What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam

Juvat wrote:

Ed Rasimus posted:

The continual deployment (despite the fairly dismal combat
effectiveness) of the F-102 during SEA seems to disagree with your
last statement here.

Fair enough, and fairly close in the details, I believe that F-102s
were gone from SEA by Jul 1970. Yes? No?

No. At least as I recall, and posted. There were still F-102s deployed
in '72 when I was back at Korat in the F-4. Danang and Udorn I
believe. But, I've been wrong in the past....there was, after all, the
fateful decision to marry my first wife.

I should have posited that had the NVAF threat been deem
greater...there would have been a greater force than four Dets of
roughly 6 jets each. Mea Culpa.

Realistically, the NVAF threat was small, yet, the need for an air
defense response existed and it made more sense to deploy those
specialized aircraft and retain the mission flexibility of other
tactical jets that could also carry iron up N.


No one thought the Beagles were coming, but there was a lot of
apprehension about a singleton MiG-17 or 21 making a penetration over
Laos into the Thai bases or across the DMZ to Danang. An alert
interceptor force was always deployed.

I'd be willing to speculate that "somebody" in 13th/7th AF thought
IL-28s were a threat. The reason for my statement is simply that I've
read about the Beagle threat perception in CHECO reports, inferred on
my part becasue the reports mention the Beagle being able to reach
Saigon.

I'm always bothered by the "historians" and "statisticians" who quote
from CHECO and Red Baron reports. In a few years this crap will go
unrefuted, but while a few crusty *******s are still alive, we'll
throw a bull-**** flag occasionally.

If the IL-28s, parked at Gia Lam were a threat, we should have taken
them off the ramp. We could have done it on any given day. We all knew
where they were and had the wherewithal to do it. The ROE prevented it
until '72 when we were finally allowed to jettison on the airfields.

The air attack threat was more realistically from a MiG 17 or 21 with
a pair of bombs making a quick dash in-country. During several years
of the bombing pause, the MiGs operated further south than the main
bases in Pack VI, including Vinh and Dong Hoi. It would have been well
within the capabiltiy of the little jets to make a run at NKP, Udorn,
Ubon or Danang.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

Ed Rasimus posted:


No. At least as I recall, and posted. There were still F-102s deployed
in '72 when I was back at Korat in the F-4. Danang and Udorn I
believe. But, I've been wrong in the past....

I think you are mistaken, from reading Michel referencing the F-4s
sitting alert at Udorn and flying CAPs on Laos/NVN border. Perhaps he
missed this detail.

According to Pete Stickney's post...
The 64th FIS was inactivated in November '69,
with the 509th FIS once again picking up the Don Muang det. Operations
at Da Nang ended in ealy '70, and the Don Muang det was closed in late
May. On 24 July, 1970, the 509th FIS was inactivated. The 82nd FIS,
which had been at Naha AB, and had been supplying alert dets in Korea,
inactivated in May, 71.

So my question would be...what unit in 1972 since all the PACAF F-102s
were history (so to speak). I suspect that you honestly don't know,
but that may not alter your recollection (right or wrong).

Realistically, the NVAF threat was small, yet, the need for an air
defense response existed and it made more sense to deploy those
specialized aircraft and retain the mission flexibility of other
tactical jets that could also carry iron up N.

Apparently only until Jul 70 for the 509th, and May of 71 for the 82d.

Regarding my reference to CHECO reports...

I'm always bothered by the "historians" and "statisticians" who quote
from CHECO and Red Baron reports.

Hmmm, imagine folks like myself actually believing the contemporaneous
reporting of tactics, trends, and analysis by the likes of Robert
Futrell and Warren Thompson.

I am certainly a skeptical asshole, looking for mutiple sources.

In a few years this crap will go
unrefuted, but while a few crusty *******s are still alive, we'll
throw a bull-**** flag occasionally.

Fair enough...you tossed out the F-102s still in SEA in 1972. That may
well proved to be a bull-**** flag *or* simply bull-****. Does that
mean we ignore you if you prove to be incorrect on this matter of
fact? Not at all. The problem I found with oral history is the lack of
contemporaneous documentation.

If the IL-28s, parked at Gia Lam were a threat,...

Which would support the reason for having F-102s at TSN and Don
Muang..

The air attack threat was more realistically from a MiG 17 or 21 with
a pair of bombs making a quick dash in-country...

Which explains the Det at Da Nang however long that lasted (1970
according to Stickney's research), and certainly not past Jul 72 when
the 366th TFW moved to Thailand...and Udorn Det whenever it closed.

Juvat

National Geographic Vol.128, No. 3, September 1965 "United States Air Force
Of Planes and Men" pages 302-3 has the picture you are looking for. It shows
2 Voodoos, 6 Delta Daggers, 1 Navy Sky Warrior and 1 Super Sabre. One of
the Delta Daggers pictured is 56-1161 which was lost in a Viet Cong attack
on Da Nang, Jul 1, 1965 so it had already been destroyed by the time this
picture made it to press. This was one of my favorite issues as kid growing
up as a SAC brat.


snip
Wrong. F-102's did serve in both Vietnam and Thailand (which is why
every once in a while you see a photo of a Delta Dagger in SEA camo).
If you can get a hold of an old National Geographic from that period
that covered the war (sorry, can't recall which issue...), you'll note
that a photo of Tan Son Nhut (or whatever the spelling was) showed
F-102's sitting in sandbagged revetments. I believe three were listed
as combat losses, one to a Mig, the remaining two to ground fire, and
a few others were lost during VC sapper/rocket attacks on the ground.
Served as interceptors, some escort duty, and even ground
attack--there was even an experamental program where they went after
NVA cooking fires at night with their IR Falcons. They also used their
12 unguided rockets against ground targets.

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
At a guess... Find an IR source (running engine, camp fire, etc.) with
the IR sensor, then fire unguided FFARs at IR source.

I believe the gent may be mixing up his situations a bit. There was an
experament conducted in the theater of operations where F-102's used
their IR sensor, paired with their IR Falcons, to strike heat sources
along the Ho Chi Minh Trail--more of a nuisance program than anything
else.

A modified Sidewinder got similar use (AGM-87A Focus I, apparently) -
said to be intended for use on truck headlights (visible or IR)
according to Friedman.

Wouldn't have thought the Falcon would be much use for the role, with
its reliability problems and small warhead, but if it's what you've got
I guess you use it and hope...

I gather the objective was really little more than keeping the bad
guys on-edge. Apparently the folks in charge were looking for ways to
(a) use the F-102's they already had in hand, and (b) make life for
the gomers on the HCM trail as troublesome as possible. The account I
read indicated that the usual target was *cooking fires*, in hopes of
killing a few relaxing bad guys and making them sweat over trying to
get a hot bowl of rice to go with their fermented fish heads.
Believeable when you consider some of the other even more exotic and
off-the-wall things that were considered and even tried in an effort
to interdict the NVA/VC supply routes (i.e., people sniffers, for
one), or when you consider the amount of arty that was fired for H&I
purposes (that term no longer even appears in our arty doctrine, from
what my old Redleg buddies told me).

Brooks

Juvat wrote:

Ed Rasimus posted:


No. At least as I recall, and posted. There were still F-102s deployed
in '72 when I was back at Korat in the F-4. Danang and Udorn I
believe. But, I've been wrong in the past....

I think you are mistaken, from reading Michel referencing the F-4s
sitting alert at Udorn and flying CAPs on Laos/NVN border. Perhaps he
missed this detail.

In "Clashes" Michel is dealing with MiG engagements, not with air
defense alerts. Clashes has a lot of good research behind it and
Marshall has the experience to back up that of which he writes. But,
even he makes mistakes, such as calling all the ECM pods for the war,
QRC-160.

Certainly there were F-4s on alert at Udorn and absolutely they were
flying CAP, but CAP is a different mission than air defense and alert
can be for a number of mission options--I sat alert at Korat in 105's,
but that was SAR and ground attack alert. And, I sat alert at Korat in
F-4Es, but that also was for ground attack.


According to Pete Stickney's post...
The 64th FIS was inactivated in November '69,
with the 509th FIS once again picking up the Don Muang det. Operations
at Da Nang ended in ealy '70, and the Don Muang det was closed in late
May. On 24 July, 1970, the 509th FIS was inactivated. The 82nd FIS,
which had been at Naha AB, and had been supplying alert dets in Korea,
inactivated in May, 71.

So my question would be...what unit in 1972 since all the PACAF F-102s
were history (so to speak). I suspect that you honestly don't know,
but that may not alter your recollection (right or wrong).

I honestly don't know what unit was deployed, but I'm fairly confident
in the recollection that 102s were still in SEA in '72.

Realistically, the NVAF threat was small, yet, the need for an air
defense response existed and it made more sense to deploy those
specialized aircraft and retain the mission flexibility of other
tactical jets that could also carry iron up N.

Apparently only until Jul 70 for the 509th, and May of 71 for the 82d.

Regarding my reference to CHECO reports...

I'm always bothered by the "historians" and "statisticians" who quote
from CHECO and Red Baron reports.

Hmmm, imagine folks like myself actually believing the contemporaneous
reporting of tactics, trends, and analysis by the likes of Robert
Futrell and Warren Thompson.

I certainly like Thompson. His compilation of history in "To Hanoi and
Back" is excellent. Still, I like to deal with people who actually
flew the missions more than folks who are familiar with the bowels of
the AU library and how to run a micro-fiche machine.

I am certainly a skeptical asshole, looking for mutiple sources.

In a few years this crap will go
unrefuted, but while a few crusty *******s are still alive, we'll
throw a bull-**** flag occasionally.

Fair enough...you tossed out the F-102s still in SEA in 1972. That may
well proved to be a bull-**** flag *or* simply bull-****. Does that
mean we ignore you if you prove to be incorrect on this matter of
fact? Not at all. The problem I found with oral history is the lack of
contemporaneous documentation.

If the IL-28s, parked at Gia Lam were a threat,...

Which would support the reason for having F-102s at TSN and Don
Muang..

The air attack threat was more realistically from a MiG 17 or 21 with
a pair of bombs making a quick dash in-country...

Which explains the Det at Da Nang however long that lasted (1970
according to Stickney's research), and certainly not past Jul 72 when
the 366th TFW moved to Thailand...and Udorn Det whenever it closed.

If the 366th moved out of Danang in July of '72 at the peak of
Linebacker, it's a surprise to me. Of course, I was a member of a
squadron that was deactivated at Korat in September of '72, so it's
possible. There were movements all over the theater at that time,
including the 35th and 67the TFSs coming from Kadena and the entire
354th TFW from CONUS as well as the F-4s from the 4th at S-J. And
don't forget the F-111s and even the 561st WW from George.

What was at Danang then and where did the 366th go in Thailand? Only
the Marine F-4 det?

Udorn still had a full house of F-4s and RFs until I left theater in
July of '73.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

"Juvat" wrote in message
...
Kevin Brooks blurted out:


I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the
personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were
activated and flew in Vietnam,

Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO. The
original question you will recall had to do with ANG F-102 units
called up. He posited none due to the mission. He was correct on that
score. Yes? No?

or to those "champagne unit" (your
description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam?
Methinks not...

Okay, but that's an entirely different issue from the "entitled"
gentlemen that used their position to get an officer slot in the TX
ANG...in an airplane that had next to ZERO chance of getting activated
and sent into harm's way. So I'd be willing to bet Scott would have no
problem acknowledging the excellent service of the SEA volunteers.

Is the military dedication, professionalism, or 'influence' of any other
officer who served in the Texas ANG at that time in question?
Or indeed any other non-draftee, who incidentially did not see combat during
the Vietnam years?

Or is it only some guy, who 30 years later, would become president?

Hindsight is a wonderful thing.

15 years ago, a B-52 crew performing close air support over a battlefield
was a laughable concept. They had basically a ZERO chance of 'being
activated'. Times change. Tactics and A/C roles change.

They could just as easily have changed for the -102 crews.

Pete

Juvat wrote in message . ..
Kevin Brooks blurted out:


I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the
personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were
activated and flew in Vietnam,

Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO.

No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in
their meaning and intent.

The
original question you will recall had to do with ANG F-102 units
called up. He posited none due to the mission. He was correct on that
score. Yes? No?

No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong)
because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an
interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand
(including some RAAF folks with F-86's at one point, IIRC) throughout
the period of major US involvement).


or to those "champagne unit" (your
description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam?
Methinks not...

Okay, but that's an entirely different issue from the "entitled"
gentlemen that used their position to get an officer slot in the TX
ANG...in an airplane that had next to ZERO chance of getting activated
and sent into harm's way.

Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought,
too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had
ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA
throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the
manning that supported them.


So I'd be willing to bet Scott would have no
problem acknowledging the excellent service of the SEA volunteers.

Well, since he is so willing to brush the entire 111th FIS, a unit
that did contribute pilots to fly F-102's in Vietnam, with his "I hate
GWB" brush, I would disagree that he demonstrates such willingness.


Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
last F-102's left active duty?

When?

The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that
is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, after
the US had concluded the treaty with Hanoi (source:
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/Hi...468/ch11-4.htm). They continued
in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC). So, throughout
this period of the Vietnam conflict, the Dagger remained in "front
line" service. It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the
RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident, and remained in theater throught
the time of US major involvement. Not bad for Scott's "second echelon"
fighter, as he would call it, no?


Since you did not even have a ghostly
idea that they had served in Vietnam, how the heck are we supposed to
believe your assessment of their operational status?

Again...simply from a comprehension stand point the question was ANG
F-102 sqdns recalled for SEA...NOT, I repeat NOT if any AD squadrons
served.

No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in
Vietnam, period. Which Scott managed to fumble--but hey, that's
excusable, we all make mistakes, and he admitted as much (which is
better than a lot of folks hereabouts...). But he left the ballpark
when he tried to go political and engaged in wholesale libel with his
"the Guard was a haven for draftdodgers" crap. My brother served in
the Guard at the very end of the Vietnam conflict--AFTER serving on
active duty and pulling a year flying DUSTOFF missions out of Danang
and Phu Bai...but hey, that tarbrush Scott was wielding casts a broad
stroke, does it not? ANG and ARNG units were serving in Vietnam as
well, along with a few thousand former ARNG "individual replacements"
(see what happened to the HIARNG infantry brigade that was
activated....). Then we get the attempt to tar the entire 111th FIS
because Scott does not like GWB; again, uncalled for.

Scott was correct on this score even if he simply guessed.

Not really. The F-102's went in when the curtain went up, and returned
only when it went down. ANG F-102 folks played in the same sandbox as
their AC counterparts.


As to even the
definition of 'first line", have you ever looked at what the breakdown
in the old ADC force was during that period? Take a gander at how many
of those forces you call "second echelon", I presume, were standing
alert on a routine basis.

Fair point...then read Charles J Gross book published by the Office of
Air Force History "Prelude to Total Force" The Air National Guard
1943-1969." Apparently the USAF AD Corona (generals) held the notion
the ANG was second echelon for quite awhile, highlighted by the
deployment of ANG forces to Korea for the Pueblo Crisis. The highly
successful F-100 deployment to SEA was quite the eye-opener for AD
commanders.

I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier
example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG
fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same
decade.


Not really. The degree of state control has always been exaggerated by
those who have never served in a Guard unit, which number I am
guessing from your sneering tone you would be a part of.

OK your AD and ANG service and my AD and ANG service differed greatly.

My AD and ARNG service, you mean.

I agree with Scott's POV on state control in the past (only from
asking the question of career ANG guys). YMMV

OK. Just how did the states leverage this control? Appointing
officers? Not really--they had to be vetted by a federal rec board
before the appointments were effective. Training plans? Nope--that was
controlled by the federal side. IET? Nope, because this was after it
was decided that all NG personnel would attend AC IET. Money,
organization, and/or equipment? Heck no--that was firmly the purview
of the feds. So, where was all of this state control really
manifested?


Too little, too late (in terms of backpeddling, that is). Go up and
read your first paragraph in *this* post and then come back and tell
me you were not "attacking".

OK...I don't think he was attacking.

Then you apparently share his view of the Guard as a whole during that
period. Too bad.

And I think it is fairly accurate
to postulate that the USAF didn't think the F-102 was essential in
SEA, short legs and an adversary with a token number of IL-28s.

Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the
war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air
strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense? Good way to
get a bloody nose (see what happened when we had B-29's caught on
Saipan during WWII by that "remote" threat).

Brooks


Juvat

Ed Rasimus posted:

In "Clashes" Michel is dealing with MiG engagements, not with air
defense alerts. Clashes has a lot of good research behind it and
Marshall has the experience to back up that of which he writes.

True...but wouldyou acknowledge that F-102s did fly CAPs and not
simply sitting cocked at the end of a runway? And can you agree that
the F-102 shot down by the MiG-21 in Feb 1968 was flying CAP?

Certainly there were F-4s on alert at Udorn and absolutely they were
flying CAP, but CAP is a different mission than air defense and alert
can be for a number of mission options--I sat alert at Korat in 105's,
but that was SAR and ground attack alert. And, I sat alert at Korat in
F-4Es, but that also was for ground attack.

So taking this just a little bit farther...if they were still in place
at Udorn in 1972 they just might have flown CAPs, they might have even
practiced some ACM vs the local air-to-air sqdns (13th, 555th, and TDY
523d, etc). Yet when the F-8s came to town to play, no mention of
giving the F-102s a taste. No mention of using F-102s for DACM for the
benefit of the air-to-air guys. [FWIW, Ritchie does say that the 432d
selected crews for the air-to-air mission into RP-6.]

I honestly don't know what unit was deployed, but I'm fairly confident
in the recollection that 102s were still in SEA in '72.

I certainly like Thompson. His compilation of history in "To Hanoi and
Back" is excellent.

Fair enough...since I got you to acknowledge that Thompson just might
have his **** in one sock, look at page 309 of his book. Fourth entry
down...Udorn...number of F-102s there in 1967 = 6, number there in
July 1972 = ZERO. Number of F-102s in SEA in July 1972 = ZERO.

He could be mistaken, his data is from a HQ document and not an eye
witness account.

Still, I like to deal with people who actually
flew the missions more than folks who are familiar with the bowels of
the AU library and how to run a micro-fiche machine.

I resemble that remark...Fair enough...Idle --*Chaff* --*Flare* -- I'm
just having a problem wondering whose "there i was story" to believe.

If the 366th moved out of Danang in July of '72 at the peak of
Linebacker, it's a surprise to me.

Ummm, respectfully are you being sarcastic with the last part? See
Thompson page 223...talks about the movement of the 366th from Da Nang
to Takhli in June of 1972.

So I ask the question again, sincerely, who do we believe? And why am
I doing all the citations/research?

Juvat

I posted:
Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO.

Kevin Brooks posted:
No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in
their meaning and intent.

Kevin cool your jets pardner...the title of this thread is what?

"What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam"

What does "called up" mean to you? To me it means what non-active duty
units, Guard or Reserve were activated for duty. How do you "call up"
an active duty unit?

It does NOT mean which Acitve Duty squadrons deployed. But I'd bet
that's how you're reading this thread.

No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong)

Actually he said "I don't think any were. This plane was strictly an
interceptor for shooting down bombers. No guns, no ground attack
capability."

I'm pretty sure history will confirm that F-102s were indeed
interceptors lacking a surface attack mission. I acknowledge the
kludged attempts to use it's IRST in a surface attack role, but that
was NOT it's mission (Air Defense as you acknowledge). And history
will confirm that no ANG unit was called up for active duty in SEA.

because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an
interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand
throughout the period of major US involvement).

Okay...you're absolutely right. He was incorrect WRT to the presence
of ANY F-102s.

Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought,
too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had
ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA
throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the
manning that supported them.

Come on Kevin...I'm sincerely trying to keep this on topic about ANG
F-102 sqdns and Scott's post.

ZERO chance of an ANG F-102 pilot flying combat unless he volunteered.
The issue regarding the four ANG F-100 units that deployed, it's a
great display of what the citizen airman has been willing to do for
our country from the gitgo. The USAF was very pleased with that
deployment. (Not back pedaling...before you suggest that I am)

The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that
is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, ... They continued
in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC).

I guess you won't be surprised when I was hoping for a little more
detail, like last AD sqdn date and last ANG date. Guess I'll do the
reasearch [sigh].

It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the
RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident,

You'd be hard pressed to make a case of "first" deployed after the
Gulf of Tonkin. Afterall, the 1st Air Commando (Farm Gate) guys were
already flying combat sorties from Bien Hoa before GoT, as were RF-101
guys (Able Mable) from Misawa (45th TRS) and Kadena (15th TRS). You
get the picture.

No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in
Vietnam, period.

Kevin, re-read the title of this thread. "What F-102 units were called
up for Viet Nam," not what F-102 units served in SEA. Sir you are in
error...but I bet you disagree with me.

Scott was correct on this score even if he simply guessed.

Not really.

OK...I say tomato...you say cantalope.

I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier
example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG
fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same
decade.

Phew...uhhh my bad, I was trying to keep the discussion close to
topic, sorta, hoping to keep it on SEA deployments of ANG F-102s. I
mentioned the only activations during SEA.

If you wish I can cite every ANG squadron activated for Berlin and the
deployment location, but I don't think it is germaine to F-102s in
SEA.

Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the
war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air
strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense?

Fair question, one I cannot answer. If the threat were that great,
then why not bring the superior interceptor (the F-106) in to replace
the F-102, I cannot answer that one either. I guess the F-102 was so
good at it's mission the AF only needed 24 or so in SEA (four 6 plane
Dets) and that might be proof of its effectiveness as an Interceptor.

Truly sorry for the bad blood. You have misconstrued my intent. That
being Scott was correct that no ANG F-102 unit was called up for Viet
Nam, and he was mistaken that no F-102 units served in SEA.

Juvat

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
Juvat wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks blurted out:


I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the
personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were
activated and flew in Vietnam,

Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO.

No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in
their meaning and intent.

The
original question you will recall had to do with ANG F-102 units
called up. He posited none due to the mission. He was correct on that
score. Yes? No?

No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong)
because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an
interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand
(including some RAAF folks with F-86's at one point, IIRC) throughout
the period of major US involvement).


or to those "champagne unit" (your
description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam?
Methinks not...

Okay, but that's an entirely different issue from the "entitled"
gentlemen that used their position to get an officer slot in the TX
ANG...in an airplane that had next to ZERO chance of getting activated
and sent into harm's way.

Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought,
too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had
ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA
throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the
manning that supported them.

If I recall my reading correctly(an article I read about 34 years ago), the
ANG F100 units were flying "C" models, while the Regular Air Force was
flying "D " models. A difference which may seem minor, but apparently was
significant.