Greatest Strategic Air Missions?

Pete Stickney wrote:

There's some evidence that POL was seen as a weak point in the early
days of WW 2.

Absolutely it was. Even after the U.S. jumped in POL was considered a good
payoff target...the problem was (IIRC) that the entire POL system (from
production to distribution) was so dispersed that only the production node was
seen as vulnerable to air strike and the effects of hitting production much too
delayed. After Ploesti, no serious strikes on POL facilities took place again
until the Spring before D-Day.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Mon, 23 Aug 2004 01:28:09 -0600, George Ruch
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

I'd think that maybe 11 days might be closer to a battle, but if you
want it to be called campaign, [...]

Looked pretty impressive from my seat.

No doubt, Ed.

I'd call the whole Linebacker II campaign a strategic success. As I
remember, the North Vietnamese had walked away from the Paris negotiations,
and had to be 'persuaded' to come back. Seems like taking the gloves off
worked.

I don't know how long we could have sustained that level of losses,
specially the BUFFs, but I'm reasonably sure the NV thought we'd go as long
as we had to. If only we'd done it earlier...

The loss level dropped abruptly after day six and although several
more BUFFs were lost in the remaining five days, the near total
destruction of the NVN air defense system means that the campaign
could have been sustained until the level of the 1964 LeMay
prescription--"back to the stone age."

I was at Takhli at the time - 474AMS pod shop (ALQ-87s). We didn't get
much detail at the time - some of the strike photos, but not much of the
big picture. We lost 6 airplanes - three of them during Linebacker.

On day six, I was part of a
Hunter/Killer flight supporting a day strike to Hanoi. We orbited
Bullseye (Hanoi geographic center) for more than 25 minutes at six
thousand feet over a solid undercast--a prescription for almost
certain disaster a week earlier.

Glad you got back in one piece. That could definitely have ruined your
day.

The question about how it might have turned out had we done it earlier
is certainly one for extended debate, but that was then and this is
now. The huge difference was that during the period in question, there
was a significant doubt about what would inadvertently trigger
intervention by the Soviets or the PRC and start the slippery slide to
nuclear exchange.

Even without that possibility, a heavy bombing campaign would have been a
very sharp dual edged sword. Military necessity vs. major portions of Hanoi
and Haiphong leveled by 'indiscriminate' bombing. The foreign press and
some of our own would have torn the Johnson and Nixon administrations
apart.

Bottom line for consideration, however, is that the restraint
exercised by the Nixon administration in terminating the campaign
after eleven days when an agreement was reached seems to put into
question the assertions of atrocities, war crimes, carpet-bombing, etc
instituted from the highest levels of command.

Good point.

| George Ruch
| "Is there life in Clovis after Clovis Man?"

"Glenfiddich" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 23 Aug 2004 17:36:52 +0300, "Vello" wrote:
"hobo" wrote in message
...
In article KYBVc.118201$sh.114795@fed1read06,
"Leadfoot" wrote:

Some candidates

Yamamoto shootdown
Hiroshima
Paul Doumer bridge LGB
Dambusters
Tirpitz
Norwegian heavy water
Midway
Doolittle raid

Why isn't the Israeli attack on the Egyptian AF to start the Six Day
war
listed? After their AF was destroyed on the ground the Egyptians
ordered
their troops on the border to retreat, which was most likely a mistake,
and they were slaughtered by the Israelis as they withdrew. Eliminating
Egypt so quickly allowed the Israelis to fight a 3 front war one front
at a time.

It's for sure one of greatest, expecially if to keep in mind that air
superiority was main factor in their victory.

Israel had that after they caught many of the Egyptian planes
on the ground, but you seem to be saying Israel had air superiority
BEFORE they attacked.
Can you confirm that to be the case?


No, no, sorry, what I want to point out is the fact that before surprise
attack Egypt outnumbered Israel by planes by far. Without taking air
superiority with that brilliant operation all the war would probably turn
for disaster for Israel as Egypt was much stronger by tanks and manpower,
too. This way I think this single operation was a key for all war.

"Fred the Red Shirt" wrote in message
m...
"Leadfoot" wrote in message
news:KYBVc.118201$sh.114795@fed1read06...
What are some of the greatest strategic air missions?

Some candidates

Yamamoto shootdown
Hiroshima
Paul Doumer bridge LGB
Dambusters
Tirpitz
Norwegian heavy water
Midway
Doolittle raid

Interview with Heisenberg and others in the German nuclear program,
as well as conversations among the German scientists surrepeticiously
recorded while in British detention indicate that the German nuclear
program was geared toward nuclear power and not an atomic bomb.

If the Germans had dedicated more resources to nuclear weapons then
I'd argue that the Norwegian heavy water raid might have reversed
the outcome of the war.

But after reading through this thread I'd have to agree that the
greatest strategic air mission FAILURE was the attack on
Pearl Harbor, despite being an overwhelming tactical victory.
Strategicaly, it assured the ultimate defeat of Japan.

Hiroshima, because it along with Nagasaki ended the War without
an invasion of the Japanese mainland would be the greatest
strategic air victory.

--

FF

Strong candidate would be air bridge to West Berlin. It unites western world
again - and let us understand, that despite war was over, there still was a
totalitarian state wanting to rule the Europe and Universe.

(BUFDRVR) wrote in message ...
Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

What was the issue in Paris that the NV refused to accept before
Linebacker II, and to which they agreed afterward?

None. The only changes to the document signed in January 1973 and the one
agreed upon in October 1972 was some wording.


So in 1973 did NV abandon an issue they had been holding out for?
If not, why'd they walk out?

I had thought that the last dividing issue was the presence of NVA
troops in South Vietnam, e.g. the "Parrot's Beak". South Vietnam
refused to sign the treaty unless the the NVA troops withdrew and
NV refused to withdraw them. Ulitmately, South Vietnam relented
and the treaty was signed.

Have I got that wrong?

--

FF

Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

So in 1973 did NV abandon an issue they had been holding out for?

Nope.

If not, why'd they walk out?

There walk out was two fold. First off, the agreement and draft were finalized
in mid-October '72 and arrangements made to sign the document "after
consultations". The NVN were immediately ready, however Kissenger needed to
travel to Saigon to meet with with Nguyen Van Thieu and get his "ok" on the
agreement. The agreement contained several aspects that Theiu thought
unacceptable including no provision to remove NVA forces in SVN. Thieu even
wanted the agreement to include the removal of VC forces from SVN. While Nixon,
Kissenger and Thieu debated and looked at recrafting the agreement, bombing
south of the 20th parallel (on top of NVA forces) continued. Hanoi accused the
U.S. of purposely using the agreement to stall while Saigon regrouped their
ground forces. Meanwhile....back in the U.S. several democratic Senators just
prior to the Thanksgiving break called for a vote on suspending funding for the
war in SE Asia. The idea began to publically be debated and suddenly Hanoi
figured they could get the whole enchillada by *not* signing the agreement and
simply waiting for the U.S. Congress to end the war. So...they announced the
U.S. was stalling, rejected the proposed changes presented by Kissenger and
left. Why did they return? Because the calls in Congress for suspending funding
died down, Nixon bombed them during the Christmas break and no congressmen
publically made a "peep" and because they figured the deal they made in October
was the best they were going to get. Le Duc Tho informed Kissenger on 27
December he was returning to Paris and was ready to sign the original
agreement. Kissenger leaned on Theiu, there was some wording that was changed,
but basically the Peace Accord signed in January 1973 was the one drafted in
October 1972.

I had thought that the last dividing issue was the presence of NVA
troops in South Vietnam, e.g. the "Parrot's Beak". South Vietnam
refused to sign the treaty unless the the NVA troops withdrew and
NV refused to withdraw them. Ulitmately, South Vietnam relented
and the treaty was signed.

For the most part, yes.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

(BUFDRVR) wrote in message ...
Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

So in 1973 did NV abandon an issue they had been holding out for?

Nope.

If not, why'd they walk out?

There walk out was two fold. First off, the agreement and draft were finalized
in mid-October '72 and arrangements made to sign the document "after
consultations". The NVN were immediately ready, however Kissenger needed to
travel to Saigon to meet with with Nguyen Van Thieu and get his "ok" on the
agreement. The agreement contained several aspects that Theiu thought
unacceptable including no provision to remove NVA forces in SVN. Thieu even
wanted the agreement to include the removal of VC forces from SVN. While Nixon,
Kissenger and Thieu debated and looked at recrafting the agreement, bombing
south of the 20th parallel (on top of NVA forces) continued. Hanoi accused the
U.S. of purposely using the agreement to stall while Saigon regrouped their
ground forces. Meanwhile....back in the U.S. several democratic Senators just
prior to the Thanksgiving break called for a vote on suspending funding for the
war in SE Asia. The idea began to publically be debated and suddenly Hanoi
figured they could get the whole enchillada by *not* signing the agreement and
simply waiting for the U.S. Congress to end the war. So...they announced the
U.S. was stalling, rejected the proposed changes presented by Kissenger and
left. Why did they return? Because the calls in Congress for suspending funding
died down, Nixon bombed them during the Christmas break and no congressmen
publically made a "peep" and because they figured the deal they made in October
was the best they were going to get. Le Duc Tho informed Kissenger on 27
December he was returning to Paris and was ready to sign the original
agreement. Kissenger leaned on Theiu, there was some wording that was changed,
but basically the Peace Accord signed in January 1973 was the one drafted in
October 1972.

It would seem that there is no reason to believe the NVN would not
have returned as soon as the SVN agreed to the October, 1972 terms.
IOW, bringing the NVN back to the table by itself accomplished nothing.

Does this not imply that Linebacker II accomplished nothing worthwhile?


I had thought that the last dividing issue was the presence of NVA
troops in South Vietnam, e.g. the "Parrot's Beak". South Vietnam
refused to sign the treaty unless the the NVA troops withdrew and
NV refused to withdraw them. Ulitmately, South Vietnam relented
and the treaty was signed.

For the most part, yes.


--

FF

Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

It would seem that there is no reason to believe the NVN would not
have returned as soon as the SVN agreed to the October, 1972 terms.

Had Theiu agreed initially, the Peace Accord would have been signed in
November.

Does this not imply that Linebacker II accomplished nothing worthwhile?

No, the bombing campaign, along with silence from the U.S. congress convinced
the NVN that they were not going to get the whole "enchilada". By there
reasoning, if congress accepted a bombing campaign in previously restricted
areas of Hanoi, certainly they were not ready to vote to suspend funding for
the war.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On 2 Sep 2004 10:59:49 -0700, (Fred the Red
Shirt) wrote:


Does this not imply that Linebacker II accomplished nothing worthwhile?


I've got several hundred POW friends that might like to discuss that
with you.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
"Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights"
Both from Smithsonian Books
***www.thunderchief.org

Ed Rasimus wrote in message . ..
On 2 Sep 2004 10:59:49 -0700, (Fred the Red
Shirt) wrote:


Does this not imply that Linebacker II accomplished nothing worthwhile?


I've got several hundred POW friends that might like to discuss that
with you.


Your friends might have been home for Christmas 1972 had the SVN
agreed to the accords in October 1972. The SVN continued to
hold out foir awhile even AFTER the NVN returned to the table.
The seminal event that brought them home was the agreement to
the accords by the SVN.

Had the SVN relented befor Linbacker II AND the NVN reneged then
the efficacy of Linbacker II would be pretty well established.
As it is, we can only speculate.

--

FF