Seeking anecdotes about "instructor in command"

Hi, all:

I'm giving a presentation on what someone here called "instructor in
command" syndrome: a pilot getting complacent because there's an instructor
in the aircraft.

I've found a number of good ones here, but any more - esp. with something
"interesting" - would be welcome.

I'd also appreciate it if someone could point me at a reference to something
that I've been told occurred. A CFI was sitting in the back of an aircraft
that made a bad landing. Even though the CFI had no role in the flight, he
bore some of the brunt from the FAA.

Thanks...

Andrew

On Wed, 30 Jun 2004 14:00:33 -0400, Andrew Gideon
wrote:

I'd also appreciate it if someone could point me at a reference to something
that I've been told occurred. A CFI was sitting in the back of an aircraft
that made a bad landing. Even though the CFI had no role in the flight, he
bore some of the brunt from the FAA.

I've heard similar stories, but they all involve an ATP, not a CFI.

z

I'm giving a presentation on what someone here called "instructor in
command" syndrome: a pilot getting complacent because there's an instructor
in the aircraft.


(it was me who called it that). Not so much "complacent" as "trusting"... you
are there to learn, and you must trust the instructor to take you beyond your
level of comfort in order to do this. Some can get complacent too, but that's
not necessary for bad things to happen.

Jose

--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

Teacherjh wrote:

(it was me who called it that). Not so much "complacent" as "trusting"...
you are there to learn, and you must trust the instructor to take you
beyond your
level of comfort in order to do this. Some can get complacent too, but
that's not necessary for bad things to happen.

I'm drawing a very important distinction between "trusting" and
"complacent". That is, in fact, the entire point I want to get across:
that trust is good, but taking it into complacency is bad.

Sure, that's obvious when I write it that way laugh. But it's not
something I see discussed, and I've been looking for it recently. More,
the line can be tough to define, although I'm trying (as you'll see below).

It is absolutely necessary that a pilot trust an instructor to get the best
use out of that instructor. The example you and I are both using - going
past one's personal "envelope" with an instructor as guide - is one such
very good use.

However, this idea of the instructor as a safety mechanism can be taken too
far with the pilot has in his mind, even if quietly, "if this was bad, he'd
say something".

This is similar to some of what I've been reading about CRM, in that the
recommendation is that the concerns of the least confortable pilot are
paramount. That is, if one of two pilots think conditions (ie. weather)
are bad, then they're treated as bad - even if the other pilot is
comfortable with the conditions.

But a pilot with an instructor that accepts an uncomfortable situation - or
that stops looking for them - because the instructor is in the aircraft is
giving away that safety net.

It's a bit of a vague line between "going past the envelope" and "least
comfortable rules". As best I can see, the difference is in intent. I
might plan, for example, to go past my comfort level in x-wind landings
with an instructor. That's different from attempting a landing possibly
outside my skill level because "if this was bad, he'd say something".

With intent comes communication. For example: "I've never landed in gusts
this severe; shall we try?".

- Andrew

As best I can see, the difference is in intent. I might plan,
for example, to go past my comfort level in x-wind landings
with an instructor. That's different from attempting a landing possibly
outside my skill level because "if this was bad, he'd say something".

With intent comes communication. For example: "I've never landed in gusts
this severe; shall we try?".


Well put. The key is how much the instructor knows of the student (and how
much the student tells him). "If this were bad, he'd say something" is
perfectly valid, if the instructor knows he's taking the student outside the
envelops (and is thus extra vigilant). But this puts the onus on the
instructor to be vigilant after the student says so. Now who's "in command"?

A similar issue comes up with an IFR safety pilot. I was in a situation where
I was under the hood with a safety pilot, VFR under an overcast. My safety
pilot says "ok, you can take the hood off now, we're in the clouds".

WHAT????

I was PIC - if I merged with another target, it would be my rear in the sling
(before going into the casket). But I was trusting another.

Jose

--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

Teacherjh wrote:

Well put.

Thanks. I don't think I've quite said it in a way which which I'm
completely happy, which is why I'm still trying.

The key is how much the instructor knows of the student (and
how
much the student tells him). "If this were bad, he'd say something" is
perfectly valid, if the instructor knows he's taking the student outside
the
envelops (and is thus extra vigilant). But this puts the onus on the
instructor to be vigilant after the student says so. Now who's "in
command"?

I'm not clear what point(s) you're making here. I assume that we're both
hoping that the instructor is fully vigilant for the entire flight. Is
that what you mean?

But I'm looking more from the non-instructing pilot's perspective. The
distinction, perhaps, is a difference between an explicit choice to go
beyond one's envelope and a less than explicit relaxation of the care with
which one is operating (because the instructor is there to catch mistakes).

Even if the instructor is perfect, this is still an increase in risk (as the
number of careful pilots in the plane is unnecessarily reduced {8^). More,
complacency can become a habit.

[...]

I was PIC - if I merged with another target, it would be my rear in the
sling
(before going into the casket). But I was trusting another.

To me, this is a separate issue. Misplaced trust is absolutely a risk. I
used to fly with someone (a pilot; not an instructor). When I finally
realized that this was not wise - because he'd habits I viewed as unsafe as
I came to know them - I stopped.

After that occurred, I had a chance to sit right seat with someone new to
me. It was when I first joined my club, and I thought riding along with
someone would be a good and fun way to learn various club procedures.

It wasn't until I was preparing for the flight that I realized how
uncomfortable I was. What if I was putting myself in the right seat next
to an untrustworthy pilot? Again.

[Happily, it all worked out well - he's a fine and safe pilot, and we had a
nice time.]

- Andrew

"Teacherjh" wrote in message
...
A similar issue comes up with an IFR safety pilot. I was in a situation
where
I was under the hood with a safety pilot, VFR under an overcast. My
safety
pilot says "ok, you can take the hood off now, we're in the clouds".

Wow. Had he let that happen intentionally? Or was that just his lighthearted
way of alerting you to an accidental cloud penetration?

--Gary

...if the instructor knows he's taking the student outside
the envelops (and is thus extra vigilant)...

I assume that we're both
hoping that the instructor is
fully vigilant for the entire flight.


Well, only sort of. I expect the instructor (absent other issues) to be paying
attention to how I am flying the plane, not so much to how the plane is being
flown. The distinction is subtle, but consider that if the instructor were
the pilot flying (and I were baggage) the instructor's attention would be fully
occupied by the instruments and the view outside the window. When I take over
that task, I expect the instructor to be trying to make me a better pilot, not
so much trying to make this flight a safer flight.

An instructor will let different amounts of deviation go uncorrected, depending
on the level of the student. A new student can't recover very well from an
unstable approach, but a more experienced pilot can probably salvage approaches
that he shouldn't have screwed up in the first place. If an experienced pilot
makes a less than perfect approach, the instructor may not think all that much
of it, assuming the pilot flying can (and will) recover. So, here the
instructor is assuming more skill on the part of the pilot, and the pilot is
assuming the instructor will catch his mistakes (after all, that's what he went
up with an instructor for).

In this case, pilot and instructor do not agree as to where the edge of the
envelope is, and problems ensue. You can have the opposite scenario, where an
instructor is constantly correcting or taking over for minor deviations, which
could even be a matter of style (coming in steeply or shallowly for example).
Here the instructor isn't letting the pilot flying have enough rope, in the
other example there is too much rope.

When I talk about "instructor in command", I include also the cases where the
instructor says, for example on a cross country training flight, "let's go
under the overcast" (rather than file IFR and go through it, or fly on top of
it). The pilot might not be comfortable doing what he considers scud running,
and the instructor might be completely comfortable with the conditions. The
instructor gives no thought to the pilot's envelope (or decides that he's there
to stretch it a bit), and the pilot flying figures that this is the instruction
he's paying for, and goes ahead under the overcast (which he never would have
done alone).

The instructor has no reason to believe this is a problem for the student, and
the student expects that since the conditions are within the instructor's
limits, he will learn something.

Jose








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(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

My safety pilot says "ok, you can take the
hood off now, we're in the clouds".

Wow. Had he let that happen intentionally? Or was that just his lighthearted
way of alerting you to an accidental cloud penetration?


I think it was intentional. He seemed pleased, in the same sense that an
instructor giving training (under an IFR flight plan) is pleased when actual
conditions are encountered. I don't think he realized that nobody was
separating aluminum at that point (though he knew we were VFR and I made it
clear that we were to remain VFR).

It's not all that easy to judge 500 feet from the bottoms of a cloud - they
always look closer than they are, and maybe he misjudged or overcompensated.

Ok.. what do I do? Climb, descend, turn around? We were pretty low to descend
blind out of the clouds, but my safety pilot said we had ground contact and I
descended out of it pretty quickly, told approach we were IMC, descending out
of it and turning around for home and went back to the home airport, where I
shot a practice approach there. I also made it clear that my safety pilot's
job was to keep us sufficiently clear of clouds, granite, and aluminum.

Although I stayed mostly under the hood, I did peek more than occasionally to
be sure we were sufficiently clear of these impediments to good times. In
retrospect, perhaps I should have ripped off the hood, bonked him with it, and
tossed him outside. Ironically, he's very safety conscious when it comes to
equipment - wanting backups for the vacuum and electrical system, and the
latest and greatest in GPS technology. (seems to be a trend - nobody looks at
the sectionals any more), so I was unprepared for this particular event.

Jose



--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

Andrew Gideon wrote
I'm drawing a very important distinction between "trusting" and
"complacent".

I'm not sure you can effectively do that.

Sure, that's obvious when I write it that way laugh. But it's not
something I see discussed, and I've been looking for it recently. More,
the line can be tough to define, although I'm trying (as you'll see below).

I'm glad you realize it's tough, but I think it's worse than that. I
think the line is impossible to define in a manner useful to the
student, because almost by definition it will require a level of
knowledge and judgment that the student will not posess.

It is absolutely necessary that a pilot trust an instructor to get the best
use out of that instructor. The example you and I are both using - going
past one's personal "envelope" with an instructor as guide - is one such
very good use.

But in order to trust the instructor, you have to believe the
instructor really knows best. In other words, you have to believe
that while you are operating outside your envelope, the instructor is
well within his. This is made more difficult because there are many
documented cases where this was not true. All I can say is, choose
your instructor carefully. Just because the FAA gives a guy a piece
of paper doesn't mean he's qualified.

However, this idea of the instructor as a safety mechanism can be taken too
far with the pilot has in his mind, even if quietly, "if this was bad, he'd
say something".

Now you're changing the situation. Yes, poor communications can be
deadly. It is indeed quite possible for the student to see something
the instructor has missed. It is absolutely legitimate and proper for
the student to bring this up. However, it is equally legitimate for
the instructor to say "Yes, I'm aware of this, and it's not a problem
because..." and you either trust the instructor and keep going or you
get another instructor.

This is similar to some of what I've been reading about CRM, in that the
recommendation is that the concerns of the least confortable pilot are
paramount.

And that's fine - as long as you don't translate this to mean that the
most scared pilot makes the decision.

That is, if one of two pilots think conditions (ie. weather)
are bad, then they're treated as bad - even if the other pilot is
comfortable with the conditions.

And that's fine - unless you interpret it to mean that the least
comfortable pilot gets to decide that a diversion, precautionary
landing, or 180 will be done when it's not necessary.

Consider an extreme case - a low time VFR-only pilot is flying with an
ATP. The visibility ahead is terrible and the ceilings are low. The
ATP decides this is no big deal, files IFR, and proceeds to his
destination. Should his decision change because of the low time
VFR-only pilot in the right seat? Does it matter if the pilot in the
right seat is acting as copilot - maybe tuning radios and keeping
track of maps?

If the answer is yes, that's a great rule - if you never need to
accomplish anything (as the more experienced pilot) or never need to
learn anything (as the less experienced pilot). The whole point of
becoming a better pilot is to develop the skill and knowledge that
will allow you to complete a flight when others can't. The whole
point of carrying a copilot is to be able to offload some tasks onto
that copilot, which reduces your workload and allows you to extend
your capability without giving up the safety margin. The whole point
of riding copilot with a more experienced pilot is to learn from the
more experienced pilot and extend your capability. The least
comfortable pilot rule works against these goals.

The concerns of the copilot should be addressed, but the ultimate
decisionmaking authority remains with the captain. Always. And yes,
somtimes that means pressing on when the copilot is uncomfortable
because the captain is comfortable.

But a pilot with an instructor that accepts an uncomfortable situation - or
that stops looking for them - because the instructor is in the aircraft is
giving away that safety net.

I think you need to separate the two. The student who stops paying
attention becuase the instructor is there does indeed increase the
risk unnecessarily. He should vocalize his concerns, both because
there is a possibility that the instructor missed something, and
because this will allow the instructor to determine where the
student's weaknesses are and address them. However, operating outside
one's own envelope by definition means accepting an uncomfortable
situation. Let's say in the above case that the ATP lets the VFR-only
pilot fly. I assure you that VFR-only pilot will be uncomfortable as
he negotiates the transition to instruments and flies in the bumps and
rain. However, it will be a spectacular learning experience for him -
even if he never goes on to get an instrument rating, it will improve
his odds of successfully handling a VFR-into-IMC emergency.

It's a bit of a vague line between "going past the envelope" and "least
comfortable rules". As best I can see, the difference is in intent. I
might plan, for example, to go past my comfort level in x-wind landings
with an instructor. That's different from attempting a landing possibly
outside my skill level because "if this was bad, he'd say something".

With intent comes communication. For example: "I've never landed in gusts
this severe; shall we try?".

I think the real difference is not intent but communication.

When operating outside one's envelope, there is unavoidable risk. I
feel this risk is justified by the gains to be made in skill and
knowledge, which will increase capability and reduce risk on future
flights, but let's not lose sight of the fact that not all risk is
avoidable.

The risk caused by poor communication in such a situation IS
avoidable, and should be avoided.

It is said that two CFI's in a primary trainer equal half a student
pilot, and I can tell you from experience that this can be very true.
When I decided that I wanted to be a tailwheel instructor (a REAL one,
not just what the FAA considers legal) a friend of mine, who is a real
tailwheel instructor, gave me some dual in his Champ. I was already a
CFI and a tailwheel pilot at the time - in fact I had hundreds of
landings in a taildragger - but there is a difference between being
good enough to do it and good enough to teach it. But first we did
some brushup - on a narrow paved obstructed runway of course, since
grass is too easy. We almost lost the airplane.

My experience had been in a 7ECA Champ (no, not a Citabria - there was
such a thing as a 7ECA Champ) which had toe brakes and a big engine.
We were flying a 7BCM Champ, with heel brakes and a smaller engine. I
got a bit off center, botched the rudder correction (not being used to
heel brakes - I only ever had a few hours in a heel-brake Cub and that
was years ago), and the small burst of throttle didn't do what I was
used to. Fortunately, my friend caught it before we hit the trees.

This was a perfect example of poor communication. He thought I
already knew how to do it. I thought it would be fine because he was
there. We've been a lot more careful about preflight briefings when
we fly together since then. However, even after we rebriefed and I
expressed my concerns that the runway was too narrow and too
obstructed - we kept flying. I was outside my comfort zone, but not
outside his.

Basically, I think you're invoking intent when what we're really
dealing with is just communication. The intent was the same first and
second time around; it's just that the first time around we botched
the communication and nearly put a wing in the trees.

As a corollary to this, I don't think it makes sense to place the
communication burden entirely on the student or copilot. The
instructor or captain also has a responsibility to communicate.
Ideally, he should anticipate the concerns of the student or copilot
and address them pre-emptively.

Michael