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More long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids, with added nationalistic abuse (was: #1 Jet of World War II)



 
 
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  #1  
Old August 19th 03, 11:23 AM
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised
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Default More long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids, with added nationalistic abuse (was: #1 Jet of World War II)

On Mon, 18 Aug 2003 20:56:13 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

[snip agreed points... err, I mean customary imperialistic Yankee
insults and abuse]

They'd just re-allocate the bases to the relevant groups. Swap a
grass strip for an asphalt one in another Group. I don't think it's a
major issue.


Not quite that simple, if you want to base them close to the U.S. daytime units. Who's going
to use the grass strips 2 Gp. would be giving up? The heavies aren't.


Ironically they did have to operate heavies from grass strips in
1940-42 with all that that suggests in terms of all-weather
operational effectiveness, but in this case 3 Group has a larger
allocation of asphalt runways. They can have some of 5 Group's more
southerly ones as well, if neccessary. In this case we don't have
Harris fulminating about the USAAF getting a disproportionate
allocation of the all-weather base construction program.

Really? I thought it had a better range and bombload, but I'm no
expert.


Slightly (but not significant in a tactical sense) better range, but only 3,000 lb. vs. 4,000
lb. bombload. Going into the Ruhr by day in 1943/early '44 at 10-15,000 feet (vs. the 20,000
feet plus of the heavies) would be a 'really bad idea' (tm).


Yes, but not a hell of a lot worse than the "Daylight Lanc" fantasy, I
mean, operational evaluation platform. I'm certain the B-25 carried
more than 3,000lbs, but maybe only over shorter distances.

I saw it fulfilling a diversionary/supporting role, hitting
airfields and less-heavily defended targets outside the major heavy
Flak belts and giving the Luftwaffe controllers headaches trying to
identify the main raiding force formations. In other words, doing for
the B-24s in 3 Group what the 2nd Bomb Division B-24s did for the
B-17s in the rest of the 8th AF historically at this point.


The mediums were doing what you say, but at shorter ranges, and there was never much doubt by
the Luftwaffe who they were owing to the very different cruise and bombing altitudes.


I still think hitting Schipol and Alkmaar with regular medium strikes
and sequential fighter sweeps before and during B-17/B24 raids being
routed over them is a good idea, and better than trying to do the same
over the Pas de Calais. Put enough B-25 raids below the higher
heavies, with enough fighter support, and the fighters with the best
opportunity for bouncing the heavies escort and forcing them to drop
external tanks will get sucked into their own private war and divert
attention from the main force.

The tactical bombers had to face the Flak when operating over western
Germany in 1945, and it was suvivable given adequate support and
decent planning.


In 1945, when much of the defense was in a state approaching collapse, and where our airpower
was overwhelming.


And when the Flak threat, which is the main issue we both have with
them in 1943-44, was much higher. If they were usable in 1945, their
main threat in regard to operational altitude was less capable in
1943. Obviously, the fighter threat is the real issue in 1943, but
the Luftwaffe could not afford to treat them like a Circus over the
Pas De Calais, and so their ability to concentrate on them and inflict
heavy attrition at their own leisure would be constrained.

And many of the tactical targets they did hit had
substantive flak defence (albeit nowhere near 1943 Ruhr levels, let
alone 1945 Politz levels). Even so, I wouldn't suggest using them as
a deep-penetration strategic force.


Seems we agree on that, then.


I see them hitting targets in Belgium, Holland and on the fringe of
the German Bight and the Ruhr. I think that's credible: the
Luftwaffe in 1943 could have given them a hard time, but only at the
expense of ignoring the heavies which would be right behind them.

Of course, the key difference between a USAAF daylight strategic
bombing effort and an RAF one would be the greater efficiency of the
latter. I mean, once we factor out all those ludicrous PX
requirements for Coca-Cola, ice-cream and signed movie star's
underwear, we should free up about 50% extra import capacity for bombs
and replacement aircraft.....


Ha! And if we could eliminate all the manhours lost/opportunites missed to morning and
afternoon tea/brewing up, we could have won the war in 1944 at the latest;-)


I thought we were resorting to ridiculously hyperbolic stereotypes for
comic effect. I can't see anybody disputing this*. Which reminds me,
time for a large wet.

[* Notice the British war effort defeding tea-production against the
encroaching Japanese prove this: note the tea-producing areas marked
with a *

1941: Malaya - Have it.
1942: Singapore - Can't be bothered
1942: Burma - Knock yourselves out.
1943: Arakan - Yawn.
1944: Imphal & Kohima en route to Assam*: Fight to the death!

also in terms of naval history:

1941: Force Z - You've got working torpedos? Rats.
1942: Java Sea - You've still got those torpedos? Ah well.
1942: Ceylon* - Back, you slant-eyed fiends!]

Next: the impact of Dougout Doug's massive personal consumption on
the coffee supply and the consequent fall of the Phillipines, 1942.

Gavin Bailey

--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell

  #2  
Old August 20th 03, 03:27 PM
Geoffrey Sinclair
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The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote in message ...

And when the Flak threat, which is the main issue we both have with
them in 1943-44, was much higher. If they were usable in 1945, their
main threat in regard to operational altitude was less capable in
1943. Obviously, the fighter threat is the real issue in 1943, but
the Luftwaffe could not afford to treat them like a Circus over the
Pas De Calais, and so their ability to concentrate on them and inflict
heavy attrition at their own leisure would be constrained.


While the amount of flak guns went up it appears the standard
"window" was an effective jammer until the end of the war, so
flak effectiveness seems to have gone down on a per gun
basis from mid 1943. Hence the USAAF's use of it.

I will drop this in since I have not seen it elsewhere,

From the British history Design and Development of Weapons,
M M Postan, D Hay, J D Scott.

It claims there were 4 basic Spitfire airframes which it labels
A, B, C and D

D was the mark 21 onwards,
C was the mark VII, VIII and most griffon marks up to XIX

A was the original which served for the marks I, II, IV. It was
stretched to do the Va, Vb, VI, PR VII and XIII and the Seafire I.

B was the airframe developed from the abortive mark III fighter,
it was used for the Vc, IX and XII, and presumably XVI. The
main change appears to be the "universal" wing.

I doubt this makes a major difference to CoG calculations in the
mark V though. It seems the fighter had quite a tight margin,
the report that for AB186 noting handling was worse with a
Rotol propeller, rather than the standard de Havilland propeller,
they were testing a modified elevator balance.

BR202 (tropical Vc) was tried with a 29 gallon rear fuselage tank,
requiring repositioning of the water tank, oxygen bottle and the
R3002 radio, the certificate of design was issued on 7th July 1942
along with official approval.

Some Spitfire Vs were flown from England to Gibraltar in early
1942, January I think, 5.5 hour flight.

Seen Morgan and Shacklady, page 150 in my copy, map of
Spitfire V range with extra fuel arrangements?

Ferry, full overload tanks, 5 minutes take off, cruise at 240 mph
with 20% fuel reserve, reinforcing radius 1140 miles.

Escort, 5 minute take off, 10 minute climb, 15 minutes maximum
power, remainder cruise at 240 mph, radius 540 miles. Given
the need for higher cruise and problems of slower bombers this
still should have meant around the German border at least. Note
the extra range required a bigger oil tank, from 7.5 or 8.5 to 14.4
gallons. Note the deeper noses on the PR versions. The book
does not state what fuel tankage is being used.

In early 1942 Sholto-Douglas was asking for tanks of up to 30
gallons in the wings. Fighter Command had realised it needed
more range to fight over France, it does not seem to have come
up with the idea it should try for Germany. Apparently with drop
tanks the Typhoon could make the German border. The RAF
in Ceylon recognised the need for longer range as well, noting
the Japanese capabilities.

Fuel tankage according to Morgan and Shacklady,

VIII 47 (upper) + 49 (lower) in front fuselage + 2 x14 (1 in each wing)
IX 48 (upper) + 37 (lower) in front fuselage (same as V) later 2x18
(1 in each wing) and 33 or 41 in rear fuselage.
XIV 36 (upper) + 48 (lower) in front fuselage + 2x12.75 (1 in each wing)
XVIII 36 (upper) +48 (lower) in front fuselage + 2x12.75 (1 in each wing)
+2x33 in rear fuselage. By the looks of it the FR version a camera
replaced one of the rear fuselage tanks.

The PR X, 47 (upper) + 48.5 (lower) in front fuselage + 2x66 (1 in each
wing) the cameras were in the rear fuselage.

The text mentions the mark IXe weights with 66 gallon rear tank.
As far as I can tell the idea of major Spitfire modifications keeps
running into the problem that until the P-47 was proven the allies
did not have another fighter that could be considered a match
for the Fw190A and Bf109G, hence the rush for the IX instead
of awaiting the mark VIII. The middle east had to do without
Spitfires until early/mid 1942 (Malta then Egypt), the major
withdrawal of mark IXs from fighter command to the squadrons
in Tunisia in early 1943.

As far as I can see the long range Spitfire requires a Merlin
60 series to be competitive, and for the forward CG, wing
fuel tanks, preferably a cut down rear fuselage for weight
reasons, a bigger tail (at least XIV size) and the rear fuselage
tanks, taking the best from the above you end up with 47 + 49
in the front fuselage 2 x 18 (1 in each wing) and 66 gallons in
the rear fuselage, total 198 gallons. Then add external tanks,
and remembering these are imperial gallons. Vickers
apparently had a proposal for 197 gallons of internal fuel, in
the above configuration. This would give a still air range of
around 1,400 miles. The mark IX ML186 was apparently
trialed in January 1945 with a 66 gallon rear tank and maybe
some of the other tanks, take of speed was 78 mph, longitudinal
stability started at 140 mph, flaps and undercarriage down
tended to make the aircraft stable again. The pilot had to have
his hand on the control stick at all times, cruising at 245 mph
at 12,000 feet meant the aircraft could not be trimmed. After
35 gallons of fuel from the rear tank had been burnt the aircraft
"stabilised".

Spitfire output by Supermarine works, (from a graph in Design
and Development of Weapons, which goes from January 1941
to December 1943, with a small quota of error when adding the
totals up)

columns are date / total for month / IV / VII / VIII / IX / XI / XII / XIV /
Seafire. There was 1 mark VI in November 1942.

Nov-42 112 / 3 / 3 / 6 / 58 / 3 / 1 / 0 / 37
Dec-42 106 / 5 / 2 / 8 / 54 / 8 / 2 / 0 / 27
Jan-43 130 / 4 / 4 / 10 / 63 / 10 / 3 / 0 / 36
Feb-43 114 / 2 / 1 / 20 / 48 / 11 / 6 / 0 / 26
Mar-43 117 / 0 / 4 / 40 / 24 / 12 / 20 / 0 / 17
Apr-43 98 / 0 / 4 / 46 / 10 / 8 / 17 / 0 / 13
May-43 126 / 0 / 10 / 43 / 18 / 27 / 0 / 28 / 0
Jun-43 110 / 0 / 7 / 76 / 6 / 14 / 7 / 0 / 0
Jul-43 105 / 0 / 5 / 81 / 0 / 12 / 7 / 0 / 0
Aug-43 124 / 0 / 5 / 96 / 0 / 19 / 4 / 0 / 0
Sep-43 133 / 0 / 5 / 104 / 0 / 20 / 4 / 0 / 0
Oct-43 133 / 0 / 3 / 108 / 0 / 19 / 0 / 3 / 0
Nov-43 125 / 0 / 8 / 88 / 0 / 19 / 0 / 10 / 0
Dec-43 124 / 0 / 16 / 76 / 0 / 22 / 0 / 10 / 0

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.


  #3  
Old August 21st 03, 08:33 AM
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised
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On Thu, 21 Aug 2003 00:27:07 +1000, "Geoffrey Sinclair"
wrote:

[snip yet more tiresome rationality and logical discourse]

I will drop this in since I have not seen it elsewhere,

From the British history Design and Development of Weapons,
M M Postan, D Hay, J D Scott.


[snipadoodledo]

B was the airframe developed from the abortive mark III fighter,
it was used for the Vc, IX and XII, and presumably XVI. The
main change appears to be the "universal" wing.

I doubt this makes a major difference to CoG calculations in the
mark V though.


Actually, I think it does for the Vb vs Vc. The longitudinal
stability problems were worse in the Vb, while the Vc had some useful
things to factor into consideration like re-raked undercarriage and
bomb/drop-tank plumbing, not to mention a different internal wing
structure which might have allowed small wing tanks. I don't think
the Vb wing had that capacity due to strength issues.

It seems the fighter had quite a tight margin,
the report that for AB186 noting handling was worse with a
Rotol propeller, rather than the standard de Havilland propeller,
they were testing a modified elevator balance.


Yes, but also note the constant buggering about with different ballast
displacements for the different props, CSUs and fuselage equipment
fitting. The Vb Trops are the worst, I think, as they carried more
weight in the rear fuselage behind the existing CoG and more weight
overall.

BR202 (tropical Vc) was tried with a 29 gallon rear fuselage tank,
requiring repositioning of the water tank, oxygen bottle and the
R3002 radio, the certificate of design was issued on 7th July 1942
along with official approval.


Some Spitfire Vs were flown from England to Gibraltar in early
1942, January I think, 5.5 hour flight.


October 1942 was the date I have for ferry flights from Gibraltar to
Malta, using the 170 gallon Boulton Paul tank and 29 gallon rear
fuselage tank tested in the summer of '42. So far as I know they were
all shipped to Gibraltar beforehand though, just like they were
shipped to Takoradi, Egypt and later on Casablanca. The ferry Spits
weren't in combat trim.

Seen Morgan and Shacklady, page 150 in my copy, map of
Spitfire V range with extra fuel arrangements?


Yes, but this seems to be related to the October 1942 Gib-Malta ferry
range, and doesn't reflect a realistic combat radius with operational
load and operational fuel reserves (the escort range given would need
a 5 hour endurance on external fuel and a 270 mile range on internal
fuel excluding 15 mins combat allowance). I honestly have
difficulties seeing any LR Spit, especially a V, getting back from
Berlin on internal fuel only as that chart seems to indicate. Relying
on external tankage to get into combat and return to base is a
non-starter, and that's how I see that chart personally.

Escort, 5 minute take off, 10 minute climb, 15 minutes maximum
power, remainder cruise at 240 mph, radius 540 miles. Given
the need for higher cruise and problems of slower bombers this
still should have meant around the German border at least. Note
the extra range required a bigger oil tank, from 7.5 or 8.5 to 14.4
gallons. Note the deeper noses on the PR versions. The book
does not state what fuel tankage is being used.


The extra oil was less of a problem with later single-piece engine
blocks (Merlin 50 and 60 upwards). 540 miles is a problematic figure
for a Mk V escort range on existing fuel, the deciding factor of which
would be the range on internal fuel to get home, not just the tankage
available in external stores. That's why I've been ranting about
rear-fuselage tanks in the Mk V. We're still not approaching the
ranges and endurance required for PR Spits, but even so the fitting of
a PR XI oil tank and nose profile is entirely possible.

In early 1942 Sholto-Douglas was asking for tanks of up to 30
gallons in the wings. Fighter Command had realised it needed
more range to fight over France, it does not seem to have come
up with the idea it should try for Germany.


If BC were wedded to a daylight campaign against Germany, this would
follow, pushed along by a torrent of invective in memos from Harris
and the CAS.

The text mentions the mark IXe weights with 66 gallon rear tank.
As far as I can tell the idea of major Spitfire modifications keeps
running into the problem that until the P-47 was proven the allies
did not have another fighter that could be considered a match
for the Fw190A and Bf109G, hence the rush for the IX instead
of awaiting the mark VIII. The middle east had to do without
Spitfires until early/mid 1942 (Malta then Egypt), the major
withdrawal of mark IXs from fighter command to the squadrons
in Tunisia in early 1943.


The RAF in the MTO were still, even after Eisenhower had pushed for Mk
IXs to supplement promised deliveries of Mk VIIIs in December 1942, on
the short end of the stick for Mk IX allocations. What we need in
this TL is a senior RAF staff constituency able to take on Fighter
Command and win, in terms of dictating fighter operations, development
and production.

[snip basically agreed spec of LR Mk IX]

[Mk VIII production figures from Postan]

That gives ACM Kramer about 550 Mk VIIIs in the second half of 1943,
or about 90 per month as I suspected.

Gavin Bailey



--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell

  #4  
Old August 21st 03, 10:15 PM
Guy Alcala
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Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:

snip Spit production data, fuel capacities

Thanks for all this, Geoffrey.

Guy

  #5  
Old August 22nd 03, 01:28 PM
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised
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On Tue, 19 Aug 2003 20:56:37 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Not quite that simple, if you want to base them close to the U.S. daytime units. Who's going
to use the grass strips 2 Gp. would be giving up? The heavies aren't.


Ironically they did have to operate heavies from grass strips in
1940-42 with all that that suggests in terms of all-weather
operational effectiveness,


I know they did, and they seem to have abandoned the idea at the first opportunity.


I know, but I was working with an earlier conversion-to-daylight frame
in mind, namely the summer of 1943, ideally before Hamburg gives
Harris some unchallengeable success to rentrench his preferred
night/area bombing strategy.

but in this case 3 Group has a larger
allocation of asphalt runways.


They can have some of 5 Group's more
southerly ones as well, if neccessary. In this case we don't have
Harris fulminating about the USAAF getting a disproportionate
allocation of the all-weather base construction program.


I just don't see the point of converting 2 Gp. to heavies with all the disruption that would
cause, when you still want a day medium bomber force.


Yes, I was talking about 3 Group re-equipping with Liberators there.
Some of their ex-Wellington bases (like Feltwell, Methwold, etc)
weren't concreted by the summer of 1943, and they need bases with
concrete runways for the Libs.

3 Gp. needs to convert from Stirlings in
any case, which are no longer participating in the main offensive, and thus (from Butch's point of
view) are almost completely ineffective.


Again, I think you're working with a later point of departure from the
existing historical timeline than me. In the summer of 1943 the
Stirling force was actually scheduled to expand by another couple of
new squadrons. Now that you've brought them to mind, they might be
useful in shallow-penetration heavily-escorted daylight raids with
their bombload.

[B-25 ops]

Yes, but not a hell of a lot worse than the "Daylight Lanc" fantasy, I
mean, operational evaluation platform. I'm certain the B-25 carried
more than 3,000lbs, but maybe only over shorter distances.


Not internally, it didn't. The B-25 bomb bay was smaller than the B-26's. Allowable loads were 1
x 2,000 lb., or 2 x 1,000/1,600 lb., or 6 x 500 lb. or some larger number (8/10/12? I forget) of
250 lbers.


The figures I have are 15,000ft loaded cruise and a 4,000lb bombload
which 2 Group were using from 1943 into 1944 from the references I've
seen. Obviously, this was for targets in France, so deeper
penetration might reduce the bombload, but it seemed to have the best
range/bombload/defensive armament characteristics of the available
bombers in 2 Group: frankly, intermediate-level penetration raids
with Bostons or Venturas (the alternatives) are a non-starter.

At some point around 1944 they realized that the 2,000 lb. station was essentially
never used, so it was removed and that made enough room for them to carry 1 extra 1,000 lb. bomb.


Bowyer claims the very first Mitchell raid in 2 Group in January 1943
(escorted by Mustang Is, interestingly enough) featured a bombload of
2 x 1,000lb and 4 x 500lb per aircraft. If this is correct, I think
you're underestimating the possible bombload, or I'm underestimating
the impact of increased fuel loading for more distant targets.

The B-26 bomb bay could carry 2 x 2,000 lb. (and occasionally did), or 4 x 1,000 lb., or 8 x 500
lb., etc. Early models (B-26, B-26A and I think some early B-26Bs) had an additional aft bomb bay
usable for small bombs, but this had first been sealed shut as being of more use for other
purposes, and then deleted from production altogether.


The British only got one allocation, initially of about 50 Marauders
in 1942, which were used in the MTO, so we'd need to come up with come
convincing operational justifications to grab those USAAF production
allocations. I'm not sure, if my figures are correct, there's any
need to replace the B-25 which after all is being operated by 2 Group
already with a very low wastage rate. Easier to expand an existing
resource than demand a new one entirely.

[2 Group ops]

I still think hitting Schipol and Alkmaar with regular medium strikes
and sequential fighter sweeps before and during B-17/B24 raids being
routed over them is a good idea, and better than trying to do the same
over the Pas de Calais. Put enough B-25 raids below the higher
heavies, with enough fighter support, and the fighters with the best
opportunity for bouncing the heavies escort and forcing them to drop
external tanks will get sucked into their own private war and divert
attention from the main force.


Pretty much what they were doing, although perhaps not that deep.


Indeed, that's the point. The whole effort would have to be
reoriented from northern France/western Belgium to focus on Holland
and nothern Belgium. With the occasional trip to industrial targets
like Knapsack, except not with unescorted Blenheims this time.
Hitting the closer industrial targets should help diffuse the flak
deployment beyond the targets hit by the 8th.

Woensdrecht (along with Lille,
Poix, Conches etc.) was a common target for B-26s in 1943, escorted by Spits. If the Spits could
get them or B-25s to Eindhoven, Gilze-Rijn, Florennes etc., it would certainly be helpful,
although the Luftwaffe was already pulling back to bases beyond medium bomber (and P-47) range in
late '43.


The real battle would soon displace beyond Spitfire range, then beyond
LR Spit and Thunderbolt range, and then the Lightnings and Mustangs
would have to carry the brunt. But this is a complementary approach.
Extending the range of the shorter-ranged fighters is an essential
force-multiplier, and will still do valuable work even when the main
Luftwaffe fighter resistance has been pushed back from the coastal and
inland belts into Germany itself.

I'm not sure that the flak threat in '45 _was_ higher. Even the heavies average bombing altitude
decreased considerably in 1945, down to the mid teens.


Not over the big targets, though. Hitting smaller towns with rail
junctions as part of the transport plan, or smaller factories in
semi-rural areas wasn't the same as tackling the Ruhr or Leipzig.

Some of that is likely due to a shift to
more tactical (and thus less well-defended) targets, but not all of it. I imagine the disruption
in production and more especially transport was affecting ammo supply, C2 was failing/being
seriously degraded, and morale was undoubtedly collapsing as well. While the percentage of damage
to flak compared to fighters was increasing, I haven't seen any evidence that it was due to
increased effectiveness of the former; rather, it seems to be due to the ever-decreasing
effectiveness of the latter.


My impression is that the overall flak threat on major target
complexes increased.

I see them hitting targets in Belgium, Holland and on the fringe of
the German Bight and the Ruhr. I think that's credible: the
Luftwaffe in 1943 could have given them a hard time, but only at the
expense of ignoring the heavies which would be right behind them.


Fine by me. The B-26s were hitting targets there (not the Bight or the Ruhr); weren't the
Mitchells?


Not often enough accordng to me, but then you're the man in charge of
Fighter ops administration.

I know they were bombing the same targets in France (and presumably coastal Belgium)
as the B-26s were. As you can see, my knowledge of 2 Gp. ops is limited.


They and the 9th hit the same kind of targets: mostly western
Holland, western Belgium and northern France, going deeper as time
progressed and the invasion period began. I want them bombing
airfields like Jever and Rheine, attempting to hit the fighter force
which will come up to dispute the path of the 8th AF. Even if the
Luftwaffe response concentrates on the tactical raids, the potential
bombing damage they can inflict will be too significant for the
experten to amble around, only looking to engage with the tactical
advantage and avoiding combat if they can't get up-sun and above in
time, like they did over the Pas de Calais. This time there will be
irate Luftwaffe brass demanding that the bombers be short down, and
never mind their attritional exchange with the enemy fighters
meanwhile. And while they were knocking down those Spitfire Vs from
the close escort, the airfield was bombed by thirty Mitchells and
another two hundred B-17s passed overhead unmolested.

Hitting more significant targets than the Circus ops will compell a
less attritionally-advantageous (for the Germans) Luftwaffe response,
and thus increase the effectiveness of the supporting raids beyond
what a couple of Typhoon squadrons bombing Poix could do.

I thought we were resorting to ridiculously hyperbolic stereotypes for
comic effect. I can't see anybody disputing this*. Which reminds me,
time for a large wet.


That will give me just enough time to slip out and get an ice cream cone then, and drink a couple
of bottles of coke on the way back. This silk underwear certainly does keep the thighs from
chafing -- What, you thought we wanted the stuff for some vicarious sexual thrill? ;-)


J. Edgar Hoover, eat your heart out.

I have to add that the critical importance of tea to the British war
effort was well-understood at the time.

******
"We're out of tea - you know what that means - the men won't put up
with it and we'll come to a grinding halt."

I sent a suitably worded signal to the Commanding General of 12th TAC:
"Out of tea period the war is about to stop period".

Within six hours a Dakota landed with enough tea on board to satisfy
us for months. Attached to one of the chests was a personal message
to me: "Keep the war going we are right behind you period."
*********

From "Spitfire into Battle" by Wilfred Duncan-Smith. Interestingly,
he also claimed a Tiger by strafing in the same campaign (south of
France, 1944):

"Continuing past Vienne, and on the open road, I spotted a Tiger tank
going as hard as it could towards Lyons. More in hope than anger I
gave it all my remaining ammunition. To my utter amazement it belched
smoke and caught fire. When I gave my report to Tim Lucas, the senior
Army Liaison Officer, he did not believe me, shaking his head and
muttering that a Tiger was too tough for the shells of a Spitfire. I
got my own back when I took him to the spot in my jeep, after we got
to Lyons on 7 September, and showed him the tank. I was there, I am
pleased to say, burnt out, with 'Bravo RAF' painted on its blackened
hull. To me the sight was worth a couple of Me109s. Apparently some
armour-piercing incendiary shells had ricohetted off the tarmac road
into the oil tank and engine - pure luck, but very satisfying."

Gavin Bailey

--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell

  #6  
Old August 23rd 03, 04:20 AM
Guy Alcala
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The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

On Tue, 19 Aug 2003 20:56:37 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Not quite that simple, if you want to base them close to the U.S. daytime units. Who's going
to use the grass strips 2 Gp. would be giving up? The heavies aren't.

Ironically they did have to operate heavies from grass strips in
1940-42 with all that that suggests in terms of all-weather
operational effectiveness,


I know they did, and they seem to have abandoned the idea at the first opportunity.


I know, but I was working with an earlier conversion-to-daylight frame
in mind, namely the summer of 1943, ideally before Hamburg gives
Harris some unchallengeable success to rentrench his preferred
night/area bombing strategy.


Okay, I was working on ACM Kramer's timeline, where the decision to switch was definitely fall '43.
Note that this wasn't based on the actual situation, more an "if we decided to to make this change,
what would such a decision entail?

snip

I just don't see the point of converting 2 Gp. to heavies with all the disruption that would
cause, when you still want a day medium bomber force.


Yes, I was talking about 3 Group re-equipping with Liberators there.
Some of their ex-Wellington bases (like Feltwell, Methwold, etc)
weren't concreted by the summer of 1943, and they need bases with
concrete runways for the Libs.


Okay, that clears up the confusion.


3 Gp. needs to convert from Stirlings in
any case, which are no longer participating in the main offensive, and thus (from Butch's point of
view) are almost completely ineffective.


Again, I think you're working with a later point of departure from the
existing historical timeline than me.


Yes.

In the summer of 1943 the
Stirling force was actually scheduled to expand by another couple of
new squadrons. Now that you've brought them to mind, they might be
useful in shallow-penetration heavily-escorted daylight raids with
their bombload.


Only for targets with light flak defenses, similar to those the mediums would go after. At least they
have dual controls, but they'd already been taken off day ops over France back in 1941?, and I don't
think the defenses had gotten any lighter since. BTW, do you have any idea why they didn't put some
extended tips on the Stirlings, as they did for the Halifax? Maybe it just would have taken too much of
a change to get them up to reasonable heights.

[B-25 ops]

Yes, but not a hell of a lot worse than the "Daylight Lanc" fantasy, I
mean, operational evaluation platform. I'm certain the B-25 carried
more than 3,000lbs, but maybe only over shorter distances.


Not internally, it didn't. The B-25 bomb bay was smaller than the B-26's. Allowable loads were 1
x 2,000 lb., or 2 x 1,000/1,600 lb., or 6 x 500 lb. or some larger number (8/10/12? I forget) of
250 lbers.


The figures I have are 15,000ft loaded cruise and a 4,000lb bombload
which 2 Group were using from 1943 into 1944 from the references I've
seen. Obviously, this was for targets in France, so deeper
penetration might reduce the bombload, but it seemed to have the best
range/bombload/defensive armament characteristics of the available
bombers in 2 Group: frankly, intermediate-level penetration raids
with Bostons or Venturas (the alternatives) are a non-starter.


Absolutely, which is why Embry wanted to go all B-25/Mosquito.

At some point around 1944 they realized that the 2,000 lb. station was essentially
never used, so it was removed and that made enough room for them to carry 1 extra 1,000 lb. bomb.


Bowyer claims the very first Mitchell raid in 2 Group in January 1943
(escorted by Mustang Is, interestingly enough) featured a bombload of
2 x 1,000lb and 4 x 500lb per aircraft. If this is correct, I think
you're underestimating the possible bombload, or I'm underestimating
the impact of increased fuel loading for more distant targets.


I suppose that load just might be possible, depending on the arrangement of the bomb racks. I don't
have a diagram of the B-25 bomb rack arrangement, and it's been awhile since I saw one up close. Plays
hell with accuracy though, carrying a mixed load like that. Max. load, internal and external, is
quoted as 5,200 lb. It's never been clear from the sources available to me whether you could carry 500
lbers externally on the wing racks the heaviest bombs specifically mentioned as carried there are 325
lb. depth charges. And a torpedo on the centerline, but I think we can ignore that. BTW, what was the
target of that first attack? Are we talking a "just nip across the channel to Calais and back" sort of
thing?

The B-26 bomb bay could carry 2 x 2,000 lb. (and occasionally did), or 4 x 1,000 lb., or 8 x 500
lb., etc. Early models (B-26, B-26A and I think some early B-26Bs) had an additional aft bomb bay
usable for small bombs, but this had first been sealed shut as being of more use for other
purposes, and then deleted from production altogether.


The British only got one allocation, initially of about 50 Marauders
in 1942, which were used in the MTO, so we'd need to come up with come
convincing operational justifications to grab those USAAF production
allocations. I'm not sure, if my figures are correct, there's any
need to replace the B-25 which after all is being operated by 2 Group
already with a very low wastage rate. Easier to expand an existing
resource than demand a new one entirely.


Oh, I wasn't implying that we switch 2 Gp. to B-26s, as the production capacity isn't there in any case
(what with Omaha switching over to B-29s). The B-25 is fine. It's odd that the USAAF and RAF wound up
using different a/c exclusively in the ETO, when you'd think it would have been far simpler to
concentrate on a single type. Both forces uses both of them in the MTO, but the B-26 benefited most
from the shorter supply lines and better infrastructure in the ETO, as the B-25 required less
maintenance and could be flown from worse airfields.

snip 2 Gp. ops areas of agreement

I'm not sure that the flak threat in '45 _was_ higher. Even the heavies average bombing altitude


decreased considerably in 1945, down to the mid teens.


Not over the big targets, though. Hitting smaller towns with rail
junctions as part of the transport plan, or smaller factories in
semi-rural areas wasn't the same as tackling the Ruhr or Leipzig.

Some of that is likely due to a shift to
more tactical (and thus less well-defended) targets, but not all of it. I imagine the disruption
in production and more especially transport was affecting ammo supply, C2 was failing/being
seriously degraded, and morale was undoubtedly collapsing as well. While the percentage of damage
to flak compared to fighters was increasing, I haven't seen any evidence that it was due to
increased effectiveness of the former; rather, it seems to be due to the ever-decreasing
effectiveness of the latter.


My impression is that the overall flak threat on major target
complexes increased.


In number of guns often true, but the C2 was worse.

I see them hitting targets in Belgium, Holland and on the fringe of
the German Bight and the Ruhr. I think that's credible: the
Luftwaffe in 1943 could have given them a hard time, but only at the
expense of ignoring the heavies which would be right behind them.


Fine by me. The B-26s were hitting targets there (not the Bight or the Ruhr); weren't the
Mitchells?


Not often enough accordng to me, but then you're the man in charge of
Fighter ops administration.

I know they were bombing the same targets in France (and presumably coastal Belgium)
as the B-26s were. As you can see, my knowledge of 2 Gp. ops is limited.


They and the 9th hit the same kind of targets: mostly western
Holland, western Belgium and northern France, going deeper as time
progressed and the invasion period began. I want them bombing
airfields like Jever and Rheine, attempting to hit the fighter force
which will come up to dispute the path of the 8th AF.


Yes, those, Deelen and Twente etc. would all be useful.

snip more noxious agreement

I thought we were resorting to ridiculously hyperbolic stereotypes for
comic effect. I can't see anybody disputing this*. Which reminds me,
time for a large wet.


That will give me just enough time to slip out and get an ice cream cone then, and drink a couple
of bottles of coke on the way back. This silk underwear certainly does keep the thighs from
chafing -- What, you thought we wanted the stuff for some vicarious sexual thrill? ;-)


J. Edgar Hoover, eat your heart out.


We draw the line at accessorizing with earrings and pearl necklaces; supposedly he didn't.

snip story confirming tea as vital to the British war effort

Guy

  #7  
Old August 24th 03, 01:06 PM
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised
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On Sat, 23 Aug 2003 03:20:19 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

[Stirlings doing daylight tactical bombing in support of B-17s]

Only for targets with light flak defenses, similar to those the mediums would go after. At least they
have dual controls, but they'd already been taken off day ops over France back in 1941?, and I don't
think the defenses had gotten any lighter since.


They weren't taken off due to heavy losses per se [3-6 Stirlings from
7 and 15 Sqns in 3 Group were used in July 1941 for Circus ops], just
that BC wanted them for the main strategic offensive and any bomber
lost in daytime or even allocated to FC was seen as a disproportionate
waste of resources from painfully small and slowly-expanding
four-engined bomber production. We're reversing that perspective
here, particularly after October 1943 when the Stirling force is baked
by sufficient production output, but by the same token is looking for
a mission as they are about to get dropped from deep-penetration
missions.

BTW, do you have any idea why they didn't put some
extended tips on the Stirlings, as they did for the Halifax? Maybe it just would have taken too much of
a change to get them up to reasonable heights.


The only effort to do this that I can see came with the
"super-Stirling" using Centaurus engines mooted by Shorts in 1941.
The Centaurus wasn't going to appear in adequate numbers in time to
have an impact on Stirling usage in the real world, meanwhile in
1941-42 the MAP and AM were unhappy with Short's chronic failure to
meet existing Sitrling production targets. Any new type or equipment
change which would further hinder production seems to have been
dismissed out of hand, although that's conjecture on my part in the
absence of hard evidence.

The ceiling of the Stirling I was regarded as a problem, but it was
hoped better engines would fix the problem, rather than changing the
airframe, i.e. by the Hercules XIs used in the Stirling III.

[2 Group B-25s using 4,000lb bombloads in January 1943]

BTW, what was the
target of that first attack? Are we talking a "just nip across the channel to Calais and back" sort of
thing?


Yes, the targets were on the Ghent-Terneuzen canal in Belgium; but on
the other hand they also carried 4,000lbs on deeper penetrations to
Brest and Normandy that I'm aware of. I was hoping you might have
some evidence of 12th AF range and bombloads to compare, or even from
ops in the SWP.

[cowardly and snivelling agreement by the colonialist Yanqui
running-dogs snipped]

J. Edgar Hoover, eat your heart out.


We draw the line at accessorizing with earrings and pearl necklaces; supposedly he didn't.

snip story confirming tea as vital to the British war effort


Well, it would help if you were aiming to contribute some badly-needed
inaccurate, nationally chauvanistic-abuse to this thread, if you could
actually manage some substantive inaccuracy. I note that so far I
have been the only contributor to succeed in adding unsupported
personal abuse to the thread so far. My victory in traditional usenet
terms is, frankly, unassailable.

Gavin Bailey


--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell

  #8  
Old September 3rd 03, 05:09 AM
Guy alcala
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
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This and several other messages in the thread seem to have eluded my
server, so I just found them on googlegroups.

(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) wrote in message ...
On Sat, 23 Aug 2003 03:20:19 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

[Stirlings doing daylight tactical bombing in support of B-17s]


snip

BTW, do you have any idea why they didn't put some
extended tips on the Stirlings, as they did for the Halifax? Maybe it just would have taken too much of
a change to get them up to reasonable heights.


The only effort to do this that I can see came with the
"super-Stirling" using Centaurus engines mooted by Shorts in 1941.
The Centaurus wasn't going to appear in adequate numbers in time to
have an impact on Stirling usage in the real world, meanwhile in
1941-42 the MAP and AM were unhappy with Short's chronic failure to
meet existing Sitrling production targets. Any new type or equipment
change which would further hinder production seems to have been
dismissed out of hand, although that's conjecture on my part in the
absence of hard evidence.


Green says they were supposed to get new wings of 135 ft.(!) span.

snip

[2 Group B-25s using 4,000lb bombloads in January 1943]

BTW, what was the
target of that first attack? Are we talking a "just nip across the channel to Calais and back" sort of
thing?


Yes, the targets were on the Ghent-Terneuzen canal in Belgium; but on
the other hand they also carried 4,000lbs on deeper penetrations to
Brest and Normandy that I'm aware of. I was hoping you might have
some evidence of 12th AF range and bombloads to compare, or even from
ops in the SWP.


I'll have to retrieve a book on the B-26 from another library, as it
compares the B-25 and B-26 in North African ops. All I have handy is
a table printed in Wagner's "American Combat Planes," labeled "AAF
Bombers in the European War, 1942-45." Here's the sortie count and
bomb tonnage for the B-25 and B-26:

B-25: 63,177 sorties; Tonnage 84,980. 1.345 Tons/sortie.

B-26: 129,943 sorties; Tonnage 169,382. 1.304 Tons/sortie.

These are presumably short tons. I've always been a bit surprised
that the average bomb load is higher for the B-25, but that gets into
too many unknown variables.


[cowardly and snivelling agreement by the colonialist Yanqui
running-dogs snipped]

J. Edgar Hoover, eat your heart out.


We draw the line at accessorizing with earrings and pearl necklaces; supposedly he didn't.

snip story confirming tea as vital to the British war effort


Well, it would help if you were aiming to contribute some badly-needed
inaccurate, nationally chauvanistic-abuse to this thread, if you could
actually manage some substantive inaccuracy. I note that so far I
have been the only contributor to succeed in adding unsupported
personal abuse to the thread so far. My victory in traditional usenet
terms is, frankly, unassailable.


True. I blame my upbringing. How was I to know that opinions based
rational analysis as free as possible of emotional attachment to the
subject matter, would be considered so passe'? Even when I try and
make some really outrageous, wholly partisan and wildly inaccurate
statement, I find facts and weaselly caveats creeping back in. Oh,
the shame of it, that I'm so ill-suited for the majority of Internet
discourse.

Guy
  #10  
Old September 3rd 03, 05:17 AM
Guy alcala
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(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) wrote in message ...
On Thu, 21 Aug 2003 00:27:07 +1000, "Geoffrey Sinclair"
wrote:

[snip yet more tiresome rationality and logical discourse]

I will drop this in since I have not seen it elsewhere,

From the British history Design and Development of Weapons,
M M Postan, D Hay, J D Scott.


[snipadoodledo]

B was the airframe developed from the abortive mark III fighter,
it was used for the Vc, IX and XII, and presumably XVI. The
main change appears to be the "universal" wing.

I doubt this makes a major difference to CoG calculations in the
mark V though.


Actually, I think it does for the Vb vs Vc. The longitudinal
stability problems were worse in the Vb, while the Vc had some useful
things to factor into consideration like re-raked undercarriage and
bomb/drop-tank plumbing, not to mention a different internal wing
structure which might have allowed small wing tanks. I don't think
the Vb wing had that capacity due to strength issues.


snip

Vader states that the Mk VIIIs had the 'C' wing, which implies that
the Mk. IXs should have been able to be given LE tanks with little
difficulty. I'm under the impression that the substantive changes to
the Mk. VII/VIII were in the fuselage, and except for the tanks the
wings were identical. Does anyone actually KNOW what the
structural/internal changes were from the Mk.V/IX etc. to the Mk.
VII/VIII? We all know about the tail wheel, but there had to be more
than that.

Guy
 




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