pearl harbor, why no usn a/c in the air?

"old hoodoo" wrote in message ...
I have never heard of a single navy aircraft getting airborne at Pearl Harbor. Was this because all the naval aircraft were based
at a single facility? Has there ever been an accounting of what actually happened to immobilize the navy air?

The army managed to get up an assortment of fighters for at least a token defense.


Al


According to Morison, three Kanehoe based PBYs were aloft when the
attack started. One of these, working the Ward datum, sighted a sub
and dropped smoke pots at 0633. He also notes that one "combat plane
available for instant use" on Ford Island was launched "with
difficulty" during the attack and ordered to search a sector between
280 and 330 by Adm Bellinger. Apparently several utility types wre
lauched from Ford during this timeframe as well.
The hapless SBD's from Enterpise were aloft inbound to Ford and found
themselves in the fray as well. They left the boat between 0615 and
0637. Several were shot down by the Japs with the survivors landing at
Ford late in the attack while getting a Blue-on-Blue smackdown to
boot.
More were shot down in later searches by both enemy and friendly fire
that afternoon and evening.
(Later Admiral) Moorer went aloft in one of the 3 surviving PBYs just
after the attack.

Here is a thread i picked up in a Google search:

http://www.j-aircraft.com/bbs/pearl_config.pl?read=291


Dano

"old hoodoo" wrote in message
...
I have never heard of a single navy aircraft getting airborne at Pearl
Harbor. Was this because all the naval aircraft were based
at a single facility? Has there ever been an accounting of what actually
happened to immobilize the navy air?

The army managed to get up an assortment of fighters for at least a token
defense.


Al

From: Henry J Cobb
Date: 4/9/2004 19:26 Pacific Daylight Time

snip

Applying VP-21's numbers

Which wasn't based at PH in any event ...

we get 51 planes required to do a 360° search
to 450 miles so just 20 planes in the air could have done a search
beyond the strike radius of any Japanese carrier based aircraft.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/martin_1.html

The "Martin-Bellinger Report" on aircraft availability

start
PATROL WING TWO
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
December 19, 1941.

Memorandum for Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: In accordance with our conversation of yesterday, I am
forwarding to you the following information:
....

[i]t should be noted that there were insufficient patrol planes in the Hawaiian
Area effectively to do the Job required. For the commander of a search group to
be able to state with some assurance that no hostile carrier could reach a spot
250 miles away and launch an attack without prior detection would require an
effective daily search through 360 to a distance of at least 800 miles.
Assuming a 16-mile radius of visibility this would require a daily 16 hour
flight of 84 planes. A force of not less than 209 patrol planes, adequate spare
parts and ample well trained personnel would be required for such operations.

(Signed) P. N. L. BELLINGER
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
end

RADM Bellinger appears to not agree.

MW

Snip

Launching things like seaplanes, which were present
at Pearl, would be useless and suicidal.

Fighters from ENTERPRISE did arrive over Pearl in the course of the
attack.

--
Andrew Toppan --- --- "I speak only for myself"
"Haze Gray & Underway" - Naval History, DANFS, World Navies Today,
Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more - http://www.hazegray.org/

Of course, if the relatively limited seaplane patrol assets had been used
for long range search, there was the possibility the attack force might have
been detected prior (perhaps well prior) to launch. As there were
insufficient aircraft to provide a truly effective search (perhaps 180
degree hemisphere to the west of Oahu), it was decided to not search at all.

The short and long term impacts of an early warning at Pearl are interesting
to ponder. There are a number of scenarios in which the outcome for the US
could have been far worse.

R / John

It's a given the search capability wasn't there. It's also a given there
was a war warning out. I'd think a prudent commander would do the best he
could with the assets he had. Formulate some threat axes. 270 would be
more likely than 090. Application of a little common sense (your enemy
might like to avoid detection, therefor he's likely to give your forward
bases: Wake, Midway, etc) might refine that considerably. There's even a
discipline (Operations analysis, senior course at USNA) that's intended for
problems just like this: maximization of search detection with given
assets.

So maybe you wind up with a pattern that gives a PsubD of 30%. An educated
guess (threat axis either NW or SW of Pearl) might sweeten that
considerably. And you FLY! They had SOME search capability, why not use
it? Instead they played staff games ... memos flying all over the place.
Can't do a full search, so we'll ask for the assets (non-existent) and sit
on our hands till we get them.

The underlying problem was that while a Japanese attack was expected, no one
knew where it might occur. But on Oahu in early December 1941, everyone
knew, in their hearts, it couldn't happen there (or if it did, it would be
sabotage by all those Japanese living on the island).

R / John

poor intelligence from the dem administration

"old hoodoo" wrote in message
...
I have never heard of a single navy aircraft getting airborne at Pearl
Harbor. Was this because all the naval aircraft were based
at a single facility? Has there ever been an accounting of what actually
happened to immobilize the navy air?

The army managed to get up an assortment of fighters for at least a token
defense.


Al

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/...365-Pearl.html
On Sunday, December 7, 1941, this ship, acting as squadron leader for
the Commander Destroyer Squadron THREE, was at the Navy Yard, Pearl
Harbor, in a restricted availability status undergoing preliminary
radar installation work.

How many radar equiped ships did the Navy have sitting at Pearl Harbor?

-HJC

"Henry J Cobb" wrote in message

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, this ship, acting as squadron leader for
the Commander Destroyer Squadron THREE, was at the Navy Yard, Pearl
Harbor, in a restricted availability status undergoing preliminary
radar installation work.

How many radar equiped ships did the Navy have sitting at Pearl Harbor?

Damned if I know.

Why don't you take a look at Vol. 3, "History of U.S. Naval Operations in
WWII" by CAPT Samuel Elliot Morrison, USNR. IIRC he has a complete order of
battle for PACFLT in December, 1941 that includes some information on the
technical capabilites and availability of U.S. vessels.

Your tone suggests some hostility toward strategic and tactical decisions
made at the time. Placing the Fleet forward at Pearl (instead of back at
Dago) was controversial when it was made. It was a political decision made
at the highest levels of government.

Much has been made of the "proof" of Pearl Harbor vulnerablity given a
successful raid during naval exercises a few years before and the successful
British attack at Taranto. In truth those operations don't really show the
basing decision, or the specific defense decisions, to be inherently
unsound. They only show that any base is vulnerable to attack under some
conditions.

Toland has written a couple of books, IIRC, on the subject of December, 7,
1941. I comment them to you.

Bill Kambic

Bill Kambic wrote:
Your tone suggests some hostility toward strategic and tactical decisions
made at the time. Placing the Fleet forward at Pearl (instead of back at
Dago) was controversial when it was made. It was a political decision made
at the highest levels of government.

That's still a good idea today.

5200 nautical miles between San Diego and Soul and almost 6000 between
San Diego and Taipei vs 4200 nautical miles between the East Coast and
Tripoli.

The only place you could base a carrier further from any place you'd
possibly use it is in Texas.

I just hope that as the Navy once again becomes more forward based that
better care is put on force protection this time.

-HJC

"Henry J Cobb" wrote in message

Bill Kambic wrote:
Your tone suggests some hostility toward strategic and tactical
decisions
made at the time. Placing the Fleet forward at Pearl (instead of back
at
Dago) was controversial when it was made. It was a political decision
made
at the highest levels of government.

That's still a good idea today.

Indeed.

5200 nautical miles between San Diego and Soul and almost 6000 between
San Diego and Taipei vs 4200 nautical miles between the East Coast and
Tripoli.

I'm not sure I see your point.

The only place you could base a carrier further from any place you'd
possibly use it is in Texas.

I just hope that as the Navy once again becomes more forward based that
better care is put on force protection this time.

Sure, but no defense is 100% (as no offense in 100%). Commanders do the
best they can with the assets available.

Bill Kambic

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