Why was the Fokker D VII A Good Plane?

Not according to Dan Ford.

Walt, you are a grumpy idiot. I *lived* in Frankfurt after the war.

Control K!

Address these points:

That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far worse than
the RAF did.

That during 1944 over 1/3 of 8th AF bombs hit within 1,000 feet of the aiming
point using visual means.

That B-17's made made up a very important part of a "strike package" to which
the Germans could find no answer.

That the Germans denuded other fronts of day fighters to combat the unescorted
B-17's, when the 8th AF was only sending a few dozen on any given raid.

That on three days during May 1944, the USAAF reduced German synthetic oil
production by 50%. By September, largely due to raids by USAAF heavy bombers,
the Luftwaffe was receiving 1/15th of its required fuel allocation.

That without this havoc wreaked largely by the USAAF, RAF Bomber Command could
not have operated over Germany at all.

That B-17's are offically credited with shooting down more German aircraft than
all other USAAF aircraft types COMBINED (including fighter types). Though B-17
gunner claims were wildly inflated, they were still very deadly and dangerous.
At least two high scoring German aces were killed in combat with B-17's. A
high scoring night fighter ace, whose aircraft had not been touch in months in
combat with the RAF, was killed in his first combat with B-24's.

Without a fleet of B-17's in place in England at the start of 1944, no invasion
of Europe would have been possible. This because the Germans showed they would
only fight for the type of targets that could only be struck by B-17's, and her
stablemate, the B-24.

As Dr. Russell Weigley notes in "Eisenhower's Lieutenants", during the spring
and summer of 1944 the Allies held victory through air power in their grasp,
but did not persevere for the kill.

Walt

Greasy wrote:

On 19 Apr 2004 14:40:45 GMT, (ArtKramr) sed:

On one hand....

That is a false and ignorant point of view. We could put a bomb
in a pickle barrel form 10,000 feet and I have done it many times.

...then on the other.

If the target was missed by 10 miles and the
bomb load hit a farm destroying farm machinery and animals and grain storage
that deprived the enemy of food, that was a good mission.

I suppose the Germans ran out of pickle barrels for targeting.

Or, as Art said, conditions for bombing varied, along with the
accuracy of the attempt.

Add to this the varying experience and capabilities of individual
groups, squadrons or bombardiers, I don't know why bombing in
WWII has to be labeled "inaccurate" in the context of the times
or judged no better than area bombing.

The variation in results due to such conditions is true to this
very day. The fact that a laser guided munition hits a mosque
instead of the missile battery set up next to it does not mean
"smart bombs" are no more effective than "dumb bombs", even
though at times, there really might not be much difference in
effect between the two!


SMH

Subject: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
Date: 4/19/04 11:42 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

You are doing yourself a disservice by repeating the pickle barrel claims,
that is not reality.

My experience and all that I quote comes from flying missions over Germany
under all conditions of enemy action and weather. I don't think you can get
closer to reality than that.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Subject: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
From: "Keith Willshaw"

They were switched to invasion targets too. The reality is that
the heavies were required to attack the transportation network
and defences in germany and

The heavy lifitng on the transportation targets wwas handled by the 9th Air
Force using B-26's and P-47's to attack bridges, marshalling yards, rail lines,
crossroads, ordnance depots etc. It was called tactical bombing and the 9th
was a tactical air force. See strike photos of these missions on my website.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Subject: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
From: (WalterM140)
Date: 4/20/04 4:08 AM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

Not according to Dan Ford.

Walt, you are a grumpy idiot. I *lived* in Frankfurt after the war.

Control K!

Address these points:

That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far worse
than
the RAF did.

That during 1944 over 1/3 of 8th AF bombs hit within 1,000 feet of the aiming
point using visual means.

That B-17's made made up a very important part of a "strike package" to
which
the Germans could find no answer.

That the Germans denuded other fronts of day fighters to combat the
unescorted
B-17's, when the 8th AF was only sending a few dozen on any given raid.

That on three days during May 1944, the USAAF reduced German synthetic oil
production by 50%. By September, largely due to raids by USAAF heavy bombers,
the Luftwaffe was receiving 1/15th of its required fuel allocation.

That without this havoc wreaked largely by the USAAF, RAF Bomber Command
could
not have operated over Germany at all.

That B-17's are offically credited with shooting down more German aircraft
than
all other USAAF aircraft types COMBINED (including fighter types). Though
B-17
gunner claims were wildly inflated, they were still very deadly and
dangerous.
At least two high scoring German aces were killed in combat with B-17's. A
high scoring night fighter ace, whose aircraft had not been touch in months
in
combat with the RAF, was killed in his first combat with B-24's.

Without a fleet of B-17's in place in England at the start of 1944, no
invasion
of Europe would have been possible. This because the Germans showed they
would
only fight for the type of targets that could only be struck by B-17's, and
her
stablemate, the B-24.

As Dr. Russell Weigley notes in "Eisenhower's Lieutenants", during the spring
and summer of 1944 the Allies held victory through air power in their grasp,
but did not persevere for the kill.

Walt



It's no use Walt. You will never get these guys to admit that we won the war.
(sheesh)


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Subject: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
From: Stephen Harding
Date: 4/20/04 5:18 AM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

Add to this the varying experience and capabilities of individual
groups, squadrons or bombardiers, I don't know why bombing in
WWII has to be labeled "inaccurate" in the context of the times
or judged no better than area bombing.

It is only labelled innacurate by ground forces who hate to give the USAAC
credit for anytting and wannabees who don't know any better. For accuracy see
the strike photos on my website.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Cub Driver wrote:
On 19 Apr 2004 17:35:16 GMT, ost (Chris Mark) wrote:

I doubt there is an error-free history published, and some of them seem
inexplicable. I remember reading David Halberstam's "The Reckoning,"

In "A Bright and Shining Lie," there's a photograph of a B-26 Marauder
of the type used in Vietnam

That of course probably wasn't the author's fault, though he ought to
have checked the photos as well as his text.

Heck, I occasionally get confused over the A-26/B-26 Invader and the
B-26 Marauder. They really should have just left the Invader as the
A-26.

--
Marc Reeve
actual email address after removal of 4s & spaces is
c4m4r4a4m4a4n a4t c4r4u4z4i4o d4o4t c4o4m

"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Subject: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
From: "Keith Willshaw"

They were switched to invasion targets too. The reality is that
the heavies were required to attack the transportation network
and defences in germany and

The heavy lifitng on the transportation targets wwas handled by the 9th
Air
Force using B-26's and P-47's to attack bridges, marshalling yards, rail
lines,
crossroads, ordnance depots etc. It was called tactical bombing and the
9th
was a tactical air force. See strike photos of these missions on my
website.


For much of the war that was true and I certainly have no intention
of denigrating the valiant efforts of the 9th AF

However in the run up to the invasion in 1944 RAF bomber command dropped
98,000 tons of bombs on transportation targets and a further 93,000 tons
on defences and troop concentrations. Between April and August 1944
such operations were the mainstay for the heavies.

Keith

WalterM140 wrote in message ...

Address these points:

The question becomes why should anyone address the points given
Walter ignores the replies that hurt his fiction.

That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far
worse than the RAF did.

Incorrect, Walter has a small selected set of quotes from some Germans
he tries to pretend mean all Germans and that their quotes are supposed
to prove Walter's claims. For a start put Coastal Command's record into
the mix.

That during 1944 over 1/3 of 8th AF bombs hit within 1,000 feet of the aiming
point using visual means.

Last time Walter actually showed this he simply took the monthly accuracy
reports, summed and then divided by 12, assuming the 8th dropped exactly
the same amount of bombs in each month in 1944.

The USSBS bombing accuracy report notes in the last 4 months of 1944
the 8th managed 30% of bombs within 1,000 feet in good visibility and
9.4% in bad visibility when visual bombing was used. For every 5 tons
of bombs dropped in good visibility in this period 3 tons was dropped in
poor visibility, overall accuracy, within 1,000 feet for the 4 months was
actually 22.4%.

That B-17's made made up a very important part of a "strike package" to which
the Germans could find no answer.

The answer was the jets, mainly the Me262, backed up by improvements
in the standard Fw190 and Bf109 plus exotics like the Do335.

If the B-17 is that good agitate to bring it back into service as a bomber.

That the Germans denuded other fronts of day fighters to combat the unescorted
B-17's, when the 8th AF was only sending a few dozen on any given raid.

Basically a junk claim, overstating the number of fighters moved and when
they moved and downplaying the number of USAAF bombers raiding.

That on three days during May 1944, the USAAF reduced German synthetic oil
production by 50%.

Junk claim, the raids of 12 May 1944 cut avgas production from
5,845 tons/day to 4,821 tons/day, production had rebounded to
5,541 tons/day on 27 May. Two days of raids cut production back
to 2,775 tons/day, and there was little recovery before further raids
were done. This is avgas, not German synthetic oil, from the Speer
30 June 1944 oil report to Hitler.

To give you an idea about fluctuations in daily numbers 7 June was
1,823 tons, 8 June 3,718 tons, 9 June 2,756 tons, with no allied raids.

The avgas results are impressive enough, but they have to be
exaggerated it seems. Spaatz seems to have decided to ensure
his strikes would have the best chance to succeed by waiting until
very good weather was possible.

By September, largely due to raids by USAAF heavy bombers,
the Luftwaffe was receiving 1/15th of its required fuel allocation.

The Speer oil reports indicate Walter needs to quantify largely.
Since the oil reports note drops in avgas production after USAAF
and RAF raids. The USSBS credits the USAAF with 16,386 tons
of bombs on Hydrogenation plants May to August 1944, the RAF
with 4,538 tons.

It seems the average avgas production from hydrogenation plants
in late 1943/early 1944 was 172,300 tons/month, broken down
by plant the top 7 were Poelitz 45,000, Gelsenkirchen 29,000,
Leuna and Brux both 20,000, Sholven/Beur 16,000, Bohlen 15,000,
Wessling 10,000 tons/month, with the other plants making the rest.

The RAF attacked Gelsenkirchen, Sholven and Wessling to the
end of August 1944.

That without this havoc wreaked largely by the USAAF, RAF Bomber
Command could not have operated over Germany at all.

Walter's usual junk claim, just ignore the drop in loss rates in mid July
1944 just after the capture of a Ju88G nightfighter for a start.

That B-17's are offically credited with shooting down more German aircraft than
all other USAAF aircraft types COMBINED (including fighter types). Though B-17
gunner claims were wildly inflated, they were still very deadly and dangerous.

The B-17/24 versus German fighters in 1943 was still a losing
proposition for the bomber in terms of numbers shot down on
both sides and it became steadily worse for the bombers.

At least two high scoring German aces were killed in combat with B-17's. A
high scoring night fighter ace, whose aircraft had not been touch in months in
combat with the RAF, was killed in his first combat with B-24's.

Walter will simply keep repeating this claim as if it is proof the B-17
was a heavy fighter in disguise, as opposed to removing machine guns
and gunners to carry more bombs and therefore do fewer sorties for
the same damage on the ground. The USSBS noted the more bombers
sent the lower the overall accuracy for example.

Without a fleet of B-17's in place in England at the start of 1944, no invasion
of Europe would have been possible. This because the Germans showed
they would only fight for the type of targets that could only be struck by B-17's,
and her stablemate, the B-24.

Another junk claim, the Luftwaffe fought for French airspace pre invasion
or lost the ability to intervene when the invasion began. It was not essential
to bomb Germany in early 1944, very nice though as it force the Luftwaffe
fighter force away from France making the pre invasion support easier.

It will come as a shock to those allied aircraft shot down over France
in the first half of 1944 that the Germans only fought over the "type of
targets that could only be struck by B-17s and her stablemate, the B-24".
I also wonder what target had a B-17 only allowed to bomb, with assist
from B-24s marker on it. The above junk claim is actually an improvement
over the usual claims, the B-24 is granted a mention.

As Dr. Russell Weigley notes in "Eisenhower's Lieutenants", during the spring
and summer of 1944 the Allies held victory through air power in their grasp,
but did not persevere for the kill.

Ah yes, that great book on the air war in Europe 1944/45.

This is an 800 page book, including appendices etc. Looking up the index
one finds Harris is mentioned on 5 pages, Portal 4 pages, Arnold 4 pages,
Doolittle 5 pages, Coningham (2nd TAF commander) 2 pages, Quesada
(9th Air Force) 2 pages but he is mentioned under some of the 19 pages
for "IX tac". Leigh-Mallory has mentions on 15 pages, the most of any air
commander. Coming second is Spaatz with 12 pages, a biography over
2 pages, the original oil plan on 1 page, the original transport plan over 4
pages, D-day bombing 1 page, Crossbow commitments 2 pages, the
September 1944 version of the oil plan on 1 page and finally 2 pages over
his promotion to 4 star general.

As people can probably guess most of the above mentions occur on the
same pages, the sketch of the pre invasion bombing ideas and decision,
and a note on what the heavy bombers could/should have done in the post
SHAEF control period.

One of the mentions of Harris is over the attempts to bomb the Roer Dams.

The book's "home" is the US Army, it is a very bad move to use it as an
authority on the air war. For example Weigley seems to miss the fact
SHAEF "diverted" effort from oil strikes by asking for attacks on tank
and truck factories.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

"Geoffrey Sinclair" wrote in message
...
WalterM140 wrote in message
...

Address these points:

The question becomes why should anyone address the points given
Walter ignores the replies that hurt his fiction.

That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far
worse than the RAF did.

Incorrect, Walter has a small selected set of quotes from some Germans
he tries to pretend mean all Germans and that their quotes are supposed
to prove Walter's claims. For a start put Coastal Command's record into
the mix.

That during 1944 over 1/3 of 8th AF bombs hit within 1,000 feet of the
aiming
point using visual means.

Last time Walter actually showed this he simply took the monthly accuracy
reports, summed and then divided by 12, assuming the 8th dropped exactly
the same amount of bombs in each month in 1944.

The USSBS bombing accuracy report notes in the last 4 months of 1944
the 8th managed 30% of bombs within 1,000 feet in good visibility and
9.4% in bad visibility when visual bombing was used. For every 5 tons
of bombs dropped in good visibility in this period 3 tons was dropped in
poor visibility, overall accuracy, within 1,000 feet for the 4 months was
actually 22.4%.

That B-17's made made up a very important part of a "strike package" to
which
the Germans could find no answer.

The answer was the jets, mainly the Me262, backed up by improvements
in the standard Fw190 and Bf109 plus exotics like the Do335.

If the B-17 is that good agitate to bring it back into service as a
bomber.

That the Germans denuded other fronts of day fighters to combat the
unescorted
B-17's, when the 8th AF was only sending a few dozen on any given raid.

Basically a junk claim, overstating the number of fighters moved and when
they moved and downplaying the number of USAAF bombers raiding.

That on three days during May 1944, the USAAF reduced German synthetic
oil
production by 50%.

Junk claim, the raids of 12 May 1944 cut avgas production from
5,845 tons/day to 4,821 tons/day, production had rebounded to
5,541 tons/day on 27 May. Two days of raids cut production back
to 2,775 tons/day, and there was little recovery before further raids
were done. This is avgas, not German synthetic oil, from the Speer
30 June 1944 oil report to Hitler.

To give you an idea about fluctuations in daily numbers 7 June was
1,823 tons, 8 June 3,718 tons, 9 June 2,756 tons, with no allied raids.

The avgas results are impressive enough, but they have to be
exaggerated it seems. Spaatz seems to have decided to ensure
his strikes would have the best chance to succeed by waiting until
very good weather was possible.

By September, largely due to raids by USAAF heavy bombers,
the Luftwaffe was receiving 1/15th of its required fuel allocation.

The Speer oil reports indicate Walter needs to quantify largely.
Since the oil reports note drops in avgas production after USAAF
and RAF raids. The USSBS credits the USAAF with 16,386 tons
of bombs on Hydrogenation plants May to August 1944, the RAF
with 4,538 tons.

It seems the average avgas production from hydrogenation plants
in late 1943/early 1944 was 172,300 tons/month, broken down
by plant the top 7 were Poelitz 45,000, Gelsenkirchen 29,000,
Leuna and Brux both 20,000, Sholven/Beur 16,000, Bohlen 15,000,
Wessling 10,000 tons/month, with the other plants making the rest.

The RAF attacked Gelsenkirchen, Sholven and Wessling to the
end of August 1944.

That without this havoc wreaked largely by the USAAF, RAF Bomber
Command could not have operated over Germany at all.

Walter's usual junk claim, just ignore the drop in loss rates in mid July
1944 just after the capture of a Ju88G nightfighter for a start.

That B-17's are offically credited with shooting down more German
aircraft than
all other USAAF aircraft types COMBINED (including fighter types).
Though B-17
gunner claims were wildly inflated, they were still very deadly and
dangerous.

The B-17/24 versus German fighters in 1943 was still a losing
proposition for the bomber in terms of numbers shot down on
both sides and it became steadily worse for the bombers.

At least two high scoring German aces were killed in combat with B-17's.
A
high scoring night fighter ace, whose aircraft had not been touch in
months in
combat with the RAF, was killed in his first combat with B-24's.

Walter will simply keep repeating this claim as if it is proof the B-17
was a heavy fighter in disguise, as opposed to removing machine guns
and gunners to carry more bombs and therefore do fewer sorties for
the same damage on the ground. The USSBS noted the more bombers
sent the lower the overall accuracy for example.

Without a fleet of B-17's in place in England at the start of 1944, no
invasion
of Europe would have been possible. This because the Germans showed
they would only fight for the type of targets that could only be struck
by B-17's,
and her stablemate, the B-24.

Another junk claim, the Luftwaffe fought for French airspace pre invasion
or lost the ability to intervene when the invasion began. It was not
essential
to bomb Germany in early 1944, very nice though as it force the Luftwaffe
fighter force away from France making the pre invasion support easier.

It will come as a shock to those allied aircraft shot down over France
in the first half of 1944 that the Germans only fought over the "type of
targets that could only be struck by B-17s and her stablemate, the B-24".
I also wonder what target had a B-17 only allowed to bomb, with assist
from B-24s marker on it. The above junk claim is actually an improvement
over the usual claims, the B-24 is granted a mention.

As Dr. Russell Weigley notes in "Eisenhower's Lieutenants", during the
spring
and summer of 1944 the Allies held victory through air power in their
grasp,
but did not persevere for the kill.

Ah yes, that great book on the air war in Europe 1944/45.

This is an 800 page book, including appendices etc. Looking up the index
one finds Harris is mentioned on 5 pages, Portal 4 pages, Arnold 4 pages,
Doolittle 5 pages, Coningham (2nd TAF commander) 2 pages, Quesada
(9th Air Force) 2 pages but he is mentioned under some of the 19 pages
for "IX tac". Leigh-Mallory has mentions on 15 pages, the most of any air
commander. Coming second is Spaatz with 12 pages, a biography over
2 pages, the original oil plan on 1 page, the original transport plan over
4
pages, D-day bombing 1 page, Crossbow commitments 2 pages, the
September 1944 version of the oil plan on 1 page and finally 2 pages over
his promotion to 4 star general.

As people can probably guess most of the above mentions occur on the
same pages, the sketch of the pre invasion bombing ideas and decision,
and a note on what the heavy bombers could/should have done in the post
SHAEF control period.

One of the mentions of Harris is over the attempts to bomb the Roer Dams.

The book's "home" is the US Army, it is a very bad move to use it as an
authority on the air war. For example Weigley seems to miss the fact
SHAEF "diverted" effort from oil strikes by asking for attacks on tank
and truck factories.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.