wholesale libel with his
"the Guard was a haven for draftdodgers" crap.

Wasn't it? That's certainly the way I remember it....and I knew a
quite a few people who were in it for exactly that reason.

Well, I've got the distinct impression that the period in question is
prior to your birth, but let me point out that there is a considerable
difference between ANG and Army NG. During the SEA period, a lot of
folks sought Guard duty specifically to avoid active Army draft
service. But, to stretch the Guard responsibility to fit the mission
and extensive training requirements of an ANG pilot is a significant
move.


Good question. I thought that through the 1980's the chain of command
for the NG went to the Governor unless the unless the units had been
federalized.

The example that comes to mind was Eisenhower doing this to keep NG
troops from being used by segratationist governors in the school
integration efforts in the mid-1950's.

While you are technically correct, in that NG units are under the
control of the Governor of the state, there is a parallel chain of
command to the NGB and then reporting to the appropriate service CinC
and then JCS. While Army Guard units were activated to enforce federal
policy and also for disaster relief and riot duty (in '68) the ANG
units are much more often activated for federal military service
deployed.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Cub Driver posted:

Now you're being ridiculous.

Geez Dan, thanks for the breath of fresh air. I'm honestly not trying
to escalate the signal to noise ratio here...honestly trying to post
details

The title of the thread has nothing to do
with the discussion,

And here I was trying to keep it within near earth orbit of the title
of the thread. Mea Culpa, mea culpa.

and it was Scott's post that moved it into its
present territory. If he didn't mean to do that, he can always
apologize and set the record straight.

Your concerns are noted.

Juvat

Kevin Brooks posted:


By deploying them into the theater of operations from their current
station would be one manner of "calling up" an AC unit.

OK but that's not how I would interpret it when I was active duty.
Different strokes...

I took it as a total force question.

Again, fair enough...not how I read it.

Take away the "strictly"; as it was indeed used in ground attack
missions, albeit not very effectively...why put blinders on only in regards to the F-102's
history?

Not trying to put blinders on it, I did post that Scott was incorrect
on this score. He made an easy mistake.

Sorry to inform you of this, but this thread began to meander
(something that is rather common in Usenet) after Scott made his post
and tried to link it to an anti-GWB thrust. As others have commented,
the only folks who seem restricted to the ANG-only approach appear to
be you and Scott.

OK, guilty as charged I was honestly trying to keep it on topic.
Respectfully, I'm happy NOT to discuss GWB service record. Nuff said.

OK. So your earlier statement that no ANG units were deployed was
apparently misworded--I would assume that you mean no F-102 units were
activated?

You are correct on that score, I fumble fingered the text when I left
out F-102.

Which would be true enough--but that leaves one wondering
whether F-102 units would indeed have been activated if sufficient
*volunteers* had not stepped forward?

A very small detail regarding F-102 pilots on active duty from Colonel
(PhD) Gross' "Prelude to the Total Force..." page 150

"Pilot shortages due to Southeast Asia operations increasingly
affected the Air Guard. Small numbers of Air Guard F-102 were
encouraged to volunteer for temporary active duty overseas. In July
1968, twenty-four of these pilots were on active duty at bases in
Holland, Germany, Alaska, the Philippines, and Okinawa."


Gee, I was unaware you were so picky... Good enough?

The devil is in the details...

Well, the folks in Bien Hoa did not have to deploy into the theater of
operations after the Gulf resolution, now did they (see, this playing
with finite word definitions can work both ways)?

You win...my sincere apologies for not staying on topic.

I did read where the 509th FIS claims to have been the first
unit to deploy into the RVN after the GT incident--is that wrong?

My humble apologies again, since there were so many deployments to SEA
from back in 1961 up until the GT incident, I honestly don't think a
great deal about which outfit gets the "honor" of being first.

But it is germane to the fact that the USAF already regarded the ANG
as a real, honest to goodness go-to-war asset well before the entry of
GWB into ANG service.

I encourage you to read Gross' book, it might get you to reconsider
that remark.

Regarding the Berlin call-up (there's that expression again) there
were bright spots (no aircraft lost in the deployment) and some less
than stellar deals like three of the four provisional Fighter Wings
BUSTING their ORIs, one actually busted twice. All deployed ANG
tactical fighter (versus interceptor) squadrons were not currently
qualified in conventional surface attack, but had mistaken qualified
in nukes....

Anyway lots of great stuff in the book. Good and bad.

No bad blood. But I get a bit tired when folks like Scott traipse out
the old "the Guard was a bunch of draftdodgers" mantra, ...
The first is a gross exaggeration born of enough folks making the
claim in the past, so it must be true, right?

Again read Gross, he writes..."President Johnson's decision to rely on
draftees rather than reservists raised questions about the expense and
military utility or reserve programs. Many Americans were incensed
that their sons and husbands were being drafted to risk death in
Southeast Asia while men who received drill pay stayed home. The
draft-exempt status of the National Guard, as well as other reserve
programs, became a major incentive to volunteer for those programs."

You can disagree with Gross, but I think he nailed it.

Finally...my apologies, reasonable men can disagree (still scratching
my head over Dan's post) and with that you are welcome to the last
word.

Juvat

Hi Peter

No more world of lie, I saw a CF-101 get off the ground in roughly 2,000
feet at Goose on a 45 degree below zero sunny morning.

On the 1st of June, 1962, eight R.A.A.F. CA-27 Sabres were deployed to
Ubon R.T.A.F.B. from Butterworth, Malaya. They acted as a
counter-measure to communist operations in the region. This detachment
formed the basis for a re-formed No. 79 (F) Squadron. The squadron was
assigned to the S.E.A.T.O. force during the Thailand Crisis. No. 79 (F)
Squadron flew some of the earliest C.A.P.'s over Thailand before things
started to really heat up in Viet Nam. The squadron remained in
Thailand until August, 1968 when at that time it was officially disbanded.

Cheers...Chris

Ed Rasimus wrote:

I would acknowledge that F-102s flew. I would acknowledge that F-102s
even did some ersatz ground attack. I would assert that in 150 North
Vietnam missions in Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I & II, I never once
was supported by an F-102 CAP. Not once. I never was supported by and
F-102 escort, nor in a package with an F-102 sweep either. Never had
an F-102 participate in any NVN mission that I was on.

I realize that second-hand accounts shared by "non-participants" is
viewed with contempt by many on this NG so if you happen to fall
into that category go ahead and stop reading now...

Having said that and for those who are interested, my Dad was one
of the first group of fighter pilots to operate supersonic fighters
(e.g: Dueces) with operational FIS squadrons back in the mid to
late '50's. A while back I shared with the NG a local newspaper
story about him ejecting from an F-102 over Wisconsin (predictably,
the nitpicker contingent here even picked apart THAT!) Anyway,
he especially loved the Duece's maneuverability and often spoke
fondly of the ol' bird. Seems Walt BJ who also flew the Duece felt
exactly the same way about it.

However, when the topic of F-102's being sent to Vietnam came
up (they were based out of Udorn which is where Dad was based
out of while flying the A-1E) he didn't have much to say about
it other than it was a waste of resources and -102's didn't belong
in SEA, period.

Just my 0.02

-Mike Marron