Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944

Mike Williamson wrote in message ...
Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:

The P-38 was the least effective of the USAAF fighters over Germany,
thanks to a combination of factors. Once the USAAF could deploy
escorts in numbers to the required targets then yes the Luftwaffe day
fighter force was in trouble. The engineering to provide the escorts
in numbers took most of 1943. Then the long range escorts appeared.


I would like to point out that the "least effective fighter" may
not be taking an overall view.

Would it help is I mentioned the implied late 1943 and early
1944 and on heavy bomber escort missions? The P-38
had real problems with both tactics and equipment in this
environment.

Most of the problems with P-38
operations were the result of early doctrine and poor training
of aircrew in multi-engine operations. They suffered through
comparatively high loss rates in early operations where their
writ was not to pursue the enemy, but to provide close escort,
much as the Luftwaffe fighter force was in the Battle of Britain.
Being unable to pursue an enemy limits your kill potential, but
they DID cause a significant drop in bomber losses.

The P-38s had cockpit heating problems with rally degraded
pilot performance, they also had problems with high speed
dives, the pilots were very wary of them, and the Luftwaffe
liked diving away from combat. It made it hard to use the
dive tactic.

Also, unlike the Pacific the P-38 was not significantly faster
than the fighters it was engaging.

The trouble with training is a limit on early deployment of
effective fighters.

In 1945, P-38s which were still flying escort missions under
the later doctrine (and in equal or superior numbers to the
defenders) had about the same results as their
brethren in -47s and -51s.

As far as I am aware the use of P-38s on heavy bomber escort
missions in 1945 was very limited, what sort of information do
you have on the mission.

The P-38 also proved highly successful
with 9AF on low level interdiction sorties.

Agreed.

Adding in its ability
to be adapted to do almost anything (how many P-51s were ever
fitted with a Norden bombsight or pathfinder blind bombing radar
system?) and the P-38 was highly successful in Europe.

As a fighter bomber clearly it worked well. Unfortunately the
requirement is for a high altitude long range escort fighter
in 1943.

It's
reputation suffered from engine problems (which were absolutely
unknown in the MTO, PTO, or even Alaskan theaters, and were
quite possibly due to fuel problems which admittedly affected
the turbosupercharged Allisons more than the Merlins) and
from the inevitable process of being the aircraft tasked with
proving that your current doctrine isn't working the way it
should.

And that meant the ability to put together a reliable escort force
was significantly reduced.

A poster noted that the use of P-38s in the photo-recon
role (F-4 and F-5) limited the number of armed fighter types
available, but strategically a squadron of long range high
speed photographers (particularly in the Pacific) was almost
certainly more valuable than another squadron of fighters -
unless they are your escort for the day, of course.

The poster was me, pointing out the reality of allocating scarce
resources instead of the cardboard cut out "bad guys" approach
to the history.


Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

WalterM140 wrote:

snip

Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let
alone
1942.

Sure they were in hand, but they also caused a lot of delay, which is why the
a/c
was so slow in getting into mass production and why the numbers remained so
low
relatively late.

If someone had said, "hey, we are going to need long range escorts, and the
only aircraft even remotely capable is the P-38," then these problems might
have been overcome.

But the P-38 wasn't "the only aircraft even remotely capable" of long range escort,
especially not in 1943. Remember that the longest-ranged US escort fighter of the
war wasn't a P-38 or P-51. As I pointed out in another post, the P-38 prior to the
J had 300 gallons of internal fuel, and the P-47 prior to the D-25 had 305. Go
he

http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/More_P-38_Stuff.html

and here

http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/P-47.html

And click on the links for the "Flight Operation Instruction Chart" for both a/c
(it helps if you save them and then tile them side by side). This is for a P-38L
w/410 gallons internal instead of 300, vs. an early model P-47 w/o water injection,
but just compare the cruise ranges and gal/hr. fuel flows in say Cruise Condition
IV at 25,000 or 30,000 feet, with each a/c assumed to have 250 gallons of fuel for
cruise. You'll note that the range is identical at 700 statute miles, with the
P-38L cruising slightly faster (an earlier version without the extra internal fuel
would probably cruise a bit slower for max. range) but burning about 3-4 gal./hr.
more than the P-47. The need was for a longer-range fighter, and the P-38, P-47
and P-51 could all be modified to increase theirinternal/ and/or external fuel
carriage. And they all were.

The P-38's original perceived range advantage was due to its large external,
unpressurized 165 gallon ferry tanks, which was fine in the low/medium overwater
cruise conditions typical of the PTO and MTO, but unacceptable in the ETO owing to
the need to be above 20,000 feet relatively soon to avoid flak on crossing the
occupied Dutch/Belgian/French coasts. Otherwise the P-47's 200 gallon ferry tank
would have been reasonably acceptable in the ETO, and histories would be describing
the P-47 as a long-range fighter from the get go. Instead, the tank was carried
only half full so that all the fuel would be burned by the time the a/c reached
about 22,000 feet or so, above which no fuel could be drawn. Better than nothing,
but the a/c had to pay the drag for 200 gallons of fuel while only receiving the
benefit of 100 gallons. The same would have been the case with the P-38, and there
would have been no point in carrying more than a single 165 gallon tank for ETO
high altitude escort missions.


The P-38F, the first full-up combat-capable version was
available
for combat in August 1942; the first flight was made in January 1939, so
roughly
3.5 years elapsed. Even allowing for a fairly leisurely development prior to
the
war, the P-38's development was unusually prolonged, especially when compared
with
its single-engined stablemates. And then in 1943 the wing leading edges,
turbos,
radiators etc. all had to undergo a major redesign to fit leading edge tanks
in,
then they had to re-tool before they could produce them.

snip


3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production
was
still
ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same
problems
in
August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved
IOC
in the
ETO.

That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed
it.
But they did not.

Can't push what you don't know you need,

They could have known they were going to need a lot more P-38's. The kernal of
this whole issue is that Eaker and Hunter didn't divine that they needed a long
range escort, and remained blind to this fact after pretty much everyone else
had tumbled onto it.

Summarizing from Freeman, the first RFI for availability of drop tanks for fighters
was sent from the 8th back to Air Materiel Command on 3 October 1942, which
certainly implies that improved range was on someone's mind quite early. After it
became clear that the 8th would only be dealing with the P-47 for some time,
arrangements were made in January 1943 to ship Republic 200 gallon paper composite
ferry tanks to the UK. A few arrived in February and were evaluated by VIIITH AFSC
at Langford Lodge and by Cass Hough's 8th Air Technical Section at Bovingdon,
numerous operational deficiencies being noted, including poor aerodynamics, lack of
pressurization so fuel couldn't be drawn above 22,000 feet, the tank tended to
impact the a/c upon release, and if fuel was left in the tanks for more than a few
hours it started to leak. The tank also lacked the strength to be pressurized.
Changes were designed and tested to improve the jettison behavior.

Simultaneously 8th AFSC was requested to design a 100 gallon steel tank that could
be attached under a P-47, and which wouldn't suffer from the faults of the Republic
tank. Prototype testing was successful in March, and an order was placed to
deliver 1,000/month starting in June, but shortages of sheet steel in England
delayed production.

Meanwhile, In May 8th ATS had managed to modify the P-47's instrument vacuum system
to pressurize a drop tank, which meant that fuel could be drawn as high as 35,000
feet. Further improvements were made to the design as well as to the tank pipe
connections to ensure a clean break on jettison.

Production delays with the steel 100 gallon tank caused ATS to look at the British
108 gallon paper composite tank as a substitute. It had been examined earlier but
was insufficiently strong to be pressurized. Investigation found that it was
possible to strengthen the tank to withstand 17psi, and it was cleared for
production on 7 July 1943. The first was delivered on 12 July.

Meanwhile, because the need was so obvious, 8th FC decided to use the 200 gallon
Republic tank despite its deficiencies, as being the only tank available in any
quantity (1,150 on hand on 24 July 1943) at the time. It was only filled halfway
owing to the lack of pressurization, and they were dropped at 23,000 feet.

As an additional stopgap, in July 4,000 nominally 75 gallon (actually 84 gallon)
P-39 tanks which had been ordered from the US had also arrived. These provided
about as much radius increase as the half-full 200 gallon tanks owing to their far
lower drag, and could be pressurized. However, modifications had to be made to the
tanks and the P-47s to fit them to belly shackles. First mission use followed in
late August 1943, after the 56th FG's a/c had been modified.

At the beginning of September the first cylindrical 108 gallon steel tanks (the
production version of the ATS 100 gallon design) started delivery, and the same
month the strengthened 108 gal. cylindrical paper tanks began delivery, seeing
first use on the 27 September mission to Emden. A problem with these tanks was
that there was only 4 inches of ground clearance when mounted on the P-47's
centerline, making them unusable on rough airfields. A request for a flat 150
gallon steel tank to avoid this problem was made in August, with the tanks being
delivered starting in the following February.

Meanwhile more 75 gallon P-39 steel tanks had been arriving, but further deliveries
were cancelled in December, at which time 7,500 108 gallon tanks had been
delivered. The 75 gallon tanks were then restricted to P-51 units until used up.

In early 1944, P-47s had wing pylons added (a production change), which allowed a
pair of 108 gallon (or even 150 gallon) tanks to be carried underwing, although
some delay ensued owing to the need to improve sway braces. Only when this point
was reached was the P-47's combat radius limited by its internal fuel capacity.
The P-47D-25 with increased internal tankage and a bubble canopy was in production,
but deliveries would obviously take some time to make it to the operating
theaters. That was less of a problem than it might have been, as the P-51 and
P-38J which had been going through much the same range improvement process (but
without the big fuselage redesign also underway on the P-47D-25) were available in
increasing numbers to provide the TARCAP, while the P-47s provided ingress and
egress escort.

Ultimately the P-47N became the longest-ranged escort fighter of WW2, but it took a
near total wing redesign to do it, and the a/c just barely made it into the war in
the Pacific.

The point of all this is that the 8th was aware of the range issue and was doing
what it could to improve it with the a/c (P-47) and resources available to it, from
a very early stage. They were forced to utilize many stopgaps and work-arounds,
but with two possible exceptions, it seems to me that the 8th was doing everything
in their power to fix the problem (along with thousands of others). The first
exception was Eaker's placing improved fighter range 4th on his priority list (and
I've never seen what Nos. 1-3 were, so am not in a position to judge if the order
should have been changed). The second exception was the relatively long time
between the request for a 150 gallon flat tank and its availability. I assume this
was probably due to materiel shortages, but don't know. Alternatively the P-47
could have been given wet wing pylons earlier, but that's probably requires a
production mod (for wing strengthening at least), not a field retrofit.

and since they didn't have ANY P-38s
in
the late fall of 1942, winter, spring or summer of 1943, there was no
opportunity
for them to work out the bugs.

Now that doesn't seem fair, because a P-38 group WAS in England in December
1942. That was the 78th FG. According to Freeman in "The Mighty Eighth", most
of the aircraft and pilots were sent to North Africa.

The 78th arrived in Nov. - Dec., and the a/c and pilots were sent down to North
Africa in February. In the meantime, few bombing missions were flown owing to the
poor weather, and I'm not even sure if the 78th flew any combat missions at the
time - they may well have been training, or rectifying equipment deficiencies.

Also, at the start of 1943, the B-17 groups were dealing fairly well with the
German fighters. By the summer the Germans would modfy the equation in their
favor. Freeman does note that the P-38 was "a complicated aircraft to build and
production was unable to meet the demands both the demands of attrition and
equipment of new units."

Perhaps what it comes down to is this:

Even if Eaker and Hunter had been strongly seeking P-38's for escort, could
those demands have been met by say, "Blitz Week" in 1943, when the GAF really
started to hurt the Fortresses?

You're suggesting that production could not possibly have met the need. I'll
grant that possibility. It's a what-if, and we'll never know.

The 1st, 14th and 82nd FGs had all been sent
to the
MTO, while the 78th had been stripped of a/c to replace losses, and
transitioned to
the P-47. Sending all the P-38s to the MTO was a decision made well above
Eaker's
pay grade, and there wasnt anything he could do about it.

As I say above, the B-17's at the start of 1943 were seen to be coping with the
Luftwaffe defense. But it's also true that the 8th AF was the premier force in
the world as far as Arnold was concerned.

But not as far as the rest of the JCS, CCS and the respective governments were
concerned, and Arnold was going to go along with them.

If the 8th had been seen as needing long range escorts, surely they could have
been provided.

And they were, but only from about Nov. - Dec. 1943, as early as it was possible to
do so, and six months after the requirement was identified. And the same holds
true for every other theater, except that they got their long-range escorts even
later. The P-38F/G/H was a useful interim "long-range fighter" in those theaters
where altitude and climate performance wasn't the issue it was in the ETO, but it
wasn't inherently any longer-ranged than the contemporary P-47. As far as
long-range and combat radius goes, the best 1943 medium and high altitude fighter
was the early Corsair, with 361 gallons internal and a 150 gallon tank. But the
124 gallons in the wings was a bit dangerous (not self-sealing, but inerted), and
was deleted from later versions. Now there's a 'what if' for you, but it suffers
from similar production number limitations as the P-38 in that timeframe.

snip

Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing
Eaker of
remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that
case
by
June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the
Fall/Winter
of 1942/43.

They should have.

Why?

Because they got their asses handed to them.

Not prior to mid-43 they hadn't, so why should they be expected to be clairvoyant
in late '42?

snip

Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't
have
been increased.

And yet it wasn't, despite screams from the MTO and PTO asking for every
single
P-38 they could get.

Do you know that? Maybe they were straining every sinew to turn out P-38's.
I've gotten the impression that no particular stress was put on. They were
surely working as dilligently as anyone in war production, but did anyone say,
this is the most important fighter we have?

In the MTO and PTO, you bet they did. Which were the only theaters they were being
used in at the time.

The USAAF was sold on the
Thunderbolt.

And was doing everything possible to improve it, in the theaters it was being used
in.

Development of the Merlin Mustangs lagged also.

snip

Not that I've seen, once the performance of the Mk.X conversion was known. But it
took NA quite a while to a production design and then get it into production and
service, and the Mustang was the fastest US fighter development program in the
World War 2 period. I've seen no indication that there was unnecessary delay in
that period; the delay seems to have been in the Mustang I era, when the USAAF was
so dilatory in testing it.

Guy

"Eaker as late as October 1943 still believed the key was in the size of the
bomber formations... Eaker stuck to this belief while high-ranking officers
such as Chief of the Air Staff Barney Giles and commanmder of the VIII
Bomber
Command Fred Anderson had determined that escort was the key to victory."

-- "To Command the Sky, p. 112, by McFarland and Newton

"During June 1943 Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett visited
England to observe Eighth Air Force operations. He spent considerable time
inspecting the VIII Fighter Command and especially the problems of escort.
At
an Eighth Air Force comanders' mmeeting immediately after Lovett's visit,
Hunter told Eaker that he feared Lovett would insist on the use of P-38's
for
escort. Hunter identified the P-38 as a "wonderful ship," but preferrred to
give the P-47 a "complete trial." In doing so Hunter reavealed his
misunderstanding of the basic issue confronting the Eighth Ar Force in the
summer and fall of 1943. The bombers needed escorts with range, bot
superior
fighters. The P-47 was a better dogfighter, but it did not have the legs to
fly
long escort missions."

ibid, p. 114

I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or
that
he communicated such with Lovett.

So why were P-47s fitted with drop tanks and used as escorts during
Eaker's period of command?

You seem to have just made it up.

Translation Walter is as bad at character assassination as history.


You lied. You got caught. Again.

You wrote:

Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
War for Air to push for a long range fighter.


Eaker never said anything during the summer of 1943 to Asst. SecWar Lovett such
as you said he did.

Bye, Sinclair.

Walt

Subject: Night bombers interception....
From: Presidente Alcazar
Date: 7/20/2004 1:20 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

On Mon, 19 Jul 2004 13:24:16 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:

Trouble is a fight between an aircraft armed with 30mm cannon and
one armed with a single 0.5 will mostly favour the fighter.
The most successful defensive tactic was to perform an
immediate evasion by flying a violent corkscrew manoeuvre

Indeed, and I'm skeptical of the utility of a hand-mounted machine-gun
in a ventral window with restricted vision, manned by a frozen
air-gunner who has to endure hour after hour of vigilance on multimple
missions before facing the slit-second reactions required to deal with
a real assailant. Plenty of bombers were lost to stern attacks, and
even attacks from beneath passed through the visible arc of the rear
turret before they closed to engage, which should indicate the real
problems encountered relying on unassistated visual observation alone
for bomber defence.

Gavin Bailey



True. The fighter had the advantage. But we got a lot of those little *******s
anyway. When you fight a war you take your losses and keep fighting no matter
what..


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Subject: Night bombers interception....
From: "Nele VII" AP
Date: 7/19/2004 9:48 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:



ArtKramr wrote in message ...
ubject: Night bombers interception....
From: "Keith Willshaw"

hat single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of
the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not
uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to
return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C
as being unsuitable for combat use.


Why do you think we gave them to the Brits? Same reason we gave P-39's to
the
Russians.

Pokrishkin was grateful for P-39 achieving "only" 59 victories! So much for
an "Iron Dog" in the hands of an ace )))))



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer


How a plane performs in the hands of an ace is meningless. There were too few
of them to matter. Its flat spin problems killed too many average pilots to be
acceptable to us. We had better planes so why suffer a dog? THe Russians were
not so fortunate


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Subject: Night bombers interception....
From: "Nele VII" AP
Date: 7/19/2004 9:48 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:



ArtKramr wrote in message
...
ubject: Night bombers interception....
From: "Keith Willshaw"

hat single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of
the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not
uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to
return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C
as being unsuitable for combat use.


Why do you think we gave them to the Brits? Same reason we gave P-39's
to
the
Russians.

Pokrishkin was grateful for P-39 achieving "only" 59 victories! So much
for
an "Iron Dog" in the hands of an ace )))))



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer


How a plane performs in the hands of an ace is meningless. There were too
few
of them to matter. Its flat spin problems killed too many average pilots
to be
acceptable to us. We had better planes so why suffer a dog? THe Russians
were
not so fortunate


The USAAF operated over 2000 P-39's at peak in early 1944.
Most of these were in the PTO and MTO as the type suffered
heavy losses against the Luftwaffe over France and was replaced by the
Spitfire V in the 31st Fighter Group based in southern England.

They were heavily used in the Med however and post war analysis
showed that they had the lowest loss rate per sortie of any USAAF
fighter used in the European theatre.

Keith

Subject: Night bombers interception....
From: "Keith Willshaw"
Date: 7/20/2004 7:09 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:


"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Subject: Night bombers interception....
From: "Nele VII" AP
Date: 7/19/2004 9:48 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:



ArtKramr wrote in message
...
ubject: Night bombers interception....
From: "Keith Willshaw"

hat single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of
the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not
uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to
return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C
as being unsuitable for combat use.


Why do you think we gave them to the Brits? Same reason we gave P-39's
to
the
Russians.

Pokrishkin was grateful for P-39 achieving "only" 59 victories! So much
for
an "Iron Dog" in the hands of an ace )))))



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer


How a plane performs in the hands of an ace is meningless. There were too
few
of them to matter. Its flat spin problems killed too many average pilots
to be
acceptable to us. We had better planes so why suffer a dog? THe Russians
were
not so fortunate


The USAAF operated over 2000 P-39's at peak in early 1944.
Most of these were in the PTO and MTO as the type suffered
heavy losses against the Luftwaffe over France and was replaced by the
Spitfire V in the 31st Fighter Group based in southern England.

They were heavily used in the Med however and post war analysis
showed that they had the lowest loss rate per sortie of any USAAF
fighter used in the European theatre.

Keith



The Med and the ETO were two world's apart. No comparison on any basis.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
Date: 7/20/2004 2:24 AM Pacific Standard Time

As far as I am aware the use of P-38s on heavy bomber escort
missions in 1945 was very limited, what sort of information do
you have on the mission.

The only P-38's I ever saw in the ETO carried cameras for recon work. No
guns.They used to come in at our field at Florennes for gas.on thier way home.
Besides for the cost and labor to make a P-38 you could darn near make two
P-51's, so why bother?


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

These rockets
were very effective and often took out 3 or 4 bombers and broke up the
formation.

Often? That doesn't jibe with German claims - multiple claims from a single
rocket salvo were VERY rare, as most of the pilots using them misjudged the
release point for the often-erratic WGr 21s.

Damage to more than one bomber was common; but destroying more than one was
not. I haven't met a LW pilot that felt the rockets were a better choice than
cannons - and I have heard more than one of them curse about those "damned
rockets" that made their aircraft sitting ducks for escorts.

v/r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR

Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.

As far as I am aware the use of P-38s on heavy bomber escort
missions in 1945 was very limited, what sort of information do
you have on the mission.

They were certainly being used. An example: The 1st fighter group conducted 12
heavy bomber escort missions in April, 1945. That's down from 18 heavy bomber
escort missions in April, 1944. But in that month the group conducted only one
other operation--a strafing mission. However, in April, 1945, the 1st, besides
the 12 bomber escort missions, conducted 29 photo escort missions, 14
dive-bombing missions, 10 armed reconnaissance missions, and two fighters
sweeps. Busy schedule.


Chris Mark