How can we "fix" LEX to prevent wrong runway selection everywhere?

I've followed the lengthy and somewhat heated discussion speculating
responsibility in the LEX accident, but I've not seen any thread on
improvements other than a few comments about traffic lights on runways,
or more people added to the system to double-check the double-checkers.
I'm interested in what the industry might do to achieve a technical
solution with relatively small front-end cost and very, very little
operational cost. (As you suspect, I have nothing to do with the
government or any of its agencies).



I find myself wondering what the cost of a low-power ground radar
capable of interpreting transponder codes, coupled to a small (not much
horsepower) computer capable of matching the geo-coords of the txpdr to
the assigned runway (or taxiway) and triggering an alarm if the variance
is too great. This should all be off-the-shelf technology, shouldn't be
considered a "flight critical" or "safety-of-flight" system (so if it
goes down for a few hours only the local information would change), and
shouldn't have to be maintained other than for hardware failures. With
the low-power and digital technology even the non-critical radar could
be maintained by break-fix only. Developed into an appliance type
system, these could be mass produced to lower the cost even more.



It seems to me that by adding traffic lights implies that we now have to
add an additional duty to the ground / flight controller which
introduces the human factor an additional time. Additionally, the
traffic light relies on the crews on parallel runways knowing which
light/runway they are really on - a seeming failure at LEX. Adding more
controllers to the system doesn't yield the best return on investment
either. Non-critical repetitive tasks should be automated where
possible.

I find myself wondering what the cost of a low-power ground radar capable of interpreting transponder codes, coupled to a small (not much horsepower) computer capable of matching the geo-coords of the txpdr to the assigned runway (or taxiway) and triggering an alarm if the variance is too great

It would not help in the case of intersecting runways when the aircraft
is =at= (or close to) the intersection and lined up for the wrong one.
It would not know that the pilot is intending to take off, rather than
simply pausing for traffic. (this means that there could be many false
alarms or many misses, depending on how the software is set up).

This should all be off-the-shelf technology, shouldn’t be considered a “flight critical” or “safety-of-flight” system (so if it goes down for a few hours only the local information would change)

.... and it may well be down when it's needed. One of the issues with
the LEX incident was that lights were not working properly, and there
was construction on the runway. It shouldn't have mattered (as your
proposed system's down time shouldn't matter) but if the system is
there, and it's relied upon, and it's down, then even though people may
know it's down, it provides a hole in which to bury oneself.

That's why we practice partial panel and such, and why there is a
reaction against all the gee-whiz (moving map, glass) in the cockpit
with some pilots thinking it reduces general pilot competency.

Jose
--
"Never trust anything that can think for itself, if you can't see where
it keeps its brain." (chapter 10 of book 3 - Harry Potter).
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

Jim Carter wrote:
I've followed the lengthy and somewhat heated discussion speculating
responsibility in the LEX accident,

Lets see... we could paint the runway name with big numbers on the
runway or put little signs next to the runway entrance.

We could put a device in the cockpit that automatically indicates
which direction the aircraft is pointed so the pilot could compare
it with his assigned runway.

We could require that commercial aircraft that are operating at
night use runways that have runway lights.

We could use a moving map that shows the aircraft postition.

Ron Natalie wrote in
:

Lets see... we could paint the runway name with big numbers on the
runway or put little signs next to the runway entrance.

We could put a device in the cockpit that automatically indicates
which direction the aircraft is pointed so the pilot could compare
it with his assigned runway.

We could require that commercial aircraft that are operating at
night use runways that have runway lights.

We could use a moving map that shows the aircraft postition.

Absolutely a great idea. I'm going to write my congressman, the
president and FAA and see if we can make this happen.

8-)

--

Jim Carter wrote:

I’ve followed the lengthy and somewhat heated discussion speculating
responsibility in the LEX accident, but I’ve not seen any thread on
improvements other than a few comments about traffic lights on runways,
or more people added to the system to double-check the double-checkers.
I’m interested in what the industry might do to achieve a technical
solution with relatively small front-end cost and very, very little
operational cost. (As you suspect, I have nothing to do with the
government or any of its agencies).

The fixes are already in place for what happened at LEX.

The concerns of the industry are (correctly) about runway intrusions,
such as happen at places like LAX far too often.

-----Original Message-----
From: Jose ]
Posted At: Wednesday, October 04, 2006 9:13 AM
Posted To: rec.aviation.ifr
Conversation: How can we "fix" LEX to prevent wrong runway selection
everywhere?
Subject: How can we "fix" LEX to prevent wrong runway selection
everywhere?

I find myself wondering what the cost of a low-power ground radar
capable of interpreting transponder codes, coupled to a small (not
much
horsepower) computer capable of matching the geo-coords of the txpdr
to
the assigned runway (or taxiway) and triggering an alarm if the
variance
is too great

It would not help in the case of intersecting runways when the
aircraft
is =at= (or close to) the intersection and lined up for the wrong one.
It would not know that the pilot is intending to take off, rather than
simply pausing for traffic. (this means that there could be many
false
alarms or many misses, depending on how the software is set up).


Good point - the system would have to monitor the aircraft after it was
in position and during the start of the takeoff roll to determine which
intersecting runway was being used.

This should all be off-the-shelf technology, shouldn't be considered
a
"flight critical" or "safety-of-flight" system (so if it goes down for
a
few hours only the local information would change)

... and it may well be down when it's needed. One of the issues with
the LEX incident was that lights were not working properly, and there
was construction on the runway. It shouldn't have mattered (as your
proposed system's down time shouldn't matter) but if the system is
there, and it's relied upon, and it's down, then even though people
may
know it's down, it provides a hole in which to bury oneself.

Another good point - The alarm would have to be in both tower cab and
the cockpit and have to be audible to be effective.

I'm not sure how we can ever reduce the possibility to zero regardless
of the technology we implement. Short of erecting a barrier net on the
inactive runway, there may be no way of keeping humans from making a
mistake and attempting to depart on the wrong runway.

As it is now however, the only checks and balances are all human. I'm
not sure it shouldn't remain that way, but at the same time if some
technical solution isn't developed by the industry then the politicians
and lawyers will develop one for us. We all know how well those work...


That's why we practice partial panel and such, and why there is a
reaction against all the gee-whiz (moving map, glass) in the cockpit
with some pilots thinking it reduces general pilot competency.

Jose
--
"Never trust anything that can think for itself, if you can't see
where
it keeps its brain." (chapter 10 of book 3 - Harry Potter).
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

-----Original Message-----
From: Ron Natalie ]
Posted At: Wednesday, October 04, 2006 10:08 AM
Posted To: rec.aviation.ifr
Conversation: How can we "fix" LEX to prevent wrong runway selection
everywhere?
Subject: How can we "fix" LEX to prevent wrong runway selection
everywhere?

Jim Carter wrote:
I've followed the lengthy and somewhat heated discussion speculating
responsibility in the LEX accident,

Lets see... we could paint the runway name with big numbers on the
runway or put little signs next to the runway entrance.

We could put a device in the cockpit that automatically indicates
which direction the aircraft is pointed so the pilot could compare
it with his assigned runway.

We could require that commercial aircraft that are operating at
night use runways that have runway lights.

We could use a moving map that shows the aircraft postition.

I agree completely Ron; we've all flown with those tools for years and
years. I'm sure you will agree that there are a few times that humans
make mistakes -- that makes us all human. Since the only checks and
balances for the "am I on the right runway" decision are all human,
those mistakes continue to be made.

50 years ago the LEX accident would have been declared pilot error and
the media would not have sensationalized the issue like they do today.
I'm worried this sensationalism will end up forcing a new set of
regulations on us that do very little to address the problem.

-----Original Message-----
From: Sam Spade ]
Posted At: Wednesday, October 04, 2006 1:48 PM
Posted To: rec.aviation.ifr
Conversation: How can we "fix" LEX to prevent wrong runway selection
everywhere?
Subject: How can we "fix" LEX to prevent wrong runway selection
everywhere?

Jim Carter wrote:

I've followed the lengthy and somewhat heated discussion speculating
responsibility in the LEX accident, but I've not seen any thread on
improvements other than a few comments about traffic lights on
runways,
or more people added to the system to double-check the
double-checkers.
I'm interested in what the industry might do to achieve a technical
solution with relatively small front-end cost and very, very little
operational cost. (As you suspect, I have nothing to do with the
government or any of its agencies).

The fixes are already in place for what happened at LEX.


Other than the lighting, numbering, signage, and instruments in the
cockpit I'm not sure what "fixes" you might be thinking about. Sam, if
you meant those items I mentioned here, then we have to agree that they
still require passive human interpretation and are still being
overlooked or ignored. My solution isn't 100% complete, but I think it
might be closer than we already are.

The concerns of the industry are (correctly) about runway intrusions,
such as happen at places like LAX far too often.

I wonder if this solution could also be used to address runway
incursions by predicting movement of aircraft on the ground. Wouldn't it
be nice to be able to solve 2 problems with 1 relatively inexpensive
solution? That factor alone probably dooms the suggestion to oblivion.

Good point - the system would have to monitor the aircraft after it was
in position and during the start of the takeoff roll to determine which
intersecting runway was being used.

.... and then what? The aircraft is rolling on the runway, it takes
maybe thirty seconds to get airborne. It would take five to ten seconds
to ascertain that the wrong (intersectiong) runway was being used.
(remember, aircraft are also cleared to taxi on the "wrong" runway to
get to where they are going; the system needs to know this is an
attempted takeoff). With twenty seconds to go, the system has to notify
the pilot (in a way that doesn't make other pilots who may be doing a
correct concurrent takeoff think the message is for them) and then the
pilot has to hear, evaluate, react, and be able to take corrective action.

It's not as easy as it sounds, and its usefulness is still questionable.

Another good point - The alarm would have to be in both tower cab and
the cockpit and have to be audible to be effective.

That's not the point. The point is that if the system itself is down,
there will be no alarm anywhere. Then somebody will propose some other
system that will address the same issue another way, and more money will
be spent on research, development, installation, and supervision, and
the end result will be that the money comes from somewhere - perhaps
draining =other= safety programs.

...there may be no way of keeping humans from making a
mistake and attempting to depart on the wrong runway.

That's for sure.

Jose
--
"Never trust anything that can think for itself, if you can't see where
it keeps its brain." (chapter 10 of book 3 - Harry Potter).
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

http://www.hiltonsoftware.com/FeatureSmartTaxi.html

$129.95

-----------------
"Jim Carter" wrote in message
news:002701c6e7bb$b46227b0$4001a8c0@omnibook6100.. .
I've followed the lengthy and somewhat heated discussion speculating
responsibility in the LEX accident, but I've not seen any thread on
improvements other than a few comments about traffic lights on runways, or
more people added to the system to double-check the double-checkers. I'm
interested in what the industry might do to achieve a technical solution
with relatively small front-end cost and very, very little operational cost.
(As you suspect, I have nothing to do with the government or any of its
agencies).

I find myself wondering what the cost of a low-power ground radar capable of
interpreting transponder codes, coupled to a small (not much horsepower)
computer capable of matching the geo-coords of the txpdr to the assigned
runway (or taxiway) and triggering an alarm if the variance is too great.
This should all be off-the-shelf technology, shouldn't be considered a
"flight critical" or "safety-of-flight" system (so if it goes down for a few
hours only the local information would change), and shouldn't have to be
maintained other than for hardware failures. With the low-power and digital
technology even the non-critical radar could be maintained by break-fix
only. Developed into an appliance type system, these could be mass produced
to lower the cost even more.

It seems to me that by adding traffic lights implies that we now have to add
an additional duty to the ground / flight controller which introduces the
human factor an additional time. Additionally, the traffic light relies on
the crews on parallel runways knowing which light/runway they are really
on - a seeming failure at LEX. Adding more controllers to the system doesn't
yield the best return on investment either. Non-critical repetitive tasks
should be automated where possible.