Persian Tomcats in service

There's a very interesting article in the current issue of Combat Aircraft,
Vol 7, No. 6. It's by Tom Cooper and Liam F. Devlin and titled "Iran: A
Formidable Opponent?"

The article is about Iran's current air force capabilities, specifically
focusing on the Tomcats in Iranian service (it is in keeping with the
issue's focus on the retirement of the Tomcat from USN service; several
other magazines are doing similar Tomcat farewell issues).

According to the authors, the Tomcat remains in frontline Iranian service
and in sizeable numbers. The authors claim that in late 2003 a USAF E-3
Sentry tracked 16--yes, SIXTEEN--Iranian Tomcats flying in formation. This
was the largest number spotted at one time since 1997, when nine were
tracked over the southern Persian Gulf by the US Navy.

The article is somewhat defensive in tone. The authors claim that although
Western sources report that the Tomcat is barely operable, this is untrue.
The Iranians have put a lot of effort into maintaining and even rebuilding
their Tomcats and Phantoms, and they may have as many as 65 Phantoms in
service. It said that the US has decided that the Tomcat is barely operable
because it no longer operates on the borders, but only deep inside Iran.
But they claim that this is actually because the Iranians are trying to
preserve their assets and keep their most powerful fighter farther from
potential harm.

They also make a number of other claims, including that the CIA may have
acquired or inspected a Russian MiG-31 in 1997, and that the Russians
offered 22 secondhand MiG-31 aircraft to the Iranians, who turned them down.
(The CIA reportedly sought to buy these aircraft rather than let the
Iranians get them.) The article also claims that the Russians offered
Su-27s, Su-30s, and MiG-29s to the Iranians, but the Iranians are wary of
buying Russian aircraft because the terms are bad. For instance, the
Russians do not allow license building of their jet engines. Simply put,
the Russians won't give the Iranians enough independence and the Iranians
don't want to get stuck in a position of weakness when it comes to acquiring
spare parts for their aircraft.

There's a lot of amazing stuff in the article and it would be fascinating if
true. But one objection that I've heard others make about Cooper and his
other co-writer Farzad Bishop is that it is impossible to independently
confirm their information. They might conduct a lot of interviews with
Iranian pilots and ex-pat Iranians, but we don't know how carefully they
check their information. (This article by Cooper and Devlin concedes that
fewer Iranians have left the country since the mid-1990s, so it is harder to
speak to Iranians outside the country.)

Personally, the one thing I'm dubious about is the claim that Western
intelligence agencies do not have a good understanding of just how active
the Iranian F-14s are. If they turn on their radars, then the US intel
assets in the Persian Gulf will detect them. In addition, satellite photos
should also indicate how many F-14s are operable. Sure, the Iranians must
keep a lot of them in hangars, but occasionally they will move them around
airfields and they can be counted. In fact, somebody with a credit card
could order up commercial images of Iranian airfields and check for
themselves. So I don't buy the claim that US intel officials think that
_virtually no_ F-14s or their AWG-9 radars are still operating. My
suspicion is that the authors are responding to misinformed trash talking in
the aviation press, not to what US intel actually believes about Iranian
capabilities.

All that said, the one thing that establishes credibility for Cooper and
Devlin (as well as Cooper and Bishop in their books on the Iranian F-4s and
F-14s) is the impressive array of photos that they have collected. These
include aerial refueling shots of F-4s and Su-24s, as well as formation
shots of F-5s and other aircraft, and a very cool grainy image of an F-14 at
extremely low altitude over the Gulf. That aircraft is in the current
blue/gray paint scheme. They also have a photo of an F-14 with an ATM-54A
training round alongside, photographed in April 2004. That raises an
interesting point--if the Iranians no longer can operate the AIM-54 Phoenix,
then why would they be carrying around training rounds? Clearly they retain
some kind of AIM-54 Phoenix capability.



D

Follow the money!

To begin with, the Shah bought plenty of spare parts. Two AVCAL's (each
consisting of one year's estimated usage of spare parts based on flight
hours) were required to be delivered concurrent with the first IIAF
F-14. That allowed plenty of time for copying and improvement.

Second, the USN lied to Congress that 70% of inflight malfunctions would
be repairable at the Organizational or Intermediate Maintenance levels,
without resort to the slow, highly expensive Depot or Contractor levels.

Third, Congress dictated the use of a myriad of small-business
minority-setaside contractors to provide bit-and-piece components for
production and spare parts. Many were totally inept, dishonest, or both.

For instance: A red or green lens for the nav lights cost $18,000;
Hughes used a special transistor in the AWG-9 Radar that was not
manufactured, but selected for its special characteristics from bulk
quantities of a common type of transistor used in GM auto seat belt
controllers. The yield rate for usable transistors was about 1 in 2,700
tested. Guess what happened when GM dropped that seat-belt design.

Fleet introduction was a real zoo, with the production line, the IIAF
and current fleet usage all in competition for the same non-existent
parts.

The IIAF logistics and maintenance guys, all graduates of the USAF
Palace Log training track, got a real snicker out of that one, and
contracted with French companies to provide outyear support.

To make a long story short, the guts of any nearly system-ready F-14 in
Iran's current inventory bear no resemblance to what was in them in
1975. The sons of the Frenchmen who provided logistics and engineering
to the Shah in the 1970's are providing them to Iran today, along with
the Russians. The flying pack of internal rat**** that USN maintainers
put up with for years long since went the way of the Wing Flap Glove
Vane Controller System.

By the way, another old giggle: When the first F-14 landed at Point
Mugu, the canopy warped so badly in the sunshine that it couldn't be
closed until it was taken into the hangar and cooled down. Everyone was
going nuts about what the Iranians would say when they found out (lots
of our oil dollars riding on this deal, guys). The Iranians were
totally unconcerned; their hangers were underground and a canopy would
never be opened in the sun. Point is, these airframes have been stored
and maintained in conditions superior to most museums. The original
hangar and support facilities were designed by the French, also.

OK, it's time for one of you aero types to explain the history of the
Wing Flap Glove Vanes, and where they went.

Rick




DDAY wrote:
There's a very interesting article in the current issue of Combat Aircraft,
Vol 7, No. 6. It's by Tom Cooper and Liam F. Devlin and titled "Iran: A
Formidable Opponent?"

The article is about Iran's current air force capabilities, specifically
focusing on the Tomcats in Iranian service (it is in keeping with the
issue's focus on the retirement of the Tomcat from USN service; several
other magazines are doing similar Tomcat farewell issues).

According to the authors, the Tomcat remains in frontline Iranian service
and in sizeable numbers. The authors claim that in late 2003 a USAF E-3
Sentry tracked 16--yes, SIXTEEN--Iranian Tomcats flying in formation. This
was the largest number spotted at one time since 1997, when nine were
tracked over the southern Persian Gulf by the US Navy.

The article is somewhat defensive in tone. The authors claim that although
Western sources report that the Tomcat is barely operable, this is untrue.
The Iranians have put a lot of effort into maintaining and even rebuilding
their Tomcats and Phantoms, and they may have as many as 65 Phantoms in
service. It said that the US has decided that the Tomcat is barely operable
because it no longer operates on the borders, but only deep inside Iran.
But they claim that this is actually because the Iranians are trying to
preserve their assets and keep their most powerful fighter farther from
potential harm.
snip
*** Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com ***

Don't know the current status of Iranian F-14 readiness but can vouch for
Iranian pilots being a bit better than camel jockeys. I personally saw then
fly three Iranian Air Force Boeing 747s in military parade formation at a
flight demonstration for the Shah in the mid 1970s.

That said, my guess is they would fare no better against our Air Force, Navy
and Marine aviators than did the Iraqis. It's probably more a matter of
motivation than skill.

Crown prince Raza, the Shah's son, claims the young people in Iran,
including the Revolutionary Guard, are ready to revolt against the murderous
mullahs if they can get some support from us western nations. Certainly that
would be better all round than our invading yet another middle east country!

WDA

end

"DDAY" wrote in message
k.net...
There's a very interesting article in the current issue of Combat
Aircraft,
Vol 7, No. 6. It's by Tom Cooper and Liam F. Devlin and titled "Iran: A
Formidable Opponent?"

The article is about Iran's current air force capabilities, specifically
focusing on the Tomcats in Iranian service (it is in keeping with the
issue's focus on the retirement of the Tomcat from USN service; several
other magazines are doing similar Tomcat farewell issues).

According to the authors, the Tomcat remains in frontline Iranian service
and in sizeable numbers. The authors claim that in late 2003 a USAF E-3
Sentry tracked 16--yes, SIXTEEN--Iranian Tomcats flying in formation.
This
was the largest number spotted at one time since 1997, when nine were
tracked over the southern Persian Gulf by the US Navy.

The article is somewhat defensive in tone. The authors claim that
although
Western sources report that the Tomcat is barely operable, this is untrue.
The Iranians have put a lot of effort into maintaining and even rebuilding
their Tomcats and Phantoms, and they may have as many as 65 Phantoms in
service. It said that the US has decided that the Tomcat is barely
operable
because it no longer operates on the borders, but only deep inside Iran.
But they claim that this is actually because the Iranians are trying to
preserve their assets and keep their most powerful fighter farther from
potential harm.

They also make a number of other claims, including that the CIA may have
acquired or inspected a Russian MiG-31 in 1997, and that the Russians
offered 22 secondhand MiG-31 aircraft to the Iranians, who turned them
down.
(The CIA reportedly sought to buy these aircraft rather than let the
Iranians get them.) The article also claims that the Russians offered
Su-27s, Su-30s, and MiG-29s to the Iranians, but the Iranians are wary of
buying Russian aircraft because the terms are bad. For instance, the
Russians do not allow license building of their jet engines. Simply put,
the Russians won't give the Iranians enough independence and the Iranians
don't want to get stuck in a position of weakness when it comes to
acquiring
spare parts for their aircraft.

There's a lot of amazing stuff in the article and it would be fascinating
if
true. But one objection that I've heard others make about Cooper and his
other co-writer Farzad Bishop is that it is impossible to independently
confirm their information. They might conduct a lot of interviews with
Iranian pilots and ex-pat Iranians, but we don't know how carefully they
check their information. (This article by Cooper and Devlin concedes that
fewer Iranians have left the country since the mid-1990s, so it is harder
to
speak to Iranians outside the country.)

Personally, the one thing I'm dubious about is the claim that Western
intelligence agencies do not have a good understanding of just how active
the Iranian F-14s are. If they turn on their radars, then the US intel
assets in the Persian Gulf will detect them. In addition, satellite
photos
should also indicate how many F-14s are operable. Sure, the Iranians must
keep a lot of them in hangars, but occasionally they will move them around
airfields and they can be counted. In fact, somebody with a credit card
could order up commercial images of Iranian airfields and check for
themselves. So I don't buy the claim that US intel officials think that
_virtually no_ F-14s or their AWG-9 radars are still operating. My
suspicion is that the authors are responding to misinformed trash talking
in
the aviation press, not to what US intel actually believes about Iranian
capabilities.

All that said, the one thing that establishes credibility for Cooper and
Devlin (as well as Cooper and Bishop in their books on the Iranian F-4s
and
F-14s) is the impressive array of photos that they have collected. These
include aerial refueling shots of F-4s and Su-24s, as well as formation
shots of F-5s and other aircraft, and a very cool grainy image of an F-14
at
extremely low altitude over the Gulf. That aircraft is in the current
blue/gray paint scheme. They also have a photo of an F-14 with an ATM-54A
training round alongside, photographed in April 2004. That raises an
interesting point--if the Iranians no longer can operate the AIM-54
Phoenix,
then why would they be carrying around training rounds? Clearly they
retain
some kind of AIM-54 Phoenix capability.



D

In article , "W. D. Allen"
wrote:

Crown prince Raza, the Shah's son, claims the young people in Iran,
including the Revolutionary Guard, are ready to revolt against the murderous
mullahs if they can get some support from us western nations. Certainly that
would be better all round than our invading yet another middle east country!

Yeah, but the problem with guys who have vested interests is that they tend
to drink their own bathwater.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

On Wed, 03 May 2006 14:23:20 -0700, (Harry
Andreas) wrote:

In article , "W. D. Allen"
wrote:

Crown prince Raza, the Shah's son, claims the young people in Iran,
including the Revolutionary Guard, are ready to revolt against the murderous
mullahs if they can get some support from us western nations. Certainly that
would be better all round than our invading yet another middle east country!

Yeah, but the problem with guys who have vested interests is that they tend
to drink their own bathwater.

Isn't this the son of the same guy who never saw it coming?

Like father, like son?

I was an instructor at NAS Corpus when the Iranian revolution took
place. You could tell who was on what side becaus the Shah's guys
wore name tags that said "IIN" (Iranian Imperial Navy) and the other
guys wore tags that said "INN" (Iranian National Navy). The IIN guys
seemed to outnumber the INN guys, but not by much.

Maybe among the more Western oriented youth there is a desire to
replace the Mullahs, but I wonder how deep it runs.

Bill Kambic
Haras Lucero, Kingston, TN
Mangalarga Marchador: Uma Raça, Uma Paixão

To make the long story short, it is quite ironic that US Navy got rid
of Tomcats just in time when they could face foreign F-14s in battle
;-)))

I'm not an expert in naval hardware as many others are. My expertise lies in
policy, admin, and personnel issues. However, I believe we need to keep in
mind that this aircraft was built with 1960's technology.

Yea....they might have been upgraded...and the Iranians sent many guys my
age to western engineering schools (I knew quite a number in college...good
students too!!) But many a Tomcat was defeated by an aggressor squadron A-4
and F-5 flown by a well trained and seasoned pilot. How well trained are
Iranian pilots and how adept are they in fighting the aircraft?

In my mind the biggest concern would be their long range air-air missile
capability. What is it? What are our counter measures? It's easy to awe
civilians and observers. What I'm curious is what our aviators were
thinking. Was it "uh oh!" or "those poor paisons will be dead if they fly
against us"?

----------
In article , "Thomas A.
Hoffer" wrote:

I'm not an expert in naval hardware as many others are. My expertise lies in
policy, admin, and personnel issues. However, I believe we need to keep in
mind that this aircraft was built with 1960's technology.

Yea....they might have been upgraded...and the Iranians sent many guys my
age to western engineering schools (I knew quite a number in college...good
students too!!) But many a Tomcat was defeated by an aggressor squadron A-4
and F-5 flown by a well trained and seasoned pilot. How well trained are
Iranian pilots and how adept are they in fighting the aircraft?

Doesn't that work both ways? In other words, if the Iranian F-14s are 1960s
technology, doesn't your A-4/F-5 analogy indicate that an older aircraft can
beat a newer one?

I think that the essential point of the article was that we shouldn't
underestimate Iranian aerial capabilities. They have demonstrated an
ability to keep these planes flying for decades.



D

DDAY wrote:
----------

Doesn't that work both ways? In other words, if the Iranian F-14s
are 1960s technology, doesn't your A-4/F-5 analogy indicate that an
older aircraft can beat a newer one?

I think that the essential point of the article was that we shouldn't
underestimate Iranian aerial capabilities. They have demonstrated an
ability to keep these planes flying for decades.



D



If I can jump in here at this point, the Iranian Tomcats are only the tip
of the spear and in many ways are irrelevant. It's been demonstrated
over the last 5 years in that region, that air to air battles aren't won in
the air, but by taking out the opposition's C3 infrastructure. Once
that's been achieved, the best way to not lose your air force is to bury it
in the desert.

While this was a straightforward process with the Iraqis (both times) one
would assume that the Iranians have learned from the failures over the
border.


If it comes to a Hornet Vs Tomcat battle, I'm guessing that somebody's
jumped too far ahead in the game plan.



--

Cheers

Dave Kearton

in going through some old navy paperwork i came across this..
"the f14 requires 50 to 60 maint hrs every hour it flies, while the
super hornet needs 10 to 15 maint hrs for each flight hour...

if true, thats a hell of a difference...