Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: "Keith Willshaw"
Date: 7/17/2004 11:21 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:


"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: "Keith Willshaw"
Date: 7/16/2004 5:03 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:


"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944


We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly
turret.They
wouldn't take them. Big mistake.

The RAF operated at least one squadron of B-17's and a number of B-24's
Bomber command were NOT impressed by the type and operated them
mainly as EW aircraft jamming German communications

Keith


They were getting the **** shot out of them every night as they flew
planes
with no belly turrets. And hey used the planes with belly turrrets,
B-17's and
B-24's for electronic jammimg? Brilliant. Just brilliant.


It was since they Germans needed those electronic aids to
find them. Bottom line Art is that most hight bombers
never saw what killed them and no radar guided turrets
were then available.

The option then was fit a belly turret of doubtful utility
and to do so you have to remove the H2S Radar dome
you need to find the target.

Keith


How about take off a few pounds of bombs and do both?


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: ojunk (Steve Mellenthin)
Date: 7/17/2004 12:09 PM Pacific

That is where I was headed with the question. Thanks for the response. It
has
been my impression, perhaps erroneous, that the choice of the stream stragegy
was not the best decision at times when a loose gaggle and varying run-in
headings and altitudes between the 2-4 airgraft groupings would have been
more
effective. As I said, only an impression not backed up by much research or
fact.

Steve


That makes for lousy bomb patterns on the target.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: (WalterM140)
Date: 7/17/2004 1:12 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their
daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered
in height to minimise flak damage.



That might have been influenced by the fact that no other aircraft type could
fly in the tight formations used by the B-17.

I've heard that B-26s could also fly in very tight formations, but I
shouldn't
think as at high an altitude as the B-17.

B-17's could maintain formation at heights almost twice as high as the
altitude
at which Bomber Command usually operated, either by day or by night.

Walt

Walt


No trick maintaining formation at high altitudes. The trick is hitting the
target from high altitudes.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: ojunk (Steve Mellenthin)
Date: 7/17/2004 11:58 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

The B-26 of WW2 was the Martin Marauder, that of
Vietnam was the Douglas Invader which was originally
designated A-26 and was a later design largely replacing
the B-26.

I stand corrected. Lack of familiarity with the earlier B-26.


See my website for B-26's in combat from every angle.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ubject: Night bombers interception....
From: (WalterM140)
Date: 7/17/2004 1:48 PM Pacific Standard Time

The Americans were ultimately able to make daylight precision bombing pay
off,
although not the way they intended, that is true.

Walt

But the B-26's working from 10,000 feet exceeded their wildest dreams of
bombing accuracy


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 7/17/2004 1:23 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

Chris Mark wrote:

From: smartace11@

My origninal question was mainly
about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided
some
aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations

More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as
the
war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss
rate
was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The
B-25
loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
sorties.

Chris, could I know the source of your loss rate figures? I've had
difficulty in
tracking down MTO and early PTO data to compare the B-25 and B-26.

Guy


Remember that the B-25's were in the MTO. A less hazardous theatre.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

In article 40f8ceaa$0$1306$5a62ac22@per-qv1-newsreader-
01.iinet.net.au, says...

This sort of ignores the fact the RAF had been steadily building up the
bomber support system, and the loss rates had peaked in earlier times,
with new tactics helping to drop the losses back into the acceptable
category. For example late 1941, and mid 1943.

What sort of tactics were used?


It comes down to whatever Hastings defines as the Trenchard doctrine,
the unescorted bomber devastating the target had long been disproved
before March 1944.

What do these escort fighters do?



--
Logically we attempt to devise reasons for our irrational behaviour.

Observations of Bernard - No 62

The 'special navigation equipment' carried on Wilde Sau Bf 109s and FW
190s
consisted of a UV lamp and specially coated maps. The special nav
features of
the FuG 16Z were not utilized because they would have required a personal
controller for each "Boar", so instead they were following the
Reichjägerweile
(general information fighter broadcast - "The four-motor bombers are
approaching Kassel; all aircraft within range, strong raid approaching
Kassel",
that sort of thing. No naviads in the cockpits of the Wilde Sau airmen I
have
interviewed.

I believe these aircraft had artificial horizons, the FuG 16Z, ultraviolet
or Radium instrumentation dials.

The guys I have interviewed were in 10./JG 300 primarily, and they were the
only instrument-rated Wilde Sau; the difference is that the rest of the program
were basically day fighters, flying under exceptionally good night visibility.
As I said before, the only thing they said was different from the standard
daylight Bf 109s in use, was the small UV maplight. Its probable that you are
right and that other Staffels in the program had slightly better navaids, but
it was never intended to use "night-flyers" in the program, just standard day
fighter pilots. We had a long conversation with Oberst Herrmann on this exact
subject as part of our interview.

Protecting a fighter pilots night vision
was all important, the Luftwaffe even had a device to measure the speed of
recovery of eyes after being illuminated by light. The the the wild sow
hunted aircraft that had been caught in searchlights.

Yes, as they all said, "The eyes of a hunter is what was needed - no radar, no
controller, nothing was more important than excellent night vision." I heard
that from every NJG pilot we tracked down.

They did perform
ground controled interceptions that this was of course limited by the number
of Wurzburg radars and oppertators:

Not during the actual Wilde Sau program, but following its termination, they
did exactly this. Once the rest of JG 300 went back to exclusively daylight
combat, the sole remaining nightfighter Staffel in JG 300 (the massively
overstrength 10th Staffel at Jüterbog), THEN controllers were used to guide
single Bf 109s toward their targets. From what I have been told, this was not
done during the earlier period, when Wilde Sau's were primarily hunting
Viermots over citiesl

I believe mosquitoes were the main
target.

There were several Mosquito Jagd units, operating from September 44 to April
1945, including NJGr 10, 10./JG 300, two gruppes within NJG 11, etc., but these
were all after the Sept 44 demise of the Wilde Sau program.

The Me 109G6 U4N was equipped with Naxos to home onto bomber
emisions and to also home back to homebase. This type was little used
because it came at the end of wild sow tactics when the Luftwaffe had
managed to get its radars working again.

Also the reluctance of bomber crews to leave the H2S on, since all of them knew
by then that their suspicions concerning the Germans homing on it had already
been confirmed. A Mosquito was deliberately sent up as bait and it was
immediately tracked and attacked by a Naxos-equipped fighter. Later, an H2S
was operating on the -ground-, and a Luftwaffe fighter homed onto it. After
that incident, crews were quite judicious with its use, and the LW realized it
was not going to be an effective tracking tool.

I believe that great of squadrons
in training was between 20 to 75 percent. Finnish pilots trained by the
Germans in night fighting had only a 10 percent death rate simply because
they were far better trained to start with.

The "airman's death" that met most of the Wilde Sau airmen was caused by their
general inexperience, compounded by the rigors of night combat. It was
everything the day fighter nachwuchs faced, multiplied many times. Its a
wonder any of them made it through more than a flight or two.

The correct translation of "Wilde Sau" Wild Sow not Wild Boar. It alludes
to the wild sow's willingness to aggressively defend its young.

I know their songs Its difficult for me to call professional nightfighter
airmen "old lady pigs", so I used Boars - my mistake, but it was intentional.

Quite often when the German radar was working the link between the
ground
and night fighter was not.

They were being jammed and intruded upon for the last two years of the
war.
When the voice RT was 'stepped on', most NJ pilots had their bordfunkers
switch
to Morse, which was not as easier to operate in a dirty environment.

I meant to say it was easier to operate in that environment. Silly slip....

The introduction of the Bernhard-Bernhardine system
improve matters. This system was very jam proof it told a night fighter
exactly where was in that provided a secure telemetry to link the night
fighter with ground control by a ticker tape.

One cool part of that system is that it was the first on earth to provide
a
blind landing capability, when hooked to a three-axis autopilot. The
Interim
Nightfighter (Me 262 B-1a/U1) 'version 2' carried this setup, as did a
couple
captured Ju 88 nightfighters.

It is a fascinating system. I Would like to know the technology of it?

Look up the K-22 automatic pilot. If you send me a note off board, I will
forward some more info about it.


I have read that the Luftwaffe was heading towards fully automatic
interceptions, this system was perhaps only one step away.

Very close. Allies were always only a step behind, but by late 1944, early
1945, the night arm of the Luftwaffe was playing with amazing toys.

You have any information on the German EGON system which was similar to
"oboe". This was quite an advanced night bombing device on the Luftwaffe's
side but I am not sure where it was used if ever.

Sorry - its at the PRO in England. I focus on nightfighters over Europe, so I
didn't copy that file when I saw it.

Berndard was essentially an early datalink system intended for large
bombers
but it evolved into a fighter director.that was quite advanced for its
day.

Because the German Lichtenstein radar had large aerials aircraft were
slowed
down considerably this limited number of interceptions they were able to
achieve.

Crews often scored 4, 5, or even more Abschusse in a single sortie. Other
Experten crews managed up to 7. Faster speed does not help a radar
interception of a slow target in low/zero visibility.

The ideal situation occurred when the night fighter pilots managed to
infiltrate into the middle of the bomber stream, it was in this situation
that these multiple victories occurred. In the middle of the bomber stream
jamming and window was minimal.

Yes - like piranhas in a fishtank, no place for the bombers to turn...

I believe diversionary raids however
frequently lead the night fighters on a fruitless chase: they often were led
to the wrong city and then lacked the speed to defend the correct one in
time.

Exactly so. Other times, they sat in their cockpits on the ground watching a
distant city burn, as their flight controllers denied them permission to
launch, supposedly because the target was not yet known. For the pilots, it
was unbearable.

v/r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR

Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.

From: Guy Alcala g_alcala@junkpostoffic

Chris, could I know the source of your loss rate figures?

Part of a project I'm working on. I've been plugging away at a history of the
air war in the MTO off and on for some years and got curious about operations
in other theaters and how they compared.
Whether B-25 or B-26, losses track pretty closely with mission profile. For
example, the 319th, a B-26 group sent to the MTO, was trained in low-level
attacks. But after less than three months, losses were so severe that it was
withdrawn from combat and retrained in medium altitude bombardment, after which
losses plummeted. The 310th, a B-25 outfit, was somewhat similar, although it
kept a specialized low-level squadron for sea sweeps for a long time.
Whether B-25 or B-26, used as medium altitude bombers, losses were in the
roughly one per 150-200 sortie range and 3-4 times higher when they went down
on the deck.
B-26 losses were higher than B-25 losses in the MTO. I suspect the biggest
reason was better single-engine performance by the B-25.
B-26s also had much higher abort figures than the B-25, several times higher,
in fact. I suspect better reliability and easier maintenance of the B-25s
Wright engines, played some role in this, but more important likely was the
problems the B-26 had with its electrically operated props, so that a generator
failure would lead to a mission abort.
Conversely, in the Pacific, with the B-25 groups flying low-level missions, the
hydraulicly operated props caused losses. Typically, a plane would take a hit
in the oil cooler and start losing oil. Had the plane been at 10,000 feet,
that engine's prop would have been feathered and the engine shut down. Good
chance the old bird would make it home or to an emergency field. But on the
deck shutting down the engine was not an option. The plane had to maintain
power on both engines until it got clear of the target. Unfortunately, by that
time, oil pressure might well have dropped so low that the prop couldn't be
feathered.
The B-25 had good short field performance compared to the B-26. That made it
more desirable in the rougher theaters of operation. Turnaround time on the
B-25 was quicker as well, so that it was possible when needed, say as during
the Anzio invasion, for a single plane to fly multiple sorties in a single day.
Maximum lifting capability was around two-thirds greater (depending somewhat
on models compared) for the B-25 compared to the B-26, basically meaning that
B-25s could stagger into the air with seemingly impossible loads. Thus, in the
Pacific, you would have B-25s staging out of Palawan flying missions to bomb
shipping in Saigon, staying in the air 10 or 11 hours.
All the B-26 units in Italy were eventually phased out, as they had been in the
Pacific, so that eventually B-26s only operated in the ETO.


Chris Mark

WalterM140 wrote:

The Brits ignored American advice on how to use the B-17. Admittedly, the
B-17C was not ready for the big leagues.

Could that be why they ignored the advice?

Perhaps.

I'll suggest that there was -no way- given the British experience in WWI that
they were going to the heavy daylight bomber route in WWI. And I don't blame
them a bit for that.

Assuming that your second "WWI" above should read "WWII", I'd point out that the
Brits did go the "heavy daylight bomber route" in WW II, initially and later.
Losses on the early raids to Wilhelmshaven etc. by Wellingtons (both 'heavies',
and reasonably well-armed by the standards of the day) convinced them that
"self-defending bomber formations" weren't. They lacked a long-range escort
fighter at the time, and the BoB delayed any development of same, but they
continued to fly some daylight missions with heavies, within escort range by
Stirlings in 1941 and '42, beyond escort range by Lancs in 1942. The latter were
more in the nature of special missions, but the escorted Stirling missions were
relatively routine. The Stirling was ill-suited to daylight missions against
well-defended targets, but the RAF did give the missions a tryout. And after air
superiority had been won and escort could be provided, the heavies flew an
increasing percentage of daylight missions in 1944 and 1945.

Guy