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#1
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GPS approach safety case
10ish years after overlay GPS approaches were introduced in the US, we in
the UK still have no GPS approaches. There must be a considerable body of evidence collected on accidents, incidents and anomalies over the period that GPS approaches have been in use. In particular, there may be evidence that GPS approaches have improved overall safety in non-precision approaches. Any pointers please? Thanks Julian Scarfe |
#2
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Julian Scarfe wrote: 10ish years after overlay GPS approaches were introduced in the US, we in the UK still have no GPS approaches. There must be a considerable body of evidence collected on accidents, incidents and anomalies over the period that GPS approaches have been in use. In particular, there may be evidence that GPS approaches have improved overall safety in non-precision approaches. Any pointers please? No pointers. Emprically, I'd say they are working great in the US. The issue is politics, not safety. |
#3
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wrote in message ... Julian Scarfe wrote: 10ish years after overlay GPS approaches were introduced in the US, we in the UK still have no GPS approaches. There must be a considerable body of evidence collected on accidents, incidents and anomalies over the period that GPS approaches have been in use. In particular, there may be evidence that GPS approaches have improved overall safety in non-precision approaches. Any pointers please? No pointers. Emprically, I'd say they are working great in the US. The issue is politics, not safety. tend to agree. Look who controls the GPS infrastructure. without assurances that the integrity of the system was not at the whim of the US Department of Defence, I cannot see the UK authorities being prepared to rely on GPS. Ultimately this does become a safety issue. What the US authorities do in their own country and to their own airspace system is one thing, doing it in someone else's is another. |
#4
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"S Green" wrote in message ... No pointers. Emprically, I'd say they are working great in the US. The issue is politics, not safety. tend to agree. Look who controls the GPS infrastructure. without assurances that the integrity of the system was not at the whim of the US Department of Defence, I cannot see the UK authorities being prepared to rely on GPS. Ultimately this does become a safety issue. Are you seriously suggesting that the DOD would on a whim turn off all the GPS signals and possibly cause thousands of people to die in landing accidents? Um, yeah -- let's see: "Mr. President, we had a terrorist threat of condition chartreuse today, so we decided to kill thousands of people at random all over the world by turning off the GPS system. When the terrorists actually blew up London, we were unable to respond because the GPS system was turned off." "Good job, boys. The political fallout over that should be minimal..." No, I don't think so. Next I suppose that you are going to claim that the British don't have any radar that they could use in the event of a navigation system failure. Or maybe your view really is just anti-American politics after all. |
#5
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At the risk of sounding endlessly questioning,
How would turning off GPS suddenly cause the death of thousands. Other navigational equipment is required (at least in the US). And the GPS system IS a DOD facility, operated by the US. I dont see any obligation being promulgated on us to the rest of the world. The Russians have their own version dont they? Do you think they have any sense of responsibility to any US users who may happen to be using their system? Dave C J Campbell wrote: "S Green" wrote in message ... No pointers. Emprically, I'd say they are working great in the US. The issue is politics, not safety. tend to agree. Look who controls the GPS infrastructure. without assurances that the integrity of the system was not at the whim of the US Department of Defence, I cannot see the UK authorities being prepared to rely on GPS. Ultimately this does become a safety issue. Are you seriously suggesting that the DOD would on a whim turn off all the GPS signals and possibly cause thousands of people to die in landing accidents? Um, yeah -- let's see: "Mr. President, we had a terrorist threat of condition chartreuse today, so we decided to kill thousands of people at random all over the world by turning off the GPS system. When the terrorists actually blew up London, we were unable to respond because the GPS system was turned off." "Good job, boys. The political fallout over that should be minimal..." No, I don't think so. Next I suppose that you are going to claim that the British don't have any radar that they could use in the event of a navigation system failure. Or maybe your view really is just anti-American politics after all. |
#6
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"Dave S" wrote in message link.net... At the risk of sounding endlessly questioning, How would turning off GPS suddenly cause the death of thousands. Other navigational equipment is required (at least in the US). And the GPS system IS a DOD facility, operated by the US. I dont see any obligation being promulgated on us to the rest of the world. The Russians have their own version dont they? Do you think they have any sense of responsibility to any US users who may happen to be using their system? Maybe that is Europe's problem. Somehow they can't understand that we are not creepy, underhanded Europeans with an ulterior motive for everything. They think that we must be just like they are. So, if it is not to kill thousands of people, what is the hidden agenda behind keeping DOD in charge of GPS? If turning off GPS will not endanger anyone, what is the real objection that the Europeans have to it? |
#7
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"S Green" wrote in message
... tend to agree. Look who controls the GPS infrastructure. without assurances that the integrity of the system was not at the whim of the US Department of Defence, I cannot see the UK authorities being prepared to rely on GPS. Ultimately this does become a safety issue. But the UK authorities already rely on GPS at least to the same extent. As well as having to carry ADF, VOR and DME for IFR flight in controlled airspace, anyone wanting to fly at or above FL100 (note that that's equivalent to 10,000 ft, perhaps not what US pilots are used to for flight levels) needs B-RNAV (B for Basic). The only economical way of meeting the B-RNAV requirement is to carry a TSO-C129a class A GPS receiver. I have in the back of my mind that, ironically, it has to be class A1 (approach capable) because B-RNAV imposes some extra requirements beyond the A2 spec, but I'm not sure. Thus if the GPS infrastructure disappears, the unavailability of a few overlay approaches or even standalone GPS approaches is the least of our problems! I'd like to see: a) a relaxation in the requirement to carry all of ADF, VOR *and* DME if there's also a TSO-C129a GPS receiver and the conventional nav equipment allows sensible backup. b) the ability to fly overlay NDB approaches without ADF, again provided nav equipment is carried to enable an approach at an alternate. Sometimes, and I know its rare, politics falls before a rational argument... Julian Scarfe |
#8
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"Julian Scarfe" wrote in message = news:G%Jwc.281$%a5.54@newsfe5-win... =20 =20 ..... As well as having to carry ADF, VOR and DME for IFR flight in controlled airspace, anyone wanting to fly at or above FL100 (note that that's equivalent to 10,000 ft, perhaps not what US pilots are used to for = flight levels) needs B-RNAV (B for Basic). The only economical way of meeting = the B-RNAV requirement is to carry a TSO-C129a class A GPS receiver. I = have in the back of my mind that, ironically, it has to be class A1 (approach capable) because B-RNAV imposes some extra requirements beyond the A2 = spec, but I'm not sure.=20 =20 =20 Julian Scarfe =20 =20 Interesting, if that A1 need is indeed the case. Approach capability seems an odd requirement in equipment mandated only = for high-altitude flight. But logic shouldn't be applied recklessly to regulations, should it? ---JRC--- |
#9
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"John R. Copeland" wrote in message
... Interesting, if that A1 need is indeed the case. Approach capability seems an odd requirement in equipment mandated only for high-altitude flight. But logic shouldn't be applied recklessly to regulations, should it? Reveiwing some historical material, I think I'm mistaken. B-RNAV mandated health-word checking and pseudorange step detection which caused some grief against US standards, but I believe that was about the difference between C129 and C129a. Julian Scarfe |
#10
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Julian, so what is the reason no gps approaches in the UK?
What is the CAA waiting for? Are there not some fields that could benefit from an approach that can be lined up exactly with the centerline? Is it only politics? Stan On Sun, 6 Jun 2004 19:11:38 +0100, "Julian Scarfe" wrote: "S Green" wrote in message ... tend to agree. Look who controls the GPS infrastructure. without assurances that the integrity of the system was not at the whim of the US Department of Defence, I cannot see the UK authorities being prepared to rely on GPS. Ultimately this does become a safety issue. But the UK authorities already rely on GPS at least to the same extent. As well as having to carry ADF, VOR and DME for IFR flight in controlled airspace, anyone wanting to fly at or above FL100 (note that that's equivalent to 10,000 ft, perhaps not what US pilots are used to for flight levels) needs B-RNAV (B for Basic). The only economical way of meeting the B-RNAV requirement is to carry a TSO-C129a class A GPS receiver. I have in the back of my mind that, ironically, it has to be class A1 (approach capable) because B-RNAV imposes some extra requirements beyond the A2 spec, but I'm not sure. Thus if the GPS infrastructure disappears, the unavailability of a few overlay approaches or even standalone GPS approaches is the least of our problems! I'd like to see: a) a relaxation in the requirement to carry all of ADF, VOR *and* DME if there's also a TSO-C129a GPS receiver and the conventional nav equipment allows sensible backup. b) the ability to fly overlay NDB approaches without ADF, again provided nav equipment is carried to enable an approach at an alternate. Sometimes, and I know its rare, politics falls before a rational argument... Julian Scarfe |
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