Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944

"Steve Mellenthin" wrote in message
...
They were getting the **** shot out of them every night as they flew
planes
with no belly turrets. And hey used the planes with belly turrrets,
B-17's
and
B-24's for electronic jammimg? Brilliant. Just brilliant.



Arthur Kramer

Art,

Going back to an earlier discussion on encountering AAA on a bomb run, I
have
always wondered if large formations all on the same run-in headig was an
appropriate tactic for a medium (attack) bomber such as the B-26. It
always
seemed to me that smaller flights on different target approach headings
might
be more effective for and that the danger of a mid-air in between
formations
might be less than the danger of flak in a bomber stream on a predictable
flight path. This is what the B-52s went to in Linebacker II to cut
losses.
There is a tacit assumption of a good measure of air superiority in my
question.

Steve

The strategy of the bomber stream is the same as that used
by birds and fish when they form dense flocks. Its much harder
for a number of predators to pick off 10 from within the mass
than 10 individuals.

In the case of daylight ops the bombers were separated
not only by distance but by elevation with high and low
formations as well as leading and trailing ones.

Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their
daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered
in height to minimise flak damage.

Keith

"Steve Mellenthin" wrote in message
...
smartace11 wrote:



I don't disagree at all, I am just asking the question. The B/A-26 was
used in
Vietnam as well and my question is whether using a medium bomber/attack
aircraft was appropriately used in a heavy bomber role. There is no doubt
that
the heavies in War 2 were employed in what seems to have been the most
logical
tactic. The -26 is a bit of a different beast and its main advantage
seems to
have been speed and maneuverability, not payload.

Thats a different aircraft than the one Art flew

The B-26 of WW2 was the Martin Marauder, that of
Vietnam was the Douglas Invader which was originally
designated A-26 and was a later design largely replacing
the B-26.

Keith

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Probably because its untrue

The simple fact is that during March 1944 bomber command flew a total
of 9031 sorties with a loss rate of under 4%. Nuremburg was indeed a
disaster
but an isolated one.

The RAF definitely was defeated over Germany by the Luftwaffe in the
Spring of
1944. Being put onto invasion targets has obscured this fact.

"Bomber Command had lost 4,160 aircraft missing and crashed in England.
Harris's failure to bring Germany to her knees, and the cost of his
failure,
had become embarrassingly evident to every man but himself.


Bull**** - losses in the first 4 months of 1944 were as follows

Month Lost Crashed %Loss
January 314 38 5.6
Febuary 199 21 5.2
March 283 39 3.6
April 214 25 2.4


During this period the B-17's of US 8th AF were suffering very
similar loss rates.

So what? What has that got to do with the RAF?


It shows the RAF were doing no worse than the USAF

And during the first 4 months of 1944, the USAAF was seriously attriting
the
Luftwaffe. The RAF was not. The Spitfires didn't have the range to help
out
over Germany. That's where the Luftwaffe was.





And in a letter to
the Air Ministry on April 7, 1944, he came as close as ever in his life
to
conceding that he was in deep trouble:

'The strength of the German defenses [he wrote] would in time reach a
point at
which night-bombing attacks by existing methods and types of heavy
bombers
would involve percentage casualty rates which in the long run could not
be
sustained...we have not yet reached that point, but tactical
innovations
which
have so far postponed it are now practically exhausted....'


So in fact in the spring of 1944 he is saying he has NOT been defeated,

Harris was in denial. As Hastings points out, he was the only one not
saying
that.

If you watch the World At War episode, "Whirlwind", you'll hear Harris say
that
the Battle of Berlin was not a defeat. But it was, and a bad one.


The Battle of Berlin was indeed a defeat, that was not the
entirety of the air war over Germany however and its provably
untrue to claim that ai operations over Germany were suspended.

Keith

"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Subject: Night bombers interception....
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 7/15/2004 10:04 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

Jack wrote:

ArtKramr wrote:

We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.
They wouldn't take them. Big mistake.

I presume they did so because they preferred some other aircraft (or
weapon system) which we also offered. Do you know what the preferred
alternative might have been?

Perhaps they wished to avoid large manning requirements and sought
aircraft with fewer required crew positions.

The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs
which
were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful. Contrary to
Art's
assertion, Bomber Command did operate some B-17Gs, but they were used by
100 Group (electronic countermeasures), not as part of the main force.
Coastal Command also used them, but the B-17 was less suited to night
bombing than the British a/c, barring considerable modifications. Given
that the B-17 was preferred by the 8th AF for daytime missions over the
B-24, and the B-24 was preferred in the Pacific and for various other
roles, there was no good reason for RAF Bomber Command to use them in
preference to the Lancaster and Halifax.

Guy


They never used them where they really needed them against night fighter
attack
with their big fat 50 caliber Browning heavy machine guns. The German
planes
were never well armored enough to withstand the American 50's.

You are incorrect.

The RAF operated B-17's in action in daylight long before the
USA even entered the war. The results were heavy losses and
poor results.

By the September of 1941, RAF Fortresses had flown 22 attacks against
targets such as Bremen, Brest, Emden, Kiel, Oslo, and Rotterdam, loss
rates on these missions averaged 20% and little damage was done.

The concept of self defense was flawed. This was a
lesson the USAAF would learn the hard way in 1943.

Keith

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs
which
were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful.

The Brits ignored American advice on how to use the B-17. Admittedly, the
B-17C was not ready for the big leagues.


The USA had zero combat experiencewith the B-17 in 1941 and
sold the B-17 on the basis of the self defending bomber. It failed
in 1941 and again when the USAAF tried it in 1943.

Keith

Guy Alcala wrote:
WalterM140 wrote:


It would have been quite easy to stop P-38 escorts in 1943, just attack
them early, and force them to jettison their external tanks, they were
carrying about as much or more fuel externally than internally.

It was -shown- that even a few dozen P-38's had a very delerious effect on the
tactics of the German day fighters.

There's no "it would have been quite easy to..." to it. What you suggest was
not a factor.


Only because the Germans rarely did so. U.S. fighter commanders were surprised
that they didn't try it more often, because it was so obviously a good idea.
Indeed, the Luftwaffe had tried to do so for a while, but heavy singl-engine
fighter losses (against P-47s) had resulted in an order from either Goring or
Schmidt (I forget which) sometime in the late-43 early '44 period (I forget) to
cease such attacks and move the fighters back. A bad decision.

BTW, ISTR for Geoffrey's info that the early J models were all retrofitted with
leading edge tanks either shortly before or shortly after achieving IOC in the ETO.


Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.

Thanks for the minutia.


Not minutia in this case, but very germane, as the lack of P-38 numbers was a
factor. Production was very limited at the time. Then there's the extra training
time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting units
operational/providing replacement pilots.


The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively could
have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed
solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available in
England in 1942.

Eaker and Hunter didn't do that.


While Eaker and Hunter were doctrinally blind to the need for far too long, the
need for a long-range fighter in the ETO in 1942 was hardly obvious given the
shallow penetrations we were making at the time. Arnold ordered Giles to increase
the internal fuel of the fighters around June '43 IIRR (don't have the reference,
"To Command The Sky" by McFarland and Newton, handy), giving him six months to
achieve it. Besides the P-38 was only in the ETO for a couple of months before
they were all sent to the Med.

I consider one of the great historical "what ifs" to be what if at least some P-38s
had remained in the 8th from November 1942 until September '43 (we'd have to assume
that P-38 production was sufficient that the 78th FG wouldn't have had its P-38s
stripped from it and sent to the Med as attrition replacements, so they weren't
forced to transition to the P-47). Would we have been able to fix the P-38's high
altitude/cold and wet climate problems prior to the availability of the P-51?

As it is, we know from Zemke that turbosupercharger control freeze-up was still an
issue in August _1944_ (IIRR he was flying a J-15), despite the problem being
identified no later than when the 55th FG had gone operational in mid-October '43.
Even assuming that the problems (engines, turbo controls, cockpit heat, dive flaps;
the boosted ailerons were a 'nice to have') had been fixed earlier, was it possible
to produce enough P-38s in that period to supply the needs of the PTO, MTO _and_
ETO? It seems unlikely, given the relatively low production totals of the P-38
compared to the single-engine a/c, and cost -- both the P-47 and P-38 cost about
double the P-51 to build in money, materiel and man-hours; fuel requirements were
also about double.


Given the production totals achieved with other aircraft, the US COULD
have ramped up production of the P-38, but the war production board
didn't approve second source production until very late (IIRC about
120 P-38s were eventually produced by Vultee-Nash, but likely none
of them ever made it to the combat theaters). If the engines had been
swapped out for two-stage Merlins, the turbo and early intercooler
problems would have been eliminated, at the cost of some fuel
efficiency, and Lockheed submitted a proposal for this, although
politics prevented this. That the P-38 was developed to US
specifications before the war resulted in the Allison engine
use, and the US focused on turbosupercharging for inline engines.
Of course, at that time, the Merlin didn't have two-stage
supercharging either, so the turbo was really the only practical
way to go for high altitude performance at the time.

The Allies had their share of bad production decisions, but
the greater industrial capability tended to make these decisions
less than critical to the final outcome and not as noticed in
the overall picture.

Mike Williamson

The B-26 of WW2 was the Martin Marauder, that of
Vietnam was the Douglas Invader which was originally
designated A-26 and was a later design largely replacing
the B-26.

I stand corrected. Lack of familiarity with the earlier B-26.

Keith Willshaw wrote:

"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Subject: Night bombers interception....
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 7/15/2004 10:04 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

Jack wrote:

ArtKramr wrote:

We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.
They wouldn't take them. Big mistake.

I presume they did so because they preferred some other aircraft (or
weapon system) which we also offered. Do you know what the preferred
alternative might have been?

Perhaps they wished to avoid large manning requirements and sought
aircraft with fewer required crew positions.

The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs
which
were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful. Contrary to
Art's
assertion, Bomber Command did operate some B-17Gs, but they were used by
100 Group (electronic countermeasures), not as part of the main force.
Coastal Command also used them, but the B-17 was less suited to night
bombing than the British a/c, barring considerable modifications. Given
that the B-17 was preferred by the 8th AF for daytime missions over the
B-24, and the B-24 was preferred in the Pacific and for various other
roles, there was no good reason for RAF Bomber Command to use them in
preference to the Lancaster and Halifax.

Guy


They never used them where they really needed them against night fighter
attack
with their big fat 50 caliber Browning heavy machine guns. The German
planes
were never well armored enough to withstand the American 50's.

You are incorrect.

The RAF operated B-17's in action in daylight long before the
USA even entered the war. The results were heavy losses and
poor results.

To be sure, IIRR the RAF never operated their Fortess Is (B-17Cs) in a group of
more than six, usually three or less, and often from altitudes above 30,000
feet. They just didn't have that many (only 20 in a single squadron), and the
reliability was pretty poor. RAF usage amounted to not much more than a 2 month
live fire operational test program. After all, they only dispatched 39 sorties
in those 22 missions. Still, the RAF usage was helpful in pointing out to the
US problems which needed fixing.

By the September of 1941, RAF Fortresses had flown 22 attacks against
targets such as Bremen, Brest, Emden, Kiel, Oslo, and Rotterdam, loss
rates on these missions averaged 20% and little damage was done.

The concept of self defense was flawed. This was a
lesson the USAAF would learn the hard way in 1943.

To be fair, the RAF experience didn't prove or disprove the US tactical
doctrine, because their practice didn't reflect it. It had to wait until 1943
for that doctrine to be _proven_ unsound, because only then was it able to be
properly tested. It's a shame that Eaker persisted in believing the doctrine
was correct for as long as he did (in the face of all the evidence to the
contrary), but then he apparently believed the kill claims by the bomber gunners
were reasonably accurate. We know better.

Guy

In the case of daylight ops the bombers were separated
not only by distance but by elevation with high and low
formations as well as leading and trailing ones.

Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their
daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered
in height to minimise flak damage.

Keith


That is where I was headed with the question. Thanks for the response. It has
been my impression, perhaps erroneous, that the choice of the stream stragegy
was not the best decision at times when a loose gaggle and varying run-in
headings and altitudes between the 2-4 airgraft groupings would have been more
effective. As I said, only an impression not backed up by much research or
fact.

Steve

Mike Williamson wrote:

Guy Alcala wrote:

snip

Even assuming that the problems (engines, turbo controls, cockpit heat, dive flaps;
the boosted ailerons were a 'nice to have') had been fixed earlier, was it possible
to produce enough P-38s in that period to supply the needs of the PTO, MTO _and_
ETO? It seems unlikely, given the relatively low production totals of the P-38
compared to the single-engine a/c, and cost -- both the P-47 and P-38 cost about
double the P-51 to build in money, materiel and man-hours; fuel requirements were
also about double.


Given the production totals achieved with other aircraft, the US COULD
have ramped up production of the P-38, but the war production board
didn't approve second source production until very late (IIRC about
120 P-38s were eventually produced by Vultee-Nash, but likely none
of them ever made it to the combat theaters).

that production could havebeen increased I dont deny. that it could have been increased
to the extent posible with the p-51 and to a lesser extent the P-47 seems unlikely, given
that the P-38 wasnt originally designed for mass production. I realize that Lockheed had
done considerable re-design to improve its mass producibility, but the a/c manhours
required are still far higher than a single. The P-47 being an exception, but then
Republic never seems to have had management as good as their designers - their a/c were
always expensive, heavy and late, but generally excellent.

If the engines had been
swapped out for two-stage Merlins, the turbo and early intercooler
problems would have been eliminated, at the cost of some fuel
efficiency, and Lockheed submitted a proposal for this, although
politics prevented this.

Assuming the Merlin swap would have solved the major problems, it still would have taken
considerable time to do. Look how long it took between the Mustang X and the P-51B
achieving IOC.

That the P-38 was developed to US
specifications before the war resulted in the Allison engine
use, and the US focused on turbosupercharging for inline engines.
Of course, at that time, the Merlin didn't have two-stage
supercharging either, so the turbo was really the only practical
way to go for high altitude performance at the time.

The Allies had their share of bad production decisions, but
the greater industrial capability tended to make these decisions
less than critical to the final outcome and not as noticed in
the overall picture.

True, although in this case the lack of sufficient numbers of long-range escorts
available earlier was most definitely noticeable.

Guy