Did the Germans have the Norden bombsight?

On Sat, 1 May 2004 11:42:36 +0200, "Emmanuel Gustin"
wrote:

The hit probability with such
weapons was probably far too low to justify carrying the heavy
weapons and endangering the life of the gunners.

I am continually amazed at how many planes were indeed shot down by
bomber gunners.

W/O Hazzard was flying a Lockheed Hudson light bomber (the windows of
the transport still in place!) on a solo raid of the Japanese airfield
at Akyab in May 1942. Three Nakajima Hayabusas (Oscars) chased him out
to sea. He flew at low level so they couldn't get beneath him, and
they took turns taking runs on him.

His rear gunner was the aptly named Sgt McLuckie. I'm not sure how
sophisticated his sight was, but he winged one of the Hayabusas badly
enough that it turned back to Burma. The second attack was made by Col
Kato, commander of the 64th Sentai and the most famous army fighter
pilot in Japan. (The Japanese did have some individual heroes.)
McLuckie lit up Kato's Hayabusa, and the colonel made the obligatory
suicide divide into the sea.

That was May 21?, 1942. All of Japan went into mourning, and Kato was
promoted two grades to buck general and enshrined as a war god. His
diary was published in the newspapers. It was much bigger shock to
Japan than the Midway defeat (about which the navy did not admit
much), and the whole tenor of Japanese newspapers changed to one of
bitter resolve from the previous triumphalism.

The British learned of it on the radio and decorated Hazzard. I'm not
sure about McLuckie.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
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Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

The "pickle barrel" claim originated with propagandists of the Norden
Company and the War Department, not the brave men who flew the
missions.

It was the standard the crews trained toward. Pickle barrels were common
sights in the grocery stores of the day. In fact, I have the impression they
were larger than regular barrels.

It proved pretty rare to achieve that sort of accuracy in Europe. But if you
don't set a goal, you surely can't do very well.

We know that the USAAF had to abandon the idea of bombing only in visual
conditions. There were too few days when this was possible to justify the very
expensive bomber force nor was it possible to hurt the Germans badly enough.

It proved very difficult to make accurate attacks with blind bombing methods.
In "Half a WIng, Three Engines, and a Prayer" the author relates a mission
that had a German target as primary. That target was obscured. A Belgian air
field was selected as a target of opportunity. The group made a couple of runs
on that target that weren't within the norm. Ultimately, the group broup their
bombs back to Molesworth. At the debrief the group commander said: "Next
time, leave those bombs in Germany!"

And I think that over time it became acceptable to think that any bomb that hit
Germany was a good bomb. That proved not to be the case.

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was quite critical of the
effectiveness of strategic bombing. This in no way reflects on the
courage and sacrifice of the men who flew the missions.

As Art Kramer likes to point out, the US Strategic Bombing Survey authors had
an ax to grind. Their objectivity is somewhat suspect. But obviously, as the
Germans held out until the very end and given the tremendous cost in blood and
treasure, obviously the bombing was a big disappointment.

There was a lot of disagreememt on what to bomb and a general inability to get
enough bombs on decisive targets. The Germans also expended great effort to
repair what damage was done.

The targets that the Americans chose early on, specifically aircraft factories
and ball bearing plants, proved pretty resilient to damage. The USAAF also
early on flew a lot of raids to help suppress the U-Boats. Saint Nazaire was
"flak city" well before the first US bomber went to Germany. The US effort
also suffered from poor leadership in the form of Eaker and Hunter (the fighter
commander). Once they were replaced, things immediately improved dramatically.
Of course having a big infusion of new bomb groups and Mustang equipped groups
didn't hurt either. The Americans also determined to hit oil targets, which was
the one big success of the bombing. The RAF helped on this, but Harris was
reluctant to act, and adamant that this was a waste, when it was the one target
system that could collapse the German economy.

Walt

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Fact is the factory was repeatedly attacked and the most damaging raid
of them was that by the RAF in March 1942 which destroyed 40% of the
factory


Details?


I'll ask again. Details?


From MOD Archives

Bomber Command launched its largest raid thus far of the war, in March 1942
against the large Renault factory at Boulogne-Billancourt, Paris, which was
an important source of trucks for the German military. Some 235 bombers
attacked, in an hitherto unprecedented concentration over the target - 121
per hour - which demonstrated that the risk of collision at night was lower
than feared, no accidents being suffered. The raid was a great success -
300 bombs fell directly on the factory, causing an estimated loss of
production of 2,300 trucks and destroyed 40% of the factory.

Well, that is clearly not the -most- successful attack as the 4/4/43 raid
deprived the Germans of over 3,000 lorries and 498 out of 500 bombs fell into
the factory area.

What you've also shown inadvertantly is that, given the accuracy over this
French target, defenses over German targets degraded RAF accuracy very badly
indeed.

The German night fighters in particular degraded RAF accuracy on many, in fact
most occasions, where they made an effective interception.

German defenses degraded RAF accuracy in a way that there is no parallel for
on the USAAF side. In some instances of almost fanatic resistance by the
Germans, some of the most accurate bombing of the war was still done by USAAF
units.

Two instances:

"Over 900
bombers were detailed and 886 actually dispatched over the Essex coast
for
plants in the Leipzig area; although the two leading combat wings
attacked
an FW 190 repair depot at Zwickau in the same area which, apart from
its own
importance, served to mislead the enemy as to the chief
objectives...Soon
after the leading bombers of the 3rd Division had turned north-east
after a
south-easterly thrust across Belgium, they were met by an estimated
200
enemy interceptors. Spaatz was correct in his speculation that the
Luftwaffe
would rise to meet strikes against oil plants, although at this point
the
enemy could not have known the bombers' ultimate destination. From
12.25
hrs. for 35 minutes, the two composite 4th wing formations headed for
Zwickau experienced determined oppostion. Mass saturation tactics were
pressed so close that at least one rammed a B-17. From this ordeal the
4th
emerged in some disorder. Colonel Vandevanter flying with his 385th
Group in
the lead, ordered the formation to reduce speed so that others could
reform;
this undoubtedly added to the good bombing later achieved-- the 385th
managed to place 97% of their bombs within 2,000 ft of the aiming
point.
Four times the 4th Wing was attacked on the mission, losing 11
Fortresses, 7
from the 447th group.
The 3rd division's 45th and 13th wings attacked the Brux oil plant
leaving
it burning and inoperative, while Liberators of 2nd Division achieved
similar results at Zeitz and Bohlen; great damage too, was inflicted
at
Merseburg and Lutzendorf by the 1st Division."

--"The Mighty Eighth" p. 141-42 by Roger Freeman

"Lt. Col Ross Milton, formerly of Polebrook and now of the 91st, was
allergic
to tough rides. It seemed every time he led the Wing, he would
ineveitably
wind up in the front position, whether the mission was so laid out or
not, and
the mission would meet violent opposition. Oschersleben was no
exception.
Leading the combat wing formation, he found himself in front and, for
the most
part, without fighter escort almost throughout the trip. Over an hour
before
reaching the target, the Wing was jumped by a large number of Jerry
fighters.
The lead aircraft was badly hit. An engine was lost, several cannon
shells
exploded in the cockpit, and Col Milton and Captain Everett, the
pilot, were
both painfully wounded. The Wing nevertheless ploughed through and
bombed the
target, although 13 aircraft were lost in the attack. The 91st
Group's bombs
went astray due to structural damage in the lead ship which affected
the
mounting of the bombsight, but the 381st's bombs fell true and
straight on the
MPI, and these bombs and those of the wings that followed did a
complete
demolition job on an important aircraft factory."

-"Mighty Eighth War Diary" pp. 165-66


Walt

Walt

Walt

For example the Stuvi sights used in Ju-87s and Ju-88s were highly
advanced, computerized sights for their day.

Did they ever bomb from 25,000 feet?

A few Arado 234B Jet bombers made attacks from 10,000 meters using the
Lotfe 7E conected aircraft conected to the Patin autopilot.


Stuvi was a dive bombing sight, which the Ju87-88 pilots claimed was
capable of placing the bombs exactly to the wanted spot, within few
meters accuracy.

The largest use of the Lofte and other level bombing sights on high
altitude bombing that I can imagine right now would be the Heinkel 177
raids on eastern front. The attacks on London during '44 were made in
glide I think.

I don't have the 177 resources at hand right now, but my understanding
is that these attacks, for example the destruction of Velikiye Luki
supply depots, were highly effective high altitude level bombing raids.
What altitude exactly, that I don't know, but far higher than the
general combat altitude in the eastern front, as the intercepting Soviet
pilots were reported to be having trouble reaching the Heinkels.

jok

In message , WalterM140
writes

Soon
after the leading bombers of the 3rd Division had turned north-east
after a
south-easterly thrust across Belgium, they were met by an estimated
200
enemy interceptors. Spaatz was correct in his speculation that the
Luftwaffe
would rise to meet strikes against oil plants, although at this point
the
enemy could not have known the bombers' ultimate destination.

Isn't this sentence self-contradicting?

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

Spaatz was correct in his speculation that the
Luftwaffe
would rise to meet strikes against oil plants, although at this point
the
enemy could not have known the bombers' ultimate destination.

Isn't this sentence self-contradicting?

It was a strike on an oil plant. The Germans did rise to meet it.

I'd say that once the bombers reached a certain point, the Germans knew an
important raid was in the offing. They had to respond. Don't forget that the
Germans also increased the number of flak guns around the oil facilities in
this time frame. There was no doubt that the Germans would fight for the oil
plants. They had by this time pretty much stopped opposing strikes against
France.

Walt

In message , WalterM140
writes
Spaatz was correct in his speculation that the
Luftwaffe
would rise to meet strikes against oil plants, although at this point
the
enemy could not have known the bombers' ultimate destination.

Isn't this sentence self-contradicting?

It was a strike on an oil plant. The Germans did rise to meet it.

But they didn't know the target.

I'd say that once the bombers reached a certain point, the Germans knew an
important raid was in the offing. They had to respond.

Which has nothing to do with your assertion that they had to respond to
an attack on an oil target.

Don't forget that the
Germans also increased the number of flak guns around the oil facilities in
this time frame. There was no doubt that the Germans would fight for the oil
plants. They had by this time pretty much stopped opposing strikes against
France.

Irrelevant to my point.

Mike

Irrelevant to my point.

Take it up with Roger Freeman. He wrote the text you take issue with.

Walt

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was quite critical of the
effectiveness of strategic bombing. This in no way reflects on the
courage and sacrifice of the men who flew the missions.

As Art Kramer likes to point out, the US Strategic Bombing Survey authors had
an ax to grind. Their objectivity is somewhat suspect.

Well, Art has an ax to grind, too. What was the Survey's alleged ax?

Is there any *evidence* to support that charge?

Germans held out until the very end and given the tremendous cost in blood and
treasure, obviously the bombing was a big disappointment.

I'm not so sure about that. This thread was about the accuracy of the
Norden sight. But as I've mentioned before and others have agreed,
the bombing may have been primarily to destroy the LW, not to destroy
targets on the ground. Thus the question whether the bombs landed in
a pickle barrel is irrelevant. Even if industrial production
continued, and even grew, we achieved aerial supremacy and were able
to invade Europe. So the bombing was not a "big disappointment."

vince norris

This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.
WalterM140 wrote in message ...
"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Fact is the factory was repeatedly attacked and the most damaging raid
of them was that by the RAF in March 1942 which destroyed 40% of the
factory

From MOD Archives

Bomber Command launched its largest raid thus far of the war, in March 1942
against the large Renault factory at Boulogne-Billancourt, Paris, which was
an important source of trucks for the German military. Some 235 bombers
attacked, in an hitherto unprecedented concentration over the target - 121
per hour - which demonstrated that the risk of collision at night was lower
than feared, no accidents being suffered. The raid was a great success -
300 bombs fell directly on the factory, causing an estimated loss of
production of 2,300 trucks and destroyed 40% of the factory.

Well, that is clearly not the -most- successful attack as the 4/4/43 raid
deprived the Germans of over 3,000 lorries and 498 out of 500 bombs fell
into the factory area.

Firstly the quote says target area, not factory area secondly the reality
is one raid can be more damaging and the other cause more production
loss, people can be reassigned to say night shift in order to get around
damaged machinery.

The 305th deceived a DUC for the mission, which makes it look like
a very above average USAAF raid.

What you've also shown inadvertantly is that, given the accuracy over this
French target, defenses over German targets degraded RAF accuracy
very badly indeed.

So we are busy working through Walter's fictional view of the war, still to
come is the attempt to claim the RAF did not drop any 4,000 pound bombs
on Germany before September 1944, amongst others.

Walter will ignore the loss of accuracy with distance that all bombers
suffer from, and night bombers in particular. The navigation errors,
the problems with long distance weather forecasts.

The German night fighters in particular degraded RAF accuracy on many,
in fact most occasions, where they made an effective interception.

Effective interception will no doubt be defined as an interception
where Walter thinks accuracy was reduced.

Walter may try and trot out his "proof" of this, RAF raids on Berlin in
winter 1943, just about the hardest target in the book. He will then use
ideas like measuring accuracy from the official aiming point even when
the pathfinders marked another point 1 to 2 miles away.

Not to mention he is comparing RAF bombers under flak and fighter
attack when bombing to USAAF bombers under flak attack only.

German defenses degraded RAF accuracy in a way that there is no parallel
for on the USAAF side. In some instances of almost fanatic resistance by the
Germans, some of the most accurate bombing of the war was still done by
USAAF units.

Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".

The USAAF people do not need this sort of junk thrown at them, that
they need this sort of bias to look good.

We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human. Not
super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
error with an increase in the flak defences.

Bomber Command had its creep back problems.

Welcome to humanity and the fact the men went out and did their job.

Two instances:

"Over 900 bombers were detailed and 886 actually dispatched
over the Essex coast for plants in the Leipzig area; although the
two leading combat wings attacked an FW 190 repair depot at
Zwickau in the same area which, apart from its own
importance, served to mislead the enemy as to the chief
objectives...Soon after the leading bombers of the 3rd Division
had turned north-east after a south-easterly thrust across Belgium,
they were met by an estimated 200 enemy interceptors. Spaatz
was correct in his speculation that the Luftwaffe would rise to meet
strikes against oil plants, although at this point the
enemy could not have known the bombers' ultimate destination. From
12.25 hrs. for 35 minutes, the two composite 4th wing formations headed for
Zwickau experienced determined oppostion. Mass saturation tactics were
pressed so close that at least one rammed a B-17. From this ordeal the
4th emerged in some disorder. Colonel Vandevanter flying with his 385th
Group in the lead, ordered the formation to reduce speed so that others could
reform; this undoubtedly added to the good bombing later achieved-- the 385th
managed to place 97% of their bombs within 2,000 ft of the aiming
point. Four times the 4th Wing was attacked on the mission, losing 11
Fortresses, 7 from the 447th group.
The 3rd division's 45th and 13th wings attacked the Brux oil plant
leaving it burning and inoperative, while Liberators of 2nd Division achieved
similar results at Zeitz and Bohlen; great damage too, was inflicted at
Merseburg and Lutzendorf by the 1st Division."

--"The Mighty Eighth" p. 141-42 by Roger Freeman

And yes, Spaatz did not tell the Luftwaffe he was after oil targets that
day, it was good flying weather and the Luftwaffe reacted.

This is the usual stuff, mission 353, 12 May 1944, 1st Bomb Division
2 MIA and 3 written off, 2nd Bomb Division 3 MIA and 5 written off
3rd Bomb Division 41 MIA and 1 written off. "Strong enemy fighter
reaction against leading elements of 3rd Bomb Division." The
96th lost 12 the 452nd 14 bombers. There were 42 losses from 295
despatched, 258 effective sorties, so these two groups lost over half
the total lost.

I should add the 447th group lost 7 aircraft, the rest no more than 2,
the 385th group, praised above lost 2 aircraft including one that
as abandoned over the Thames, and we can presume it was the
best bombing, otherwise why include the result. Look like the
385th took heavy fighter fire or rather managed to escape the
fight but with some disorganisation?

So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
fanatic resistance". Says it all really. Last time this quote was
trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
B-17 was.

By the way the Germans reported around an 18% drop in avgas
production as a result of the 12 May raids, down from 5,845
tons per day to 4,821 tons per day. Zeitz, attacked by the 2nd
bomb division is said to have lost all production for a time
according to the USSBS, Leuna attacked by the 1st bomb
division also lost 100% of production for two weeks.

So most of the loss appears to come from the other two strikes,
not the one on Zwickau and Brux, which would indicate the raid
overall was the least effective. Zeitz lost 519 tons per day of
production of all fuels (not avgas) due to the 12 May raids.

So now we go to 11 January 1944,

"Lt. Col Ross Milton, formerly of Polebrook and now of the 91st, was
allergic to tough rides. It seemed every time he led the Wing, he would
ineveitably wind up in the front position, whether the mission was so laid
out or not, and the mission would meet violent opposition. Oschersleben
was no exception. Leading the combat wing formation, he found himself
in front and, for the most part, without fighter escort almost throughout the trip.
Over an hour before reaching the target, the Wing was jumped by a large
number of Jerry fighters. The lead aircraft was badly hit. An engine was lost,
several cannon shells exploded in the cockpit, and Col Milton and Captain
Everett, the pilot, were both painfully wounded. The Wing nevertheless ploughed
through and bombed the target, although 13 aircraft were lost in the attack.
The 91st Group's bombs went astray due to structural damage in the lead ship
which affected the mounting of the bombsight, but the 381st's bombs fell true
and straight on the MPI, and these bombs and those of the wings that followed
did a complete demolition job on an important aircraft factory."

-"Mighty Eighth War Diary" pp. 165-66

Note Freeman is quoting the wartime assessments, not the actual
damage report put together by the Germans. The USSBS notes
the acceptances from the Argo plant were 12/43 39, 1/44 67, 2/44
22, 3/44 111. Not exactly a complete demolition job.

Mission 182, 177 B-17s to Oschersleben, lost 34 plus 2 written off,
the 381st lost 8 aircraft that day, so this is an example of a USAAF
formation holding together under heavy attack. The point to make
is if this were the rule that Walter's fiction tries to claim it is then there
would be no necessity to highlight it.

The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.

The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
super human to refute the fiction.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.