Did the Germans have the Norden bombsight?

I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that the
night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day fighters
were.

Walter you really need to understand the way the JG300 series of units
operated, they had no radar, they intercepted over the target.


And you -know- that when they did that, they was supposed to operate above the
flak, which was only supposed to fire up to a certain altitude when the wild
boars were operating.

Walt

"He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter
attack were not always inclined to listen."

Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".


You're welcome to show the opposite. Instead you just carp.

US raids on 8/17/43, 1/11/44, and 5/12/44 -- just off the top of my head -- had
good effect on target despite heavy German resistance and severe loss.

If you can find some US raids that were not effective due to flak and fighters,
as opposed to weather, poor navigation, poor bomb aiming, or some other factor,
go for it.

Walt

Ah yes, the wipe the slate clean approach again.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
As can be seen from the remark Walter is going to ignore the difference
between a shallow and deep penetration

As we've seen, and you seem to confirm, that applied to the RAF, it didn't
apply to the USAAF.

Seen the bomb photographs from the USAAF strikes on Switzerland?
Or do you subscribe to the theory the raids were some sort of deliberate
message to the Swiss?

Note how Walter deletes my words so he can pretend I agree with him.

The USAAF force on 8/17/43 at Regensburg had good effect on target. That
was a
deep penetration. It was heavily attacked. So did the raid of 1/11/44. That
raid was heavily attacked but still had a very successful bombing, and so did
the various raids of 5/12/44 which were also heavily opposed. There were
many others.

The 8th air force mounted around 1,000 missions during the war, I have
no idea of the average number of groups per mission but say it was 20.
So 20,000 results, Walter is reciting the results of 2 groups that came
under heavy attack and did well, at least one received a unit citation,
apparently they were handed out for average results. The May 1944
raid the example group under heavy attack lost 1 aircraft MIA,

"So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
fanatic resistance". Says it all really. Last time this quote was
trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
B-17 was."

Bomber Command launched over 1,000 raids in WWII, Walter finds
a raid description, and tells us all how only the nightfighters affected
accuracy that night.

Now for Regensburg, remember we are talking about "almost fanatical
resistance", affecting bombing accuracy. There were146 B-17s sent
with 127 credited with bombing the target, 24 lost and 1 written off.
Every group participating received a unit citation. All the information is
in the Mighty 8th War Diary, a work Walter claims to have.

There were 7 bomb groups sent.
The 96th lost no aircraft, claimed 5 kills and had 19 out of 21 bomb the target.
The 388th lost 1 aircraft after bombing the target and claimed 7 kills.
The 84th had 20 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 1 and claimed 13 kills.
The 385th had 19 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 3 and claimed 48 kills.
The 95th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 4 and claimed 25 kills.
The 390th had all aircraft bomb the target, but lost 6 and claimed 6 kills.
The 100th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 9 and claimed 36 kills.

Walter wants to claim the entire 4th wing did well after encountering
heavy resistance. The numbers indicate the candidates are the 95th
and 100th, in terms of number of aircraft lost before the target and the
385th in terms of kills claimed.

If you could show that some US attacks had poor effect on target because of
flak or fighters as opposed to clouds, haze, bad navigation or just poor bomb
aiming, then you might have something. But I don't think you can do that.
You'll just continue to carp at the Americans.

You see, when I post the USAAF bomb reports, and so on they are
deleted.

"We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human. Not
super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
error with an increase in the flak defences."

This raid on the Renault plant shows what the RAF could do against undefended
targets. I mean, after all, it -was- dark, wasn't it?

By the way folks the undefended bit is dropped when the USAAF attacks
the target. And the difference between a shallow and deep penetration
is going to be ignored.

But over Germany, the accuracy dropped dramatically.

Walter has one raid in France and one raid in Germany to prove it so.

But the Americans could and often did get really good effect on target as at
the Renault plant on 4/4/43, and they could do it on the 8/17/43 Regensburg
raid -- no matter what the Germans did.

Yes folks, the Renault plant becomes defended when the USAAF
appears and undefended when the RAF appears. Regensburg
is dealt with above.

To the next "" is simply my material that had to be deleted,

"This is quite amusing, apparently the attacks on Billancourt are
an accuracy measure, a base line for how much the defences
affected accuracy, but only for the RAF, not for the USAAF.

Not surprising really, if the claim is 498 out of 500 USAAF "fell
on the factory". This was 4 April 1943.

Now go to Huls, in Germany, 22 June 1943, it was a 541 acre site,
0.845 square miles. The bombs fell over a 12 square mile area,
with 20% within the factory fences, not on the factory.

Given the amount of open space in the factory area we have gone
from 99.6% to around 5% or less accuracy. And under the rules being
used this must all be due to the effects of the defences.

Just ignore the attacks on Billancourt were much more effective
mainly because of the weak defences, both fighter and flak, enabling a
lower bombing altitude. Choosing them as a baseline is bad enough,
using it as a baseline for only one air force shows the standard agenda.

It is simple really, take a couple of quotes on the RAF strategic
situation, pretend they are about bombers on the tactical level,
a quote from a master bomber on an area raid and ignore the
problems master bombers had with such raids and the other
problems that night. Having done that go find a couple of the
well documented missions where USAAF bombers performed
above average. Announce this as the USAAF standard and
ignore the USAAF and USSBS reports on bombing accuracy
and, in particular, the way defences degraded accuracy. If one
RAF bomber crew flinched once it is the RAF standard, it one
USAAF formation took heavy losses but bombed accurately it
is the USAAF standard.

Just like before when USAAF success is based on the Luftwaffe
moving 4% of its fighter force but RAF success is measured on
the effects on the German economy, the output of tens of millions
of workers. Walter must really hate the USAAF to smear it like
he does, the way he claims it needs the contest rigged to look
good.

Think of it this way, go find the stories of the RAF bombers that
continued on to attack the target despite heavy damage on the
way out, then go look for the times USAAF bomb groups missed
their target, use these to compare the effects of the air forces.

The men who flew the missions do not need this sort of damage
to their reputations."

This is a progression we've seen before; your notes, and this is a good
example, get so over the top ridiculous that I am willing to leave them
largely unaswered. They won't sway anybody worth swaying.

Translation, Walter cannot answer them, so they need to be ignored.
Meantime I go on collecting nice emails about my posts.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that the
night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day fighters
were.

Walter you really need to understand the way the JG300 series of units
operated, they had no radar, they intercepted over the target.

And you -know- that when they did that, they was supposed to operate above the
flak, which was only supposed to fire up to a certain altitude when the wild
boars were operating.

Walter is always good for a great laugh. After trying to claim the
nightfighters were not intercepting over the target, despite the
quote he posted stating it, the claim has to be deleted.

Remember the whole point is the claim the nightfighters reduced
bombing accuracy, and willingness to approach the target, which
means must have been attacking over the target.

People can now go and read the many complaints made about the
Luftwaffe flak units ignoring any flak ceilings, in contrast to the
admired Naval flak units. See Aders in his History of the German
Nightfighter force.

Walter will now show us the documentation that shows no flak kills
on the night, and/or the way all RAF aircraft were above the flak
ceiling and/or they knew they were above the flak ceiling, all after
proving there was a flak ceiling in place that night and it was
adhered to.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
"He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter
attack were not always inclined to listen."

Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".

You're welcome to show the opposite. Instead you just carp.

Translation, when I include the reports they are ignored or deleted.

US raids on 8/17/43, 1/11/44, and 5/12/44 -- just off the top of my head -- had
good effect on target despite heavy German resistance and severe loss.

I like the "off the top of my head" line, implying Walter has actually done
some sort of research as opposed to committing to memory the really
good results ("boys own flying adventures") and then trying to claim they
are typical. Major Bigglesworth for the RAF anyone?

If you can find some US raids that were not effective due to flak and fighters,
as opposed to weather, poor navigation, poor bomb aiming, or some other factor,
go for it.

This is just cut and paste from the current thread.


"The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.

The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
super human to refute the fiction."

Keep your postings refuting Walter, and it is simple to cut and paste
the same, unanswered, replies when the same junk claims are made
using the same junk "proof".

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email

Cub Driver wrote in message ...
On 30 Apr 2004 05:00:14 GMT, nt (Krztalizer) wrote:

Realize also that those B-29s were dropping a far larger percentage of
relatively light fire bombs, in comparison to the 8th's general preference for
GP and HE.

I'm not sure that the 20th AF was dropping incendiaries all that much,
before the March fire raid. It was a whole radical change in tactics,
not merely a change in altitude.

Table 126 USAAF statistical digest, tons of bombs dropped by the
20th Air Force, columns are date / total bomb tonnage / HE tonnage
/ incendiary tonnage

Jun-44 / 547 / 501 / 46
Jul-44 / 209 /209 / 0
Aug-44 / 252 / 184 / 68
Sep-44 / 521 / 521 / 0
Oct-44 / 1,669 / 1,023 / 646
Nov-44 / 2,205 / 1,758 / 447
Dec-44 / 3,661 / 3,051 / 610
Jan-45 / 3,410 / 2,511 / 899
Feb-45 / 4,020 / 2,401 / 1,619
Mar-45 / 15,283 / 4,105 / 11,178
Apr-45 / 17,492 / 13,209 / 4,283
May-45 / 24,285 / 6,937 / 17,348
Jun-45 / 32,542 / 9,954 / 22,588
Jul-45 / 43,091 / 9,766 / 33,325
Aug-45 / 21,873 / 8,641 / 13,232

1944 / 9,064 / 7,247 / 1,817
1945 / 161,996 / 57,524 / 104,472
Total / 171,060 / 64,771 / 106,289

The problem over Japan as I understand it was the jet stream--indeed,
that this was the *discovery* of the jet stream. Flying with the jet
stream, the planes were too fast for the Norden to be effective.
Flying against it, they were too vulnerable to flak. (Winter of
1944-45.) And I suppose that flying at right angles to it meant they
couldn't hit anything, though I never read that.

My understanding is basically the same except that it would be
the discovery of the jet stream over Japan, not the jet stream
per se.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email

As we've seen, and you seem to confirm, that applied to the RAF, it didn't
apply to the USAAF.

Seen the bomb photographs from the USAAF strikes on Switzerland?
Or do you subscribe to the theory the raids were some sort of deliberate
message to the Swiss?

I don't know if you are being obtuse or not.

The Americans carried their targeting systems with them. Shallow or deep, it
made no difference.

The USAAF force on 8/17/43 at Regensburg had good effect on target. That
was a
deep penetration. It was heavily attacked. So did the raid of 1/11/44. That
raid was heavily attacked but still had a very successful bombing, and so
did
the various raids of 5/12/44 which were also heavily opposed. There were
many others.

The 8th air force mounted around 1,000 missions during the war, I have
no idea of the average number of groups per mission but say it was 20.
So 20,000 results, Walter is reciting the results of 2 groups that came
under heavy attack and did well, at least one received a unit citation,
apparently they were handed out for average results. The May 1944
raid the example group under heavy attack lost 1 aircraft MIA,


I'm saying you can't show that German opposition degraded the accuracy of the
USAAF attacks, the way the nightfighters drgraded the accuracy of Bomber
Command over Germany.

"So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
fanatic resistance".

That wasn't the only example. As I indcate, you are getting so over the top
ridiculous, you can almost be ignored.

Just because that formation lost only one aircraft doesn't mean they were not
heavily attacked. As Freeman indicates, the formation at one point was in some
disorder. They still bombed accurately.

In part of your note of yesterday that I didn't feel warranted a response, you
indicated that the experience of the 303rd on the 1/11/44 raid was invalid
--because they were not under attack -- in the target area--. That is so
completely ridiculous. You seem to have your little coterie of supporters
hovering around who won't post themselves, but will make up little funny
stories about pickle barrels. Maybe you are impressing them.

Says it all really. Last time this quote was
trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
B-17 was."


Unescorted B-17's could get good effect on target despite the worst the Germans
could do. Not so the RAF, as the official history shows.

Bomber Command launched over 1,000 raids in WWII, Walter finds
a raid description, and tells us all how only the nightfighters affected
accuracy that night.


Walt saw a lot of anecdotal evidence of that and was interested to learn that
the offical British history confirmed it.

Now for Regensburg, remember we are talking about "almost fanatical
resistance", affecting bombing accuracy.

--Not-- affecting bombing accuracy--

There were146 B-17s sent
with 127 credited with bombing the target, 24 lost and 1 written off.
Every group participating received a unit citation. All the information is
in the Mighty 8th War Diary, a work Walter claims to have.

Yeah, found it on the remnants table. Cheap.


There were 7 bomb groups sent.
The 96th lost no aircraft, claimed 5 kills and had 19 out of 21 bomb the
target.
The 388th lost 1 aircraft after bombing the target and claimed 7 kills.
The 84th had 20 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 1 and claimed 13 kills.
The 385th had 19 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 3 and claimed 48 kills.
The 95th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 4 and claimed 25 kills.
The 390th had all aircraft bomb the target, but lost 6 and claimed 6 kills.
The 100th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 9 and claimed 36 kills.

Walter wants to claim the entire 4th wing did well after encountering
heavy resistance.

Walt said no such thing. You're a lying son of a bitch, aren't you?

Walt wants to say there was good effect on target. You are making things up
from whole cloth. But doubtless your buddies are glad you are defending the
right.

The numbers indicate the candidates are the 95th
and 100th, in terms of number of aircraft lost before the target and the
385th in terms of kills claimed.


And all this pedantry shows what exactly?

If you could show that some US attacks had poor effect on target because of
flak or fighters as opposed to clouds, haze, bad navigation or just poor
bomb
aiming, then you might have something. But I don't think you can do that.
You'll just continue to carp at the Americans.

You see, when I post the USAAF bomb reports, and so on they are
deleted.


Address the point, Sinclair. Can you show that flak or fighters degraded USAAF
accuracy?

The answer is no, you cannot. So you just carp and parade your pedant's
pedigree.


"We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human.

We know the Germans are clear that the USAAF hurt them much worse than the RAF
did.


Not
super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
error with an increase in the flak defences."


Which you don't quote.


This raid on the Renault plant shows what the RAF could do against
undefended
targets. I mean, after all, it -was- dark, wasn't it?

By the way folks the undefended bit is dropped when the USAAF attacks
the target.

It was dark, right? There was good effect on target, right? It was
undefended, right?

It helps establish a baseline for accuracy. And as I indicated the other day,
we can see clearly that over German targets, that accuracy was seriously
degraded by the German defenses in a way that has no parallel in the USAAF
experience.

And the difference between a shallow and deep penetration
is going to be ignored.


As I said earlier, the USAAF took their targeting systems with them. You're
confirming that the vaunted RAF had an accuracy problem due to its technology.

Okay, fine. Too bad they didn't have better aircraft. Then they could have
attacked by day.

Too bad they didn't develop a better heavy machine gun for defense, or a
bomber with a very strong stucture, or very forgiving flight characteristics,
or one that could fly in tight formations above the worst of the flak. Too bad
they didn't have an aircraft like the B-17.

But over Germany, the accuracy dropped dramatically.

Walter has one raid in France and one raid in Germany to prove it so.


You don't deny it. As I suggest above, Mr. Wiltshaw, I believe it was, started
the ball rolling on this by showing that that RAF could get pretty could
concentration on an undefended factory. But over Germany where there were
flak, fighters and searchlights, they had to settle for attacking whole cities
and burning out the workers, not burning down the factories.

The Americans didn't have to do that.

But the Americans could and often did get really good effect on target as at
the Renault plant on 4/4/43, and they could do it on the 8/17/43 Regensburg
raid -- no matter what the Germans did.

Yes folks, the Renault plant becomes defended when the USAAF
appears and undefended when the RAF appears.

The Renault factory was undefended when the Americans hit it. After they left
the target area, they were attacked by JG 26. The point is that when the USAAF
-and- the RAF hit it, it was undefended. And the Americans could get good
effect on target despite the worst the Germans could do. Not so the RAF.

Regensburg
is dealt with above.

To the next "" is simply my material that had to be deleted,

A lot of your material is over the top ridiculous.

You delete a lot of my material; I don't mind.


"This is quite amusing, apparently the attacks on Billancourt are
an accuracy measure, a base line for how much the defences
affected accuracy, but only for the RAF, not for the USAAF.


I think you are lying. I think you took my meaning perfectly.

Not surprising really, if the claim is 498 out of 500 USAAF "fell
on the factory". This was 4 April 1943.

Now go to Huls, in Germany, 22 June 1943, it was a 541 acre site,
0.845 square miles. The bombs fell over a 12 square mile area,
with 20% within the factory fences, not on the factory.


Huels was badly damaged. But I don't see the point. You don't address the
point.

Can you show that USAAF accuracy was degraded by flak and fighters, or even by
fighters, the way the official British history shows that the RAF's accuracy
was degraded when intercepted by the NJG?

No, you can't. You can only carp.

Given the amount of open space in the factory area we have gone
from 99.6% to around 5% or less accuracy. And under the rules being
used this must all be due to the effects of the defences.


Huels was badly damaged.

Just ignore the attacks on Billancourt were much more effective
mainly because of the weak defences,

I have actually addressed the attack on the Renualt plant at Billancourt quite
a bit. but we can see on one hand accuarcy against an undefended target --
Billancourt-- and the accuracy over German targets and we can say,
"hmmmmmmm....big difference."


both fighter and flak, enabling a
lower bombing altitude. Choosing them as a baseline is bad enough,
using it as a baseline for only one air force shows the standard agenda.


Both Air Forces attacked it. But the USAAF could get the same accuracy despite
the worst the Germans could do; RAF accuracy was degraded when the defenses
made a strong reaction.


It is simple really, take a couple of quotes on the RAF strategic
situation, pretend they are about bombers on the tactical level,

Yeah, well. The German night fighters were not harrasssing British bombers
over Germany on a strategic level. It was pretty personal.

a quote from a master bomber on an area raid and ignore the
problems master bombers had with such raids and the other
problems that night.

It was noted on enough missions to be noted in the official history.

You're boring me, Sinclair.

Having done that go find a couple of the
well documented missions where USAAF bombers performed
above average. Announce this as the USAAF standard and
ignore the USAAF and USSBS reports on bombing accuracy
and, in particular, the way defences degraded accuracy.

I haven't seen anything that indicated that fighters degraded the accuracy. On
many raids, the bombing was very accurate no matter how the Germans reacted.

You are welcome to lay aside your charts and abstracts and cite some actual
raids where the RAF had good concentration on target despite being heavily
engaged by the NJG. Seriously, I think there was at least one.

If one
RAF bomber crew flinched once it is the RAF standard, it one
USAAF formation took heavy losses but bombed accurately it
is the USAAF standard.

But that wasn't the case.

If one RAF bomber crew flinched?

"The night was clear. Bomber Command's
Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and
concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct
Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of
Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas."

Five aircraft out of 468? Who do you think you are fooling Sinclair? That's
a lot of flinching.

I cite one raid. As far as i know, you've -never- cited a good raid by the
RAF, one that had pretty good effect on target. Of course the targets were
whole cities. That should make it easier. Can you cite such a raid or raids?
Besides raids that resulted in the random firestorm, or the advent of window?
I've cited several raids. Thanks for mentioning Huels. That raid had good
effect on target, as did the others I named.

Now you name some significant Main Force raids of equal effect. And you have
this advantage -- the RAF targeted whole cities, typically.



Just like before when USAAF success is based on the Luftwaffe
moving 4% of its fighter force but RAF success is measured on
the effects on the German economy, the output of tens of millions
of workers.

What I showed there was that after more than a year of Harris' command, the
effect of British bombing on the German economy was nil. On the other hand,
the Germans were very concerned over USAAF operations and after a period of
less than a year were giving them priority in the defense.

Now, if we extrapolate, we see after a year of USAAF operations the double
strike raid against Regensburg/Shweinfurt on 8/17/43 -- a year after the first
raid. What sort of effort was Bomber Command having on 9/1/40, a year after the
war started? Or maybe we can add 8 months, the time between the attack on
Pearl Harbor and the first USAAF raid. Let's see, that takes us to the Summer
of 1941. What effect was the RAF having on German industry in that time frame?

Almost none.

Isn't that about the time the Butts report came out? So given the same time
frames to develop, the USAAF is wrecking the Regansburg ME-109 factory, the
British were trying to improve on getting 3 aircraft out of 100 within five
miles of the target.

This just gets better and better. Or more embarrassing for you.

Walter must really hate the USAAF to smear it like
he does, the way he claims it needs the contest rigged to look
good.


Do you remember that thread on the moderated WWII group called "Was the
daylight bombing campaign necessary?"

We've come a long way since then, haven't we? Now the question is, since you
seem to agree that RAF accuracy over distance was so poor, why was the RAF
wasting its time dropping so many bombs so inaccurately at night? I mean, the
accuracy over Germany, when compared to that raid on the Renault plant -- it's
sort of pitiful, isn't it?

Think of it this way, go find the stories of the RAF bombers that
continued on to attack the target despite heavy damage on the
way out

On the way out, the target had already been attacked.

, then go look for the times USAAF bomb groups missed
their target, use these to compare the effects of the air forces.


The Americans sometimes missed, and missed wide. You're dodging the question
that we have wandered on to. Did the German fighter defenses degrade the US
bombing the way it did the British bombing?

I think the answer is no, and your dodging seems to confirm that you have no
information to the contrary.

The men who flew the missions do not need this sort of damage
to their reputations."

This is a progression we've seen before; your notes, and this is a good
example, get so over the top ridiculous that I am willing to leave them
largely unaswered. They won't sway anybody worth swaying.

Translation, Walter cannot answer them, so they need to be ignored.

People can judge for themselves.

Meantime I go on collecting nice emails about my posts.


I've no doubt you do. If you are hishonest enough to post it, there are those
hopeful enough to buy it.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that
the
night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day
fighters
were.

Walter you really need to understand the way the JG300 series of units
operated, they had no radar, they intercepted over the target.

And you -know- that when they did that, they was supposed to operate above
the
flak, which was only supposed to fire up to a certain altitude when the wild
boars were operating.

Walter is always good for a great laugh.

I'm right; you tried to fool people.

After trying to claim the
nightfighters were not intercepting over the target, despite the
quote he posted stating it, the claim has to be deleted.


See above. You lied, and as is often the case, you got caught.

Remember the whole point is the claim the nightfighters reduced
bombing accuracy, and willingness to approach the target, which
means must have been attacking over the target.


It doesn't mean that at all; you are blatantly lying. I even provided the
quote:

"Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging
the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs
prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews
harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen."

-- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks

What you know damn well was the case, was that the bulk of both day and night
fighter attackes happened well before the target. Ever hear of the Kammhuber
line?

You are so easy to show as a liar. You're pitiful.


People can now go and read the many complaints made about the
Luftwaffe flak units ignoring any flak ceilings, in contrast to the
admired Naval flak units. See Aders in his History of the German
Nightfighter force.

That wouldn't be the point, would it? Why didn't you post that before in this
thread? The German flak was supposed to moderate their fire when the wild
boars were around. Most of the fighter activity took place away from the
target cities, for both forces.


Walter will now show us the documentation that shows no flak kills
on the night, and/or the way all RAF aircraft were above the flak
ceiling and/or they knew they were above the flak ceiling, all after
proving there was a flak ceiling in place that night and it was
adhered to.


I don't have to. What you posted was complete bull****.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
"He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter
attack were not always inclined to listen."

Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".

It somehow made its way into the official history.


You're welcome to show the opposite. Instead you just carp.

Translation, when I include the reports they are ignored or deleted.


And blah blah blah. You can't show it, so you just carp.


US raids on 8/17/43, 1/11/44, and 5/12/44 -- just off the top of my head --
had
good effect on target despite heavy German resistance and severe loss.

I like the "off the top of my head" line, implying Walter has actually done
some sort of research as opposed to committing to memory the really
good results ("boys own flying adventures") and then trying to claim they
are typical. Major Bigglesworth for the RAF anyone?

Are you saying those raids didn't have good effect on target? Or that they
were not heaviy opposed, or what exactly?


If you can find some US raids that were not effective due to flak and
fighters,
as opposed to weather, poor navigation, poor bomb aiming, or some other
factor,
go for it.

This is just cut and paste from the current thread.


"The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.

The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
super human to refute the fiction."

Where do you show the defenses caused the errors?

The ball bearing plants at Shweinfurt on 10/14/43, to quote Freeman were
"heavily hit." The 351st group placed all bombs within 1,000 feet of the
aiming point. This, in spite of heavy fighter opposition.


Walt

My understanding is basically the same except that it would be
the discovery of the jet stream over Japan, not the jet stream
per se.

Was it generally known? It seemed to surprise everyone when it
appeared over Japan, though I suppose it was journalists/historians
who were surprised, rather than meteorologists?

Is the jet stream over Japan the same altitude as elsewhere, or does
it move up and down so much as to make this moot?

How wide is the jet stream? On the evening wx forecast, it is always
depicted as a blue tunnel or worm (usually heading for New England).
Is it hundreds or thousands of miles wide?

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

On 03 May 2004 10:13:47 GMT, (WalterM140) wrote:

This is a progression we've seen before; your notes, and this is a good
example, get so over the top ridiculous that I am willing to leave them
largely unaswered.

Don't stop at the "largely".

Gavin Bailey

--

Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

On Tue, 04 May 2004 05:41:18 -0400, Cub Driver wrote:

My understanding is basically the same except that it would be
the discovery of the jet stream over Japan, not the jet stream
per se.

Was it generally known? It seemed to surprise everyone when it
appeared over Japan, though I suppose it was journalists/historians
who were surprised, rather than meteorologists?

Before World War II, meteorologists suspected that something like the
jet stream must exist based on the observed movement of storm systems
and of high-altitude clouds. Most sources seem to agree, though, that
the existence of jet streams was not confirmed until they were
actually encountered in high-altitude flight during the war.

Is the jet stream over Japan the same altitude as elsewhere, or does
it move up and down so much as to make this moot?

Jet streams vary in altitude between about 6 and 9 miles, over Japan
and elsewhere. According to the web page at

http://www.historyhouse.com/in_history/balloon_1/

Japanese meteorologists independently confirmed the existence of the
jet stream using instrumented balloons during the winter of 1943-44,
and the Japanese incendiary balloon campaign from November 1944 to
March 1945 was based on the theory that the jet stream would carry
balloons across the Pacific from Japan to the west coast of the US.

(True, as it turned out, though only a small percentage of the ten
thousand or so balloons launched actually landed in the US, and the
only fatalities caused by the campaign were six picnickers who were
killed near Bly, Oregon, when they found a balloon and it detonated
when they tried to pull it down from a tree.)

How wide is the jet stream? On the evening wx forecast, it is always
depicted as a blue tunnel or worm (usually heading for New England).
Is it hundreds or thousands of miles wide?

Jet streams vary between about one and four hundred miles wide, and
one to three miles deep. Wind speeds of three hundred mph or greater
are possible in winter.


ljd

This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.

Ah yes, stage 2 of the wipe the slate clean approach again, assume
everyone has forgotten the earlier problems with the "proof" and simply
resubmit it.

So we have an attempt to prove the degradation of bombing
accuracy was mainly due to the defences in the RAF case and
the weather in the USAAF case.

To prove this, select a group of USAAF raids, often using the
results of units that received citations, claim these are typical.
Ignore that in some cases the heavy fighter attacks claimed
resulted in zero or one bomber MIA and few kill claims logged
by the gunners, definitely ignore the fact some of the formations
lost their aircraft after bombing.

You see even in the worst raids there were units that were not
engaged by the fighter defences. Even when some groups were
heavily hit it was often the one squadron that took most of the losses.
Decline to mention the fighters usually held off near the target to
give the flak a chance.

Just ignore all this and announce this is the USAAF baseline.

Select one RAF raid where the marking was in the wrong place,
where the bombers came under fighter attack during the bomb
run (later strenuously deny the contents of the quote used to
show this). Measure accuracy from the official aiming point.

Announce this as the RAF baseline.

Announce how this proves the case. Wonder why so many people
are busy laughing.

Throw around accusations of lies in reply.


WalterM140 wrote in message ...
As we've seen, and you seem to confirm, that applied to the RAF, it didn't
apply to the USAAF.

Seen the bomb photographs from the USAAF strikes on Switzerland?
Or do you subscribe to the theory the raids were some sort of deliberate
message to the Swiss?

Deleted text,

"Note how Walter deletes my words so he can pretend I agree with him."

I don't know if you are being obtuse or not.

The Americans carried their targeting systems with them. Shallow or deep, it
made no difference.

Walter is clearly not up on the USAAF use of ground based radio
aids in 1944 and 1945.

So Walter presumably believes the attacks on Switzerland were deliberate.

The USAAF force on 8/17/43 at Regensburg had good effect on target. That
was a
deep penetration. It was heavily attacked. So did the raid of 1/11/44. That
raid was heavily attacked but still had a very successful bombing, and so
did
the various raids of 5/12/44 which were also heavily opposed. There were
many others.

The 8th air force mounted around 1,000 missions during the war, I have
no idea of the average number of groups per mission but say it was 20.
So 20,000 results, Walter is reciting the results of 2 groups that came
under heavy attack and did well, at least one received a unit citation,
apparently they were handed out for average results. The May 1944
raid the example group under heavy attack lost 1 aircraft MIA,

I'm saying you can't show that German opposition degraded the accuracy of the
USAAF attacks, the way the nightfighters drgraded the accuracy of Bomber
Command over Germany.

The reality is Walter knows I can show it, hence the way he deletes
the evidence. His claims over state the effect on the RAF and under
state the effect on the USAAF. Standard stuff really.

"So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
fanatic resistance".

That wasn't the only example. As I indcate, you are getting so over the top
ridiculous, you can almost be ignored.

Yes folks, when Walter is caught deciding losing 1 aircraft is to be
the definition of heavy fighter attack he will simply attack the person
showing the real evidence.

Just because that formation lost only one aircraft doesn't mean they were not
heavily attacked. As Freeman indicates, the formation at one point was in some
disorder. They still bombed accurately.

By the way Walter now assumes they were heavily attacked.

Remember the bomber gunner multiplication table? Similar thing for the
fighter encounter table.

This is from an RAF report, the 31 March 1945 raid when the formation
was hit by around 30 Me262s who made a single pass, knocking down
around 4 bombers, "78 encounters and 28 crews reported one or more
combats".

In part of your note of yesterday that I didn't feel warranted a response, you
indicated that the experience of the 303rd on the 1/11/44 raid was invalid
--because they were not under attack -- in the target area--. That is so
completely ridiculous.

Yes folks, when Walter is in trouble just invent other people's
words while forgetting his. It will be interesting to see what text
Walter uses to substantiate this claim, the text I wrote,

"The 303rd lost 11 bombers on 11 January 1944. I will snip the
description of the losses, most of which occurred before the
target, the quote is noting at times different views of the same loss.

In other words these bombs missed their target and came down on
facilities nearby, we are talking accuracy here, hitting the official
target, not nearby ones, under the current absurd rules.

Yes folks, if you can find two examples over the period of the war your
case is proved, just ignore the cases where the USAAF bombers missed.
Especially if you can use wartime assessments of accuracy and, in
particular, damage. Note there is no measure of how many bombs
missed the target, only that some did and implying most."

See anything of being attacked over the target,? As opposed to
pointing out the RAF bombers were attacked by fighters over
the target, in Walter provided evidence, which he goes on
below to try and deny.

You seem to have your little coterie of supporters
hovering around who won't post themselves, but will make up little funny
stories about pickle barrels. Maybe you are impressing them.

Translation Walter has noted his fiction is unsupported. Note how
Walter has been obsessed with pickle barrels recently.

Says it all really. Last time this quote was
trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
B-17 was."

Unescorted B-17's could get good effect on target despite the worst the Germans
could do. Not so the RAF, as the official history shows.

It is quite simple folks, note how the Official History quotes are not
repeated here, they had to be cut out immediately I put the full
context in.

Apparently unescorted RAF B-17s could not hit targets if we are to
take the above words literally.

Alternatively we are back at the usual boys own stuff, the B-17 heavy
fighter idea. Junk.

Bomber Command launched over 1,000 raids in WWII, Walter finds
a raid description, and tells us all how only the nightfighters affected
accuracy that night.

Walt saw a lot of anecdotal evidence of that and was interested to learn that
the offical British history confirmed it.

It is quite simple folks, note how the Official History quotes are not
repeated here, they had to be cut out immediately I put the full
context in.

As for anecdotal evidence Walter trawls books looking for quotes
he can use, out of context and heavily edited if needed.

Now for Regensburg, remember we are talking about "almost fanatical
resistance", affecting bombing accuracy.

--Not-- affecting bombing accuracy--

There were146 B-17s sent
with 127 credited with bombing the target, 24 lost and 1 written off.
Every group participating received a unit citation. All the information is
in the Mighty 8th War Diary, a work Walter claims to have.

Yeah, found it on the remnants table. Cheap.

Thanks for the confirmation, it helps when I quote the diary
because it shows how selectively Walter uses any work.

There were 7 bomb groups sent.
The 96th lost no aircraft, claimed 5 kills and had 19 out of 21 bomb the
target.
The 388th lost 1 aircraft after bombing the target and claimed 7 kills.
The 84th had 20 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 1 and claimed 13 kills.
The 385th had 19 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 3 and claimed 48 kills.
The 95th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 4 and claimed 25 kills.
The 390th had all aircraft bomb the target, but lost 6 and claimed 6 kills.
The 100th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 9 and claimed 36 kills.

Walter wants to claim the entire 4th wing did well after encountering
heavy resistance.

Walt said no such thing. You're a lying son of a bitch, aren't you?

Walter's words,

"The 8/17/43 raid by the Fourth Bomb Wing on
Regensburg was another example of very accurate bombing despite heavy
opposition by the Germans."

Anybody see anything about some of the formations, as opposed to
the whole wing? Walter will presumably accuse Walter of telling lies.

Walt wants to say there was good effect on target. You are making things up
from whole cloth. But doubtless your buddies are glad you are defending the
right.

Translation Walter will simply wish away unpleasant facts.

The numbers indicate the candidates are the 95th
and 100th, in terms of number of aircraft lost before the target and the
385th in terms of kills claimed.

And all this pedantry shows what exactly?

How about that. I accurately report what the USAAF did and Walter
simply ignores it, not for him to let people see the facts and decide
for themselves, the fact free editorial laced with the "right" conclusions
is the preferred option.

If you could show that some US attacks had poor effect on target because of
flak or fighters as opposed to clouds, haze, bad navigation or just poor
bomb
aiming, then you might have something. But I don't think you can do that.
You'll just continue to carp at the Americans.

You see, when I post the USAAF bomb reports, and so on they are
deleted.

Address the point, Sinclair. Can you show that flak or fighters degraded USAAF
accuracy?

The answer is no, you cannot. So you just carp and parade your pedant's
pedigree.

"We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human.

Note this is an 8th Air Force document reporting the bombing results.
I could add the various USSBS accuracy reports and even Doolittle
noting the environment became better leading to better results. Walter
normally deletes the evidence.

Doolittle when commenting on improvements in accuracy during 1944,
"there were no real improvements in bombing equipment. The improvement
was in the environment in which the bombing took place." In other words
fewer fighter interceptions as the main decrease in resistance.

"We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human.

We know the Germans are clear that the USAAF hurt them much worse
than the RAF did.

As you can see when confronted with the evidence Walter either
deletes it or changes the subject, back to a favourite junk claim,
from carefully selected quotes.

Not
super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
error with an increase in the flak defences."

Which you don't quote.

Walter keeps deleting the evidence.

The calculation was each flak gun added 4.5 feet to error, rather precise.
Apart from misidentifying targets, crews improperly levelled gyroscopes
and cut bomb runs short.

This raid on the Renault plant shows what the RAF could do against
undefended
targets. I mean, after all, it -was- dark, wasn't it?

By the way folks the undefended bit is dropped when the USAAF attacks
the target.

It was dark, right? There was good effect on target, right? It was
undefended, right?

Translation Walter is going to ignore his original claim and pretend
to answer other questions.

It helps establish a baseline for accuracy. And as I indicated the other day,
we can see clearly that over German targets, that accuracy was seriously
degraded by the German defenses in a way that has no parallel in the USAAF
experience.

It is simple really, find a report on an RAF raid on Berlin, misrepresent
the report, find a report on a USAAF where bombing accuracy was good,
even when parts of the formation lost heavily, ignore things like unit
citations presented, claim both raids are "typical" and smear from there.

And the difference between a shallow and deep penetration
is going to be ignored.

As I said earlier, the USAAF took their targeting systems with them. You're
confirming that the vaunted RAF had an accuracy problem due to its technology.

Quite correct, radio aids made a big difference to long range
night raids. And as the electronics became better the result
was the night raids ended up more accurate, on average.

Okay, fine. Too bad they didn't have better aircraft. Then they could have
attacked by day.

People can see the "boys own" things here. Walter should be
railing against the diversion of resources from more B-17s into
P-51s is the B-17 was such a good heavy fighter.

Day bombing required strong fighter cover, not heavily armed
bombers.

Too bad they didn't develop a better heavy machine gun for defense, or a
bomber with a very strong stucture, or very forgiving flight characteristics,
or one that could fly in tight formations above the worst of the flak. Too bad
they didn't have an aircraft like the B-17.

Sort of summarises everything doesn't it? The penalties for heavy
armament, higher altitudes and so on are ignored, if the B-17 did it
then it must be good.

Agitate to replace those B-1s, 2s and 52s then.

But over Germany, the accuracy dropped dramatically.

Walter has one raid in France and one raid in Germany to prove it so.

You don't deny it.

Walter the accuracy dropped dramatically between undefended
and defended targets, by day and night. Accuracy dropped
with distance more quickly by night than day.

As I suggest above, Mr. Wiltshaw, I believe it was, started
the ball rolling on this by showing that that RAF could get pretty could
concentration on an undefended factory. But over Germany where there were
flak, fighters and searchlights, they had to settle for attacking whole cities
and burning out the workers, not burning down the factories.

The Americans didn't have to do that.

People can note that for all the years 1943 to 1945 the 8th dropped
more bombs by non visual sighting, the USAAF did have to settle for
area attacks for a high percentage of its efforts, comparable to the
Bomber Command percentages in 1944/45.

But the Americans could and often did get really good effect on target as at
the Renault plant on 4/4/43, and they could do it on the 8/17/43 Regensburg
raid -- no matter what the Germans did.

Yes folks, the Renault plant becomes defended when the USAAF
appears and undefended when the RAF appears.

The Renault factory was undefended when the Americans hit it. After they left
the target area, they were attacked by JG 26. The point is that when the USAAF
-and- the RAF hit it, it was undefended. And the Americans could get good
effect on target despite the worst the Germans could do. Not so the RAF.

Yes folks, the fact the USAAF bombers were hit after they had bombed
is still proof of how they could do if they were hit before they had bombed.
This is really funny.

Regensburg
is dealt with above.

To the next "" is simply my material that had to be deleted,

A lot of your material is over the top ridiculous.

Translation, unanswerable.

You delete a lot of my material; I don't mind.

Walter will now present evidence of all this deletion, beyond me
deleting the 303rd's combat report for 11 January 1944. He will
be unable to.

"This is quite amusing, apparently the attacks on Billancourt are
an accuracy measure, a base line for how much the defences
affected accuracy, but only for the RAF, not for the USAAF.

I think you are lying. I think you took my meaning perfectly.

Yes folks, Walter wants to set up a skewed comparison.

Not surprising really, if the claim is 498 out of 500 USAAF "fell
on the factory". This was 4 April 1943.

Now go to Huls, in Germany, 22 June 1943, it was a 541 acre site,
0.845 square miles. The bombs fell over a 12 square mile area,
with 20% within the factory fences, not on the factory.

Huels was badly damaged. But I don't see the point. You don't address the
point.

The point is bombing accuracy and the difference obtained when
attacking a weakly defended target in France and a strongly
defended target in Germany.

So Walter changes the subject, to how much damage was done.

Can you show that USAAF accuracy was degraded by flak and fighters, or even by
fighters, the way the official British history shows that the RAF's accuracy
was degraded when intercepted by the NJG?

No, you can't. You can only carp.

Translation, the official history does not support Walter, and the
rest of the junk flows from there.

Given the amount of open space in the factory area we have gone
from 99.6% to around 5% or less accuracy. And under the rules being
used this must all be due to the effects of the defences.

Huels was badly damaged.

Yes folks, when talking bombing accuracy run a mile from the
actual accuracy figures.

Just ignore the attacks on Billancourt were much more effective
mainly because of the weak defences,

I have actually addressed the attack on the Renualt plant at Billancourt quite
a bit. but we can see on one hand accuracy against an undefended target --
Billancourt-- and the accuracy over German targets and we can say,
"hmmmmmmm....big difference."

See above for the difference in USAAF accuracy.

both fighter and flak, enabling a
lower bombing altitude. Choosing them as a baseline is bad enough,
using it as a baseline for only one air force shows the standard agenda.


Both Air Forces attacked it. But the USAAF could get the same accuracy despite
the worst the Germans could do; RAF accuracy was degraded when the defenses
made a strong reaction.

As people can see Walter prefers to hope no one has a short
term memory. Apparently 498 out of 500 bombs on the French
factory is equal to 20% in the factory fences and around 1/4 of
that on the German factory, but only for the USAAF.

It is simple really, take a couple of quotes on the RAF strategic
situation, pretend they are about bombers on the tactical level,

Yeah, well. The German night fighters were not harrasssing British bombers
over Germany on a strategic level. It was pretty personal.

It is simple really, take a couple of quotes on the RAF strategic
situation, pretend they are about bombers on the tactical level.
As can be seen the pretence continues.

a quote from a master bomber on an area raid and ignore the
problems master bombers had with such raids and the other
problems that night.

It was noted on enough missions to be noted in the official history.

People can note the gaps between what works say and what
Walter wants them to say.

You're boring me, Sinclair.

Good. Given the amusement I derive.

Having done that go find a couple of the
well documented missions where USAAF bombers performed
above average. Announce this as the USAAF standard and
ignore the USAAF and USSBS reports on bombing accuracy
and, in particular, the way defences degraded accuracy.

I haven't seen anything that indicated that fighters degraded the accuracy. On
many raids, the bombing was very accurate no matter how the Germans reacted.

Translation Walter will not go looking for the total body of evidence,
just the reports of above average achievement by the USAAF.

You are welcome to lay aside your charts and abstracts and cite some actual
raids where the RAF had good concentration on target despite being heavily
engaged by the NJG. Seriously, I think there was at least one.

This is good, it will be interesting to see what the rules are supposed
to be here, what raids qualify geographically and time wise.

If one
RAF bomber crew flinched once it is the RAF standard, it one
USAAF formation took heavy losses but bombed accurately it
is the USAAF standard.

But that wasn't the case.

If one RAF bomber crew flinched?

"The night was clear. Bomber Command's
Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and
concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct
Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of
Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas."

Five aircraft out of 468? Who do you think you are fooling Sinclair? That's
a lot of flinching.

Yes folks, the Walter rule of RAF reporting, do not mention that night
the pathfinders marked the wrong area, not the aiming point, nor
the markers dropped away from the concentration at what was
thought to be the aiming point.

In other words folks, take a USAAF formation that attacked an
alternative target, measure how far that target was from the
primary target, use that as a measure of the error and the USAAF
crews "bravery".

Remember the raids Walter cites, on 12 and 28 May 1944, the
USAAF ones against oil raids, the strike on Zeitz had 20.8%
of bombs on the plant with visual bombing according to the
USSBS, the 1.5 square mile Leuna plant had 37.9% hit, I
believe the current absurd criteria is "that is a lot of flinching".

Walter likes to smear the men in the bombers.

From my original post to this thread,

"Walter may try and trot out his "proof" of this, RAF raids on Berlin in
winter 1943, just about the hardest target in the book. He will then use
ideas like measuring accuracy from the official aiming point even when
the pathfinders marked another point 1 to 2 miles away."

I cite one raid. As far as i know, you've -never- cited a good raid by the
RAF, one that had pretty good effect on target. Of course the targets were
whole cities. That should make it easier. Can you cite such a raid or raids?
Besides raids that resulted in the random firestorm, or the advent of window?
I've cited several raids. Thanks for mentioning Huels. That raid had good
effect on target, as did the others I named.

Now you name some significant Main Force raids of equal effect. And you have
this advantage -- the RAF targeted whole cities, typically.

This is really good, apparently I have to go find RAF raids that
really heavily damaged a city, the USAAF raids that they will
be compared to have to heavily damage a factory, using
wartime intelligence about USAAF damage levels.

Sort of summarises Walter's rules quite well.

Lets see now, the Alkett works in Berlin, November 1943, the loss
of Stug production was so bad it was the major reason a Panzer
IV line was changed to Stug IV.

Just like before when USAAF success is based on the Luftwaffe
moving 4% of its fighter force but RAF success is measured on
the effects on the German economy, the output of tens of millions
of workers.

What I showed there was that after more than a year of Harris' command, the
effect of British bombing on the German economy was nil. On the other hand,
the Germans were very concerned over USAAF operations and after a period of
less than a year were giving them priority in the defense.

Yes folks, apart from the basic junk claims see the double
standard, the RAF is measured on the effects on the economy,
the USAAF on the effects on the military.

Now, if we extrapolate, we see after a year of USAAF operations the double
strike raid against Regensburg/Shweinfurt on 8/17/43 -- a year after the first
raid. What sort of effort was Bomber Command having on 9/1/40, a year after the
war started? Or maybe we can add 8 months, the time between the attack on
Pearl Harbor and the first USAAF raid. Let's see, that takes us to the Summer
of 1941. What effect was the RAF having on German industry in that time frame?

Almost none.

Walter will of course ignore the effects of the USAAF on the
German economy in the same time frame. The fact that before
1944 the main effects of the bomber offensive were military and
that in any case the economic effects from 1943 onwards were
the result of the joint offensive.

Therefore judge the RAF on economic effects and USAAF on
the military effects.

Isn't that about the time the Butts report came out? So given the same time
frames to develop, the USAAF is wrecking the Regansburg ME-109 factory, the
British were trying to improve on getting 3 aircraft out of 100 within five
miles of the target.

This just gets better and better. Or more embarrassing for you.

Yes folks, just use different rules for the different "competitors"
and you can rig the results quite well.

Wrecking the Regensburg factory is apparently defined as the
Luftwaffe accepting over 600 fighters from it in the last quarter
of 1943, versus around half that in the first quarter of 1943.

It is apparent Walter will continue to ignore figures like the USSBS
reporting that on average in good to fair weather in the final 4 months
of 1944 35.7% of the 8th's bombs landed over 1/2 a mile away from
the aiming point, including 17.6% over a mile away. The RAF aircraft
that missed are automatically accused of being deterred by fighters
and flak, the USAAF are automatically excused

Walter must really hate the USAAF to smear it like
he does, the way he claims it needs the contest rigged to look
good.

Do you remember that thread on the moderated WWII group called "Was the
daylight bombing campaign necessary?"

We've come a long way since then, haven't we?

I did not post any article under that topic so I do not recall it,
I simply note Walter has been pushing the same skewed
claims for years.

Now the question is, since you
seem to agree that RAF accuracy over distance was so poor, why was the RAF
wasting its time dropping so many bombs so inaccurately at night? I mean, the
accuracy over Germany, when compared to that raid on the Renault plant -- it's
sort of pitiful, isn't it?

Sort of summarises Walter quite well, why did the 8th bother
using H2X at all under the same rules, given the accuracy,
originally worse than the 1941 night bombers.

Think of it this way, go find the stories of the RAF bombers that
continued on to attack the target despite heavy damage on the
way out

On the way out, the target had already been attacked.

Outbound from base Walter.

, then go look for the times USAAF bomb groups missed
their target, use these to compare the effects of the air forces.

The Americans sometimes missed, and missed wide. You're dodging the question
that we have wandered on to. Did the German fighter defenses degrade the US
bombing the way it did the British bombing?

I think the answer is no, and your dodging seems to confirm that you have no
information to the contrary.

Translation Walter deletes the replies and then announces other
people are dodging the question. Walter goes looking for a couple
of good USAAF examples, a bad RAF one and then claims these
are typical.

Use USAAF raids where the formation suffered 0 or 1 loss, or losses
after they had bombed as "good" examples of fighter interception
effects on bombing accuracy. The result is what matters, the evidence
is irrelevant.

The men who flew the missions do not need this sort of damage
to their reputations."

This is a progression we've seen before; your notes, and this is a good
example, get so over the top ridiculous that I am willing to leave them
largely unaswered. They won't sway anybody worth swaying.

Translation, Walter cannot answer them, so they need to be ignored.

People can judge for themselves.

Oh they are, believe me, they are.

Meantime I go on collecting nice emails about my posts.

I've no doubt you do. If you are hishonest enough to post it, there are those
hopeful enough to buy it.

Translation Walter is finding his junk is unsupported in forums
where people know their air war history.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that
the
night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day
fighters
were.

Walter you really need to understand the way the JG300 series of units
operated, they had no radar, they intercepted over the target.

And you -know- that when they did that, they was supposed to operate above
the
flak, which was only supposed to fire up to a certain altitude when the wild
boars were operating.

Walter is always good for a great laugh.

I'm right; you tried to fool people.

Walter is always good for a great laugh.

After trying to claim the
nightfighters were not intercepting over the target, despite the
quote he posted stating it, the claim has to be deleted.

See above. You lied, and as is often the case, you got caught.

Translation, the quote does not say what Walter wants it to say,
so declare everyone else a liar. The fun thing is Walter simply
invents these liar claims like he invents the rest of his fiction.
The more Walter accuses people of lies the closer you are to the
truth.

Remember the whole point is the claim the nightfighters reduced
bombing accuracy, and willingness to approach the target, which
means must have been attacking over the target.

It doesn't mean that at all; you are blatantly lying. I even provided the
quote:

"Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging
the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs
prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews
harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen."

-- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks

Yes folks, apparently when listening to the master bomber's VHF
instructions, as they approached the target, "harassed by fighter
attack" does not mean they were under fighter attack while
approaching the target. The only time the master bomber
instructions are useful is basically on the bomb run.

The really good laugh for the post. I mean there is no point listening
to the master bomber if you are leaving the target. Also note the
problems with listening to the master bomber and the intercom at
the same time.

Walter will ignore the reported problems with master bombers and
area attacks, the additional confusion that made his instructions
unclear at times and so on.

As a point in logic when do bombers listen for the bombing instructions?
On the bomb run or way before or after?

What you know damn well was the case, was that the bulk of both day and night
fighter attackes happened well before the target. Ever hear of the Kammhuber
line?

You are so easy to show as a liar. You're pitiful.

Walter's definition of liar is people who contradicts him.

Where do we start with this one. When the Germans largely abandoned
the Kammhuber line after the use of window, and to an extent the tighter
bomber streams, was discussed Walter spent a lot of time saying all the
British had done was make the Germans do better. The running commentary
approach, feeding the fighters into the bomber stream, was adopted in the
second half of 1943, after things like better navigation systems were fitted.
This was backed up by the single engined nightfighters attacking over the
target.

It is quite simple, Walter uses the Luftwaffe interception system from
early 1943 and tries to pretend it was around in late 1943. He needs
to erase the fighters or flak from the defences against the RAF raid he
has chosen. Ignoring the quote he posts that reports both are present.

People can now go and read the many complaints made about the
Luftwaffe flak units ignoring any flak ceilings, in contrast to the
admired Naval flak units. See Aders in his History of the German
Nightfighter force.

That wouldn't be the point, would it? Why didn't you post that before in this
thread? The German flak was supposed to moderate their fire when the wild
boars were around. Most of the fighter activity took place away from the
target cities, for both forces.

Walter will simply ignore the fact that for the period of RAF raids he
has chosen the Luftwaffe had fighter forces dedicated to intercepting
over the target. He will go with the wartime averages, not the actual
defences faced by the bombers on the selected raids. That would
wreck the fiction.

Walter will now show us the documentation that shows no flak kills
on the night, and/or the way all RAF aircraft were above the flak
ceiling and/or they knew they were above the flak ceiling, all after
proving there was a flak ceiling in place that night and it was
adhered to.

I don't have to. What you posted was complete bull****.

Translation Walter cannot handle the truth. So he invents parts of
his assumed RAF raid, trying to erase the fighters over the target,
but when he cannot do that try and erase the flak over the target.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
"He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter
attack were not always inclined to listen."

Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".

It somehow made its way into the official history.

I see. The above quote made it into the official history, or is it
another case of myths being appended to the text?

You're welcome to show the opposite. Instead you just carp.

Translation, when I include the reports they are ignored or deleted.

And blah blah blah. You can't show it, so you just carp.

The reports are repeated above, people can check to see how often
Walter ignores or deletes them if they want to.

US raids on 8/17/43, 1/11/44, and 5/12/44 -- just off the top of my head --
had
good effect on target despite heavy German resistance and severe loss.

I like the "off the top of my head" line, implying Walter has actually done
some sort of research as opposed to committing to memory the really
good results ("boys own flying adventures") and then trying to claim they
are typical. Major Bigglesworth for the RAF anyone?

Are you saying those raids didn't have good effect on target? Or that they
were not heaviy opposed, or what exactly?

Change the subject time, ignore the reality Walter has a carefully
selected group of "typical" raids".

If you can find some US raids that were not effective due to flak and
fighters,
as opposed to weather, poor navigation, poor bomb aiming, or some other
factor,
go for it.

This is just cut and paste from the current thread.


"The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.

The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
super human to refute the fiction."

Where do you show the defenses caused the errors?

From the reports of the air force and crews.

The ball bearing plants at Shweinfurt on 10/14/43, to quote Freeman were
"heavily hit." The 351st group placed all bombs within 1,000 feet of the
aiming point. This, in spite of heavy fighter opposition.

On 14 October 1943 the 351st group sent 10, had 6 attack, claimed
4 kills while losing 1 MIA.

You can see the Walter definitions working quite well, find a raid where
some of the US bombers were heavily opposed, then report the bombing
results of the formations that were fortunate enough to have escaped
heavy fighter attack.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email

On 4 May 2004 18:27:56 GMT, Laurence Doering wrote:

Jet streams vary between about one and four hundred miles wide, and
one to three miles deep. Wind speeds of three hundred mph or greater
are possible in winter.

Fascinating stuff. Thanks.

(Must wreak havoc with arrival times in London! I suppose pilots must
get permission to ride a 300 mph jet stream? That could shave two
hours off a flight BOS-LON.)

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

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