US Army Cancels Comanche Helo

All good points. Bad tactics in one engagement do not mean attack helicopters
are useless. And for all their hype, UAVs are nowhere near a true replacement.


The Army screwed up Comanche development by under-funding the effort and
dragging it out over 20 years. The aircraft itself performed, but the program
failed. This decision still leaves the Army without a replacement for the
OH-58D.

Frank

"MLenoch" wrote in message
...
Not as smart as shutting down the F-22 in '98.

We're certainly past that point. Today, the F-15s are literally falling
apart
in the air and something is needed to replaced the old F-15C and
soon-to-be
F-15E airframes. (Friends in the squadrons often tell tales of shedding
tail
feathers, etc.) New production F-15s? Maybe? Or new production F-22s?

Gephard is retiring, so the super eagle is probably no longer viable.

The F-35 is going to have to pull part of the F-15's duty even if Lockheed
pulls of a miracale, as the 160 F-22 aircraft are not enough to replace the
F-15.

"Thomas Schoene" wrote
Kevin Brooks wrote:
"Paul F Austin" wrote
"robert arndt" wrote

Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2.
Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and
the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche
was last-war's weapon.

Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable.

I'd put a different read on the same events, but with basically the same
conclusion.

What probably did in Comanche (IMO) was not the fact that the Apaches were
getting hit, but the realization that they were getting hit by weapons
that
didn't care at all about radar signature (i.e. optically pointed guns and
IR
MANPADS). If those non-radar-guided systems are really the major threats
to helos -- as the last couple of years of fighting in various places
certianly suggests they they are -- it makes no sense at all to spend
large
sums on a helicopter whose main claim to fame (and major cost driver) is
radar signature reduction.

If this logic is true, Comanche died not because it's a helicopter, but
because it's *the wrong kind* of helicopter.

Yep. A suprising outcome, that LO isn't really worth much when operating at
low altitude. The Iraqis adopted the levee en masse tactics that the
Vietnamese used, with every available tube firing upward as soon as the
alarm is given. And that's at_night_. During daylight hours things get even
worse. Slow-movers operating at low altitudes will suffer unacceptable
attrition if they're manned. The Army should develop a low-cost unmanned
weapons platform, one that can use fused data from off-board sources to cue
a low-cost on-board targeting sensor. Being a helo isn't important, carrying
heavy ordnance loads may or may not be the way to go but being able to
persist in the interdiction area_is_.

"Thomas Schoene" wrote in message
ink.net...
Kevin Brooks wrote:
"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
. ..

"robert arndt" wrote

Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2.
Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and
the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche
was last-war's weapon.

Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable.

I'd put a different read on the same events, but with basically the same
conclusion.

What probably did in Comanche (IMO) was not the fact that the Apaches were
getting hit, but the realization that they were getting hit by weapons
that
didn't care at all about radar signature (i.e. optically pointed guns and
IR
MANPADS). If those non-radar-guided systems are really the major threats
to helos -- as the last couple of years of fighting in various places
certianly suggests they they are -- it makes no sense at all to spend
large
sums on a helicopter whose main claim to fame (and major cost driver) is
radar signature reduction.

I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark. But be
careful drawing any hard and fast conclusions in regards to helo
survivability vis a vis the 11th AVN deep attack during OIF. About the best
you can do in that realm is to say that "Deep attack helo missions over open
terrain with good visibility afforded to the bad guys, and without the
benefit of the normal SEAD support from your own arty assets is extremely
risky." Not much beyond that.


If this logic is true, Comanche died not because it's a helicopter, but
because it's *the wrong kind* of helicopter.

I could generally agree with that, with the caveat that part of what was
wrong was a skyrocketing program and unit cost.


we have no UAV as yet, or in the
near term, that can do what an aircraft like the AH-64D can do;

Absolutely true. However, we may soon have UAVs that can do what the
RAH-66
could do, except for actual weapon delivery, which the Apache can handle
just fine. (Why the Comanche was bombed up to rival the Apache, I'll
never
understand.)

You have to understand the changes in the Army aviation missions over the
past few years. Dedicated attack helos were pulled from a number of units
(i.e., a portion of the divisional aviation battalions in airborne/air
assault divisions, cavalry units) some years back in favor of the AH-58D,
which was nothing more than the OH-58D with armament added. I did not like
Commanche, but I *can* see the wisdom of including a strike capability in
your cavalry scout birds--increased versatility for when things don't go as
planned, the ability to engage time sensitive targets of opportunity during
the scout mission, and ensuring that your *cavalry* units can perform their
cavalry roles, to include both guard and (even) covering force battle
operations.

That said, I am quite happy to see the demise of this program, and only wish
it had happened earlier when the resultant savings could have been applied
to other critical needs.

Brooks





--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
. ..

"Thomas Schoene" wrote
Kevin Brooks wrote:
"Paul F Austin" wrote
"robert arndt" wrote

Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2.
Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and
the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche
was last-war's weapon.

Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable.

I'd put a different read on the same events, but with basically the same
conclusion.

What probably did in Comanche (IMO) was not the fact that the Apaches
were
getting hit, but the realization that they were getting hit by weapons
that
didn't care at all about radar signature (i.e. optically pointed guns
and
IR
MANPADS). If those non-radar-guided systems are really the major
threats
to helos -- as the last couple of years of fighting in various places
certianly suggests they they are -- it makes no sense at all to spend
large
sums on a helicopter whose main claim to fame (and major cost driver) is
radar signature reduction.

If this logic is true, Comanche died not because it's a helicopter, but
because it's *the wrong kind* of helicopter.

Yep. A suprising outcome, that LO isn't really worth much when operating
at
low altitude. The Iraqis adopted the levee en masse tactics that the
Vietnamese used, with every available tube firing upward as soon as the
alarm is given. And that's at_night_. During daylight hours things get
even
worse. Slow-movers operating at low altitudes will suffer unacceptable
attrition if they're manned. The Army should develop a low-cost unmanned
weapons platform, one that can use fused data from off-board sources to
cue
a low-cost on-board targeting sensor. Being a helo isn't important,
carrying
heavy ordnance loads may or may not be the way to go but being able to
persist in the interdiction area_is_.

Why? Maybe the lesson should instead be to refrain from using attack helos
in the deep fight (what you call the "interdiction area", I presume) when
(a) the terrain is unsuitable, and/or (b) the normal SEAD support package is
not provided. Ever been in the woods when helos were operating around you?
Or in rugged terrain? During those situations it is hard to find the helo
during daylight hours; at night you are hopelessly confused. In those kind
of environments the deep attack option becomes more tenable. Even in the
situation that the 11th AVN encountered during their dissapointing OIF deep
attack mission might have had a very different outcome had the SEAD arty
support been included (it was not executed due to collateral damage
concerns). Again, you are reading a bit too much into the results of a
single mission which was conducted under rather unique circumstances, and
very likely with some serious planning flaws included in the mix.

Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a rotary UCAV
R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support the
Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some cases.

Brooks

From: (MLenoch)


Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

V-22 can still be axed.
But, isn't the F-22 already 'deployed', at least at Tyndall?
VL

Yes it is. I was down is Destin, FLA (just down the road from Tyndall) a couple
of weeks ago (vacation to get out of the cold) and saw a couple of F-22's
flying around over the Gulf of Mexico. Those babies "howl" when they fly.

Also saw a Tyndall AF pilot being interviewed on the local Destin news
concerning their brand spanking new F-22's.......can't remember his exact
words, but he was grinning ear to ear and said something to the effect that he
was flying the greatest fighter in existence.

Also visited the AF armament museum there. Ed R. might like to see the F-104
they have there. The thing looks like it just came off the assembly line.
Dave

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message

Yep. A suprising outcome, that LO isn't really worth much when operating
at
low altitude. The Iraqis adopted the levee en masse tactics that the
Vietnamese used, with every available tube firing upward as soon as the
alarm is given. And that's at_night_. During daylight hours things get
even
worse. Slow-movers operating at low altitudes will suffer unacceptable
attrition if they're manned. The Army should develop a low-cost unmanned
weapons platform, one that can use fused data from off-board sources to
cue
a low-cost on-board targeting sensor. Being a helo isn't important,
carrying
heavy ordnance loads may or may not be the way to go but being able to
persist in the interdiction area_is_.

Why? Maybe the lesson should instead be to refrain from using attack helos
in the deep fight (what you call the "interdiction area", I presume) when
(a) the terrain is unsuitable, and/or (b) the normal SEAD support package
is
not provided. Ever been in the woods when helos were operating around you?
Or in rugged terrain? During those situations it is hard to find the helo
during daylight hours; at night you are hopelessly confused. In those kind
of environments the deep attack option becomes more tenable. Even in the
situation that the 11th AVN encountered during their dissapointing OIF
deep
attack mission might have had a very different outcome had the SEAD arty
support been included (it was not executed due to collateral damage
concerns). Again, you are reading a bit too much into the results of a
single mission which was conducted under rather unique circumstances, and
very likely with some serious planning flaws included in the mix.

You kinda miss the point. Comanche's reason for existence was to incorporate
LO into an Army platform. Otherwise, continued development of OH-58s would
have delivered the needed functions sooner and cheaper. As an ancillary
issue, the Army dragged out the development 'way too long. My company's part
of Comanche was designed twice because of parts obsolescence. If Comanche
were in the middle of production, then likely, the lessons from Iraq-2 would
have been incorporated into operations. As it is, the program gets canned.

As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was that the
Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough fire into
the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese did. If you
can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place.


Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a rotary UCAV
R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support the
Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some cases.

Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that I or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those blockheads at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet. Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages for UAVs.
They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of an
unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on station
for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when needed. The
ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in coverage
over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a platform
overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets benefits
from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off and that's
hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided that in
light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program replans,
to cut its losses.

There's something systematically wrong with the way we develop aircraft.
Neither Comanche nor F-22 development should have taken as long as it has.
One of the trolls was asking for delays in F-22 production until a "complete
and independent evaluation" can be done, whatever that is. For a variety of
reasons, we can't seem to get a combat aircraft into the hands of troops in
anything like a reasonable time. During the fifties and sixties we developed
aircraft, got the -A LRIP model into the hands of troops, incorporated the
fixes for problems identified by the users in the -C model and then went
into volume production. Now, no one is willing to stick their weenie out and
the "development" stretches endlessly.

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
news

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message

Yep. A suprising outcome, that LO isn't really worth much when
operating
at
low altitude. The Iraqis adopted the levee en masse tactics that the
Vietnamese used, with every available tube firing upward as soon as
the
alarm is given. And that's at_night_. During daylight hours things get
even
worse. Slow-movers operating at low altitudes will suffer unacceptable
attrition if they're manned. The Army should develop a low-cost
unmanned
weapons platform, one that can use fused data from off-board sources
to
cue
a low-cost on-board targeting sensor. Being a helo isn't important,
carrying
heavy ordnance loads may or may not be the way to go but being able to
persist in the interdiction area_is_.

Why? Maybe the lesson should instead be to refrain from using attack
helos
in the deep fight (what you call the "interdiction area", I presume)
when
(a) the terrain is unsuitable, and/or (b) the normal SEAD support
package
is
not provided. Ever been in the woods when helos were operating around
you?
Or in rugged terrain? During those situations it is hard to find the
helo
during daylight hours; at night you are hopelessly confused. In those
kind
of environments the deep attack option becomes more tenable. Even in the
situation that the 11th AVN encountered during their dissapointing OIF
deep
attack mission might have had a very different outcome had the SEAD arty
support been included (it was not executed due to collateral damage
concerns). Again, you are reading a bit too much into the results of a
single mission which was conducted under rather unique circumstances,
and
very likely with some serious planning flaws included in the mix.

You kinda miss the point. Comanche's reason for existence was to
incorporate
LO into an Army platform.

No, its reason for existance was to provide a state of the art
reconnaissance and light attack capability that incorporated low
observability (not in just the radar spectrum, either) features. There is a
difference--the goal was not to get LO into an Army system so much as it was
to get a system that incorporated the LO.

Otherwise, continued development of OH-58s would
have delivered the needed functions sooner and cheaper.

But without the capabilities of the Commanche. The 58 series is not capable
of continual upgrade; hell, the D model is already grossly different from
the original A model, and probably about maxed out in terms of economical
upgrade. You can only cram so much poop in a bag that size and of that
particular configuration.

As an ancillary
issue, the Army dragged out the development 'way too long. My company's
part
of Comanche was designed twice because of parts obsolescence. If Comanche
were in the middle of production, then likely, the lessons from Iraq-2
would
have been incorporated into operations. As it is, the program gets canned.

Hey, I *like* the decision to can it, and it was drug out too long, was a
bit too ambitious, its radar LO design was of questionable value in view of
its trade-offs, and it was too darned expensive. But NONE of that bears upon
your claim that the manned attack helo is allegedly a thing of the past, now
does it?


As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was that the
Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough fire into
the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese did. If
you
can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place.

I don't think you fully understand the SEAD effort, and the resources that
it can include, that normally supports such an operation. Likely areas where
ground fire or weapons systems would be encountered during the ingress and
egress can be suppressed (actually saturated) by a combination of tube arty
fires, MLRS (which is probably the best single SEAD asset out to around 70
klicks), and even ATACMS (which can go to around 300 klicks) if the
mission/threat requires them. Any idea what the effect of those submunitions
going off around your "everybody shoot up" crowd would be? How many of those
that just *witness* that kind of firestorm are subsequently willing to
expose themselves if they *do* get a shot? Would it have been highly
effective if it had been included in this attack? Maybe--we'll never know.
But the idea that the results of a single mission flown under one set of
circumstances and without SEAD support should be the decisive factor in
determining the feasibility of attack helo operations is not a very
supportable postion IMO.



Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a rotary
UCAV
R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support the
Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some cases.

Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that I
or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those blockheads
at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet. Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

Kind of hard to have a CTOL airframe use a FARP, isn't it? Or use terrain
masking effectively while it loiters and peeks, or loiters and shoots?


The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages for
UAVs.
They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of an
unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on station
for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when needed. The
ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
coverage
over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a platform
overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets benefits
from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off and
that's
hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided that
in
light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program
replans,
to cut its losses.

You are mixing your systems up a bit. Long duration ISR missions are
normally flown at altitude; but the Army needs a system that can also get in
closer (lower) for finite detail. When you switch to the UCAV role, all of
those current long duration UAV's have a pretty miserly weapons load
capability--they are of little value rotating overhead if they don't still
have munitions capable of doing the various jobs required. Fixed wing UAV's
can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight quickly after rearming and
refueling--they have to mosey on back to the rear, land, get turned around,
take back off and mosey on back up to the battle area, dispense their
munitions (which from what I have seen so far is a load of maybe two
Hellfires, or four BAT's), after which they have to do it all over again.
Which tells me that the larger attack helos still have a role in the fight,
and if you are planning to go the UCAV route, a VTOL system that can use
your FARP's is an advantage.


There's something systematically wrong with the way we develop aircraft.
Neither Comanche nor F-22 development should have taken as long as it has.

I'd agree with that.

One of the trolls was asking for delays in F-22 production until a
"complete
and independent evaluation" can be done, whatever that is. For a variety
of
reasons, we can't seem to get a combat aircraft into the hands of troops
in
anything like a reasonable time. During the fifties and sixties we
developed
aircraft, got the -A LRIP model into the hands of troops, incorporated the
fixes for problems identified by the users in the -C model and then went
into volume production. Now, no one is willing to stick their weenie out
and
the "development" stretches endlessly.

Which is why spiral development is all the rage these days. But when they do
use that approach, they have some congressional weenie sitting on the Hill
start whining about the lack of complete testing, and risk, etc.

Brooks

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
news

The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages
for UAVs.
They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of
an
unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on
station
for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when
needed. The
ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
coverage
over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a
platform
overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets
benefits
from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off
and that's
hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided
that in
light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program
replans,
to cut its losses.

I've read the above three times, and I still can't see where UAVs get
credit for saving our side's human lives. Heli pilots fully
expendable??

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

"Paul F Austin" wrote



As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was that
the
Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough fire
into
the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese did. If
you
can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place.

I don't think you fully understand the SEAD effort, and the resources that
it can include, that normally supports such an operation. Likely areas
where
ground fire or weapons systems would be encountered during the ingress and
egress can be suppressed (actually saturated) by a combination of tube
arty
fires, MLRS (which is probably the best single SEAD asset out to around 70
klicks), and even ATACMS (which can go to around 300 klicks) if the
mission/threat requires them. Any idea what the effect of those
submunitions
going off around your "everybody shoot up" crowd would be? How many of
those
that just *witness* that kind of firestorm are subsequently willing to
expose themselves if they *do* get a shot? Would it have been highly
effective if it had been included in this attack? Maybe--we'll never know.
But the idea that the results of a single mission flown under one set of
circumstances and without SEAD support should be the decisive factor in
determining the feasibility of attack helo operations is not a very
supportable postion IMO.


Kevin, why fly the AH strike in the first place if you're going to use this
much support for ingress and egress? You're taking it as a given that AHs
are more efficient at delivering ordnance to some class of targets than any
other alternative. That may be true against armor in a maneuver battle but
in Iraq-2, that wasn't the target set.

If we were arming for the Fulda Gap, then AHs make a lot of sense. It's not
clear to me that it's true for the battles we fight these days.



Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a rotary
UCAV
R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support
the
Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some cases.

Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that
I
or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
blockheads
at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

Kind of hard to have a CTOL airframe use a FARP, isn't it? Or use terrain
masking effectively while it loiters and peeks, or loiters and shoots?

The object is warheads on foreheads. The FARP/short flight time ordnance
taxi is one model for doing that. A cloud of UCAVs in another. A Giant
Bombtruck In the Sky is still another. Because the Army has been wedded to
short range, low endurance platforms is no reason not to open up the
analysis space to consider other alternatives.



The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages for
UAVs.
They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of an
unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on
station
for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when needed.
The
ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
coverage
over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a platform
overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets
benefits
from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off and
that's
hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided
that
in
light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program
replans,
to cut its losses.

You are mixing your systems up a bit. Long duration ISR missions are
normally flown at altitude; but the Army needs a system that can also get
in
closer (lower) for finite detail. When you switch to the UCAV role, all of
those current long duration UAV's have a pretty miserly weapons load
capability--they are of little value rotating overhead if they don't still
have munitions capable of doing the various jobs required. Fixed wing
UAV's
can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight quickly after rearming and
refueling--they have to mosey on back to the rear, land, get turned
around,
take back off and mosey on back up to the battle area, dispense their
munitions (which from what I have seen so far is a load of maybe two
Hellfires, or four BAT's), after which they have to do it all over again.
Which tells me that the larger attack helos still have a role in the
fight,
and if you are planning to go the UCAV route, a VTOL system that can use
your FARP's is an advantage.

AHs may have their place. The Israelis certainly get a lot of use from them
(and so do the Iranians from what I've read). In the current environment,
the target set that needs servicing is the "30 second" target, between
detection and identification and either a warhead on a forehead or *oops* he
disappeared. That kind of target requires ubiquitous platforms rather than a
heavy loadout on a few platforms.

Snooping and pooping is a traditional role that OHs have filled. There's a
real question whether they're the best way to do it. A platform that flies
in the Predator envelope (about 10Kfeet) misses nothing from a sensor
standpoint that could be gained by flying at a hundred feet. In any case,
you're ignoring the value of fused sensor data from multiple platforms. No
single scout is_ever_going to operate outside the data network in the
future. To do so would be stupid.

There are two missions here.

The first is an ISR mission that's going to be served by a network of
sensors and platforms. Some of the platforms will be under control of
brigade and lower, some will be controlled by higher echelons but_all_the
take will be available to all the forces.

The second mission is ordnance delivery. AHs can do that although they
compete with fixed wing assets as well as the artillery crowd. An AH
integrates sensors and ordnance and it's not clear to me, given that data
network, where the right place in the number of platforms/loadout per
platform/sensors per platform/endurance per platform space is the right
place to be. If you're dealing with a Sea O' Tanks heading your way, that's
one thing. If you're looking to pot a target speeding from one hide to
another, that's another thing. If you're looking for a rascal on a
motorcycle that just launched an RPG at the local headquarters, that's still
another.

One abiding fault of armies is the desire to equip yourself to fight the war
you_want_to fight. That's a cardinal error.