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#61
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What was the Survey's alleged ax? Us Bus set out to prove that strategic bombing won the war, in order to bolster the case for an independent USAF. Or so it is often said. all the best -- Dan Ford email: (put Cubdriver in subject line) The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org |
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Cub Driver wrote:
What was the Survey's alleged ax? Us Bus set out to prove that strategic bombing won the war, in order to bolster the case for an independent USAF. Or so it is often said. But it's also been said that it was an attempt by Army ground officers to prove that bombing didn't do much to win the war. I didn't realize the Survey was begun even before the war was over in Europe, and four of the survey members were actually killed in action. The members of the survey consisted of 300 civilians along with 350 officers and 500 enlisted men, so it was a large effort. Besides looking over targets themselves for the effects of the bombings, they also looked for German war records as well, which were found in offices, private homes, safe-deposit boxes, in barns, caves, in one occasion a hen-house and in two occasions coffins! Given the generally favorable conclusions toward air power of the survey, it seems a tough sell to call it an attempt to degrade effectiveness of this form of war making. But I've been unable to find, in my very cursory look, exactly *who* did the survey; largely USAAF or Army ground personnel? The list of "officers of the survey" in the report foreward lists no rank along with the names, so they seem simply to be civilians from the War Dept [along with the Sect'y as well]. Since so many people were involved in making the survey [in Europe; there was a Pacific one too], it would seem any attempt to "spin" the results would have to come from higher ups, in the overall Army or War Dept command. SMH SMH |
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Mr. Sinclair in his usual carping manner:
Firstly the quote says target area, not factory area secondly the reality is one raid can be more damaging and the other cause more production loss, people can be reassigned to say night shift in order to get around damaged machinery. So what? The 305th deceived a DUC for the mission, which makes it look like a very above average USAAF raid. Of a type far beyond the capacity of the RAF. What you've also shown inadvertantly is that, given the accuracy over this French target, defenses over German targets degraded RAF accuracy very badly indeed. So we are busy working through Walter's fictional view of the war, still to come is the attempt to claim the RAF did not drop any 4,000 pound bombs on Germany before September 1944, amongst others. You're being very careful, because you know what Martn Middlebrooks said in "The Berlin Raids" backs me up. The RAF was deterred by the German defenses in a way that has no parallel with the USAAF. Walter will ignore the loss of accuracy with distance that all bombers suffer from, and night bombers in particular. The navigation errors, the problems with long distance weather forecasts. It's correct that night bombers were more inaccurate than day bombers. You couldn't find that ol' pickle barrel in a Lancaster. Only B-17's and B-24's could find them. The German night fighters in particular degraded RAF accuracy on many, in fact most occasions, where they made an effective interception. Effective interception will no doubt be defined as an interception where Walter thinks accuracy was reduced. Me, and the official history: "In January the British losses rose to 6.15 percent of all sorties against Berlin and to 7.2 per cent against Stettin, Brunswick and Madgeburg. But the effectiveness of the German defenses was not confined to destruction. Harrassed all the way to their distant targets with bombs on board, many of the bombers were forced to turn back in a damaged condition. Combat and evasive action scattered the remainder over the sky so that they no longer arrived on the target as a coherent force. Much as Berlin and the other cities suffered from the bombing terror of the winter of 1943/44, they were spared the total extinction that had been the enemy's prognosis. To quote from the British official history, "The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany": "Bomber Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter force, to draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse its effort and to persue its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto. ... The Battle of Berlin was more than a failure. It was a defeat." Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.339 by Cajus Bekker And consider this text from "The Berlin Raids" by Martin Middlebrook: "Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen." -- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks "The raid proceded in no better, no worse, manner than so many raids beyond the range of oboe. Enough of the 49 pathfinder backers-up and re-centerers arrived to produce a steady supply of green TIs. The planned route from the south east was never achieved. It is clear from the evidence of bombing photographs, that once the early raid markers and bombs were seen to go down, both the pathfinders backers-up and the main force swung in from due south, neither being prepared to spend the extra time in the target area flying to a theoretical turning point futher on." They were not prepared to fly further to the briefed point because they were being heavily engaged by night fighters. Middlebrook makes that plain. "Many of the Main Force crews were bombing the first markers they saw, instead of the centre of the markers as ordered, or were dropping short of the markers; a long 'creepback' developed. The night was clear. Bomber Command's Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas." Ibid p. 66 So we can see that although the RAF had a fairly good attack against the Renault factory near Paris -- although not as good as the 8th AF raid of 4/4/43 -- that accuracy did not translate onto German targets. The RAF was deterred by the NJG in a way that has no parallel on the USAAF side. Walter may try and trot out his "proof" of this, RAF raids on Berlin in winter 1943, just about the hardest target in the book. Are you saying it was darker over Germany than it was over France? He will then use ideas like measuring accuracy from the official aiming point even when the pathfinders marked another point 1 to 2 miles away. Wow. Looks like the Pathfinders had a tough time locating that ol' pickle barrel, huh? Not to mention he is comparing RAF bombers under flak and fighter attack when bombing to USAAF bombers under flak attack only. I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that the night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day fighters were. German defenses degraded RAF accuracy in a way that there is no parallel for on the USAAF side. In some instances of almost fanatic resistance by the Germans, some of the most accurate bombing of the war was still done by USAAF units. Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical". The USAAF people do not need this sort of junk thrown at them, that they need this sort of bias to look good. We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports 39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human. Not super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing error with an increase in the flak defences. Bomber Command had its creep back problems. Welcome to humanity and the fact the men went out and did their job. Two instances: "Over 900 bombers were detailed and 886 actually dispatched over the Essex coast for plants in the Leipzig area; although the two leading combat wings attacked an FW 190 repair depot at Zwickau in the same area which, apart from its own importance, served to mislead the enemy as to the chief objectives...Soon after the leading bombers of the 3rd Division had turned north-east after a south-easterly thrust across Belgium, they were met by an estimated 200 enemy interceptors. Spaatz was correct in his speculation that the Luftwaffe would rise to meet strikes against oil plants, although at this point the enemy could not have known the bombers' ultimate destination. From 12.25 hrs. for 35 minutes, the two composite 4th wing formations headed for Zwickau experienced determined oppostion. Mass saturation tactics were pressed so close that at least one rammed a B-17. From this ordeal the 4th emerged in some disorder. Colonel Vandevanter flying with his 385th Group in the lead, ordered the formation to reduce speed so that others could eform; this undoubtedly added to the good bombing later achieved-- the 385th managed to place 97% of their bombs within 2,000 ft of the aiming point. Four times the 4th Wing was attacked on the mission, losing 11 Fortresses, 7 from the 447th group. The 3rd division's 45th and 13th wings attacked the Brux oil plant leaving it burning and inoperative, while Liberators of 2nd Division achieved similar results at Zeitz and Bohlen; great damage too, was inflicted at Merseburg and Lutzendorf by the 1st Division." --"The Mighty Eighth" p. 141-42 by Roger Freeman And yes, Spaatz did not tell the Luftwaffe he was after oil targets that day, it was good flying weather and the Luftwaffe reacted. This is the usual stuff, mission 353, 12 May 1944, 1st Bomb Division 2 MIA and 3 written off, 2nd Bomb Division 3 MIA and 5 written off 3rd Bomb Division 41 MIA and 1 written off. "Strong enemy fighter reaction against leading elements of 3rd Bomb Division." The 96th lost 12 the 452nd 14 bombers. There were 42 losses from 295 despatched, 258 effective sorties, so these two groups lost over half the total lost. I should add the 447th group lost 7 aircraft, the rest no more than 2, the 385th group, praised above lost 2 aircraft including one that as abandoned over the Thames, and we can presume it was the best bombing, otherwise why include the result. Look like the 385th took heavy fighter fire or rather managed to escape the fight but with some disorganisation? So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost fanatic resistance". Says it all really. Last time this quote was trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted B-17 was. Unescorted B-17's could achieve outstanding accuracy despite the worst the Germans could do. The 385th formation was in "some disorder" from the German attacks, but still managed to get a good bomb pattern. They were not deterred by the German defenses in the same sort of way the official British history says the RAF was. By the way the Germans reported around an 18% drop in avgas production as a result of the 12 May raids, down from 5,845 tons per day to 4,821 tons per day. Zeitz, attacked by the 2nd bomb division is said to have lost all production for a time according to the USSBS, Leuna attacked by the 1st bomb division also lost 100% of production for two weeks. So most of the loss appears to come from the other two strikes, not the one on Zwickau and Brux, which would indicate the raid overall was the least effective. Zeitz lost 519 tons per day of production of all fuels (not avgas) due to the 12 May raids. So now we go to 11 January 1944, "Lt. Col Ross Milton, formerly of Polebrook and now of the 91st, was allergic to tough rides. It seemed every time he led the Wing, he would ineveitably wind up in the front position, whether the mission was so laid out or not, and the mission would meet violent opposition. Oschersleben was no exception. Leading the combat wing formation, he found himself in front and, for the most part, without fighter escort almost throughout the trip. Over an hour before reaching the target, the Wing was jumped by a large number of Jerry fighters. The lead aircraft was badly hit. An engine was lost, several cannon shells exploded in the cockpit, and Col Milton and Captain Everett, the pilot, were both painfully wounded. The Wing nevertheless ploughed through and bombed the target, although 13 aircraft were lost in the attack. The 91st Group's bombs went astray due to structural damage in the lead ship which affected the mounting of the bombsight, but the 381st's bombs fell true and straight on the MPI, and these bombs and those of the wings that followed did a complete demolition job on an important aircraft factory." -"Mighty Eighth War Diary" pp. 165-66 Note Freeman is quoting the wartime assessments, not the actual damage report put together by the Germans. The USSBS notes the acceptances from the Argo plant were 12/43 39, 1/44 67, 2/44 22, 3/44 111. Not exactly a complete demolition job. Mission 182, 177 B-17s to Oschersleben, lost 34 plus 2 written off, the 381st lost 8 aircraft that day, so this is an example of a USAAF formation holding together under heavy attack. The point to make is if this were the rule that Walter's fiction tries to claim it is then there would be no necessity to highlight it. That's just flat weird. The 303rd group also bombed Oschersleben on 1/11/44. "The first pass made at our group included 30 to 35 ME-109's and FW-190s. The low group, to our left, had three Forts go down from this first pass. We also saw three German fghters shot down by this group during this time. The No. 4 ship, lead ship of our element and on whose wing we were flying formation, had it's No. 1 engine hit. It immediately burst into flames and dropped out of formation. A few minutes later, this plane exploded. It is impossible to say who was in the "No.4 ship" that Vern Moncur saw go down. The fight was far too concentrated and violent for an accurate accounting of all the casualties, and the Group's records are unclear.' It is easier to account for the first three losses in the Hell's Angels low group that Moncur recorded. "Bad Check", a Fortress Hullar's crew had flown early in their tour, and one of the Group's original aircraft, was one of the first to go. Lt. G.S. McClellan's crew was aboard her in the No.7 slot of the low group's low squadron. Lt. Robert Sheets's crew aboard the "City of Wanette" in the squadron lead saw "Bad Check" at 12,000 feet circling in a tight turn. Other crews reported her going down with the wheels down, and Lt. James Fowler learned that night that 10 chutes were seen to come from her. Lt. McClellan was on his 18th trip and the rest of his crew was not far behind except for Lt. W.A. Fisher, the copilot from B-26s who was on his first B-17 raid. "Bad Check" was on her 45th mission. She reportedly went down some time between 1055 and 1105 near the town of Lienen, 20 miles Southwest of Osnabruck. Next to die was probably "Flak Wolf", Woddrop's favorite and the Queen that had taken Hullar's crew on their first mission. She was flown by Lt. J.W. Carothers's crew, most of whom were on their fourth mission. They were in the No.6 slot of the low group's low squadron, and from the nose of "The Flying Bitch", at the head of the low squadron's second element, Lt. E.L. Cronin, bombardier of Lt. K.A. Hoeg's crew, "saw Carothers pull off to the left and explode. Had time "to get men out. Saw three chutes plus some,objects, perhaps men." "Flak Wolfs" end was also observed by Lt. T. Lamarr Simmons aboard S for Sugar in the No.5 ,low squadron slot: "I saw several bombers explode before this, maybe three or four, but this one made a really vivid impression on me. I saw a wing fall off the plane, and then the whole fuselage just came apart with a whole bunch of pieces in the air and fire all over the place. I didn't see anybody get out." "Flak Wolf" was on her 40th raid. She crashed at Kloster Oesede, just South of Osnabruck. Lt. Hallden's No. 896 in ttle No.6 position of the low group's lead squadron was another early loss. From the No.4 squadron position, Lt. F.F. Wilson's crew in B-17G 42-31471 saw Hallden's bomber at 1055, just as an FW-190 was attacking from seven o'clock low. They reported his ship "in distress at 19,500 feet on a heading of 120 degrees...The aircraft was on fire and went out of formation into a spin. The tail section came off. Three men but no parachutes were seen." Most of Hallden's crew were on their fourth raid. No. 896 crashed near Kirchlengren, due Eastof Osnabriick and North of the Group's inbound track to the IP. The 190 that got them did not get away. Lt. Wilson's tail gunner, Sgt. W.G. Hubley, opened fire and "the fighter blew up and pilot bailed out." Hubley got credit for a kill. .. Schwaebe's crew, flying the "War Bride" in the No.2 slot of the low group's high squadron, peeled out of formation. This Fortress, which had taken Lt. Jack Hendry home from so many missions, was last seen at 17,000 feet by Lt. E.S. Harrison's crew from B 17G 42-39885 in the No.6 position of the lead group's low squadron. They reported her going down "under control" but no chutes were noted. It was the War Bride's 35th mission, and the seventh for half of Lt. Schwaebe's crew. The ship crashed near Detmold, about 30 miles Southeast of Osnabriick. These observations are consistent with what Lt. N.E. Shoup's crew, flying B-17F 41-24605 in the No.5 slot of the low group's high squadron, reported. At 1113 they saw a "B-17 out of control,-eight chutes," together with another B-17 that exploded with no chutes. Two minutes later they saw a third Fortress with the tail shot off and no chutes. At 1117 another Fortress fell. This bomber was Lt. W.A. Purcell's "Baltimore Bounce". Lt. Purcell's crew had gone on the raid as a spare, taking a.position in the lead squadron for one of four 303rd ships that aborted from the two group formations. Vern Moncur had the best view of her end: "Soon after the loss of the No.4 ship, the No.3 ship ahead of us also caught on fire in the No.1 engine and peeled out of formation. This ship exploded, also. Lt. Purcell was the pilot, and he and his crew didn't have a chance. (Purcell and I had been together through all of our training.) I then moved my ship up into the No.3 position, flying on the left wing of the Wing Leader, General Travis." The "Eight Ball's" crew saw "Baltimore Bounce" blow up, as did Lt. H.S. Dahleen's crew from B-17G 42-31183 in the No.5 slot of the lead squadron formation.... According to Darrell Gust, "Bombs were away at 11:48 and our tail gunner/observer reported an excellent clustering of bombs right on the target." The groups' photo interpretation report provides further confirmation of just how good Fawcett's aim had been: "The pattern of bomb bursts is seen centered squarely on the target with a heavy concentration of both high explosives and incendiaries scattered on and among the buildings of the plant. Three hits are seen on" a storage area in which aircraft are stored under a camouflage netting. An undetermined number of hits are seen on the Main Machine Shop, the Final Assembly Shop, and a probable Components Erecting Shop. Direct hits or near misses are seen on another Components Erecting Shop, a possible repair shop, and seven other smaller unidentified buildings...In addition, high explosive bursts are seen scattered over approximately one-third of the factory airfield and on an adjacent road °and railway. Incendiaries fell in the target area and across the railway sidings and the freight depot immediately south of the target...The high explosive bombs on the target were dropped by the 303rd lead Group and apparently by the 303rd low Group. Incendiaries dropped by the 379th Group flying high fell on the target and also immediately south of it...Fires appear to have been started in the plant as a result of the attack." The Hell's Angels had succeeded in their mission, but the enemy continued to make the Americans pay. As the formation pulled out to the north, homeward bound on a westward track running from Brunswick to Hannover, the German fighters were making attacks only slightly less intense than those going in." --"Half a Wing, Three Engines and a Prayer" pp.314-331 by Brian D. O'Neill The USAAF was not deterred by German fighter attacks the way the RAF was deterred by night fighter attacks. The 8/17/43 raid by the Fourth Bomb Wing on Regensburg was another example of very accurate bombing despite heavy opposition by the Germans. The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459 1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500 feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%. All well and good. The RAF could be deterred by the German defenses in a way that had no parallel with the USAAF. The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not super human to refute the fiction. There's no fiction involved. The RAF was deterred by the defenses over Germany in a way that has no parallel with the USAAF. The RAF raid on the Renault plant gives us an insight into exactly -how- badly Bomber Command accuracy was degraded by that opposition-- quite a lot. Walt |
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So the bombing was not a "big disappointment."
The Bomber Barons promised to win the war without having to invade at all. When you consider that the RAF had 55,000 KIA, the same number of officers killed in World War One, it has to be a disappointment. The same thing is true of the Americans. A lot of effort and relatively little return. Walt |
#65
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"Tarver Engineering" wrote in message ...
"Eunometic" wrote in message m... 1 Gyro stabalising the aim point to help the bombadier during run up while the aircraft was being jostelled and manoevered. The gyro stabilized the entire airplane along a track, once engaged. That might be conceovable but I don't know of any bombsight that worked quite like that. The computing wind correcting bombsights were, from all acounts that i've read, gyro stabalised and were able to calculate the aircrafts wind drift and thus make corrections for that error but they did not actualy gyro stabalised the aircaft. Gyrostabalisation could occur if the bombsight was switched through to the auto-pilot. Becuase of the unreliability of the link between norden and auto-pilot Art kramer has mentioned that they usually attacked using an indicator that was relayed from bombadier to pilot. 2 Continiously computing the aim point on the basis of aircraft manoevers and speed changes. (Essentaily the what the Stuvi did I suspect) All that is necessary to intercept a track along which one wishes to bomb. The Stuvi was a dive bombing sight not a level bombing sight. It computed a continious aim point as the aircraft entered a dive or glide. Accuracy in a 8000 feet to 5000 22 degree dive could be within 10 meters. Ju 88s could have both Stuvi and Lotfe 7s. 3 Providing a target tracking system that attempted to track the target on the basis of airspeed and altitude above ground. By then providing servo motors adjusted by the bombadier or pilot to adjust for the drift from the target the wind drift rate could be calculated by integration on a ball integrator and the correction applied to the continously computed aim point. The airplane automation was actually quite new and the PDI was an INS display for the many years until standalone PDIs were eliminated through the use of instrument transfer relays. 4 Corrective manoevers would then be applied either by the bombadier by signaling with a paddle to the pilot or direct via the autopilot. (I think Art Kramer mentions that the manual method was mostly used) The gyro will only hold the airplane on track for a short period and a human had to fly a heading to intercept the correct track. Some of the more advanced sights, better than the norden, would allow more manoevering or attack while the aircraft was descending. |
#66
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In article , WalterM140
writes So the bombing was not a "big disappointment." The Bomber Barons promised to win the war without having to invade at all. When you consider that the RAF had 55,000 KIA, the same number of officers killed in World War One, it has to be a disappointment. The same thing is true of the Americans. A lot of effort and relatively little return. Walt So what would have the level of German armament production have been WITHOUT the strategic bombing offensive? Why are you so determined to denigrate the RAF? Are you related to that Brennan creep? Both RAF and 8th AF Bomber Commands did a tough job to the best of their ability. To try to prove one was "better" or "worse" than the other is ridiculous. Comparisons are odious, and, on the available evidence, so are you. Just like a child calling names. Get a life. -- Peter Ying tong iddle-i po! |
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The computing wind correcting bombsights were, from all acounts that i've read, gyro stabalised and were able to calculate the aircrafts wind drift and thus make corrections for that error but they did not actualy gyro stabalised the aircaft As I understand it, the bombardier flew the airplane on the bombing run, at least on the heavies. (Must have been hell on the pilot! When you are flying the airplane, you have a feeling--however wrong it may be--that you are in control of its fate. The bomb run reduced the pilot to the status of a terror-ridden radio operator.) all the best -- Dan Ford email: (put Cubdriver in subject line) The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org |
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In message , "Gord
writes Well, I wooden know 'bout no pickle barrels but we sure gotta lotta pork barrels in our Capitol Trouble is, dropping bombs into *pork* barrels is called terrorism these days... -- When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite. W S Churchill Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk |
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This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.
WalterM140 wrote in message ... Mr. Sinclair in his usual carping manner: Walter needs to editorialise the facts away. This is quite amusing, apparently the attacks on Billancourt are an accuracy measure, a base line for how much the defences affected accuracy, but only for the RAF, not for the USAAF. Not surprising really, if the claim is 498 out of 500 USAAF "fell on the factory". This was 4 April 1943. Now go to Huls, in Germany, 22 June 1943, it was a 541 acre site, 0.845 square miles. The bombs fell over a 12 square mile area, with 20% within the factory fences, not on the factory. Given the amount of open space in the factory area we have gone from 99.6% to around 5% or less accuracy. And under the rules being used this must all be due to the effects of the defences. Just ignore the attacks on Billancourt were much more effective mainly because of the weak defences, both fighter and flak, enabling a lower bombing altitude. Choosing them as a baseline is bad enough, using it as a baseline for only one air force shows the standard agenda. It is simple really, take a couple of quotes on the RAF strategic situation, pretend they are about bombers on the tactical level, a quote from a master bomber on an area raid and ignore the problems master bombers had with such raids and the other problems that night. Having done that go find a couple of the well documented missions where USAAF bombers performed above average. Announce this as the USAAF standard and ignore the USAAF and USSBS reports on bombing accuracy and, in particular, the way defences degraded accuracy. If one RAF bomber crew flinched once it is the RAF standard, it one USAAF formation took heavy losses but bombed accurately it is the USAAF standard. Just like before when USAAF success is based on the Luftwaffe moving 4% of its fighter force but RAF success is measured on the effects on the German economy, the output of tens of millions of workers. Walter must really hate the USAAF to smear it like he does, the way he claims it needs the contest rigged to look good. Think of it this way, go find the stories of the RAF bombers that continued on to attack the target despite heavy damage on the way out, then go look for the times USAAF bomb groups missed their target, use these to compare the effects of the air forces. The men who flew the missions do not need this sort of damage to their reputations. Firstly the quote says target area, not factory area secondly the reality is one raid can be more damaging and the other cause more production loss, people can be reassigned to say night shift in order to get around damaged machinery. So what? As usual with Walter anything that disturbs his view is dismissed. The 305th deceived a DUC for the mission, which makes it look like a very above average USAAF raid. Of a type far beyond the capacity of the RAF. Yes folks, after being told an RAF raid was credited with destroying 40% of the factory Walter will simply ignore it. What you've also shown inadvertantly is that, given the accuracy over this French target, defenses over German targets degraded RAF accuracy very badly indeed. So we are busy working through Walter's fictional view of the war, still to come is the attempt to claim the RAF did not drop any 4,000 pound bombs on Germany before September 1944, amongst others. You're being very careful, because you know what Martn Middlebrooks said in "The Berlin Raids" backs me up. You know Walter is in trouble when he throws other people's names in front of his opinions. The 4,000 pound bomb idea gives a measure of his detachment from reality. Most of this post is cut and paste, it saves so much work, and gives you an idea of how Walter will simply repeat the same discredited claims over and over. The RAF was deterred by the German defenses in a way that has no parallel with the USAAF. Walter will go through the hundreds of raids launched in WWII, find good USAAF ones, find bad RAF ones, and "prove" his case with the careful selection of evidence. In this case the baseline is RAF raids on Berlin in the winter of 1943/44. Walter will ignore the loss of accuracy with distance that all bombers suffer from, and night bombers in particular. The navigation errors, the problems with long distance weather forecasts. It's correct that night bombers were more inaccurate than day bombers. You couldn't find that ol' pickle barrel in a Lancaster. Only B-17's and B-24's could find them. The USSBS went out and counted the bombs on 3 major German oil plants, they found, in late 1944 and early 1945 the night bombers were, on average more accurate than the day bombers. They also found the bigger bombs and longer raid times mean the night raids were more destructive. People know the night bombers started off with very bad accuracy, on average, but the rise of electronic aids changed that. Killing pickle barrels only matters if they are the great secret weapon, and it is interesting to note these wonder weapons were invisible to the B-26s etc as well, even when they had the same bomb sights as the B-17/24s. Makes the agenda quite clear, claim everything for the USAAF heavy bombers. The German night fighters in particular degraded RAF accuracy on many, in fact most occasions, where they made an effective interception. Effective interception will no doubt be defined as an interception where Walter thinks accuracy was reduced. By the way, Walter has never read the British Official history, relying on selected quotes of the work in other books. Me, and the official history: "In January the British losses rose to 6.15 percent of all sorties against Berlin and to 7.2 per cent against Stettin, Brunswick and Madgeburg. But the effectiveness of the German defenses was not confined to destruction. Harrassed all the way to their distant targets with bombs on board, many of the bombers were forced to turn back in a damaged condition. Combat and evasive action scattered the remainder over the sky so that they no longer arrived on the target as a coherent force. Much as Berlin and the other cities suffered from the bombing terror of the winter of 1943/44, they were spared the total extinction that had been the enemy's prognosis. Note the above quote says that bombers were shot down or forced to turn back early by the defences, nothing unique there. Now note it goes on to note how the defences disrupted the timing of the attack, again nothing unusual there (remember the claimed slow down to reorganise quote about a USAAF mission?). Timing was important, at night to arrive while the markers were visible and maximise countermeasure cover, by day to minimise smoke and dust problems and maximise fighter cover. It says nothing about healthy bombers failing to attack. To quote from the British official history, "The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany": "Bomber Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter force, to draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse its effort and to persue its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto. ... The Battle of Berlin was more than a failure. It was a defeat." Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.339 by Cajus Bekker Walter loves this quote, he continually uses it without noting it is a manufactured one. Nor that it says nothing about individual bombers, only the force as a whole, the parallel with the USAAF pull back in October 1943. The text in the official history is actually, "The Battle of Berlin was more than a failure. It was a defeat." (13 pages) "Bomber Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter force, to draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse its effort and to persue its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto. ... " From December 2000, Well yes Bekker is quoting the official history. The final two sentences are from page 193 volume 2. The first is from page 206 volume 2. Bekker makes it clear the quote is from two separate pages, without noting the final sentence appears pages before the first one. Walter has been told this before and as stated he actually has entered the text in the correct order, without noting the 13 page gap between parts of the text. So it is a non quote, since the last sentence of it appears on a page before the rest of the quote. Walter replied to the above sentence with: Well of course that is incorrect. Oh good, and there is a reason for the declaration? The way I see it reversing the order of the sentences means it is not quoting the author. Let alone the fact the final part of the "quote" is from 13 pages before. I gather Walter would be happy if posters came along and rearranged his posts to suit when replying then, and claimed them as his meaning. The "quote" is made up of two separate quotes, as Bekker makes clear in his book, without specifying what came from which page. So, Walter, why do you think it is a valid way to quote a work? The quote makes it very clear Bomber Command had been defeated in the Battle of Berlin, it had to withdraw. And it clearly shows the quote says nothing at all like the "conclusions" about deterrence on individual raids Walter has drawn, it exactly parallels the need for the 8th to pull back in October 1943. From November 2000, The text in the Official History is from the section detailing the effects of the battle of Berlin. It does not deal with any particular raid as such, it deals with the fact the defences were then usually able to inflict unsustainable losses on the attackers. In other words Bomber Command had been defeated and would need to change things to be able to continue to bomb the preferred targets, exactly the same as what faced the 8th Air Force in October 1943. To state it again, the official history is misquoted, misinterpreted and talks about the ability of Bomber Command to continue to mount a series of raids, not about the effect of the defences on a raid. From November 2000, Page 193 British Official History. Putting the text Walter really likes to use in its proper context, "The expectations of the Commander in Chief had not been fulfilled, and by that standard the Battle of Berlin had been a failure. The attacks on the capital itself had not "cost Germany the war" nor had the broader Lancaster offensive brought the enemy to, or, as events were to show, anywhere near, the point of capitulation on 1 April 1944. **Moreover, in the operational sense, the Battle of Berlin was more than a failure, it was a defeat.** The disastrous Nuremberg operation, in which the missing rate was no less than 11.8% brought the Bomber Command tactics of massed and concentrated attack against major targets to a dead stop and they were not again resumed until the entire air situation over Germany had been radically altered." (Bomber Command bombed German targets 5 times in April mainly in the south and west of the country, including an attacks to take advantage of moonlight nights, Friedrichshafen for example). To continue the quote, after removal of slightly over a paragraph where Harris talks about losses and asks for nightfighters, bottom of page 193 and on to page 194. "The implication was equally clear. The German nightfighter force had interposed itself between Bomber Command and its strategic object, at any rate in so far as the latter involved sustained operations of deep penetration. Thus, as for some time the Air Staff, and in particular, its deputy chief, Air Marshal Bottomley, had feared, the night offensive was brought to a situation dangerously similar to that which had already checked the day offensive of the US 8th Bomber Command. The operations against Schweinfurt and Nuremberg became famous as isolated disasters, but their real significance lay in the fact that they marked the culminating points, the former in the day and the latter in the night offensive, of two rising tides of insupportable casualty rates. These made the relevance, if not the means of application, of the Pointblank intermediate objective (Luftwaffe destruction) abundantly clear not only to those charges with the preparations for Overlord but also to those responsible for the continuation of the Strategic Air Offensive or, in the code of the time, the Pointblank ultimate objective. This was because they had destroyed the American theory that formations of heavy bombers would be able to defend themselves in daylight and because, equally, they had shown that the British night offensive could not be indefinitely sustained by the tactics of evasion, deception and radar counter action alone. It was well that they also introduced, only partly in the relationship of cause and effect, the era of the long range fighter which, fortunately, was no longer an insoluble technical problem." To complete it here comes the text before the rest of the text Walter uses, page 206, the previous paragraph in the history is about how it was discovered most of the night fighters were in northern Germany. "It was this which led Bomber Command to change not only its tactics but also, and in the process, its strategy. The attack on Berlin was almost broken off. In fact, there was only one further major operation against the capital in this phase of the campaign and that did not take place until the night of 24 March. Meanwhile a much greater proportion of the effort was brought to bear against towns in the Southern part of Germany and these were generally approached by southerly routes. The number of route markers which served to guide the nightfighters as well as the night bombers, was severely reduced, the attacks were often divided into two waves which approached by different ways and struck at different times and a much greater effort was thrown into diversionary operations. **Thus Bomber Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter force, to draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse its effort and to persue its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto.** The situation, in view of the fact that Berlin was by no means destroyed, meant that the Germans had already won the Battle of Berlin." The history notes the southern raids had about 2/3 the casualties of the northern raids. Now consider the following text, The 8th Air force was compelled, largely by the German day-fighter force, to draw away from its primary target, German industry, to disperse its effort and to persue its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto. .... The Battles of October 1943 were more than a failure. They were a defeat. You see Walter tries to announce any RAF defeat is absolute, no chance of coming back, the USAAF may suffer defeats but has a near instant answer and carries on. Now to the next quote. The text before the passage used by Walter is a quote from Farquier's navigator "It was a good, clear night below and we had an excellent view of the city. I was in the bomb aimers position. My main function was to assess the accuracy of the T.I.s. Johnny would then broadcast the information to all crews: "those green TIs are short - aim for the red ones further on" "disregard the TIs on your left" etc. Then he would encourage the Main Force with such comments as, "Come on in, fellows! The flak is nowhere near as bad as it looks!". He had an excellent R/T voice which came over loud and clear to all we later talked with. It no doubt helped to calm jittery nerves and, I believe, it helped produce a better concentration of bombs on the aiming point" Note how the master bomber is trying to tell the bombers there are badly placed markers. And consider this text from "The Berlin Raids" by Martin Middlebrook: "Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen." -- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks A master bomber aircraft had been used on two of the recent raids but little success had been achieved. Group captain John Searby who had successfully used the (master bomber) technique over Peenemunde says "There was a big difference between a limited "moonlight special" like Peenemunde and the area attacks which were much more difficult, with the sheer confusion of the bombing, the defences, smoke, fires and, of course, the terrific mass of searchlights. It was not like the relatively easy target conditions of Peenemunde. The master bomber on a area attack was a refinement that did not make much difference, because a chap could just could not see the ground properly. "And Wing Commander Ken Burns, who had been the Master Bomber over Nuremberg, says: "I think that the reason for the discontinuance of the tactic may have been that on very large areas in poor visibility it was extremely difficult to drop the primary markers accurately, and that most crews of the Main Force and some of the backers-Up had only one thought in their mind at the target and that was to get in, release their bombs and get out, and not let their own intercom be messed up by incoming instructions." " A Master bomber was used only once more in a raid to Montlucon in France mid September, before the practice was discontinued for 6 months. The impression I receive is the master bomber effectiveness is more to do with the confusion of a large raid coupled with the newness of the tactic, if the instructions do not make sense then by definition they will be ignored. "The raid proceded in no better, no worse, manner than so many raids beyond the range of oboe. Enough of the 49 pathfinder backers-up and re-centerers arrived to produce a steady supply of green TIs. The planned route from the south east was never achieved. It is clear from the evidence of bombing photographs, that once the early raid markers and bombs were seen to go down, both the pathfinders backers-up and the main force swung in from due south, neither being prepared to spend the extra time in the target area flying to a theoretical turning point futher on." They were not prepared to fly further to the briefed point because they were being heavily engaged by night fighters. Middlebrook makes that plain. When Walter runs an editorial you know the quote does not say what he claims for it, the Middlebrook words do not even appear. Ignoring the problems with raid timing and fuel loads on a long distance raid, things like the wind shift. The briefed point was beyond Berlin, in an attempt to lay a bomb pattern in a different direction to normal, the bombers would fly beyond and then turn back. Things like the timing going astray changed that as well as the idea of spending minimum time in the Berlin defence zone. "Many of the Main Force crews were bombing the first markers they saw, instead of the centre of the markers as ordered, or were dropping short of the markers; a long 'creepback' developed. The night was clear. Bomber Command's Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas." Ibid p. 66 Like I mentioned, Walter will measure accuracy from an aiming point that was not marked. The raid caused scattered damage including villages outside Berlin and every government building on the Wilhelmstrasse. Note the quotes Walter uses make it clear there were markers away from the correct aiming point. If you look up the Bomber Command War Diaries you discover the following, the Pathfinders did not identify the correct aiming point, in the centre of the city, but rather marked one on the outskirts. The main force was late, another reason why the crews were in a hurry to bomb and go on a long range mission. So comparing the actual bomb pattern to the planned aiming point ignores the fact the crews were bombing the wrong aiming point. The RAAF history notes the Germans dropped dummy markers, parachute flares were dropped over the bombers, and the main problem was apparently a major wind shift that upset the pathfinders, which would be another cause of anxiety for the crews on such a long distance mission, running out of fuel on the way home thanks to being late and a wind shift would not be wanted. Defences (passive and active) were part of the reason, tight concentrations of markers were the way to achieve accurate raids. Actually the Berlin raids makes a point that creep back was also effected by the accuracy of the marking, if a number of scattered markers went down then the bombing was dispersed leading to a bomb trail at times. So we can see that although the RAF had a fairly good attack against the Renault factory near Paris -- although not as good as the 8th AF raid of 4/4/43 -- that accuracy did not translate onto German targets. The RAF was deterred by the NJG in a way that has no parallel on the USAAF side. Yes folks, the only thing that stops RAF night bomber accuracy is German defences, nothing else. The WWII RAF has an all weather ability the modern USAF would really like. Walter may try and trot out his "proof" of this, RAF raids on Berlin in winter 1943, just about the hardest target in the book. Are you saying it was darker over Germany than it was over France? As can be seen from the remark Walter is going to ignore the difference between a shallow and deep penetration He will then use ideas like measuring accuracy from the official aiming point even when the pathfinders marked another point 1 to 2 miles away. Wow. Looks like the Pathfinders had a tough time locating that ol' pickle barrel, huh? Yes folks, as can be seen Walter needs to simply mismeasure everything to push the fiction. It was a major reason the Berlin raids failed to do the sort of damage Harris wanted, the inability to normally accurately mark a target that far from Britain in early 1944. Not to mention he is comparing RAF bombers under flak and fighter attack when bombing to USAAF bombers under flak attack only. I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that the night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day fighters were. Walter you really need to understand the way the JG300 series of units operated, they had no radar, they intercepted over the target. See above how Walter posts quotes he either does not read or simply cannot comprehend, the last line on fighters. "He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen." Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical". The USAAF people do not need this sort of junk thrown at them, that they need this sort of bias to look good. We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports 39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human. Not super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing error with an increase in the flak defences. Bomber Command had its creep back problems. Welcome to humanity and the fact the men went out and did their job. (snip) So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost fanatic resistance". Says it all really. Last time this quote was trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted B-17 was. Unescorted B-17's could achieve outstanding accuracy despite the worst the Germans could do. Yes folks, when in trouble change the subject, ignore the number of kill claims the fighters assigned to the mission recorded, just pretend there was no escort. Above all no mention the candidate for receiving "almost fanatical resistance" suffered 1 aircraft MIA. The 385th formation was in "some disorder" from the German attacks, but still managed to get a good bomb pattern. They were not deterred by the German defenses in the same sort of way the official British history says the RAF was. This is good, firstly the force lost 1 bomber, so you would hope they were not heavily disorganised, but it appears they did suffer some problems. Secondly Walter is in trouble again, this time throwing the RAF history in, since the book does not say what Walter is saying. (snip) Note Freeman is quoting the wartime assessments, not the actual damage report put together by the Germans. The USSBS notes the acceptances from the Argo plant were 12/43 39, 1/44 67, 2/44 22, 3/44 111. Not exactly a complete demolition job. Mission 182, 177 B-17s to Oschersleben, lost 34 plus 2 written off, the 381st lost 8 aircraft that day, so this is an example of a USAAF formation holding together under heavy attack. The point to make is if this were the rule that Walter's fiction tries to claim it is then there would be no necessity to highlight it. That's just flat weird. The 303rd group also bombed Oschersleben on 1/11/44. The 303rd lost 11 bombers on 11 January 1944. I will snip the description of the losses, most of which occurred before the target, the quote is noting at times different views of the same loss. (snip) According to Darrell Gust, "Bombs were away at 11:48 and our tail gunner/observer reported an excellent clustering of bombs right on the target." The groups' photo interpretation report provides further confirmation of just how good Fawcett's aim had been: "The pattern of bomb bursts is seen centered squarely on the target with a heavy concentration of both high explosives and incendiaries scattered on and among the buildings of the plant. Three hits are seen on" a storage area in which aircraft are stored under a camouflage netting. An undetermined number of hits are seen on the Main Machine Shop, the Final Assembly Shop, and a probable Components Erecting Shop. Direct hits or near misses are seen on another Components Erecting Shop, a possible repair shop, and seven other smaller unidentified buildings...In addition, high explosive bursts are seen scattered over approximately one-third of the factory airfield and on an adjacent road °and railway. In other words these bombs missed their target and came down on facilities nearby, we are talking accuracy here, hitting the official target, not nearby ones, under the current absurd rules. Incendiaries fell in the target area and across the railway sidings and the freight depot immediately south of the target...The high explosive bombs on the target were dropped by the 303rd lead Group and apparently by the 303rd low Group. Incendiaries dropped by the 379th Group flying high fell on the target and also immediately south of it...Fires appear to have been started in the plant as a result of the attack." The Hell's Angels had succeeded in their mission, but the enemy continued to make the Americans pay. As the formation pulled out to the north, homeward bound on a westward track running from Brunswick to Hannover, the German fighters were making attacks only slightly less intense than those going in." --"Half a Wing, Three Engines and a Prayer" pp.314-331 by Brian D. O'Neill The USAAF was not deterred by German fighter attacks the way the RAF was deterred by night fighter attacks. Yes folks, if you can find two examples over the period of the war your case is proved, just ignore the cases where the USAAF bombers missed. Especially if you can use wartime assessments of accuracy and, in particular, damage. Note there is no measure of how many bombs missed the target, only that some did and implying most. The 8/17/43 raid by the Fourth Bomb Wing on Regensburg was another example of very accurate bombing despite heavy opposition by the Germans. As people have gathered by his choice of references Walter has decided the USAAF is "Magnificent Men in their Flying Machines" and everyone else are short sighted fools. Note the holes in the bomb damage quote above, with Walter it is a good bet to assume there are things in there that do not help his fiction. Note the 379th is mentioned, it lost 1 aircraft. The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459 1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500 feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%. All well and good. The RAF could be deterred by the German defenses in a way that had no parallel with the USAAF. Yes folks, when confronted with the facts Walter simply repeats the lies. The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not super human to refute the fiction. There's no fiction involved. Walter is basically wall to wall fiction. The RAF was deterred by the defenses over Germany in a way that has no parallel with the USAAF. It seems Walter is going to simply pretend the range of radio aids had no bearing on night raid accuracy. The RAF raid on the Renault plant gives us an insight into exactly -how- badly Bomber Command accuracy was degraded by that opposition-- quite a lot. USAAF raid on France, 99.6% accuracy claimed, on Germany, Huls around 5% accuracy. It is simple really, to make the comparison erase the bad USAAF results and pretend real hard, find the worst RAF raids and pretend real hard. Strenuously ignore the many factors like weather, training and luck that make a difference in bombing accuracy, just claim it is all defences. Geoffrey Sinclair Remove the nb for email. |
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As can be seen from the remark Walter is going to ignore the difference
between a shallow and deep penetration As we've seen, and you seem to confirm, that applied to the RAF, it didn't apply to the USAAF. The USAAF force on 8/17/43 at Regensburg had good effect on target. That was a deep penetration. It was heavily attacked. So did the raid of 1/11/44. That raid was heavily attacked but still had a very successful bombing, and so did the various raids of 5/12/44 which were also heavily opposed. There were many others. If you could show that some US attacks had poor effect on target because of flak or fighters as opposed to clouds, haze, bad navigation or just poor bomb aiming, then you might have something. But I don't think you can do that. You'll just continue to carp at the Americans. This raid on the Renault plant shows what the RAF could do against undefended targets. I mean, after all, it -was- dark, wasn't it? But over Germany, the accuracy dropped dramatically. But the Americans could and often did get really good effect on target as at the Renault plant on 4/4/43, and they could do it on the 8/17/43 Regensburg raid -- no matter what the Germans did. This is a progression we've seen before; your notes, and this is a good example, get so over the top ridiculous that I am willing to leave them largely unaswered. They won't sway anybody worth swaying. Walt |
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