China to acquire Backfires?

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Thomas J.
Paladino Jr. writes
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...ina/tu-22m.htm

Two part question; first, do you think that China will actually succeed in
it's acquisition attempts regarding the Backfire, and if so, how many
would
they end up with?

Say rather, "How many could they support"?

Second, what does this mean to the the US? Backfires are a viable threat
to
the carrier group,

Only in sufficient numbers and with good targeting.

And good training


and with the F-14/Phoenix weapons systems getting phased
out with no real comparable replacement, I can't help but think that the
US
carrier groups may find themselves in an uncomfortably vulnerable position
sometime in the near future.

The USSR policy was to send several regiments of Backfires against a
located US CVBG and try to overwhelm it. AEGIS was the answer and remains
in US service.

The F-14 and Phoenix missile were designed
specifically to counter the long range bomber threat, and when this threat
was thought to have disappeared, the AAAM (Phoenix replacement) and the
Super-Tomcat upgrades were cancelled.

As others have said, if you need a long-range AAM then buy into Meteor.
The F-18 can carry a decent number of them, and the E-2 can detect
Backfires at long range, and the AEGIS/SM-2 remains the best shipborne AAW
in the world. (Type 45 may be better but is yet to appear, and then AEGIS
will get an update...)

Although there is basically no chance for the F-14 to be brought back to
life, should we now possibly be concerned with developing a new long-range
missile system for the F-18 and JSF, or do these aircraft already have the
capability to defeat the long-range bomber using stealth and smaller,
medium
range weapons?

The enemy has to reliably locate the US carrier.

The enemy has to get that data back to HQ.

The strike must be authorised.

The strikers must take off, form up, and get into launch range without
being disrupted by anything from comms jamming to fighter attack.

The missiles must reliably tell chaff, floating decoys and offboard
jammers from real ships: then tell real escorts from real HVUs: then
survive the hardkill defences: then defeat the softkill: and finally
inflict mission-lethal damage on the carrier.

This is not an easy chain to follow, and if any link breaks the whole
thing falls down.


If China bought MiG-23s would you panic? The Backfire and its weapons are
of the same vintage. The fundamental problem remains that you can only
mass a strike against a known target.

--
He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.
Julius Caesar I:2

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk