Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: ojunk (Steve Mellenthin)
Date: 7/18/2004 2:19 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

erroneous, that the choice of the stream
stragegy
was not the best decision at times when a loose gaggle and varying run-in
headings and altitudes between the 2-4 airgraft groupings would have been
more effective.

The goal of the stream tactic was to overload the German
night defences. These were not very efficient, for initially
the German ground control needed two radars to bring about
an interception (one to track the fighter, one to track the bomber)
and by concentrating the bombers in a dense stream, the number
of bombers that could be intercepted by a system of limited
capacity fell. Later on, German tactics were much looser and
more effective, but the concentration of the stream probably
helped to concentrate the ECM efforts that had to be applied to
keep the German controllers in the desired state of confusion.

--
Emmanuel Gustin
Emmanuel dot Gustin @t skynet dot be
Flying Guns Books and Site: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/



In my flying days the tactic was to vary the run-in headings for exactly the
same reason, to keep the gunners guessing in where to aim. Forces the
gunners


The best heaidng for a bombrun was a zero druft heaidng sinve the Norden had a
cumulative error (small) as the dirft angle increased. This was due to RCCTE
(Range Component of Cross Trail Error) because in a right triangle the
hypotenuse is always longer than either of the legs.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

The best heaidng for a bombrun was a zero druft heaidng sinve the Norden had
a
cumulative error (small) as the dirft angle increased. This was due to RCCTE
(Range Component of Cross Trail Error) because in a right triangle the
hypotenuse is always longer than either of the legs.


Arthur Kramer

Pretty much true of any bomb run with any system. On the other hand there is
something to be said for diffusing the defenses and attacking from the least
heavily defended direction. Better to get to the target knowing there is a
cartain amount of inaccuracy in the bomb aiming device than to not get there at
all.

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: ojunk (Steve Mellenthin)
Date: 7/18/2004 3:51 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

The best heaidng for a bombrun was a zero druft heaidng sinve the Norden
had
a
cumulative error (small) as the dirft angle increased. This was due to RCCTE
(Range Component of Cross Trail Error) because in a right triangle the
hypotenuse is always longer than either of the legs.


Arthur Kramer

Pretty much true of any bomb run with any system. On the other hand there is
something to be said for diffusing the defenses and attacking from the least
heavily defended direction. Better to get to the target knowing there is a
cartain amount of inaccuracy in the bomb aiming device than to not get there
at
all.




It's the way we did it in the good ol' 344th.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Chris Mark wrote:

I think we need to be careful getting too detailed with loss rates as
indicating anything significant about aircraft types because there are so many
unknown variables, everything from accuracy of squadron records to how many dud
rounds an anti-aircraft battery fired on one day compared to another.
The safe conclusions are merely that low-level missions will cause losses to
soar, whatever the aircraft type, and that single-engine performance is
important in reducing losses. Both the B-25 and B-26 were good airplanes with
slightly different attributes.

No disagreement from me - I'm not the one who's been arguing that the B-26 was used
in the ETO exclusively because the B-25 was inferior, was less able to take damage,
had a higher loss rate, etc., in the face of all the evidence and ignoring all the
factors you mention above. It's always bugged me that the B-26 is trumpeted as
having the lowest loss rate in the ETO, when it was the _only_ medium bomber in the
ETO (operated by the US). Since there's nothing to directly compare it to in that
theater, attempting to draw conclusions about its relative survivability are
meaningless.

That is not the case in the MTO, which is why I would still like to know if you can
break down the MTO numbers for the B-25 and B-26, excluding North Africa. I've got
the North African data somewhere, but only have overall "European War" data on
bomber sorties and losses, rather than the more specific post-North Africa MTO
numbers. If you can supply sorties and losses for the B-25 and B-26 for that
period, I'd be much obliged, because I haven't been able to find that anywhere
else.

Guy

WalterM140 wrote:


formation turns. So we figured they were likely restricted to tight
formation
flying at altitudes of around 18,000 or at most 20,000 feet for Lancs or
Halifax
IIIs, although we knew we'd have to lighten the bombloads to get them that
high
(owing to the need to increase the defensive armament, armor, crew, and fuel
loads).

Guy



That's interesting. Didn't the RAF typically operate at @ 15,000 feet over
German targets?

Depends on the period, the target and the individual crews, but in general not
the heavies, although Stirlings and squadron dogs might be that low or lower.
For the Nuremberg raid (except for Mossies, all Halifax and Lancaster) a/c were
assigned one of four cruise heights, 20, 21, 22, or 23 thousand feet, although 1
Group were given dispensation to cruise lower, 13-16,000 feet IIRR until they
reached the Rhine or some other river, in the hope of hiding in forecast cloud,
climbing to the same height as everyone else after that. The cloud wasn't there,
and they were hit hard.

Once the attacks started, anyone who could went higher -- one Halifax crew in a
new a/c were delighted to find that they could get up to 26,000 feet, and cruised
safely above the carnage below. Others jettisoned some of their bomb load to
improve their ceiling. Crews flying average a/c, or those with less experience
or more determination to follow orders stayed at the assigned altitude bands, and
were the main targets of the fighters. Dog a/c were stuck even lower, and on
that particular mission it actually saved many of them -- one crew couldn't get
their Lanc above 12,000 feet and in this case were fortunate, as the fighters
were going after the main stream above them.

On at least one occasion, B-17' were briefed to attack Berlin at 27,000 feet;
once to beat the clouds a group bombed from 30,000.

That's the effect of the turbos. Two-stage two-speed supercharged Merlins (or
other) would have given similar altitude performance for the British heavies. I
have a vague memory that at least one small group of B-17s dropped from close to
35,000 on one occasion, but that must have been very late war with the B-33
turbos. I've got the navigator log data for one B-24 crew's entire 35 mission
tour in 1944-45, and the highest bombing altitude recorded (for the plane) is
29,000 feet. One run was at 28,000, another at 26,700, but the majority of runs
were in the low 20s. For lightly defended targets they might drop down a few or
even several thousand feet - the lowest recorded is 9,000 feet, with another at
12,000.

Guy

Keith Willshaw wrote:

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their
daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered
in height to minimise flak damage.



That might have been influenced by the fact that no other aircraft type
could
fly in the tight formations used by the B-17.


It has more to do with the doctrine of the self defensing bomber
that was adopted by the USAAF. You'll find that B-24's
also flew in such formations.

I've heard that B-26s could also fly in very tight formations, but I
shouldn't
think as at high an altitude as the B-17.

B-17's could maintain formation at heights almost twice as high as the
altitude
at which Bomber Command usually operated, either by day or by night.


True but irrelevant since bomber command didnt fly defensive
formations by day after 1941.

I believe they did from 1944 on, but it was a somewhat looser formation than
the US flew. The RAF apparently preferred to allow a little more room for
minor evasive action.

Guy

I have read inan RAF history that some Canadian Halifax squadrons
installed a single flexible 50 cal in a ventral mount - and were
pretty suucessful at countering Schrage Musik attacks. I can well
believe that - looking up through the top of a canopy at a firing 50M2
at say 100 feet would probably be the last thing an LW Nachtjaeger
pilot saw.
Walt BJ

WalterM140 wrote:

No, the reason they weren't there is because there weren't enough to go
around,
owing to the need to redesign the a/c for mass production, and a delayed
development due to the crash of the prototype.


"The production in mid-1940 of 30 P-38's saw signifcant design changes
instituted to help mass production. For the first time, the fuselage was split
into left and right halves, and the nose section was built up independently.
The aft booms also were divided into two pieces with the skins adjusted to
accomodate this....The XP-38A was a converted P-38 with pressurization; next
production variant was the P38D of late summer 1940. The ever indeasing orders
for Lightnings prompted more design changes, both to improve performance and to
faciliate mass production."

--Warbird Tech Series vol 2, Lockheed P-38 Lightning pp. 22-26 by Frederick A
Johnsen

Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let alone
1942.

Sure they were in hand, but they also caused a lot of delay, which is why the a/c
was so slow in getting into mass production and why the numbers remained so low
relatively late. The P-38F, the first full-up combat-capable version was available
for combat in August 1942; the first flight was made in January 1939, so roughly
3.5 years elapsed. Even allowing for a fairly leisurely development prior to the
war, the P-38's development was unusually prolonged, especially when compared with
its single-engined stablemates. And then in 1943 the wing leading edges, turbos,
radiators etc. all had to undergo a major redesign to fit leading edge tanks in,
then they had to re-tool before they could produce them.

snip


3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production was
still
ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same problems
in
August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved IOC
in the
ETO.

That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed it.
But they did not.

Can't push what you don't know you need, and since they didn't have ANY P-38s in
the late fall of 1942, winter, spring or summer of 1943, there was no opportunity
for them to work out the bugs. The 1st, 14th and 82nd FGs had all been sent to the
MTO, while the 78th had been stripped of a/c to replace losses, and transitioned to
the P-47. Sending all the P-38s to the MTO was a decision made well above Eaker's
pay grade, and there wasnt anything he could do about it.

It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much
about
escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made
things
more complicated, don't you know.

But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat, the
B-17
bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.

Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing
Eaker of
remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that case
by
June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the
Fall/Winter
of 1942/43.

They should have.

Why? The Luftwaffe was still working out tactics, had barely started to attack the
heavies, hadn't yet begun to augment their fighter defenses in the west, and were
inflicting only light to moderate casualties. We were still flying shallow
penetrations, and didnt even hit a coastal target in Germany (Wilhelmshaven) until
January 30th, 1943. We were flying few missions every month owing to the poor
weather, and we only had four heavy bomb groups available (none with Tokyo tanks
that allowed us to go really deep), so no conclusive test of doctrine was possible.

Production was very limited at the time.

Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been screaming
for
P-38's the production could have been ramped up.

Everyone in every theater other than the ETO (where there were no P-38s
because
they were all sent to the MTO) was screaming for more, and yet production was
what
it was.

Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't have
been increased.

And yet it wasn't, despite screams from the MTO and PTO asking for every single
P-38 they could get. The MTO was the highest priority theater in late 1942 and
most of 1943 (at least until after Salerno), so if any one was going to get them it
was the MTO. Guadalcanal got a single squadron (339th) in December 1942 while that
outcome was still in dispute, and the PTO wanted more. The ETO was well down the
list, because there was no ground combat underway, and the base was safe.

I very much doubt that more screaming would have increased the pace
any
more than it was.

I can't help what you doubt. The 8th AF was the premier USAAF organization in
the world. Arnorld was clearly ready to provide anything needed by his close
friend Eaker. But Eaker didn't ask for it.

Arnold was a member of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, who determined
allocations after their respective governments had decided which theaters had
priority. Throughout the period in question, the MTO had priority, and Arnold gave
them first choice, often re-directing units which had originally been planned to go
to the ETO. Eaker got what was left. Only after Salerno, when it became clear
that the necessary air superiority required for D-Day had not yet been established,
and the commanders started to relocate to the UK from the Med, did the ETO move to
first priority.



Then there's the extra training
time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting
units
operational/providing replacement pilots.

That doesn't seem that big an issue to me.

It was for P-38 units and replacements, especially those that were originally
supposed to get single-engined a/c. Lots of accidents when losing an engine
on
t/o.


The source I quote above says accidents for P-38's were less for the P-38 than
for the P39, P-40 and P47 in 1942.

And for units trained from the start for multi-engine, that may be correct. But
there's still the extra training time factor, and in 1943 you're talking about
transitioning single-engine pilots to twins, if you want to crew these P-38s that
are supposed to magically become available. The 55th's experience with hastly
transitioned pilots was apparently less than wonderful.



ibid p. 14

Yes, it might to pure
hindsight to blame him for this in 1942. Definitely. But Eaker persisted
in
supporting the self-defending bomber after 17 August, '43 and even after 14
Oct. '43.

Not after Second Schweinfurt. That made him a convert. Even so, he still
made the
(apparently) cognitively dissonant decision to give the P-51s to the 9th, but
Kepner fixed that, before Doolittle replaced Eaker. It made undoubted sense
from a
logistic perspective, but none from a tactical perspective.

Second Scheinfurt was late in the game.

Sure. OTOH, it was entirely possible to write off Regensburg/Schweinfurt as
everything going wrong that could go wrong (it did). It was hardly a typical
mission, so Eaker probably felt that a sustained effort was necessary, with the
large size force he believed was necessary to succeed. And of course, although he
knew that the German fighters were inflicting damage on the bombers, he still
believed that the bombers were badly attriting the fighters. Hence October
10th-14th.

After that, there could be absolutely no doubt. Eaker was wrong, but he wanted to
win just as much as anyone did. As one of the prime apostles of the very doctrine
he was employing (Hansell being another), no one was in a better position to give
it a full test.

Guy

WalterM140 wrote:

Someone posted over on the WWII board that Galland, I believe, said that
the
P-38 was the best allied fighter.


Going from memory, Galland said the reverse - that the P-38 was seen
as easy meat, and that it reinforced the lessons of the Bf 110.

Even with drop tanks it didn't have the eventual range of the P-51,
and, as found in the Pacific war area, it didn't have the agility to
dogfight - it had to rely on 'dive & climb' tactics. Against the Bf
109 that may not have been as profitable.



You're right about Galland. There was another high scoring German ace who
spoke well of the P-38.


OTOH, McFarland and Newton quote the Luftwaffe advice re the three US fighters they
were facing over Germany. IIRR it was alongthe lines of "If P-51s, avoid always.
If P-47s engage at low and medium altitudes, but avoid at high altitudes. Engage
the P-38 anywhere, anytime." Which is odd, because at low/medium altitudes the
P-38 was arguably superior to both the ME-109 and FW-190. It could out-turn either
at slow speed, could probably out-sustain climb the FW-190A if not the ME-109, and
didn't suffer from compressibility in the dive at those altitudes. Roll
acceleration was bad, especially compared to the FW-190, but visibility and
firepower were good to excellent.

Galland had one of the toughest fights of his life against a P-38 flown by an ace,
andwas lucky to get away unscathed, but that was the pilot more than the a/c.

The P-38 was the first "energy" fighter. The top two Americans aces of the war
did fly the thing, after all.

And the results would likely have been the same if they'd flown the Corsair, P-47
or P-51.

P-38's didn't have to dogfight with the Germans any more than it did the
Japanese. The idea was to keep the Germans from massing and to keep the
ME-110's out of the game.

True, the type of fighter was less relevant than the range of the fighter.

If the range was shorter than the Mustang, it was still adequate.

Until the P-38J with LE tanks came in, the range was substantially the same as the
P-47.

Also, for a
long time, there -were- no Mustangs.

And no long-range P-38s, either. At least, not at ETO bomber escort altitudes.
Drop tanks that you can't draw fuel from above 20,000 feet or so aren't much use in
the ETO escort business.

Guy

Mike Williamson wrote:

bendel boy wrote:


Going from memory, Galland said the reverse - that the P-38 was seen
as easy meat, and that it reinforced the lessons of the Bf 110.

Even with drop tanks it didn't have the eventual range of the P-51,
and, as found in the Pacific war area, it didn't have the agility to
dogfight - it had to rely on 'dive & climb' tactics. Against the Bf
109 that may not have been as profitable.

The P-38 was the first long range fighter the US produced, and had
comparable or longer range than the P-51 throughout the entire war.

Slightly less, I'll buy. Comparable or longer, no.

As a quick exercise, look up the first Allied fighter escort mission
to appear over Berlin...

Uh huh, and these were J models with 410 gal. internal. (205 per engine),
vs. the P-51B/D's (with aft tank) 289 gallons and lower drag.

Also look up the airfield locations, and
you'll note that a -38 had to fly quite a bit farther to fly
a round trip to Berlin than a -51 did.

snip

Depends on the unit. The 55th and 20th at Nuthampstead and King's Cliffe
were well west, but then so was the 4th at Debden and the 78th at Duxford,
whether flying P-47s or P-51s. The 479th was at Wattisham, forward of the
4th and 78th, as were the 364th at Honington and the 55th after it moved
to Wormingford. The 56th was just about the most forward fighter unit
when they were at Halesworth, but moved south and a bit west to Boxted in
1944.

Guy