Low pass

On Aug 28, 6:03*pm, Andreas Maurer wrote:
On Sat, 27 Aug 2011 17:22:45 -0700 (PDT), Dave Nadler
wrote:

PS: Not a new problem. Discussed in my 1987 article:
http://www.nadler.com/public/Nadler_...g_May_1987.pdf

Hi Dave - scary lecture!

I have to admit I was horrified reading your description of all these
incidents and the nescience of the pilots - how have things progressed
since you wrote this article? Did it get better (and why?)...?

Regards from Germany
Andreas

I'll chime in because that article was published at a very
impressionable time in my soaring career and it made a substantial
impression at that time. That was the month I passed my PP glider
flight test. Also, I knew several pilots who were at the contest(s)
that article was written about and some of those guys were my
instructors.

First, no one disputes the facts, they are what they are, the friends
no longer with us, the busted ships, the memorial trophies. Some of
the other pilots had a huge issue with how Dave portrayed some of the
things he saw from his cockpit that didn't result in damage. I don't
have an opinion on that (but I have a friend that will still go angry
red in the face if this article is brought up!). However, 24 years
and 20-odd contests later, I do not find Dave's commentary far fetched
*at all*. I've seen all of this crap decision making (and lack of
decision making), first hand.

What's changed is: pilots are older & more experienced (average age
perhaps 10 yrs older now than 1987), ships are better (auto control
hookups, better handling, safety cockpits), procedures are better --
starts and finishes, critical assembly checks for instance, and
tasking is easier. A GPS navigated 2.5 hour AAT is about half the
workload of the camera documented task you were likely to get in the
mid 80s in similar weather. My opinion, anyway.

What hasn't changed (enough): lousy decision making leading to
seriously unsafe situations. Most disturbing is that the post
accident interviews often don't yield useful lessons learned (or at
least nothing new). Sometimes even the awareness of the pilot
involved seems to be lacking, he may persist in thinking he was simply
the victim of some outrageously bad luck. At least now if he's flying
a modern ship he's often around to interview. Those fatalities at
Sugarbush involved ships that had no cockpit protection to speak of.

On the other hand, the guys that mentored me starting a quarter
century ago are almost all still flying & still flying contests and
they don't break a lot of stuff. I guess I picked good role models.
Whatever. It's possible to fly competition (and do well) with a sane
safety record.

-Evan Ludeman / T8

On 8/29/2011 12:08 PM, Evan Ludeman wrote:
On Aug 28, 6:03 pm, Andreas wrote:
On Sat, 27 Aug 2011 17:22:45 -0700 (PDT), Dave
wrote:

PS: Not a new problem. Discussed in my 1987 article:
http://www.nadler.com/public/Nadler_...g_May_1987.pdf

Hi Dave - scary lecture!

I have to admit I was horrified reading your description of all these
incidents and the nescience of the pilots - how have things progressed
since you wrote this article? Did it get better (and why?)...?

Regards from Germany
Andreas

I'll chime in because that article was published at a very
impressionable time in my soaring career and it made a substantial
impression at that time. That was the month I passed my PP glider
flight test. Also, I knew several pilots who were at the contest(s)
that article was written about and some of those guys were my
instructors.

I'd been soaring ~13 years when Dave's article appeared, and though in my own
mind considered myself still a newbie/beginner - had ~850 hours and doubt if
any of my club peers considered me a newbie - it also made a favorable,
lasting, helluvan impression on me. IIRC I was sufficiently favorably
impressed I wrote him a snail mail letter thanking him for it; it was/remains
a classic IMHO, and I hope one or two RAS readers may be motivated from
reading it, to improve their own thought processes...because that's what it's
all about. Mere mechanical skill means little without some brains to leaven it.

First, no one disputes the facts, they are what they are, the friends
no longer with us, the busted ships, the memorial trophies. Some of
the other pilots had a huge issue with how Dave portrayed some of the
things he saw from his cockpit that didn't result in damage. I don't
have an opinion on that (but I have a friend that will still go angry
red in the face if this article is brought up!).

Wow...

However, 24 years
and 20-odd contests later, I do not find Dave's commentary far fetched
*at all*. I've seen all of this crap decision making (and lack of
decision making), first hand.

And certainly not limited to contests, though I realize we all like to imagine
contest pilots involve a select (better-thinking) subset of the soaring
population. Paying judgmental attention to the antics routinely displayed at
any gliderport on a soaring weekend can be not only entertaining, but
personally *useful*.


What's changed is: pilots are older& more experienced (average age
perhaps 10 yrs older now than 1987), ships are better (auto control
hookups, better handling, safety cockpits), procedures are better --
starts and finishes, critical assembly checks for instance, and
tasking is easier. A GPS navigated 2.5 hour AAT is about half the
workload of the camera documented task you were likely to get in the
mid 80s in similar weather. My opinion, anyway.

What hasn't changed (enough): lousy decision making leading to
seriously unsafe situations. Most disturbing is that the post
accident interviews often don't yield useful lessons learned (or at
least nothing new). Sometimes even the awareness of the pilot
involved seems to be lacking, he may persist in thinking he was simply
the victim of some outrageously bad luck.

Just out of curiosity, are there any readers who have NOT experienced what
Evan writes about (presuming you've poked into the thought processes of
others, of course)? "What Evan said," about that being 'disturbing'...and (to
me anyway - here comes the judgmental part) really scary/worrisome.

At least now if he's flying
a modern ship he's often around to interview. Those fatalities at
Sugarbush involved ships that had no cockpit protection to speak of.

On the other hand, the guys that mentored me starting a quarter
century ago are almost all still flying& still flying contests and
they don't break a lot of stuff. I guess I picked good role models.
Whatever. It's possible to fly competition (and do well) with a sane
safety record.

Just to be a bit anal, that last sentence covers a LOT of 'thought ground.'

What makes consistent soaring contest placers and winners isn't willingness to
take more risks than the other guys combined with consistently good luck, but
something far more complex, combining knowledge (of weather, of themselves, of
their ship, of the local geography, of the day's possibilities, etc.) skill,
and good judgment. A good argument can be made 'unintelligent risk-taking'
actually *slows* - and potentially limits - one's gaining of knowledge,
building of skill, and learning good judgment. Anyone taking risks as a means
of 'expanding their knowledge base' without also having in-hand - and being
prepared to immediately implement once certain self-defined limits are reached
- a *good* (safety-increasing) Plan B, a nearly fully-developed good Plan C
and some nascent other good possibilities is, I'd suggest, definitionally
taking 'unintelligent risks.'

FWIW...
Bob W.

On Aug 28, 12:33*pm, JJ Sinclair wrote:

where acro in defined as an abrupt maneuver involving a 30 dergee change in attitude

Where did you find that definition JJ? A lot of people confuse the
requirements for wearing a parachute with the definition of
aerobatics. Are you doing the same?

Sec. 91.303 — Aerobatic flight. - For the purposes of this section,
aerobatic flight means an intentional maneuver involving an abrupt
change in an aircraft's attitude, an abnormal attitude, or abnormal
acceleration, not necessary for normal flight.

Sec. 91.307 — Parachutes and parachuting. -

(c) Unless each occupant of the aircraft is wearing an approved
parachute, no pilot of a civil aircraft carrying any person (other
than a crewmember) may execute any intentional maneuver that exceeds—

(1) A bank of 60 degrees relative to the horizon; or

(2) A nose-up or nose-down attitude of 30 degrees relative to the
horizon.



Andy

On Aug 29, 3:32*pm, Andy wrote:
Where did you find that definition JJ? *A lot of people confuse the
requirements for wearing a parachute with the definition of
aerobatics. *Are you doing the same?

Gray area. Advisory Circular 91-48 uses both definitions.

Bart

On Aug 29, 3:01*pm, BobW wrote:
A good argument can be made 'unintelligent risk-taking'
actually *slows* - and potentially limits - one's gaining of knowledge,
building of skill, and learning good judgment.

Well, we're pretty far OT here, but one more comment to make: taking
on too much risk slows more than learning, it slows racing speeds
too! Nothing quite like flying all the way down to the weeds looking
for a top-10% thermal and having to settle for a bottom 5%-er to stay
airborne, or simply having to land. XC racing is more like running a
business than running a mile. The winners are those that manage risk
intelligently, commit their altitude (capital) to paths forward that
yield efficient progress and a spiffy return on investment (more
altitude, more capital).

But let's try not to take these parallels to their logical conclusion
(phoning up the rules committee in flight to negotiate special favors
at the expense of other competitors).

-Evan Ludeman / T8

On Aug 29, 4:50*pm, Bart wrote:
On Aug 29, 3:32*pm, Andy wrote:

Where did you find that definition JJ? *A lot of people confuse the
requirements for wearing a parachute with the definition of
aerobatics. *Are you doing the same?

Gray area. Advisory Circular 91-48 uses both definitions.

Bart

Can you give me a para reference. All I see, under definitions, is a
re-statement of the regs I quoted.

Andy

On Aug 30, 9:33*am, Andy wrote:
Gray area. Advisory Circular 91-48 uses both definitions.
Can you give me a para reference. All I see, under definitions, *is a
re-statement of the regs I quoted.

"...that exceeds:
(1) A bank of 60 degrees relative to the horizon; or
(2) A nose-up or nose-down attitude of 30 degrees relative to the
horizon.”
b The above bank and pitch tolerances further define the differences
between an acrobatic and nonacrobatic maneuver."

For me, the FARs are clear and I agree with your interpretation. Also,
Advisory Circulars are non-regulatory. But ignore them at your own
peril.

Bart

On Aug 30, 9:52*am, Bart wrote:
On Aug 30, 9:33*am, Andy wrote:

Gray area. Advisory Circular 91-48 uses both definitions.
Can you give me a para reference. All I see, under definitions, *is a
re-statement of the regs I quoted.

"...that exceeds:
(1) A bank of 60 degrees relative to the horizon; or
(2) A nose-up or nose-down attitude of 30 degrees relative to the
horizon.”
b The above bank and pitch tolerances further define the differences
between an acrobatic and nonacrobatic maneuver."

For me, the FARs are clear and I agree with your interpretation. Also,
Advisory Circulars are non-regulatory. But ignore them at your own
peril.

Bart

Back to the Idaho accident,a witness stated (NTSB report) that the
BG-12 pulled up to about 300 feet. This should have been plenty of
altitude to reverse course and put it on the runway. What happened? I
remember reading a FAA report on accidents that happen all the time.
Pilot buys a new ship and decides to buzz his house. Dives down,
buzzes, then pulls up, say 30 degrees. He looses his horizon because
the nose of his ship blocks it. Pilot isn't used to pulling G's and
without realizing it, he relaxes back stick pressure until he gets
back to 1 G. Only problem is,the nose is still up and his horizon is
still blocked. Ship stalls & falls. One happened just like this, here
in Sacramento a few years ago. Experienced buz-job-jockeys know to
lower one wing and pick up the horizon, then finish the maneuver with
nose below the horizon and airspeed 50+.
Did this happen in Idaho?
JJ

On Aug 31, 4:52*am, Bart wrote:
On Aug 30, 9:33*am, Andy wrote:

Gray area. Advisory Circular 91-48 uses both definitions.
Can you give me a para reference. All I see, under definitions, *is a
re-statement of the regs I quoted.

"...that exceeds:
(1) A bank of 60 degrees relative to the horizon; or
(2) A nose-up or nose-down attitude of 30 degrees relative to the
horizon.”
b The above bank and pitch tolerances further define the differences
between an acrobatic and nonacrobatic maneuver."

For me, the FARs are clear and I agree with your interpretation. Also,
Advisory Circulars are non-regulatory. But ignore them at your own
peril.

While no doubt some pull-ups exceed 30 degrees (and that might be more
fun) there is absolutely no need to, and even 30 degrees looks pretty
steep from the ground and converts speed into height pretty quickly.

120 knots airspeed at 30 degrees nose up is 60 knots vertical speed
(6000 fpm!).

So, we have:

1) missed approaches are standard procedure and fall under the
definition of landing for the purposes of the flying lower than 500 ft
AGL rule.

2) pull ups of 30 degrees or less do not fall under aerobatic rules.

3) at mixed-use airfields there can be other aircraft that normally
approach at 120 - 130 knots on short final.

Hell, where I learned to fly in Traumahawks (PA-38) it was standard
practice to approach at 120 knots until crossing the threshold in
order to keep out of the way of the 737 that was right behind you.
That made for about 1000 m of float slowing down which was perfect for
turning off at the midpoint taxiway.