AIM-54 Phoenix missile

"R" wrote in message
om

The Navy liked this idea so much that they started the VFX program in
1974, but so the Air Force couldn't say the Navy copied them, the
Navy chose the F-18 (larger development of the YF-17) in early 1975.
Sometime in late 1976 Northrop started a program to find a buyer for
its land based F-17 Cobra.

The Navy program was VFAX, not VFX, because attack was always part of the
plan. They were replacing A-7s as well as F-4s, after all, and could not
afford a second pure fighter on carrier decks. But Congress directed them
to use one of the Air Force LWF candidates, reasoning that these were
already tested and would not require as much development effort. The Navy
didn't much care for either design, but opted for the YF-17 as making the
best of a bad situation. In effect, they were hiring McDDonnell Douglas
(now teamed with Northrop) to turn the YF-17 into a carrier-compatible
aircraft. It seems that McAir essentially designed a new plane with a
striking resemblance to the YF-17 (that may be an exageration, but only
just). This became the F/A-18.

Northrop then tried to market a land-based version of this new aircraft as
the F-18L. Though lighter than the carrier-based F/A-18, this was still
heavier than the old YF-17 Cobra. They did use a YF-17 as a marketing tool
for the F-18L, but the production aricraft would have been rather different.

Joe Baugher's history of the F/A-18 is very valuable on these issues:

http://home.att.net/~jbaugher4/f18.html

--�
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Sat, 25 Oct 2003 21:31:25 GMT, "Tom Cooper" wrote:

Great comments Tom (damn, if we keep this up, RAM might become a
military aviation newsgroup again instead of a he-said/she-said troll
roost!)

It's very much my pleasure, Ed!

I'll do also some snips, as I see we agree on quite a few things.

There is the rub, the second crew-man. The Navy had a dedicated RIO
cadre and seemed to have a lot less difficulty with the two-man
concept than the USAF. The abortive attempt to put pilots in the
stick-equipped back seat of F-4s had left a terrible taste in the
figurative mouth of the AF and the orientation was strictly for a
single seat airplane.

Now, given that, I'll have to argue that the state of the ergonomic
art at the time was that an effective single seat cockpit could be
designed to manage the sensor/weapons suite. Certainly the success of
both the Eagle and the Viper seem to confirm this.

Actually, in the case of the Eagle, the ergonomics was not really "perfect"
straight away. Rembember that after the AIMVAL/ACEVAL the McD has got a
(pretty long) list of what needs to be improved in the cockpit, including -
between others - the radar and fire-control-system controls. At the time,
these were all considered as poorer and more complex than on the F-14.

And, by the time the USAF F-15s were usually beaten in dogfights with USN
F-14s hands down.

The footprint was of course to fit that of the F-4. But from what I read
about the history of F-15's the original idea was rather to get something
about the size of the later F-18, and certainly not planned to fly Mach
2.5.
These requirements were not the specifications that can be found in the
original FX. They were added after the Demodedovo '67, when at some stage
calls became known for the FX to become capable of Mach 3, in order to
directly match the Foxbat. Only resistance from the group that was
running
the project kept the dogfighting capability as one of main requirements.

Certainly there were mods to the specs and a capability like Foxbat
would cause some concern. But, there was also the "high/low" mix
debate going on in the bowels of the Pentagon. Some were arguing for
high tech sophistication in small "force multiplier" numbers while
others were supporting the F-5 simple, agile, low cost, deploy in
large numbers concept. Clearly the Eagle went high tech and the
results over the ensuing years support that position. While the F-5 is
everyman's sports car, if you want to go to war for real, take the
F-15.

Somewhere around 1968, there was indeed the first trace of the "high/low"
mix, with the FX being "widened" to become a swing-wing monster with a t/o
weight of something like 27.000kg and Mach 3 capability. Simultaneously the
idea of the LWF (Light-Weight Fighter" was born. Then the whole stuff was
mixed into the F-15: the LWF came back in the early 1970s, after the
cost-explosion caused by the inflation.

Originally, however, the FX was always to jump into the footsteps of the
P-51 and F-86.

I'd have to debate the priorities a bit. The speed with which the AF
brought ECM pods, ARMs, RWR and Weasels to the table makes me think
that a lot of stuff was on the front burner. Ditto for PGM
development. The air/air stuff was coming quickly, but arguably might
have taken a back seat to the air/mud because (despite the losses to
MiGs) there was less of a threat from aircraft than SAMs and flak.

Agreed: based on Vietnam experienes, the priority was air-to-ground, and
organizing and equipping strike packages that could "safely" penetrate areas
defended by a dense concentration of the SAM/radar-guided-AAA.

AIM-7E-2, the "dogfight Sparrow" was available in '72 when I checked
out in the F-4 and guys had been flying the AIM-7E with interlocks out
for several years already. Tree was deployed for Linebacker and
J-birds were on most of the air/air tasked F-4s. Also, first
production run TCTO-566 LES/TISEO airplanes were showing up in the
summer of '72, so there was some emphasis.

That's all right too. However, the "dogfight Sparrow" was - just like the
AIM-9J - only half-hearteldy tested. I.e., while the generals were talking
about them as "dogfight weapons", they were tested only at medium or high
altitudes and against non-maneuvering targets. So, both weapons were sent to
SEA without all being known about them. Later, much later, after all the
experiences from SEA were seriously studied, and much more testing of both
weapons being done, then the AIM-7E-2/4 and AIM-9J-1 as well as the AIM-9Ps
became really excellent dogfighting weapons, and so, you'll not hear any of
the Iranians (just for example) who used them in the 1980s complaining at
all.

Re. Tree: surely, they introduced it in the SEA actually already in 1971,
but only in very small numbers (eight F-4Ds with the Tripple Nickel). The
system became widespread in SEA only during the summer of 1972, by the time
the MiGs were really scarce in the skies even over the RP.6, not to talk
about whole North Vietnam. So, there was not much use of it any more (also
due to the fact that the remaining MiGs were not using their IFF as much as
before), and the planes were involved mainly in air-to-ground again. By 1973
the APX-80 was hardly known even to the Israelis - which could have badly
needed it especially when in October of the same year the Arabs came in in
huge - but very tight - formations, which were causing quite some problems
to Israeli GCI-stations.

Besides, the matter seems to have been almost forgotten within the USAF
already by 1976: remember the F-15-pilots starting to use telescopes in
their cockpits instead. Obviously, by 1979 the NCTR became the topic of the
day (despite the fact that it wasn't functioning 100% even in 1999). Others,
however, remain absolutely convinced about the Tree until today. Being
specialized in the topic of the IPGW (1980-1988), I couldn't avoid learning
a lot about projects like CT/Clear Horizont/Second View on F-4s and F-14s
sold to Iran, for example, and I must say they used them with immense
success (especially as the Iraqis were flying around with their
IFF-transponders lightning like Chrismas Trees all the times).

So, while the USAF was doing something on the topic of the air-to-air,
that's not at dispute he in fact the USAF put together many tremendous
systems. It is just so that the stuff was either slowly introduced, or
dropped soon after, or not tested-out. This, because the priority was
somewhere else. Given all of this, it's actually a wonder that anything like
F-15 could've been fielded at the time...

"anything but high-subsonic speeds" is ruling out where all reasonable
dog-fighting is done! If you aren't doing it at "high-subsonic" speed,
you're going to die in short order.

Sorry Ed, by all respoect, I'm not so sure about this. Certainly, it is a
very good method in peace-time exercises. But I don't think that more than
5-10% of war-time dogfighting done in the last 20 years would confirm this.

As a matter of fact, I talked with quite a few folks who were dogfighting in
different wars of the 1980s, and these do not think that dogfighting at high
subsonic speeds (or dogfighting at all), makes much sence. In fact, most of
them preferred the efficiency of the initial "slash attack". If there was
anything left after this one, they'd then use low-speed/high AoA turns to
point their weapons at another target and the superior acceleration to start
another attack. So, while the opponents were turning around them at high
subsonic speeds, they were swiftly repositioning and shooting down one after
the other... The tactics proved superior even against numerically superior
opponents - and this dozens of times.

But then, to the best of my knowledge, the USAF fought only one dogfight
ever since 1972, and that ended with the MiG-29 flying into the ground...

The Tom, just like the F-4B and J
before was typically tasked to take off, proceed to a CAP and orbit
120 miles from the boat waiting to be directed by an E-2C to a threat
inbound. With the Phoenix added to the weapons suite, the air defense
gained the capability to defend against anti-shipping missiles like
Kelt and Kitchen.

Yes, and that - as well as the following few paragraphs of your post
actually explain why: after a series of mishaps caused by the combo of
engine problems/pilots mistakes etc. the high AoA/low speed maneuvering was
pretty much restricted in the USN's F-14s community from late 1970s-early
1980s. Safety became paramount, and so the gents there haven't trained
flying in regimes where their planes excelled. I.e. they started dogfighting
at high subsonic speeds, where the F-15 is superior. As said above, the F-14
was nowhere as easy to fly successfully in the dogfight as the F-15: the
pilot really needs to know his stuff, and take immense care about each and
every throttle movement all the time, or the plane will either stall or the
engine explode. That caused problems to many of the less-experienced fliers,
and was frequently ending in accidents. Pilots with (far) more experience
(and quite some guts) on the type, however, haven't had problems pulling the
plane into 70° AoA, doing "bat turns" at nothing more but 70kts and turning
180° in few seconds only, just for example, in order to reposition and point
their weapons at the enemy.

Tactics were esssential to getting the F-15 success rate up. I was
aware of a distinct difference during the period I was in USAFE Hq
between the Bitburg and Soesterburg units. Bit was very tentative in
their employment while the 32nd TFS was aggressive and creative in
their tactics.

Truth: after the Vietnam War the USAF was permanently improving its
air-combat tactics, while that of the USN actually degenerated to a degree.

It must be mentioned here, however, that many exercises involving USN
F-14-units had pretty strange RoEs, to say at least. In more than 50% of the
cases the Tomcats were not permitted to use AIM-54s at all, so even this
advantage was removed right away, and their opponents were not acting the
way they would act in the case of the war and if having to expect to get
under a threat of long-range shots. I know about several specific cases
where trully stupid things were done: in one a single F-14 was sent against
a pair of F-15s that were in a climb to 30.000ft and more, because somebody
aboard the carrier wanted to see "if the Tomcat can split the Eagles". What
should have been the purpose of that "exercise" I don't know, but surely as
hell the Tomcat was "shot down" before long.

So also in the IIPGW, in 1992: although equipped with the CT, the F-14s were
considered as "not suitable" of "safe" long-range engagements against an air
force that was flying with its IFF-transponders "on" all the time. Why?
Well, because the NCTR-equipped F-15C MSIP-IIs should have had the needed
long-range EID-capability even if it was known that this was far from
functioning perfectly... Strange, to say at least...

Don't know what their problem was, but with the Mk 80 series LD/GP
bombs being the primary conventional munition and with the expressed
preference in the period for "smart system/dumb bomb" technology, I
can't see that being possible. In fact, Osirik was 1981 and the
Israeli seemed to do OK with Mk-84 dumb bombs coming off cleanly!

Indeed: the Israelis completed the separation testing for the Mk.84s in
order to be able to hit Osirak with these weapons!

The Mk.83 separation testing was completed by the Dutch after one of their
"Lawn Darts" got a better part of one of his ventral fin clipped away by a
(live) bomb that went astry.

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585

A few armchair comments for this great thread inserted below.

"anything but high-subsonic speeds" is ruling out where all reasonable
dog-fighting is done! If you aren't doing it at "high-subsonic" speed,
you're going to die in short order.
Sorry Ed, by all respoect, I'm not so sure about this. Certainly, it is a
very good method in peace-time exercises. But I don't think that more than
5-10% of war-time dogfighting done in the last 20 years would confirm
this.
As a matter of fact, I talked with quite a few folks who were dogfighting
in
different wars of the 1980s, and these do not think that dogfighting at
high
subsonic speeds (or dogfighting at all), makes much sence. In fact, most
of
them preferred the efficiency of the initial "slash attack". If there was
anything left after this one, they'd then use low-speed/high AoA turns to
point their weapons at another target and the superior acceleration to
start
another attack. So, while the opponents were turning around them at high
subsonic speeds, they were swiftly repositioning and shooting down one
after
the other... The tactics proved superior even against numerically superior
opponents - and this dozens of times.

It's always seemed very unusual to me that the super-maneuverability of
current Russian fighters gets so much bad press from many writers (and some
pilots). I can try and get names (I have them somewhere), but I'm sure
we're all familiar with general comments about how current super-maneuvers
look pretty at airshows, but mean f**k all in real combat. The old "speed
(energy) is life" dictum dominates. However, Tom's comments draw light to
my thoughts on the matter (again, only as a deadly flight-sim ace and avid
reader) that in current dogfights, conventional energy management is less
effective than pointing your nose and getting off a missile ASAP.
It would seem to me that blowing through the merge and maintaining
energy would be much less effective than doing a maneuver that wasted your
energy but gave you terrific turn rates and/or high AoA (e.g., circle,
cobra-type high AoA maneuvers). Doing so allows you to fire the very agile,
and very capable (from a seeking point of view) IR missiles at your
opponent. These missiles surely have enough energy to be deadly at any
reasonable dogfighting range (assuming you're not making Mach 2 slashing
attacks on each other). So by quickly getting a missile in the air, you've
got a chance of killing your opponent, and you've got a great way to keep
him pointed away from you while superior thrust-weight ratios give you back
your lost energy (to make a follow-up attack if required). Surely, even if
the bandit is still extending, you can lob an R-77, -27, or AIM-120 at them.
The idea that you'd need speed/energy to counter "unexpected" opponents
appears less plausible with modern combat (low number of fighters combined
with quality of SA provided by data links and airborne radar). The same
high thrust-weight ratios should let you quickly get back your energy after
your missiles have splashed the current bandit (I'll assume that your
wingman is keeping his wingman busy). So the combination of super-agility,
very capable missiles, and very high thrust-weight ratios seem to me to
represent a significant shift in the way dogfights should occur (from an
emphasis on energy management to quick nose-pointing and snap missile
shots). No longer are we dealing with primarily nose-tail engagements (due
to weapons limitations), with large numbers of fighters, that do not have
today's high thrust-weight ratios.
I'm aware that some CF-18 pilots in the RCAF have expressed genuine
concern with regards to the AoA abilities of the Su-27 family in close-in
engagements (RAF pilots I've met also speak grimly on the topic), and I also
know that typically, US pilots (and especially Eagle pilots) refer to a
dogfight as something that happens only if you've screwed up your BVR
engagement. I'm also aware that high speed initially gives you a better
chance of achieving that most deadly advantage, surprise. However, I'd be
interested to know if there still is the mentality that speed/energy is life
or has this changed(inside a dogfight, I'm aware of how important speed is
in BVR, as well as in deciding whether or not an engagement will occur in
the first place, and generally agree that speed is life)? How much does the
choice of the F-22 over the F-23 reflect this kind of mentality? I'd be
interested in hearing further opinions on this matter. Regards,

Tony
p.s.- Tom, you talked briefly about it, but I'd love to find out more about
how the TF-30's performed (or didn't!) for the Iranians in dogfights

On Sun, 26 Oct 2003 22:45:17 -0500, "Tony Volk"
wrote:

A few armchair comments for this great thread inserted below.

"anything but high-subsonic speeds" is ruling out where all reasonable
dog-fighting is done! If you aren't doing it at "high-subsonic" speed,
you're going to die in short order.
Sorry Ed, by all respoect, I'm not so sure about this. Certainly, it is a
very good method in peace-time exercises. But I don't think that more than
5-10% of war-time dogfighting done in the last 20 years would confirm
this.
As a matter of fact, I talked with quite a few folks who were dogfighting
in different wars of the 1980s, and these do not think that dogfighting at
high subsonic speeds (or dogfighting at all), makes much sence. In fact, most
of them preferred the efficiency of the initial "slash attack". If there was
anything left after this one, they'd then use low-speed/high AoA turns to
point their weapons at another target and the superior acceleration to
start another attack. So, while the opponents were turning around them at high
subsonic speeds, they were swiftly repositioning and shooting down one
after the other... The tactics proved superior even against numerically superior
opponents - and this dozens of times.

Well, I can't disagree with anything you've said (except for the
"repositioning and shooting down one after the other..") You missed my
regular and frequent rants in this forum that "dogfighting" is stupid.
The preferred sequence of event is always: first shoot BVR, second
shoot in the face at first opportunity WVR, third slash through with
high angle gun shot, fourth separate and reposition. Lather, rinse,
repeat. But, don't "turn and burn" with an opponent if you can
possible avoid it. If you do turn, follow the Israeli maxim of not
staying for more than 30-45 degrees of turn. At all times stay fast.
Do not dissipate total energy, although you may exchange kinetic for
potentical occasionally.

Given all that, the underlying principle remains, always stay at or
above your aircraft's corner velocity. Failure to do so, even with
high T/W systems is foolish. This isn't a game. It's living and dying.


It's always seemed very unusual to me that the super-maneuverability of
current Russian fighters gets so much bad press from many writers (and some
pilots). I can try and get names (I have them somewhere), but I'm sure
we're all familiar with general comments about how current super-maneuvers
look pretty at airshows, but mean f**k all in real combat. The old "speed
(energy) is life" dictum dominates.

As the Baron often said, "anything else is rubbish." Speed is life.
Period! Slowing down to kill one adversary only means that you are now
vulnerable to the adversary's wingman. No one should be in a combat
arena without mutual support.

However, Tom's comments draw light to
my thoughts on the matter (again, only as a deadly flight-sim ace and avid
reader) that in current dogfights, conventional energy management is less
effective than pointing your nose and getting off a missile ASAP.

Correct, but don't confuse pointing and shooting with squandering
your energy.

It would seem to me that blowing through the merge and maintaining
energy would be much less effective than doing a maneuver that wasted your
energy but gave you terrific turn rates and/or high AoA (e.g., circle,
cobra-type high AoA maneuvers).

It's the wingman! The threat is always paired (at the minimum.)
Slowing leads to vulnerability. Better to separate and reposition for
an attack at high energy.


Doing so allows you to fire the very agile,
and very capable (from a seeking point of view) IR missiles at your
opponent. These missiles surely have enough energy to be deadly at any
reasonable dogfighting range (assuming you're not making Mach 2 slashing
attacks on each other). So by quickly getting a missile in the air, you've
got a chance of killing your opponent, and you've got a great way to keep
him pointed away from you while superior thrust-weight ratios give you back
your lost energy (to make a follow-up attack if required).

Did I mention the wingman?

The idea that you'd need speed/energy to counter "unexpected" opponents
appears less plausible with modern combat (low number of fighters combined
with quality of SA provided by data links and airborne radar). The same
high thrust-weight ratios should let you quickly get back your energy after
your missiles have splashed the current bandit (I'll assume that your
wingman is keeping his wingman busy).

First assumption (low plausibility of unknowns) is wrong. Nothing
attracts maggots like a swirling fight with missile cons visible for
miles. Second assumption regarding wingmen is wrong. It happens that
engagement break up into multiple one-v-ones, but the desired
situation is to maintain mutual support. If support breaks down, the
priority should be to separate.


So the combination of super-agility,
very capable missiles, and very high thrust-weight ratios seem to me to
represent a significant shift in the way dogfights should occur (from an
emphasis on energy management to quick nose-pointing and snap missile
shots). No longer are we dealing with primarily nose-tail engagements (due
to weapons limitations), with large numbers of fighters, that do not have
today's high thrust-weight ratios.

You are basically correct here, but you still shouldn't be squandering
energy. The engagements aren't turn & burn with the offensive
dedicated to sweetening the tracking shot and the defensive
frantically trying to defeat solution. They are, by definition, going
to be slashing attack with high off-boresight excursions by weapons.
The ability to defeat the threat is linked to high energy state. No
energy, no missile defense. You die.

I'm aware that some CF-18 pilots in the RCAF have expressed genuine
concern with regards to the AoA abilities of the Su-27 family in close-in
engagements (RAF pilots I've met also speak grimly on the topic), and I also
know that typically, US pilots (and especially Eagle pilots) refer to a
dogfight as something that happens only if you've screwed up your BVR
engagement.

Can I hear an AMEN?

I'm also aware that high speed initially gives you a better
chance of achieving that most deadly advantage, surprise. However, I'd be
interested to know if there still is the mentality that speed/energy is life
or has this changed(inside a dogfight, I'm aware of how important speed is
in BVR, as well as in deciding whether or not an engagement will occur in
the first place, and generally agree that speed is life)? How much does the
choice of the F-22 over the F-23 reflect this kind of mentality? I'd be
interested in hearing further opinions on this matter. Regards,

Having been on F-23 development, I don't get the last question. Both
systems were high stealth, supercruise required, high agility, passive
sensors and generally BVR oriented as first option. The desires
somewhat outstripped the technology capability, but the aircraft
didn't have a lot of difference in performance.

There are tradeoffs between stealth and agility. The two concepts
aren't mutually exclusive, but optimizing both is a difficult
aerodynamic task. With less currrent capability to meet the exotic
goals of the program, the result is a skewing of the production
aircraft toward agility. Either proposal could do that.



Tony
p.s.- Tom, you talked briefly about it, but I'd love to find out more about
how the TF-30's performed (or didn't!) for the Iranians in dogfights

On Sun, 26 Oct 2003 22:45:17 -0500, "Tony Volk"
wrote:

A few armchair comments for this great thread inserted below.

"anything but high-subsonic speeds" is ruling out where all reasonable
dog-fighting is done! If you aren't doing it at "high-subsonic" speed,
you're going to die in short order.
Sorry Ed, by all respoect, I'm not so sure about this. Certainly, it is a
very good method in peace-time exercises. But I don't think that more than
5-10% of war-time dogfighting done in the last 20 years would confirm
this.
As a matter of fact, I talked with quite a few folks who were dogfighting
in different wars of the 1980s, and these do not think that dogfighting at
high subsonic speeds (or dogfighting at all), makes much sence. In fact, most
of them preferred the efficiency of the initial "slash attack". If there was
anything left after this one, they'd then use low-speed/high AoA turns to
point their weapons at another target and the superior acceleration to
start another attack. So, while the opponents were turning around them at high
subsonic speeds, they were swiftly repositioning and shooting down one
after the other... The tactics proved superior even against numerically superior
opponents - and this dozens of times.

Well, I can't disagree with anything you've said (except for the
"repositioning and shooting down one after the other..") You missed my
regular and frequent rants in this forum that "dogfighting" is stupid.
The preferred sequence of event is always: first shoot BVR, second
shoot in the face at first opportunity WVR, third slash through with
high angle gun shot, fourth separate and reposition. Lather, rinse,
repeat. But, don't "turn and burn" with an opponent if you can
possible avoid it. If you do turn, follow the Israeli maxim of not
staying for more than 30-45 degrees of turn. At all times stay fast.
Do not dissipate total energy, although you may exchange kinetic for
potentical occasionally.

Given all that, the underlying principle remains, always stay at or
above your aircraft's corner velocity. Failure to do so, even with
high T/W systems is foolish. This isn't a game. It's living and dying.


It's always seemed very unusual to me that the super-maneuverability of
current Russian fighters gets so much bad press from many writers (and some
pilots). I can try and get names (I have them somewhere), but I'm sure
we're all familiar with general comments about how current super-maneuvers
look pretty at airshows, but mean f**k all in real combat. The old "speed
(energy) is life" dictum dominates.

As the Baron often said, "anything else is rubbish." Speed is life.
Period! Slowing down to kill one adversary only means that you are now
vulnerable to the adversary's wingman. No one should be in a combat
arena without mutual support.

However, Tom's comments draw light to
my thoughts on the matter (again, only as a deadly flight-sim ace and avid
reader) that in current dogfights, conventional energy management is less
effective than pointing your nose and getting off a missile ASAP.

Correct, but don't confuse pointing and shooting with squandering
your energy.

It would seem to me that blowing through the merge and maintaining
energy would be much less effective than doing a maneuver that wasted your
energy but gave you terrific turn rates and/or high AoA (e.g., circle,
cobra-type high AoA maneuvers).

It's the wingman! The threat is always paired (at the minimum.)
Slowing leads to vulnerability. Better to separate and reposition for
an attack at high energy.


Doing so allows you to fire the very agile,
and very capable (from a seeking point of view) IR missiles at your
opponent. These missiles surely have enough energy to be deadly at any
reasonable dogfighting range (assuming you're not making Mach 2 slashing
attacks on each other). So by quickly getting a missile in the air, you've
got a chance of killing your opponent, and you've got a great way to keep
him pointed away from you while superior thrust-weight ratios give you back
your lost energy (to make a follow-up attack if required).

Did I mention the wingman?

The idea that you'd need speed/energy to counter "unexpected" opponents
appears less plausible with modern combat (low number of fighters combined
with quality of SA provided by data links and airborne radar). The same
high thrust-weight ratios should let you quickly get back your energy after
your missiles have splashed the current bandit (I'll assume that your
wingman is keeping his wingman busy).

First assumption (low plausibility of unknowns) is wrong. Nothing
attracts maggots like a swirling fight with missile cons visible for
miles. Second assumption regarding wingmen is wrong. It happens that
engagement break up into multiple one-v-ones, but the desired
situation is to maintain mutual support. If support breaks down, the
priority should be to separate.


So the combination of super-agility,
very capable missiles, and very high thrust-weight ratios seem to me to
represent a significant shift in the way dogfights should occur (from an
emphasis on energy management to quick nose-pointing and snap missile
shots). No longer are we dealing with primarily nose-tail engagements (due
to weapons limitations), with large numbers of fighters, that do not have
today's high thrust-weight ratios.

You are basically correct here, but you still shouldn't be squandering
energy. The engagements aren't turn & burn with the offensive
dedicated to sweetening the tracking shot and the defensive
frantically trying to defeat solution. They are, by definition, going
to be slashing attack with high off-boresight excursions by weapons.
The ability to defeat the threat is linked to high energy state. No
energy, no missile defense. You die.

I'm aware that some CF-18 pilots in the RCAF have expressed genuine
concern with regards to the AoA abilities of the Su-27 family in close-in
engagements (RAF pilots I've met also speak grimly on the topic), and I also
know that typically, US pilots (and especially Eagle pilots) refer to a
dogfight as something that happens only if you've screwed up your BVR
engagement.

Can I hear an AMEN?

I'm also aware that high speed initially gives you a better
chance of achieving that most deadly advantage, surprise. However, I'd be
interested to know if there still is the mentality that speed/energy is life
or has this changed(inside a dogfight, I'm aware of how important speed is
in BVR, as well as in deciding whether or not an engagement will occur in
the first place, and generally agree that speed is life)? How much does the
choice of the F-22 over the F-23 reflect this kind of mentality? I'd be
interested in hearing further opinions on this matter. Regards,

Having been on F-23 development, I don't get the last question. Both
systems were high stealth, supercruise required, high agility, passive
sensors and generally BVR oriented as first option. The desires
somewhat outstripped the technology capability, but the aircraft
didn't have a lot of difference in performance.

There are tradeoffs between stealth and agility. The two concepts
aren't mutually exclusive, but optimizing both is a difficult
aerodynamic task. With less currrent capability to meet the exotic
goals of the program, the result is a skewing of the production
aircraft toward agility. Either proposal could do that.



Tony
p.s.- Tom, you talked briefly about it, but I'd love to find out more about
how the TF-30's performed (or didn't!) for the Iranians in dogfights

"Tony Volk" wrote in message
...
snip

p.s.- Tom, you talked briefly about it, but I'd love to find out more
about
how the TF-30's performed (or didn't!) for the Iranians in dogfights

From what I know so far (bear in mind that the research is still very much
going on), I'd say that during one out of ten air combats in which Iranian
F-14s were involved something would happen to one of the engines.

They experienced all the usual stuff caused by the poor stall margin of the
TF-30: afterburner pops resulting in catastrophic engine stall, engine
compressor stalls at high AoA, flame-outs during IFR, turbine failures etc.

And this not only once, or two, but dozens of times: just for example, one
pilot alone experienced no less but three catastrophic engine stalls on the
same F-14A between 1980 and 1993, two of which already after the war, when
he had no less but 2.000 hours in combat.


Two additional remarks in response to Ed:

Well, I can't disagree with anything you've said (except for the
"repositioning and shooting down one after the other..") You missed my
regular and frequent rants in this forum that "dogfighting" is stupid.

Obviously I did. ;-))

The preferred sequence of event is always: first shoot BVR, second
shoot in the face at first opportunity WVR, third slash through with
high angle gun shot, fourth separate and reposition. Lather, rinse,
repeat. But, don't "turn and burn" with an opponent if you can
possible avoid it. If you do turn, follow the Israeli maxim of not
staying for more than 30-45 degrees of turn. At all times stay fast.
Do not dissipate total energy, although you may exchange kinetic for
potentical occasionally.

In the case of the Iranians, there were several problems, and these were
obviously the reasons why they couldn't go 100% according to this doctrine:
- in 50% of cases they were underway alone (without wingman), and facing at
least four or six, often enough between eight and 14 opponents;
- their main opponents in dogfights were Mirage F.1s and MiG-23s: both were
poor in turning, but excellent in acceleration and maintaining high subsonic
speeds - or MiG-21s, which could do good breaks, but were very poor in
acceleration
- the Iraqis were very-well aware of the AWG-9's weakness when tracking a
target flying at low level away from it - if working in the high-PRF mode

So the usual engagement looked something like this:
- if the Tomcat was armed with the AIM-54, the first missile would usually
be launched from ranges between 20 and 70km (although, I've got a still from
a TISEO-video, taken by wingman F-4, showing an AIM-54 going off over a
MiG-23 after being fired from a range of only 6.400m!)
- then the F-14 would approach to 12nm to launch the first Sparrow
- the AIM-9P was not an all-aspect weapon, while - when engaged by F-14s the
Iraqis were usually running for life at a speed of heat and lowest possible
level; so as next the Tomcat would slash through the enemy formation, do a
Bat-turn, Immelman, or something of the kind in order to turn around, and
then accelerate in order to catch the opponents and attack with Sidewinders
from behind
By that time, the Iraqi formations were usually completely scattered, with
what is left of them (usually pairs) moving like a pack of sardines: if the
leader turned left, everybody else was turning left. Reverse turns were
frequently also done, and many IrAF planes lost because of this mistake.
Seldom, very seldom would any Iraqi turn back to engage: this could happen
only if the pilot felt cornered, or one of his really close buddies was
cornered and calling for help.

So, in the essence - and except they flew MiG-21s - you´ve had the Iraqis
flying high-speed straight, high-speed turn, high-speed straight, and the
Iranians flying high-speed straight, low-speed U-turns, acceleration,
high-speed straight. The thing functioned (with a SINGLE exception in eight
years of the war!) because of many reasons, including excellent and
realistic training of Iranian F-14-crews and their mutual support (within
the cockpit), poor Iraqi AAMs, the superior maneuverability and acceleration
of the F-14 etc., etc.

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585

Ed, I couldn't have said it better...literally.

BTW, I know it was from sometime ago, but I really enjoyed reading
your comments on the F-105. [Subj: Aircraft You Have Flown
(Impressions); Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military, sci.military.naval]

DJ
www.bitteeinbit.net

Scott Ferrin wrote in message . ..

There's probably some photos in there of the YF-16 with an F101 engine
in it. The lighter weight (of the aircraft) and more thrust than a
-229 made it pretty impressive I'd guess.

I believe the F101 engine was flown/tested on FSD #1 (75-0745), not
on either one of the YF-16 prototypes.

GregD

On Mon, 27 Oct 2003 17:35:46 GMT, "Tom Cooper" wrote:

So, in the essence - and except they flew MiG-21s - you´ve had the Iraqis
flying high-speed straight, high-speed turn, high-speed straight, and the
Iranians flying high-speed straight, low-speed U-turns, acceleration,
high-speed straight. The thing functioned (with a SINGLE exception in eight
years of the war!) because of many reasons, including excellent and
realistic training of Iranian F-14-crews and their mutual support (within
the cockpit), poor Iraqi AAMs, the superior maneuverability and acceleration
of the F-14 etc., etc.

Tom Cooper

And, of course, we must note that a high percentage of Iranian pilots
were USAF trained while the Iraqi were Soviet trained. During the
years I was in Air Training Command at Williams, we had a large number
of Iranian students come through the program. Some better than others,
but all getting the USAF T-37/T-38 syllabus and then progressing to
operational qualification at a USAF course as well.

Interestingly, my first foreign student when I returned from my F-105
tour and became a T-37 IP, was a Moroccan. He had been through the
Soviet pilot training course already and had more than 900 hours in
MiGs--15 and 17! He had more than twice as many hours in fighters than
I did! Nevertheless, he was never allowed to solo in the T-37 and
during the formation phase, while he could hang on the wing better
than a lot of IPs, he was totally incapable of leading a training
formation.

When he advanced to T-38s, the higher-ups decided to let him solo in
the Talon. On about his third solo sortie, he jumped out of the
airplane. The airplane landed inverted, with full flaps down, full
forward trim, both throttles in AB and both engine fuel controls
cavitated and the engines flamed out. The determination was that he
was trying to see how long he could fly inverted (despite the dash-1
prohibition against inverted flight over 30 second.) When the engines
flamed out, he tried a "tiger airstart" by going to AB, but they
wouldn't relight because of the cavitation of the fuel controls. He
panicked and jumped out, costing us the airplane.

He was washed out and returned to Morocco. The reason he was taking US
pilot training after all those hours and already graduating from
Soviet training was that he had bailed out of a MiG-17 after hitting
the roof of his girl friend's house in Morocco doing a buzz job.

Hi Ed. Thanks for the comments, here's a few more of mine.

You missed my
regular and frequent rants in this forum that "dogfighting" is stupid.

Best fun in simulators, but I totally agree with you where real life is
concerned!

The preferred sequence of event is always: first shoot BVR, second
shoot in the face at first opportunity WVR,

I agree completely. Which makes much of the following moot in real
life, but still fun to discuss!

third slash through with
high angle gun shot, fourth separate and reposition.

I would say third, turn like hell and get a missile on you. Screw
missile defense, your best defense is a good offense. If your wingman can
attack me, what's my wingman doing? Why isn't he covering me by sending
your wingman an AIM-9 or R-73? While you two are slashing and extending,
we've used as much energy as possible to get our noses pointed at you first
(within the limits of our missile's abilities). Our noses are now pointing
at you, my missile is launched, and you now have to use that energy you've
saved to dodge the missile. Your slash kept you out of guns range, but
certainly not out of missile range (especially considering that the AIM-120
and R-77 are agile enough to be used in a dogfight). I have the leisure of
regaining my energy, or shooting another missile, or getting out of dodge,
etc. My wingman is occupying your wingman. I'll keep launching missiles
until they connect, while you are frantically on the defense against my
missiles. This shouldn't take more than a minute or so, which means any
other planes more than 10 miles away won't be here (assuming a speed of 600
mph). If there are planes closer than 10 miles, well then that's a
different story, but that seems to be a very rare event in modern (1990- )
engagements.
I guess I could sum up my position by taking offense over defense.
Offense in firing a missile ASAP vs. saving energy to defeat one, offense in
having both fighters engage (this is certainly the case with recent U.S. BVR
engagements), and offense in ending the engagement ASAP instead of saving
energy for surprise bandits.

Correct, but don't confuse pointing and shooting with squandering
your energy.

It is my understanding that achieving maximum instantaneous rate of turn
will use up your energy (correct me if I'm wrong).

First assumption (low plausibility of unknowns) is wrong. Nothing
attracts maggots like a swirling fight with missile cons visible for
miles. Second assumption regarding wingmen is wrong. It happens that
engagement break up into multiple one-v-ones, but the desired
situation is to maintain mutual support. If support breaks down, the
priority should be to separate.

Well, other than Iran-Iraq, and Bekka, (both 80's), I can't think of any
big furballs that have happened recently. Certainly, one could get enough
SA from AWACS to make a rapid judgement about the likelihood of your
dogfight getting crashed by more bandits in the near future. And I'm
confused about the wingman support. In an era of all-aspect IR missiles, it
seems to me that your best defense is to go on the offense, meaning that
your wingman should be doing more than just covering your six, he should be
actively trying to remove threats on his own. I thought one of the
advantages of the leuce-deuce was to allow both planes to bring their
weapons to bear on the enemy simultaneously? The pilots' comments I've read
regarding USAF engagements in the last 10 or so years (Gulf & Balkans) all
speak of near-simultaneous engagement (mostly BVR), so why wouldn't it be
fair to assume that my wingman takes your wingman, leaving me no worries
about "spending" my energy on getting my nose (and missiles) pointed at you?


You are basically correct here, but you still shouldn't be squandering
energy. The engagements aren't turn & burn with the offensive
dedicated to sweetening the tracking shot and the defensive
frantically trying to defeat solution. They are, by definition, going
to be slashing attack with high off-boresight excursions by weapons.
The ability to defeat the threat is linked to high energy state. No
energy, no missile defense. You die.

I agree about defeating the missile, but would it not be better to fire
a missile before your opponent and thus not have to face a reply from him
(assuming he's not suicidal enough to delay his dodge by firing at you), and
thus not have to worry a lick about your energy (wingman and others
discussed above)?

How much does the
choice of the F-22 over the F-23 reflect this kind of mentality? I'd be
interested in hearing further opinions on this matter. Regards,
Having been on F-23 development, I don't get the last question. Both
systems were high stealth, supercruise required, high agility, passive
sensors and generally BVR oriented as first option. The desires
somewhat outstripped the technology capability, but the aircraft
didn't have a lot of difference in performance.
There are tradeoffs between stealth and agility. The two concepts
aren't mutually exclusive, but optimizing both is a difficult
aerodynamic task. With less currrent capability to meet the exotic
goals of the program, the result is a skewing of the production
aircraft toward agility. Either proposal could do that.

I knew you were on the team, which is why I asked (didn't that used to
be in your signature a long time ago?). It has been reported that the F-23s
emphasis on speed and stealth was not as well accepted by the TAC (and
TAC-dominated ACC) as the F-22s more balanced emphasis that included
super-maneuverability through thrust vectoring (referred to tongue in cheek
as giving the USAF what it wanted, instead of what it asked for). The
fighter generals wanted to move a little further away from a pure BVR
fighter (a move that I think has its pluses and its cons). Heck, I'd love
it if you spilled the beans on the F-23 as far as you legally could! Thanks
for the comments Ed (and Tom). I appreciate that you're a pro talking to an
amateur, but hey, at least we're talking tactics and not logistics!
Cheers,

Tony