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  #11  
Old June 7th 04, 03:33 PM
Keith Willshaw
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"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 16:01:14 +0200, "Tamas Feher"
wrote:

A home-made armored Caterpillar turns Colorado into Palestine?

Palestine has dead. The authorities ended this one without public
deaths.


Pure chance. They had no absolutely contact with the madman whatsoever .
If he decided to target a chemical plant and cause a Bhopal-scale
industrial disaster, the cops simply couldn't stop him. In the end an
entire county could get killed.

Do you know enough about the local geography and plants to say
that this sort of thing is possible?

I worked fifteen years in the CPI and rubber industries. It would
not be possible in any plant I was involved with. Three of them
had the potential to make Bhopal look trivial.

To get a major disaster out of a modern process plant, you pretty
much have to be in the control room. Bhopal and Chernobyl (sp?)
are examples.


Tear open a line in the wrong place and you have the
potential for a major accident. For example at the outlet
from the furnaces of a cracking unit the gas is above its
self ignition temperature, a fracture here would be VERY
bad news.

In the case of the Flixborough accident in the UK a pressure
vessel was bypassed by the maintenance dept using pipes and bellows units.
Unfortunately the bypass was not properly anchored
and a slug of liquid caused the bypass to tear loose.

Keith




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  #12  
Old June 7th 04, 03:59 PM
Prof. Vincent Brannigan
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Posts: n/a
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Keith Willshaw wrote:

"
To get a major disaster out of a modern process plant, you pretty
much have to be in the control room. Bhopal and Chernobyl (sp?)
are examples.


Tear open a line in the wrong place and you have the
potential for a major accident. For example at the outlet
from the furnaces of a cracking unit the gas is above its
self ignition temperature, a fracture here would be VERY
bad news.

In the case of the Flixborough accident in the UK a pressure
vessel was bypassed by the maintenance dept using pipes and bellows units.
Unfortunately the bypass was not properly anchored
and a slug of liquid caused the bypass to tear loose.


However the idea of targeting the intruder with an air strike is simply ludicrous.
almost any facility vulnerable to damage by a bulldozer causing a disaster would be
much more vulnerable to stray rounds from an air strike.

Vince



























  #13  
Old June 7th 04, 04:47 PM
Duke of URL
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
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"Aardvark J. Bandersnatch, MP" wrote in message
news:mP_wc.12741$HG.7059@attbi_s53...
"Tamas Feher" wrote in message
...


Posse Comitatus Act and such


..do not affect the ANG (Air National Guard), of course. You didn't read
the very post you replied to!


Indeed it *does* affect the Air National Guard. Internal law enforcement

is
left to the civil authorities. The national guard would not be involved
unless the governor of the state orders units to respond.



Very small nit: In the event of a *total* breakdown of law and order and the
*total* inability of *all* local law-enforcement agencies to do their jobs,
the Governor *may* declare Martial Law. At that time, he hands over total
control of everything within his State to the State Commander of the
National Guard (the ANG Commander answers to him).
The situation in Granby didn't even equal a pimple on the ass of that size a
monster, so it didn't happen.
--
The One-and-only Holy Moses™


  #14  
Old June 7th 04, 05:03 PM
Keith Willshaw
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 15:33:05 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:


For the plant it might be, and there might be casualties there,
but, because the gas is over its ignition temperature, it can't
BLEVE. You get a fire burning the material in the pipe. There
wouldn't be effect beyond the fence. If the plant systems
functioned properly, the outage might be less than two weeks.

BTW, how would you go about breaking this line? A buldozer isn't
going to get there. These lines are fairly robust and plant's
just in case defenses against leaks are considerable.


Oh come on Peter. There are LPG lines all over the dammed
place on any refinery and a major leak is bloody hard
to contain.

Go and look at the report on what happened at
Flixborough

(I can think of much worse scenarios, but not ones started by a
bulldozer that begins outside the fence. They start with operator
or maintenance error compounded by control room error.)

In the case of the Flixborough accident in the UK a pressure
vessel was bypassed by the maintenance dept using pipes and bellows

units.
Unfortunately the bypass was not properly anchored
and a slug of liquid caused the bypass to tear loose.

Flixborough happened in 1974. At that time, I was employed by
DuPont at Maitland ON, a plant that has a very large Cyane
oxidation unit so we had passing interest in the event. IIRC,
they were using a temporary bypass that had been constucted
without engineering assistance. A slug of process fluid, caused
by a process upset, tore a bellows that was improperly installed.



Gee I just said that

There was no automatic shut-off upstream. The plant lacked modern
process controllers[3] and was, even by standards of the day, not
centrally controlled.


Quite so , not that it would have helped much


The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the
fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to
be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the
fence.


Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site
53 members of the public received major injuries and
hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was
destroyed as were several others on the same site and
close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories
were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless


No part of the plant met modern standards.


There are plenty of 1970's pterochem plants
still out there and the best control system in the
world doesnt help when you dump 50 tons of
Cyclohexane into the environment.

The causes of the
event were internal to the plant. The process affected was
obsolete and hazardous at the time and recognized as such.


A bulldozer tearing open a line would have
had the same effect.

The situation you describe is nothing like this. In your case
vapour burns as soon as it finds an oxidizer, mixing is not
possible. Shut-offs would function automatically and limit the
amount of fuel. There will be no big bang, although there would
be one hell of a whoosh.


You are assuming no coincident or consequential damage occurs, this
is a POOR assumption. What structures are being weakened
by that flame and what happens when they fail.

It is such risks that are rarely analysed and often
provide the nasty shock when an incident occurs

One of the worst industrial Bleve's happened on a
french plant where a small fire started at a faulty valve.
Trouble is the flame impinged on a LPG storage sphere

BANG

Keith




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  #15  
Old June 7th 04, 06:19 PM
Peter Skelton
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Posts: n/a
Default

On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 17:03:49 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:


"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
.. .
On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 15:33:05 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:


For the plant it might be, and there might be casualties there,
but, because the gas is over its ignition temperature, it can't
BLEVE. You get a fire burning the material in the pipe. There
wouldn't be effect beyond the fence. If the plant systems
functioned properly, the outage might be less than two weeks.

BTW, how would you go about breaking this line? A buldozer isn't
going to get there. These lines are fairly robust and plant's
just in case defenses against leaks are considerable.


Oh come on Peter. There are LPG lines all over the dammed
place on any refinery and a major leak is bloody hard
to contain.

The regulations must be drastically different over there.

Go and look at the report on what happened at
Flixborough

I have, in detail, often, with access to a lot that isn't
generally available.

(I can think of much worse scenarios, but not ones started by a
bulldozer that begins outside the fence. They start with operator
or maintenance error compounded by control room error.)

In the case of the Flixborough accident in the UK a pressure
vessel was bypassed by the maintenance dept using pipes and bellows

units.
Unfortunately the bypass was not properly anchored
and a slug of liquid caused the bypass to tear loose.

Flixborough happened in 1974. At that time, I was employed by
DuPont at Maitland ON, a plant that has a very large Cyane
oxidation unit so we had passing interest in the event. IIRC,
they were using a temporary bypass that had been constucted
without engineering assistance. A slug of process fluid, caused
by a process upset, tore a bellows that was improperly installed.



Gee I just said that


No, you blamed the accident on failure to anchor a bypass.

There was no automatic shut-off upstream. The plant lacked modern
process controllers[3] and was, even by standards of the day, not
centrally controlled.


Quite so , not that it would have helped much

It would have ended the fire within fifteen minutes.


The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the
fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to
be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the
fence.


Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site
53 members of the public received major injuries and
hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was
destroyed as were several others on the same site and
close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories
were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless


No part of the plant met modern standards.


There are plenty of 1970's pterochem plants
still out there and the best control system in the
world doesnt help when you dump 50 tons of
Cyclohexane into the environment.

There aren't may fifties plants out there and there aren't any at
all that will dump fifty tons of cyane from a pipe rupture.

The causes of the
event were internal to the plant. The process affected was
obsolete and hazardous at the time and recognized as such.


A bulldozer tearing open a line would have
had the same effect.

How do you get the bulldozer to the line? Then how do you get the
line to dump much more than its contents? And who still oxidizes
cyane outside a collum?

The situation you describe is nothing like this. In your case
vapour burns as soon as it finds an oxidizer, mixing is not
possible. Shut-offs would function automatically and limit the
amount of fuel. There will be no big bang, although there would
be one hell of a whoosh.


You are assuming no coincident or consequential damage occurs, this
is a POOR assumption. What structures are being weakened
by that flame and what happens when they fail.


No an awfull lot. That's what the controlls are about.

BTW, I'm assuming the builldozer doesn't get far into the plant.
It's not all that easy to do here.

It is such risks that are rarely analysed and often
provide the nasty shock when an incident occurs

One of the worst industrial Bleve's happened on a
french plant where a small fire started at a faulty valve.
Trouble is the flame impinged on a LPG storage sphere

BANG


You've still not dealt with the basic question. Which is whether
there was a chemical plant near the incident that was so grossly
mis-constructed and mis-managed as to be vulnerable to such an
attack.

The furnace scenario you chose shows little understanding of
explosions or chemical plants. The plant you chose is ludicrously
different from existing types.

The CPI is not immune to accident. There have been many, there
will be more but this is a low-probablility scenario. In the case
at question, calling in an air strike because of the possibility
that the bulldozer might enter a chemical plant and do mischief,
I'll stick with what they decided to do.

Peter Skelton
  #16  
Old June 7th 04, 07:58 PM
Jim McLaughlin
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"Tamas Feher" wrote in message
...
Posse Comitatus Act and such


..do not affect the ANG (Air National Guard), of course. You didn't read
the very post you replied to!



Thank you for confirming that you haven't the faintest idea what you are
talking about.



--
Jim McLaughlin

Please don't just hit the reply key.
Remove the obvious from the address to reply.

************************************************** *************************


  #17  
Old June 7th 04, 07:59 PM
Kevin Brooks
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 17:03:49 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:


snip

Go and look at the report on what happened at
Flixborough

I have, in detail, often, with access to a lot that isn't
generally available.


Bingo. Another claim of access to information not available to the rest of
us--to go along with prior claims of attending sensitive briefings on what
US personnel were doing with the contras in Nicaragua, and battle update
briefings with a command that had troops engaged in Afghanistan? And you
wonder why more and more folks don't believe you?

snip

The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the
fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to
be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the
fence.


Gee, with all that access to information, you did not realize the true
extent of offsite damage and injury, as we can see from Keith's response
below...amazing, huh?



Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site
53 members of the public received major injuries and
hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was
destroyed as were several others on the same site and
close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories
were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless


snip

Brooks


  #18  
Old June 7th 04, 08:31 PM
Keith Willshaw
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 17:03:49 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:



Oh come on Peter. There are LPG lines all over the dammed
place on any refinery and a major leak is bloody hard
to contain.

The regulations must be drastically different over there.


LPG cant read

Go and look at the report on what happened at
Flixborough

I have, in detail, often, with access to a lot that isn't
generally available.


Yeah right, I only read the official report and work
on reliability and failure studies for a living, what would
I know ?

More than you it seems since I knew the full extent of the
damage.

(I can think of much worse scenarios, but not ones started by a
bulldozer that begins outside the fence. They start with operator
or maintenance error compounded by control room error.)

In the case of the Flixborough accident in the UK a pressure
vessel was bypassed by the maintenance dept using pipes and bellows

units.
Unfortunately the bypass was not properly anchored
and a slug of liquid caused the bypass to tear loose.

Flixborough happened in 1974. At that time, I was employed by
DuPont at Maitland ON, a plant that has a very large Cyane
oxidation unit so we had passing interest in the event. IIRC,
they were using a temporary bypass that had been constucted
without engineering assistance. A slug of process fluid, caused
by a process upset, tore a bellows that was improperly installed.



Gee I just said that


No, you blamed the accident on failure to anchor a bypass.


Which is functionally identical to what you posted.

Did you even read it ?




There was no automatic shut-off upstream. The plant lacked modern
process controllers[3] and was, even by standards of the day, not
centrally controlled.


Quite so , not that it would have helped much

It would have ended the fire within fifteen minutes.


Only if it were still functional after the initial explosion, given the
scale of the damage done by what was to all intents a 50 ton
FAE thats unlikely. The issue is moot however since the major
damage was done by the initial explosion


The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the
fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to
be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the
fence.


Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site
53 members of the public received major injuries and
hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was
destroyed as were several others on the same site and
close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories
were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless


No part of the plant met modern standards.


There are plenty of 1970's pterochem plants
still out there and the best control system in the
world doesnt help when you dump 50 tons of
Cyclohexane into the environment.

There aren't may fifties plants out there and there aren't any at
all that will dump fifty tons of cyane from a pipe rupture.


There are lots of plants built in 60's and 70's


The causes of the
event were internal to the plant. The process affected was
obsolete and hazardous at the time and recognized as such.


A bulldozer tearing open a line would have
had the same effect.

How do you get the bulldozer to the line?


How you ever actually seen a pipe trench ?

Then how do you get the
line to dump much more than its contents?


Have you ever calculated how much Cyclohexane
a 14" line 1000 m long contains ?

Try it , just for kicks.

And who still oxidizes
cyane outside a collum?


It was cyclohexane and its widely used in the production
of Nylon, and any leak is highly likely to oxidise externally.

The situation you describe is nothing like this. In your case
vapour burns as soon as it finds an oxidizer, mixing is not
possible. Shut-offs would function automatically and limit the
amount of fuel. There will be no big bang, although there would
be one hell of a whoosh.


You are assuming no coincident or consequential damage occurs, this
is a POOR assumption. What structures are being weakened
by that flame and what happens when they fail.


No an awfull lot. That's what the controlls are about.


Controls dont stop steel losing its structural strength
in a fire

BTW, I'm assuming the builldozer doesn't get far into the plant.
It's not all that easy to do here.


Bull**** Peter, all that protects most plant are earth bunds and
chain link wire fences

It is such risks that are rarely analysed and often
provide the nasty shock when an incident occurs

One of the worst industrial Bleve's happened on a
french plant where a small fire started at a faulty valve.
Trouble is the flame impinged on a LPG storage sphere

BANG


You've still not dealt with the basic question. Which is whether
there was a chemical plant near the incident that was so grossly
mis-constructed and mis-managed as to be vulnerable to such an
attack.


I responded to a claim that it couldnt happen - IT CAN

The furnace scenario you chose shows little understanding of
explosions or chemical plants.


Really , care to dispute the facts ?

The plant you chose is ludicrously
different from existing types.


Peter I have worked in this industry since I was 16, I have
seen 2 major Petrochemical incidents and investigated many
others. One of those included a major fire and explosion
caused by a mobile crane striking a pipe bridge.

Go find your Granny and teach her to suck eggs.

The CPI is not immune to accident. There have been many, there
will be more but this is a low-probablility scenario. In the case
at question, calling in an air strike because of the possibility
that the bulldozer might enter a chemical plant and do mischief,
I'll stick with what they decided to do.


So will I but that doesnt eliminate the potential risk from a
bulldozer or any other piece of heavy plant.

Keith


  #19  
Old June 7th 04, 09:37 PM
Peter Skelton
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 14:59:36 -0400, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
.. .
On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 17:03:49 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:


snip

Go and look at the report on what happened at
Flixborough

I have, in detail, often, with access to a lot that isn't
generally available.


Bingo. Another claim of access to information not available to the rest of
us--to go along with prior claims of attending sensitive briefings on what
US personnel were doing with the contras in Nicaragua, and battle update
briefings with a command that had troops engaged in Afghanistan? And you
wonder why more and more folks don't believe you?


I expalined quite directly why I had deeper knowledge than
generally available. Anybody who worked at Maitland or the Texas
plant (Victoria?) had the same. As you snipped that, I conclude
you're up to your old bull again, removing context so that you
can invent some. You've recently proven yourself grossly
dishonest three times, isn't that enough?

snip

The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the
fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to
be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the
fence.


Gee, with all that access to information, you did not realize the true
extent of offsite damage and injury, as we can see from Keith's response
below...amazing, huh?

I certainly had a senior moment there. Kieth handled it nicely.
Do you have anything to contribute?



Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site
53 members of the public received major injuries and
hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was
destroyed as were several others on the same site and
close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories
were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless




Peter Skelton
  #20  
Old June 7th 04, 10:04 PM
Steven James Forsberg
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default


: You mean the ukrainians, about two years ago? That chartered Tu-154 had
: five israeli bioweapon "scientists" on-board en route to Russia. They
: were such a grave danger to the whole mankind that they needed to be
: eliminated at such a huge price in civilians.

: You mean the USSR, with KAL-007? There was an US RC-135 in the air,
: using the KAL-007 to hide behind it. The laser gyroscope error that led
: the Jumbo to fly over soviet territory and super-secret ICBM sites is
: certainly strange. You can blame that Jumbo on the CIA, rather than the
: soviets.

Actually I was thinking about Israel (a nation filled with Russians)
shooting down an Egyptian airliner. And no doubt the rooskies had a hand in
that whole 'Vincennes' thing... :-)

regards,
---------------------------------------------------



 




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