Mxsmanic , IFR sensations, and some other stuff

Gezellig wrote in news:g0skjl$55p$1
@news.albasani.net:

On Mon, 19 May 2008 16:33:33 +0000 (UTC), Bertie the Bunyip wrote:

On May 19, 7:58 am, Tina wrote:
JFK was in a spiral from about 5000 feet when he crashed. A 200
foot
error in his altimeter was the least of his problems.

He had more training for in IR than most do when they pass the
test.
This was a case of a pilot who, it would seem, was crossing the
sound
with an auto pilot engaged. Radar showed a smooth flight until that
point when most would have started down to pattern altitude from
5000
feet. The airplane went from pretty straight and pretty level to
impact in less than 30 seconds.

The NTSB report is vivid and frightening.

Thank you Tina, I just reread this,

Not that it would mean anything to you.

Bertie

Hey, Bertie, for one thread in your oh so busy day of doing nothing
but
projecting yourself as a complete Usenet asshole, why not give it a
****ing rest?


Little chance of that, I'm afraid.


Bertie

Gezellig wrote in :

On Sun, 18 May 2008 19:45:30 -0700 (PDT), wrote:

Also, I read somewhere that JFK Junior's plane crashed probably
because he did not trust his intstruments. *What's the likelihood of
that?

Hopefully for an instrument pilot, NEVER, but when you have an
instrument go out, it does up the anti in IDENTIFYING the problem and
then tossing that instrument out of your scan.

In my case, the change was pretty dramatic as it happened after
departing and in my climb in my departure as I was entering IMC.
Everything was absolutely normal on my first 1000 feet of climb and
nothing had changed on what I felt in the seat of my pants when I saw
the AI start showing a pitch up just about 100 feet inside IMC. Had I
really pitched up that much, I would have felt it. The lack of
feeling it immediately made me look at my VSI and it was rock solid
700 fpm climb, no change from below the cloud deck. Next instrument I
looked at was my airspeed and that was 90 knots, so secondary
instruments confirmed a normal climb and further confirmed my lack of
feeling in my butt indicated the AI was ghosting up on me.

I believe it's not normal to get such a dramatic change like I did,
but then again, as I am still finding out, it may not be the vacuum
pump, but the vacuum pump regulator that went out on me in my plane.
Will find out tomorrow morning when I talk with the A&P.

Ask him/her what instruments show the greatest failure levels.
Pitot-based?


You're a moron.

Gezellig wrote in :

On Mon, 19 May 2008 16:33:33 +0000 (UTC), Bertie the Bunyip wrote:

On May 19, 7:58 am, Tina wrote:
JFK was in a spiral from about 5000 feet when he crashed. A 200 foot
error in his altimeter was the least of his problems.

He had more training for in IR than most do when they pass the test.
This was a case of a pilot who, it would seem, was crossing the sound
with an auto pilot engaged. Radar showed a smooth flight until that
point when most would have started down to pattern altitude from 5000
feet. The airplane went from pretty straight and pretty level to
impact in less than 30 seconds.

The NTSB report is vivid and frightening.

Thank you Tina, I just reread this,

Not that it would mean anything to you.

Bertie

Hey, Bertie, for one thread in your oh so busy day of doing nothing but
projecting yourself as a complete Usenet asshole, why not give it a
****ing rest?


You're a ****ing moron who doesn't know **** from shinola.

On Mon, 19 May 2008 09:26:58 -0700 (PDT), Ken S. Tucker wrote:

On May 19, 7:58 am, Tina wrote:
JFK was in a spiral from about 5000 feet when he crashed. A 200 foot
error in his altimeter was the least of his problems.

He had more training for in IR than most do when they pass the test.
This was a case of a pilot who, it would seem, was crossing the sound
with an auto pilot engaged. Radar showed a smooth flight until that
point when most would have started down to pattern altitude from 5000
feet. The airplane went from pretty straight and pretty level to
impact in less than 30 seconds.

The NTSB report is vivid and frightening.

Thank you Tina, I just reread this,
http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief2.asp?...MA178& akey=1
Somewhat applicable to this thread!
Ken

He was doomed. injured ankle (rudder control issues), inability to
multi-task, turned down a co-ride with his CFI, VFR FNR, the list goes
on.

Tragic but avoidable, my 2 cents.

On Mon, 19 May 2008 13:49:32 -0400, Kirk Ellis wrote:

On Sun, 18 May 2008 23:02:24 -0400, Dudley Henriques
wrote:

I've always believed that Kennedy fell victim to a false horizon by
somehow starting a turn on a false visual reference then allowing his
nose to get away from him in the haze due to his inexperience causing
him not to realize he needed to transition immediately to instruments.
In this condition and with the nose lowering and the airspeed rising,
Kennedy desperately needed to realize he needed to level the wings and
kill the bank as the lead in to recovering the nose in pitch.
This is the classic graveyard spiral. Not solving for bank and trying to
solve for pitch simply deepened the issue. I'm fairly convinced that by
this time the nose was so low and the spiral tightening so fast he
became fixated on the grayness in front of him that he thought was gray
sky but was in fact gray water.
The rest is history.
Just my read on one potential cause for that accident.

It may be plausible to assume that if John's aircraft had been
equipped with a G1000, he and his passengers might still be with us.
It's only speculation but seems feasible.

IIRC, it's equally plausible to assume that if he had just turned on
the autopilot that was already in the aircraft they'd still be here
with us. Many links to a chain.

Chris Anderson's Book "The Day John Died" will offer more insights.

JFK Jr was a known risk taker, and was called the Master of Disaster
by his friends. His ankle may still have been in a cast on this
trip, the result of an injury from an ultra light accident not long
before. It's been said very few of his family and friends were willing
to fly with him. He lacked the superior judgment pilots should have to
avoid circumstances where they may be called upon to display superior
skills.

On May 19, 2:10*pm, Dudley Henriques wrote:

When every once of common sense,
physical sensation, charts floating, and g's pressing on your body tell
you you need to push, and your gyro panel is suspect, go immediately to
primary panel to verify.

Dudley,

How about the inverse, which I have been emphasizing in my
experiences? Would I not be saying the same thing?

Gyro tumbled in a position where I went from normal pitch to a 20
degree pitch up and I DID NOT feel the G's expected? After all the
airplane doesn't care if it's VMC or IMC outside the airframe so to
speak, so if I see that pitch change in VMC and get the seat of the
pants feelings of positive G, I would expect the same in IMC.

That lack of feeling flagged the HI which made me go to secondary
instruments. Would that not be the same thing as you describe above
(not to the extreme of floating charts) but in reverse?

In otherwords, I am catching the situation at hand before it became a
"control the airplane issue" by using my sensory feelings in the seat
of my pants against visual aids (in this case my instruments in IMC)
that changed without a corresponding seat of the pants feeling change.

For capturing the ILS below the glide slope, add power, no seat of the
pants feeling, flags me to check engine instrumentation or outside
temp probe for icing. In all what I am saying is that it supplements
and verifies the instrumentation based on power inputs (reduction or
adding). No different visually so to speak, if I look out the
windscreen or look at the AI and associated instruments in my scan.

As Gatts said, it's not being used for zero zero landings, but a
supplement to verify what my eyes say. The feeling should match what
my eyes say for POWER inputs no matter what meterological conditions
are outside the airplane. Again, not inner ear or head feelings, but
the seat of the pants feeling. Whether I look outside the windscreen
at the horizon or look at the AI, the feeling in the seat of the pants
should be the same. Any discrepancy for that feeling should be
resolved.

If both the gyro panel AND the primary panel tell you nothing, you've
got SERIOUS problems :-)

Amen on that and no seat of the pants skill will get you out of that.
That is called LUCK. And lots of good luck will you need! :-)))

On Mon, 19 May 2008 19:53:44 GMT, Benjamin Dover wrote:

You're

PLONK

Dudley Henriques wrote:
gatt wrote:
Dudley Henriques wrote:

I think what might be confusing some people reading this thread is that
even though the pilot should always be avoiding physical sensation as a
cue to perform an action while on instruments, Normal scan technique
involves the constant presence of physical sensations. This means tht
you are literally cross checking physical sensation constantly against
what the instruments are telling you. The trick to staying alive is in
being aware of these physical sensations but accepting without question
what the clocks are telling you.

Thanks, Dudley. I think that pretty much boils it down.

That funny buffeting feeling and mushiness of controls on a long apprach
might tell you to that it's time to get your eyes off the glide slope
needle and scan the instrument panel. An alert pilot wouldn't dismiss
it as turbulence, but at the same time he wouldn't panic and shove the
nose forward, either.

-c

wrote:
On May 19, 2:10 pm, Dudley Henriques wrote:

When every once of common sense,
physical sensation, charts floating, and g's pressing on your body tell
you you need to push, and your gyro panel is suspect, go immediately to
primary panel to verify.

Dudley,

How about the inverse, which I have been emphasizing in my
experiences? Would I not be saying the same thing?

Gyro tumbled in a position where I went from normal pitch to a 20
degree pitch up and I DID NOT feel the G's expected? After all the
airplane doesn't care if it's VMC or IMC outside the airframe so to
speak, so if I see that pitch change in VMC and get the seat of the
pants feelings of positive G, I would expect the same in IMC.

That lack of feeling flagged the HI which made me go to secondary
instruments. Would that not be the same thing as you describe above
(not to the extreme of floating charts) but in reverse?

In otherwords, I am catching the situation at hand before it became a
"control the airplane issue" by using my sensory feelings in the seat
of my pants against visual aids (in this case my instruments in IMC)
that changed without a corresponding seat of the pants feeling change.

For capturing the ILS below the glide slope, add power, no seat of the
pants feeling, flags me to check engine instrumentation or outside
temp probe for icing. In all what I am saying is that it supplements
and verifies the instrumentation based on power inputs (reduction or
adding). No different visually so to speak, if I look out the
windscreen or look at the AI and associated instruments in my scan.

As Gatts said, it's not being used for zero zero landings, but a
supplement to verify what my eyes say. The feeling should match what
my eyes say for POWER inputs no matter what meterological conditions
are outside the airplane. Again, not inner ear or head feelings, but
the seat of the pants feeling. Whether I look outside the windscreen
at the horizon or look at the AI, the feeling in the seat of the pants
should be the same. Any discrepancy for that feeling should be
resolved.

If both the gyro panel AND the primary panel tell you nothing, you've
got SERIOUS problems :-)

Amen on that and no seat of the pants skill will get you out of that.
That is called LUCK. And lots of good luck will you need! :-)))

The bottom line on physical sensations while IFR is always the same.
You are always comparing whether consciously or unconsciously, what you
are "feeling" and "sensing" against what the panel is telling you. Your
normal scan might be passing up raw data on the primaries as long as the
senses and the gyros match. ANY change or mismatch between these senses
and how they compare with your scan should automatically take you deeper
into the scan pattern to include raw data confirmation.
There is only one golden rule really on physical sensation. No matter
how much you feel it might be useful to use it as a cue that causes you
to act on it......DON'T! Expand the scan instead. You might be right
about the physical sensation, and it might indeed help you out of your
mismatch, but the price for that one time it fails you might be your life.
I can't stress enough the need to disregard physical sensation and opt
to expand the scan instead.
Most of the time on instruments you only get one shot at doing it right.
You might get away with correcting something by following a physical
sensation, but I think it's a terrible mistake to allow this to change
your basic thinking about what constitutes proper instrument procedure.

I had a sign hanging over my desk when I was teaching aerobatics. It was
a quote I had written about a pilot I had known very well. It read as
follows;

"I had a friend once. Jim was the hottest flyin' aerobatic son-of-a
bitch I've ever known. In his entire career, I think Jim only made one
mistake. Jim's dead!"

I read that sign every day of my tenure in aviation.

As it is for aerobatics, so it is for instrument flying.

--
Dudley Henriques