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Showstoppers (long, but interesting questions raised)



 
 
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Old April 21st 04, 05:09 AM
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Default Showstoppers (long, but interesting questions raised)

Showstoppers:
Nine reasons why we never sent our Special Operations Forces after al
Qaeda before 9/11.

by Richard H. Shultz Jr.

SINCE 9/11, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has repeatedly declared
that the United States is in a new kind of war, one requiring new
military forces to hunt down and capture or kill terrorists. In fact,
for some years, the Department of Defense has gone to the trouble of
selecting and training an array of Special Operations Forces, whose
forte is precisely this. One president after another has invested
resources to hone lethal "special mission units" for offensive--that is,
preemptive--counterterrorism strikes, with the result that these units
are the best of their kind in the world. While their activities are
highly classified, two of them--the Army's Delta Force and the Navy's
SEAL Team 6--have become the stuff of novels and movies.

Prior to 9/11, these units were never used even once to hunt down
terrorists who had taken American lives. Putting the units to their
intended use proved impossible--even after al Qaeda bombed the World
Trade Center in 1993, bombed two American embassies in East Africa in
1998, and nearly sank the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000. As a result of
these and other attacks, operations were planned to capture or kill the
ultimate perpetrators, Osama bin Laden and his top lieutenants, but each
time the missions were blocked. A plethora of self-imposed
constraints--I call them showstoppers--kept the counterterrorism units
on the shelf.

I first began to learn of this in the summer of 2001, after George W.
Bush's election brought a changing of the guard to the Department of
Defense. Joining the new team as principal deputy assistant secretary of
defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict was Bob
Andrews, an old hand at the black arts of unconventional warfare. During
Vietnam, Andrews had served in a top-secret Special Forces outfit
codenamed the Studies and Observations Group that had carried out
America's largest and most complex covert paramilitary operation in the
Cold War. Afterwards, Andrews had joined the CIA, then moved to Congress
as a staffer, then to the defense industry.

I'd first met him while I was writing a book about the secret war
against Hanoi, and we hit it off. He returned to the Pentagon with the
new administration, and in June 2001 he called and asked me to be his
consultant. I agreed, and subsequently proposed looking into
counterterrorism policy. Specifically, I wondered why had we created
these superbly trained Special Operations Forces to fight terrorists,
but had never used them for their primary mission. What had kept them
out of action?

Andrews was intrigued and asked me to prepare a proposal. I was putting
the finishing touches on it on the morning of September 11, when al
Qaeda struck. With that blow, the issue of America's offensive
counterterrorist capabilities was thrust to center stage.

By early November, I had the go-ahead for the study. Our question had
acquired urgency: Why, even as al Qaeda attacked and killed Americans at
home and abroad, were our elite counterterrorism units not used to hit
back and prevent further attacks? That was, after all, their very
purpose, laid out in the official document "Special Operations in Peace
and War" (1996). To find the answer, I interviewed civilian and military
officials, serving and retired, at the center of U.S. counterterrorism
policy and operational planning in the late 1980s and 1990s.

They included senior members of the National Security Council's
Counterterrorism and Security Group, the interagency focal point for
counterterrorism policy. In the Pentagon, I interviewed the top leaders
of the offices with counterterrorism responsibility, as well as
second-tier professionals, and their military counterparts in the Joint
Staff. Finally, the U.S. Special Operations Command, headquartered in
Tampa, Florida, is responsible for planning and carrying out
counterterrorism strikes, and I interviewed senior commanders who served
there during the 1990s.

Some were willing to speak on the record. Others requested anonymity,
which I honored, in order to put before the top leadership of the
Pentagon the detailed report from which this article is drawn. My
findings were conveyed to the highest levels of the Department of
Defense in January 2003.

Among those interviewed, few were in a better position to illuminate the
conundrum than General Pete Schoomaker. An original member of the Delta
Force, he had commanded the Delta Force in 1991-92, then led the Special
Operations Command in the late 1990s. "Counterterrorism, by Defense
Department definition, is offensive," Schoomaker told me during a
discussion we had over two days in the summer of 2002. "But Special
Operations was never given the mission. It was very, very frustrating.
It was like having a brand-new Ferrari in the garage, and nobody wants
to race it because you might dent the fender."

AS TERRORIST ATTACKS escalated in the 1990s, White House rhetoric
intensified. President Clinton met each successive outrage with a vow to
punish the perpetrators. After the Cole bombing in 2000, for example, he
pledged to "find out who is responsible and hold them accountable." And
to prove he was serious, he issued an increasingly tough series of
Presidential Decision Directives. The United States would "deter and
preempt...individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such acts,"
said Directive 39, in June 1995. Offensive measures would be used
against foreign terrorists posing a threat to America, said Directive
62, in May 1998. Joint Staff contingency plans were revised to provide
for offensive and preemptive options. And after al Qaeda's bombings of
the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Clinton signed a
secret "finding" authorizing lethal covert operations against bin Laden.

These initiatives led to the planning of several operations. Their
details rest in the classified records of the National Security
Council's Counterterrorism and Security Group. Its former coordinator,
Dick Clarke, described them as providing the White House with "more
aggressive options," to be carried out by Special Operations Forces (or
SOF, a category that includes the Green Berets, the Rangers,
psychological operations, civilian affairs, the SEALS, special
helicopter units, and special mission units like the Delta Force and
SEAL Team 6).

Several plans have been identified in newspaper accounts since 9/11. For
example, "snatch operations" in Afghanistan were planned to seize bin
Laden and his senior lieutenants. After the 1998 embassy bombings,
options for killing bin Laden were entertained, including a gunship
assault on his compound in Afghanistan.

SOF assaults on al Qaeda's Afghan training camps were also planned. An
official very close to Clinton said that the president believed the
image of American commandos jumping out of helicopters and killing
terrorists would send a strong message. He "saw these camps as conveyor
belts pushing radical Islamists through," the official said, "that
either went into the war against the Northern Alliance [an Afghan force
fighting the Taliban in northern Afghanistan] or became sleeper cells in
Germany, Spain, Britain, Italy, and here. We wanted to close these camps
down. We had to make it unattractive to go to these camps. And blowing
them up, by God, would make them unattractive."

And preemptive strikes against al Qaeda cells outside Afghanistan were
planned, in North Africa and the Arabian Gulf. Then in May 1999, the
White House decided to press the Taliban to end its support of bin
Laden. The Counterterrorism and Security Group recommended supporting
the Northern Alliance.

These examples, among others, depict an increasingly aggressive, lethal,
and preemptive counterterrorist policy. But not one of these
operations--all authorized by President Clinton--was ever executed.
General Schoomaker's explanation is devastating. "The presidential
directives that were issued," he said, "and the subsequent findings and
authorities, in my view, were done to check off boxes. The president
signed things that everybody involved knew full well were never going to
happen. You're checking off boxes, and have all this activity going on,
but the fact is that there's very low probability of it ever coming to
fruition. . . ." And he added: "The military, by the way, didn't want to
touch it. There was great reluctance in the Pentagon."

FROM MY INTERVIEWS, I distilled nine mutually reinforcing,
self-imposed constraints that kept the special mission units sidelined,
even as al Qaeda struck at American targets around the globe and
trumpeted its intention to do more of the same. These showstoppers
formed an impenetrable phalanx ensuring that all high-level policy
discussions, tough new presidential directives, revised contingency
plans, and actual dress rehearsals for missions would come to nothing.

1. Terrorism as Crime

During the second half of the 1980s, terrorism came to be defined by the
U.S. government as a crime, and terrorists as criminals to be
prosecuted. The Reagan administration, which in its first term said that
it would meet terrorism with "swift and effective retribution," ended
its second term, in the political and legal aftermath of Iran-contra, by
adopting a counterterrorism policy that was the antithesis of that.

"Patterns of Global Terrorism," a report issued by the State Department
every year since 1989, sets forth guidance about responding to
terrorism. Year after year prior to 9/11, a key passage said it was U.S.
policy to "treat terrorists as criminals, pursue them aggressively, and
apply the rule of law." Even now, when President Bush has defined the
situation as a war on terrorism, "Patterns of Global Terrorism" says
U.S. policy is to "bring terrorists to justice for their crimes."

Criminalization had a profound impact on the Pentagon, said General
Schoomaker. It came to see terrorism as "not up to the standard of our
definition of war, and therefore not worthy of our attention." In other
words, militaries fight other militaries. "And because it's not war," he
added, "and we don't act like we're at war, many of the Defense
Department's tools are off the table." The Pentagon's senior leadership
made little if any effort to argue against designating terrorism as a
crime, Schoomaker added derisively.

"If you declare terrorism a criminal activity, you take from Defense any
statutory authority to be the leader in responding," a long-serving
department official agreed. Whenever the White House proposed using SOF
against terrorists, it found itself facing "a band of lawyers at Justice
defending their turf." They would assert, said this old hand at special
operations, that the Pentagon lacked authority to use force--and
"lawyers in the Defense Department would concur. They argued that we
have no statutory authority because this is essentially a criminal matter."

In effect, the central tool for combating terrorism would not be
military force. Extradition was the instrument of choice. This reduced
the Pentagon's role to providing transportation for the Justice Department.

To be sure, Justice had its successes. With the help of the Pakistani
government, it brought back Mir Amal Kansi, the gunman who opened fire
outside CIA headquarters in 1993; with the help of the governments of
the Philippines and Kenya, it brought several of the terrorists
responsible for the first World Trade Center bombing and the attacks on
the U.S. embassies in East Africa back to stand trial. But those were
lesser al Qaeda operatives. Against the group's organizational
infrastructure and leadership, there were no such successes. Law
enforcement had neither the access nor the capability to go after those
targets.

2. Not a Clear and Present Danger or War

Since terrorism had been classified as crime, few Pentagon officials
were willing to call it a clear and present danger to the United
States--much less grounds for war. Any attempt to describe terrorism in
those terms ran into a stone wall.

For instance, on June 25, 1996, a truck bomb killed 19 Americans and
wounded another 250 at the U.S. military's Khobar Towers housing
facility near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. In the aftermath, a tough-minded
subordinate of Allen Holmes, then the assistant secretary of defense for
special operations and low-intensity conflict, asserted that the Defense
Department needed a more aggressive counterterrorism policy to attack
those responsible for these increasingly lethal terrorist attacks.
Holmes told him, "Write it down, and we'll push it."

The aide laid out a strategy that pulled no punches. Khobar Towers, the
World Trade Center bombing, and other attacks were acts of war, he
wrote, and should be treated as such. He called for "retaliatory and
preemptive military strikes against the terrorist leadership and
infrastructure responsible, and even against states assisting them." In
his strategy, he assigned a central role for this to SOF.

Holmes ran the proposal up the flagpole. A meeting to review it was held
in the office of the undersecretary of defense for policy. As the
hard-charging aide explained his recommendations, a senior policy
official blurted out: "Are you out of your mind? You're telling me that
our Middle East policy is not important and that it's more important to
go clean out terrorists? Don't you understand what's going on in terms
of our Middle East policy? You're talking about going after terrorists
backed by Iran? You just don't understand." And that was that.

In the wake of Khobar Towers, Secretary of Defense William Perry asked
retired General Wayne Downing to head a task force to assess what had
happened. Formerly the head of the U.S. Special Operations Command,
Downing had been in counterterrorism a long time. He was more than
willing to pull the trigger and cajole policymakers into giving him the
authority to do so. Interviewed in 2002 during a year-long stint as
President Bush's deputy national security adviser for combating
terrorism, he reflected on his report: "I emphasized that people are at
war with us, and using terrorism as an asymmetrical weapon with which to
attack us because they can't in a direct or conventional manner." It was
war, he told the department's senior leadership; they needed to wake up
to that fact. But his plea fell on deaf ears. He lamented, "No one
wanted to address terrorism as war."

Even after bin Laden declared war on America in a 1998 fatwa, and bombed
U.S. embassies to show his followers that he meant business in exhorting
them to "abide by Allah's order by killing Americans . . . anywhere,
anytime, and wherever possible," the Pentagon still resisted calling
terrorism war. It wasn't alone. A CIA assessment of the fatwa
acknowledged that if a government had issued such a decree, one would
have had to consider it a declaration of war, but in al Qaeda's case it
was only propaganda.

During the late 1990s, the State Department coordinator for
counterterrorism was Mike Sheehan. A retired Special Forces officer who
had learned unconventional warfare in El Salvador in the late 1980s, he
was considered one of the most hawkish Clinton officials, pushing for
the use of force against the Taliban and al Qaeda. His mantra was "drain
the Afghan swamp of terrorists."

I visited Sheehan at his office at the U.N. building in New York, where
he had become assistant secretary-general for peacekeeping. He recounted
how aggressive counterterrorism proposals were received in the Defense
Department: "The Pentagon wanted to fight and win the nation's wars, as
Colin Powell used to say. But those were wars against the armies of
other nations--not against diffuse transnational terrorist threats. So
terrorism was seen as a distraction that was the CIA's job, even though
DOD personnel were being hit by terrorists. The Pentagon way to treat
terrorism against Pentagon assets abroad was to cast it as a force
protection issue."

"Force protection" is Pentagon lingo for stronger barriers to shield
troops from Khobar Towers-type attacks. Even the attack on the USS Cole
did not change that outlook. As far as causing anyone to consider
offensive measures against those responsible, "the Cole lasted only for
a week, two weeks," Sheehan lamented. "It took a 757 crashing into the
Pentagon for them to get it." Shaking his head, he added: "The near
sinking of a billion-dollar warship was not enough. Folding up a
barracks full of their troops in Saudi Arabia was not enough. Folding up
two American embassies was not enough."

Of course, Washington continued to try to arrest those who had carried
out these acts. But the places where terrorists trained and
planned--Afghanistan, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen--remained off-limits. Those
were not areas where the Defense Department intended to fight. A very
senior SOF officer who had served on the Joint Staff in the 1990s told
me that more than once he heard terrorist strikes characterized as "a
small price to pay for being a superpower."

3. The Somalia Syndrome

In the first year of his presidency, Bill Clinton suffered a foreign
policy debacle. The "Fire Fight from Hell," Newsweek called it. The Los
Angeles Times described it as culminating in "dozens of cheering,
dancing Somalis dragging the body of a U.S. soldier through the city's
streets." Those reports followed the 16-hour shootout portrayed in the
movie "Black Hawk Down," pitting SOF units against Somali warriors in
the urban jungle of Mogadishu on October 3-4, 1993. The American
objective had been capturing Mohammed Aidid, a warlord who was
interfering with the U.N.'s humanitarian mission. The new administration
had expected a quick surgical operation.

The failure caused disquieting questions and bad memories. How could
this happen? What had gone wrong? Some Clinton officials recalled that
the last time the Democrats had held the White House, similar forces had
failed in their attempt to rescue American hostages in Tehran ("Desert
One"), a catastrophe instrumental in President Carter's 1980 reelection
defeat.

Some senior generals had expressed doubts about the Mogadishu operation,
yet as it had morphed from a peacekeeping mission into a manhunt for
Aidid, the new national security team had failed to grasp the
implications. The Mogadishu disaster spooked the Clinton administration
as well as the brass, and confirmed the Joint Chiefs in the view that
SOF should never be entrusted with independent operations.

After Mogadishu, one Pentagon officer explained, there was "reluctance
to even discuss pro-active measures associated with countering the
terrorist threat through SOF operations. The Joint Staff was very happy
for the administration to take a law enforcement view. They didn't want
to put special ops troops on the ground. They hadn't wanted to go into
Somalia to begin with. The Joint Staff was the biggest foot-dragger on
all of this counterterrorism business."

Another officer added that Somalia heightened a wariness, in some cases
outright disdain, for SOF in the senior ranks. On the Joint Staff, the
generals ranged from those who "did not have a great deal of respect"
for SOF, to those who actually "hated what it represented, . . . hated
the independent thought process, . . . hated the fact that the SOF guys
on the Joint Staff would challenge things, would question things."

During Desert Storm, for example, General Norman Schwarzkopf was
reluctant to include SOF in his war plan. He did so only grudgingly, and
kept SOF on a short leash, wrote the commander of all Special Operations
Forces at the time, General Carl Stiner, in his book "Shadow Warriors."
But SOF performed well in Desert Storm, and afterwards Schwarzkopf
acknowledged their accomplishments. In 1993, Mogadishu turned back the
clock.

4. No Legal Authority

August 1998 was a watershed for the White House. The embassy bombings
led to the reexamination of preemptive military options. President
Clinton proposed using elite SOF counterterrorism units to attack bin
Laden, his lieutenants, and al Qaeda's infrastructure.

Also considered was unconventional warfare, a core SOF mission very
different from counterterrorism. The Special Operations Command's
"Special Operations in Peace and War" defines unconventional warfare as
"military and paramilitary operations conducted by indigenous or
surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, and directed by
an external source." For the White House, this meant assisting movements
like the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.

Both the Special Operations Command's counterterrorism units and Special
Forces training for and executing unconventional warfare operate
clandestinely. That is what their doctrine specifies. But because such
operations are secret, the question arose in the 1990s whether the
department had the legal authority to execute them.

This may seem baffling. If these missions are specified in the military
doctrine of the Special Operations Command, and actual units train for
them, isn't it obvious that the Department of Defense must have the
authority to execute them? Perhaps, yet many in government emphatically
deny it.

A gap exists, they believe, between DOD's capability for clandestine
operations and its authority under the United States Code. In the 1990s,
some Pentagon lawyers and some in the intelligence community argued that
Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which covers the armed forces, did not give
Defense the legal authority for such missions, while Title 50, which
spells out the legal strictures for covert operations, gave this power
exclusively to the CIA.

Title 50 defines covert action as "an activity of the United States
Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly." Covert action
and deniability go hand in hand. If a story about a covert action hits
the newspapers, the president must be able to avow that the United
States is not mixed up in it.

But is it the case that only the CIA has this authority? Title 50,
Chapter 15, Section 413b of the U.S. Code stipulates: "The President may
not authorize the conduct of a covert action by departments, agencies,
or entities of the United States Government unless the President
determines such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign
policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national
security of the United States, which determination shall be set forth in
a finding that shall meet each of the following conditions." The key
condition is: "Each finding shall specify each department, agency, or
entity of the United States Government authorized to fund or otherwise
participate in any significant way in such action." Title 50 leaves the
choice of agency to the president and does not exclude the Pentagon.

At the heart of this debate, said a former senior Defense official, was
"institutional culture and affiliation." The department took the
position that it lacked the authority because it did not want the
authority--or the mission. He told me, "All of its instincts push it in
that direction."

One senior member of the National Security Council's counterterrorism
group recalled encountering this attitude during deliberations over
counterterrorism operations and clandestine support for the Northern
Alliance. To the Joint Staff, neither was "in their minds a military
mission. It was a covert action. The uniformed military was adamant that
they would not do covert action." And, he added, if you presented them
with "a legal opinion that says 'You're wrong,' then they would say,
'Well, we're not going to do it anyway. It's a matter of policy that we
don't.'"

The authority argument was a "cop-out," said a retired officer who
served in the Pentagon from 1994 to 2000. Sure enough, the Defense
Department could have bypassed Title 50 by employing SOF on a
clandestine basis. While both clandestine and covert missions are
secret, only the latter require that the U.S. role not be "acknowledged
publicly," which is Title 50's key requirement. Using SOF to preempt
terrorists or support resistance movements clandestinely in peacetime is
within the scope of Title 10, as long as the U.S. government does not
deny involvement when the mission is over.

But this interpretation of Title 10 was considered beyond the pale in
the 1990s. The Pentagon did not want the authority to strike terrorists
secretly or to employ Special Forces against states that aided and
sheltered them.

5. Risk Aversion

The mainstream military often dismisses special operations as too risky.
To employ SOF requires open-minded political and military leadership
willing to balance risks against potential gains. Supple judgment was in
short supply in the Pentagon in the 1990s.

Walter Slocombe served as Clinton's undersecretary of defense for
policy, and took part in all counterterrorism policy discussions in the
Department of Defense. "We certainly looked at lots of options which
involved the possible use of SOF," he stressed. But in the end they were
never selected because they seemed too hard to pull off, he
acknowledged. Options that put people on the ground to go after bin
Laden were "much too hard." It was much easier and much less risky to
fire off cruise missiles.

During Clinton's first term, someone would always find something wrong
with a proposed operation, lamented General Downing. The attitude was:
"Don't let these SOF guys go through the door because they're dangerous.
.. . . They are going to do something to embarrass the country." Downing
recalls that during his years in command, he "sat through the
preparation of maybe 20 operations where we had targeted people who had
killed Americans. Terrorists who had done bad things to this country,
and needed either to be killed or apprehended and brought back here, and
we couldn't pull the trigger." It was too risky for the Pentagon's taste.

The other side of the risk-aversion coin is policymakers' demand for
fail-safe options. A general who served in the Special Operations
Command in the 1990s encountered "tremendous pressure to do something,"
he said, but at the same time, the requirement was for "perfect
operations, no casualties, no failure." There were some "great
opportunities" to strike at al Qaeda, "but you couldn't take any risk in
doing so. You couldn't have a POW, you couldn't lose a man. You couldn't
have anybody hurt." It was Catch-22. There were frequent "spin-ups" for
SOF missions, but "in the end, the senior political and military
leadership wouldn't let you go do it."

In the mid-1990s, and again at the end of the decade, the Clinton
administration flirted with supporting the Iraqi resistance and then the
Northern Alliance. An officer who served on the Joint Staff recounted
how the senior military leadership put the kibosh on these potentially
bold moves.

The CIA ran the Iraqi operation. But its unconventional warfare
capabilities were paltry, and it turned to the military for help,
requesting that SOF personnel be seconded to bolster the effort. The
Joint Staff and its chairman wanted nothing to do with it, he said. "The
guidance I got from the chairman's director of operations was that we
weren't going to support this, and do everything you can to stall or
keep it in the planning mode, don't let it get to the point where we're
briefing this at the National Security Council or on the Hill."

Later, the National Security Council's counterterrorism group proposed
supporting the Northern Alliance. They pushed the proposal up to the
"principals" level. But attached to it was a "non-concurrence" by the
Joint Staff, opposing it as too complex and risky. That was the kiss of
death.

None of this was new to the Joint Staff officer, who had been in special
operations for a long time. "Risk aversion emerges as senior officers
move into higher positions," he explained. "It's a very common thing for
these guys to become non-risk takers. They get caught up in interagency
politics and the bureaucratic process, and get risk-averse."

A member of the counterterrorism group in the late 1990s noted that
General Hugh Shelton, a former commander of the Special Operations
Command, considered the use of SOF for counterterrorism less than anyone
when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The official said Shelton
directed the Joint Staff "not to plan certain operations, I'm sure
you've heard this from others." In fact, I had. "It got to the point,"
he said, where "the uniforms had become the suits, they were more the
bureaucrats than the civilians."

6. Pariah Cowboys

When events finally impelled the Clinton administration to take a hard
look at offensive operations, the push to pursue them came from the
civilians of the National Security Council's Counterterrorism and
Security Group.

One of the hardest of the hard-liners was the group's chief, Dick
Clarke. For nearly a decade, this career civil servant began and ended
his work day with the burgeoning terrorist threat to America. He knew in
detail the danger the bin Ladens of the world posed, and it worried him
greatly. Defensive measures were just not enough. "Clarke's philosophy
was to go get the terrorists," one former senior Pentagon special
operations official told me, "Go get them anywhere you can."

Asked if that meant using SOF, he replied: "Oh yeah. In fact, many of
the options were with special mission units." But "Dick Clarke was
attempting to take on a Pentagon hierarchy that wasn't of the same
philosophical mindset."

Clarke was not alone. Mike Sheehan also pushed for assisting the
Northern Alliance and striking al Qaeda with SOF. Such measures worried
the senior brass, who proceeded to weaken those officials by treating
them as pariahs. That meant portraying them as cowboys, who proposed
reckless military operations that would get American soldiers killed.

Sheehan explained: Suppose one civilian starts beating the drum for
special operations. The establishment "systematically starts to
undermine you. They would say, 'He's a rogue, he's uncooperative, he's
out of control, he's stupid, he makes bad choices.' It's very damaging.
.. . . You get to the point where you don't even raise issues like that.
If someone did, like me or Clarke, we were labeled cowboys, way outside
our area of competence."

Several officials who served on the Joint Staff and in the Pentagon's
special operations office remembered the senior brass characterizing
Clarke in such terms. "Anything Dick Clarke suggested, the Joint Staff
was going to be negative about," said one. Some generals had been
vitriolic, calling Clarke "a madman, out of control, power hungry,
wanted to be a hero, all that kind of stuff." In fact, one of these
former officials emphasized, "when we would carry back from the
counterterrorism group one of those SOF counterterrorism proposals, our
job was to figure out not how to execute it, but how we were going to
say no."

By turning Clarke into a pariah, the Pentagon brass discredited
precisely the options that might have spared us the tragedy of September
11, 2001. And when Clarke fought back at being branded "wild" and
"irresponsible," they added "abrasive" and "intolerant" to the counts
against him.

7. Intimidation of Civilians

Another way the brass stymied hard-line proposals from civilian
policymakers was by highlighting their own military credentials and
others' lack of them. One former defense official recounted a briefing
on counterterrorism options given the secretary of defense by senior
civilians and military officers. "The civilian, a political appointee
with no military experience, says, 'As your policy adviser, let me tell
you what you need to do militarily in this situation.' The chairman sits
there, calmly listening. Then it's his turn. He begins by framing his
sophisticated PowerPoint briefing in terms of the 'experience factor,'
his own judgment, and those of four-star associates. The 'experience
factor' infuses the presentation. Implicitly, it raises a question
intended to discredit the civilian: 'What makes you qualified? What
makes you think that your opinion is more important than mine when you
don't have the experience I have?' 'Mr. Secretary,' concludes the
chairman, 'this is my best military advice.'" In such situations, the
official said, civilians were often dissuaded from taking on the generals.

Wayne Downing, the former special operations commander, had plenty of
experience providing such briefings. "Occasionally you would get a
civilian champion," he said, who would speak up enthusiastically in
favor of the mission being presented. "And then the chairman or the vice
chairman would say, 'I don't think this is a good idea. Our best
military judgment is that you not do this.' That champion is not going
any further."

During the 1990s, the "best military advice," when it came to
counterterrorism, was always wary of the use of force. Both
risk-aversion and a deep-seated distrust of SOF traceable all the way
back to World War II informed the military counsel offered to top
decision makers. Almost all those I consulted confirmed this, and many,
including General Stiner, have described it in print.

When President Clinton began asking about special operations, one former
senior official recounted, "those options were discussed, but never got
anywhere. The Joint Staff would say, 'That's cowboy Hollywood stuff.'
The president was intimidated because these guys come in with all those
medals, [and] the White House took the 'stay away from SOF options'
advice of the generals."

Another former official during both Clinton terms described several
instances where "best military advice" blocked SOF options under White
House review. "The Pentagon resisted using Special Forces. Clinton
raised it several times with [Joint Chiefs chairmen] Shalikashvili and
Shelton. They recommended against it, and never really came up with a
do-able plan."

Occasionally, policymakers kept pushing. When support for the Northern
Alliance was on the table after the embassy bombings in Africa, the
senior military leadership "refused to consider it," a former
counterterrorism group member told me. "They said it was an intelligence
operation, not a military mission."

The counterterrorism group at the National Security Council pushed the
proposal anyway, but the Joint Staff strongly demurred and would not
support it. They argued that supporting the Northern Alliance would
entangle the United States in a quagmire. That was the end of the line.
Let's suppose, said the former counterterrorism group member, that the
president had ordered a covert strike "despite the chairman going on
record as opposing it. Now, if the president orders such an operation
against the best military advice of his chief military adviser, and it
gets screwed up, they will blame the president who has no military
experience, who was allegedly a draft dodger." The Northern Alliance was
left to wither on the vine.

8. Big Footprints

The original concept for SOF counterterrorism units was that they would
be unconventional, small, flexible, adaptive, and stealthy, suited to
discreet and discriminate use, say those "present at the creation"
following the Desert One disaster. Force packages were to be streamlined
for surgical operations. The "footprint" of any operation was to be
small, even invisible.

By the 1990s, this had dropped by the wayside. One former official
recalled that when strikes against al Qaeda cells were proposed, "the
Joint Staff and the chairman would come back and say, 'We highly
recommend against doing it. But if ordered to do it, this is how we
would do it.' And usually it involved the 82nd and 101st Airborne
Divisions. The footprint was ridiculous." In each instance the civilian
policymakers backed off.

To some extent, SOF planners themselves have been guilty of this.
"Mission-creep," one official called it. Since you can't "totally
suppress an environment with 15 guys and three helicopters," force
packages became "five or six hundred guys, AC-130 gunships, a 900-man
quick-reaction force ready to assist if you get in trouble, and F-14s
circling over the Persian Gulf." The policymakers were thinking small,
surgical, and stealthy, so they'd take one "look at it and say that's
too big."

One original Delta Force member traced this problem back to Desert One.
"We took some bad lessons from that," he said. ". . . One was that we
needed more. That maybe it would have been successful if we'd had more
helicopters. That more is better. And now we add too many bells and
whistles. We make our footprint too large. We price ourselves out of the
market."

It's a way of dealing with the military's aversion to risk. "One way we
tend to think we mitigate risk," he said, "is by adding more
capabilities for this contingency and that contingency." Asked if this
thinking had found its way into the Special Operations Command, he
replied, "Yes. Absolutely."

9. No Actionable Intelligence

A top official in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy in the 1990s described the intelligence deficit with respect to
targeting Osama bin Laden: "If you get intelligence, it's by definition
very perishable. He moves all the time and he undoubtedly puts out false
stories about where he's moving," making it extremely difficult "to get
somebody from anyplace outside of Afghanistan into Afghanistan in time.
The biggest problem was always intelligence."

But if the target had been broadened to al Qaeda's infrastructure, the
intelligence requirements would have been less demanding, noted Dick
Clarke. "There was plenty of intelligence. We had incredibly good
intelligence about where bin Laden's facilities were. While we might
never have been able to say at any given moment where he was, we knew
half a dozen places that he moved among. So there was ample opportunity
to use Special Forces."

In effect, to turn the need for "actionable intelligence" into a
showstopper, all you have to do is define the target narrowly. That
makes the intelligence requirements nearly impossible to satisfy.
Broaden the picture, and the challenge of actionable intelligence became
more manageable.

Special Operators are actually the first to seek good intelligence. But
according to an officer on the Joint Staff at the time, "no actions
[were] taken to pre-position or deploy the kinds of people that could
have addressed those intelligence shortfalls"--people who could have
provided the operational-level intelligence needed for SOF to deploy
rapidly against fleeting targets in the safe havens where terrorists nest.

What was essential for counterterrorism operations was to establish
intelligence networks in places harboring targets. This "operational
preparation of the battlespace" is accomplished by infiltrating special
operators who pass for locals. Their job includes recruiting indigenous
elements who can help SOF units enter an area of interest, and organize,
train, and equip local resistance and surrogate forces to assist them.

But no such preparation took place in the 1990s in terrorist havens like
Afghanistan, Yemen, Lebanon, and Sudan. Operating in those lands "would
have taken official approval that prior to 9/11 would have never been
given to us," one knowledgeable individual explained. "Prior to 9/11
there was no willingness to put Department of Defense personnel in such
places. No such request would have been authorized."

Why? Because it's dicey, was the bottom line for a former senior Clinton
appointee at the Pentagon. Asked if there were proposals at his level
for it, he said: "Not that I remember," adding, "I can understand why.
It raises a lot of questions. Without saying you shouldn't do it, it is
one of those things that is going to cause concern. . . . You're talking
not just about recruiting individuals to be sent, but recruiting whole
organizations, and you think about it in the context of Somalia. I'm
sure that would have raised a lot of questions. I can see why people
would have been reluctant."

DURING CLINTON'S SECOND TERM, then, the possibility of hunting down
the terrorists did receive ample attention at the top echelons of
government. But somewhere between inception and execution, the SOF
options were always scuttled as too problematic.

War and tragedy have a way of breaking old attitudes. September 11,
2001, should have caused a sea change in SOF's role in fighting
terrorism. To some extent, it has. Consider the stellar contribution of
Special Operations Forces to the campaign in Afghanistan in 2001-02. In
the early planning stages, SOF was only ancillary to the war plan; but
by the end of October 2001, it had moved to center stage. It played a
decisive role in toppling the Taliban and routing al Qaeda.

Since then, SOF have deployed to places like Yemen and the Philippines
to train local militaries to fight al Qaeda and its affiliates. And last
year, Secretary Rumsfeld ordered the Special Operations Command to track
down and destroy al Qaeda around the globe. In effect, he ordered a
global manhunt to prevent future 9/11s, including attacks with weapons
of mass destruction.

In the war against terrorism, a global SOF campaign against al Qaeda is
indispensable. Happily, our special counterterrorism units are
tailor-made for this. And now that the United States is at war, it
should be possible to overcome the showstoppers that blocked the
"peacetime" use of those forces through the 1990s.

It should be--but will it? The answer is mixed. Some showstoppers have
been neutralized. While law enforcement still has a role to play, we are
clearly fighting a war, in which the Department of Defense and the armed
forces take the lead. Thus, there should be far less latitude for
turning advocates of tough counterterrorism missions into pariahs.
September 11 and the president's response to it changed the terms of the
policy discussion.

Yet the other showstoppers have not ceased to matter. Competing power
centers continue to jockey for influence over counterterrorism policy.
In a war in which the CIA may feel it has both a role to play and lost
ground to regain, the Title 10/Title 50 debate and arguments over
actionable intelligence are likely to persist. In our democratic
society, fear of another Somalia remains. And the conventional
military's mistrust of SOF has not evaporated.

Once again, a civilian is pushing for greater use of Special Operations
Forces. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld wants the Special Operations
Command, for the first time in its history, to play the role of a
"supported command," instead of supporting the geographic commands, as
it has in the past. Neither those commands nor their friends on the
Joint Staff are likely to welcome a reversal of the relationship in
order to facilitate SOF missions. "Who's in command here?" could become
a new wartime showstopper. Some in SOF believe it already has.

Once again, the problem involves institutions, organizational cultures,
and entrenched ways of thinking. "Rumsfeld might think we're at war with
terrorism," observed one former general, "but I'll bet he also thinks he
is at war within the Pentagon....The real war's happening right there in
his building. It's a war of the culture. He can't go to war because he
can't get his organization up for it."

Donald Rumsfeld may believe that Special Operations Forces should be in
the forefront of the global war on terrorism. But for that to happen, he
will have to breach what remains of the phalanx of resistance that
blocked the offensive use of special mission units for over a
decade--and he'll have to overcome the new showstoppers as well.

For now, it appears that the most powerful defense secretary ever has
failed in his attempt to do this. In a disquieting October 16, 2003,
memo to the Pentagon elite in the war on terror--General Dick Meyers,
Joint Chiefs chairman; Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; General
Pete Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs; and Doug Feith,
undersecretary of defense for policy--Rumsfeld laments that progress has
been slow and the Defense Department has not "yet made truly bold moves"
in fighting al Qaeda. And he wonders whether his department "is changing
fast enough to deal with the new 21st century security environment."

It's a good question. As al Qaeda regroups and deploys to new
battlefields in Iraq and elsewhere, our special mission units--the Delta
boys, the SEALs, and the rest--remain on the shelf. It's time to take
them off.

Richard H. Shultz Jr. is director of international security studies at
the Fletcher School, Tufts University, and director of research at the
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence in Washington, D.C
- http://www.blackwaterusa.com/btw2004...nereasons.html

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