How 'bout a thread on the F-22 with no mud slinging, no axe grinding, no emotional diatribes, and just some clear, objective discussion?

The things I'd be most interested in a

1. Was the YF-22/YF-23 a fair flyoff or was it a case of Northop
designing what the air force asked for and Lockheed giving them what
they really wanted? How much of the decision was based on the
capabilities of the aircraft and how much on the track record of the
companies involved?

2. Is there anything unheard of popping up in the F-22's flight
testing that hasn't happened in other programs? IIRC the F-15
experienced delamination on the horizontal stabilizers. They also
clipped the wingtips and added the dogtooth to the horizontal stab.
The F-18 had to have those small strakes added to the top of the LERX.
The F-100 experienced roll reversal. The F-102 wouldn't go fast
enough without a substantial redesign. So is there anything
extraodinarily unusual about the kinks they're working out on the F-22
or is a mountain being made of a mole hill?

3. Was it really necessairy to add that "A" in? Has it really fooled
any politicians?

4. Is there any rational reason for the air force to push forward
with the F-22 if it *is* having significant problems?

5. Is there a way to cram two AIM-9Xs in the space taken by one -9M?

That's about all I can think of at the moment. Any takers?

On Tue, 06 Jan 2004 00:00:52 GMT, Scott Ferrin
wrote:

The things I'd be most interested in a

1. Was the YF-22/YF-23 a fair flyoff or was it a case of Northop
designing what the air force asked for and Lockheed giving them what
they really wanted? How much of the decision was based on the
capabilities of the aircraft and how much on the track record of the
companies involved?

There's been a lot of air down the intakes since I was closely
involved, but from my seat I would say the flyoff was fair. The two
companies took different approaches to the RFP. Lockheed's was
arguably less risky. They chose to breadboard the avionics while
Northrop opted to fly prototypes. Northrop was stealthier while
Lockheed was more agile. Lockheed had "stealth fighter" production
experience with F-117 while Northrop was doing a wide range of "cats
and dogs" including Tacit Rainbow, Peacekeeper gyros, B-747 fuselage
sections, and smarting from failures with A-9, F-20 etc.

Conversely, Northrop was partnered with MacAir who had a good
management record and production reputation for F-4, F-15 and F-18.
Lockheed was linked with Boeing and GD.

Northrop opted for difficult to manufacture curving surfaces while
Lockheed went more for the polygon shape of the F-117 (they've
smoothed the shape considerably over time).

2. Is there anything unheard of popping up in the F-22's flight
testing that hasn't happened in other programs?

When you push technology you always get "new" things happening. There
will probably be more glitches in software, man-machine interface and
weapons suite than airframe flying problems.

The F-100 experienced roll reversal.

Actually it was adverse yaw and departure from controlled flight.
"Roll reversal" is too benign a term. It really wasn't a redesign
solution so much as a training to fly that particular airplane that
made the problem go away.

The F-102 wouldn't go fast
enough without a substantial redesign.

Not enough engine on the 102 and not yet understanding "area rule",
hence the F-106 that took care of both issues.


So is there anything
extraodinarily unusual about the kinks they're working out on the F-22
or is a mountain being made of a mole hill?

Say PAH-LAH-TICKZ. There are those that support and those that oppose.
Most of the mountains of one side are molehills for the other.

3. Was it really necessairy to add that "A" in? Has it really fooled
any politicians?

It has become customary to somehow nod to the attack function. Not
necessary. Someone is made happy by the nomenclature. Who cares?

4. Is there any rational reason for the air force to push forward
with the F-22 if it *is* having significant problems?

Yes, there is the rational reason that you've already got fifteen
years development expended, you've got an obsolescent Eagle flight and
no replacement on the horizon, and there is no problem of such
significance that would justify scrapping the program.

You may have noted that in Iraqi Freedom we lost one fixed aircraft
for 16,000 sorties. In Desert Storm we lost one fixed wing for every
3500 sorties. In SEA, we lost one F-105 every 65 sorties. I kind of
favor the investment in technology over spending the blood and
gristle.

5. Is there a way to cram two AIM-9Xs in the space taken by one -9M?

Probably. Or maybe something else.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...

Conversely, Northrop was partnered with MacAir who had a good
management record and production reputation for F-4, F-15 and F-18.
Lockheed was linked with Boeing and GD.

Northrop's B-2 managment had shot themselves in the foot comming back from
lunch drunk. That caused a bias against Northrop's managment by the
government.

There was also a critical issue with the pilots liking the displays, as Lt
Col Couch had rejected the B-2's display system on first flight. The pilots
liked the YF-22 displays best.

Additionally, the YF-23 program resisted the DARPA subsidy for using Ada in
critical systems, while Lockheed pledged compliance. Lockmart had also been
more co-operative in delivering a prototype of what the contract asked for,
while Northrop tried to deliver what the government wanted now.

So, in the three politically sensitive issues for the selection, the YF-22
held the best hand.

On Mon, 5 Jan 2004 17:40:37 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:


"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
.. .

Conversely, Northrop was partnered with MacAir who had a good
management record and production reputation for F-4, F-15 and F-18.
Lockheed was linked with Boeing and GD.

Northrop's B-2 managment had shot themselves in the foot comming back from
lunch drunk. That caused a bias against Northrop's managment by the
government.

There was also a critical issue with the pilots liking the displays, as Lt
Col Couch had rejected the B-2's display system on first flight. The pilots
liked the YF-22 displays best.

Additionally, the YF-23 program resisted the DARPA subsidy for using Ada in
critical systems, while Lockheed pledged compliance. Lockmart had also been
more co-operative in delivering a prototype of what the contract asked for,
while Northrop tried to deliver what the government wanted now.

So, in the three politically sensitive issues for the selection, the YF-22
held the best hand.


ISTR Northrop being in the doghouse at the time for cost overruns on
TSAAM and McDonnell for it's part in the A-12. I don't think that
helped the YF-23's case. Also Lockeed did an extensive redesign
between selection and prototype flight whereas Northrop didn't take
advantage of the opportunity. Northop's didn't have the finale engine
nacelles (they were bigger than they would have been in the production
model because they didn't change them when the thrust reverser
requirement was dropped) and it didn't have the final missile bays.
IIRC the forward fuselage would have been slightly stretched to fit a
second bay for the Sidewinders in front of the main bay. Also with
Northrop not demonstrating high AOA flight as Lockheed did it probably
didn't help them. I sometimes wonder if Northrop was a little
overconfident. Lockeed really pushed it when it came to the flyoff as
they did later on the X-35. Northrop didn't seem to feel the need.

Actually Scott,the nacelles on the production F-23 would have been a bit
*smaller* and rounded at the top versus squared off like the prototypes,which
as you pointed out,still had the extra space for the defunct reversers.They
also would have been a bit closer together.The intakes would have been
different as well.No decision had been made AFAIK regarding the second weapons
bay,but I do know there was a plan to put the AIM-9's on rails on the inside of
the bay doors(it was a pretty wide bay) and using a rotary launcher for the
AIM-120's..The two bay arrangement used a trapeze style launch rack..Despite
your plea for no axe grinding,I predict that it will manifest itself,and I'll
keep my own biased opinions to myself :-) I'd say Ed's reply sums it up pretty
well though(as usual).Happy New Year..

On 06 Jan 2004 05:45:05 GMT, (EB Jet) wrote:

Actually Scott,the nacelles on the production F-23 would have been a bit
*smaller*


That's what I said :-)


and rounded at the top versus squared off like the prototypes,which
as you pointed out,still had the extra space for the defunct reversers.They
also would have been a bit closer together.The intakes would have been
different as well.No decision had been made AFAIK regarding the second weapons
bay,but I do know there was a plan to put the AIM-9's on rails on the inside of
the bay doors(it was a pretty wide bay) and using a rotary launcher for the
AIM-120's..The two bay arrangement used a trapeze style launch rack..Despite
your plea for no axe grinding,I predict that it will manifest itself,and I'll
keep my own biased opinions to myself :-) I'd say Ed's reply sums it up pretty
well though(as usual).Happy New Year..

On Mon, 5 Jan 2004 17:40:37 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:


"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
.. .

Conversely, Northrop was partnered with MacAir who had a good
management record and production reputation for F-4, F-15 and F-18.
Lockheed was linked with Boeing and GD.

Northrop's B-2 managment had shot themselves in the foot comming back from
lunch drunk. That caused a bias against Northrop's managment by the
government.

B-2 was released into production in 1988. It was built, designed, and
managed at Pico Rivera in what was logically named the "B-2 Division".
The ATF/YF-23 program was run from the Aircraft Division in Hawthorne.
Two distinctly different places. ATF fly-off decision came in 1990, so
it doesn't track that several thousand people at Pico Rivera would
have been caught drunk several years before program decision on a
different aircraft built at a different plant by a different division
of the company. We might also note that the B-2 co-production company
was the F-22 partner of Lockheed.

I will agree, however, that Northrop management was not the most
competent. During Spring of '88, the chairman of MacAir came to
Hawthorne and held a "come to Jesus" meeting in which he expressed his
displeasure at Northrop senior management. At that time, the decision
was made to move avionics development to St. Louis.

There was also a critical issue with the pilots liking the displays, as Lt
Col Couch had rejected the B-2's display system on first flight. The pilots
liked the YF-22 displays best.

Fusion of data and presentation was a critical design issue. It
wouldn't surprise me in the slightest if there were customer issues
with the two company proposals. But, that would have been primarily
software driven at the time of contract award.

Additionally, the YF-23 program resisted the DARPA subsidy for using Ada in
critical systems, while Lockheed pledged compliance. Lockmart had also been
more co-operative in delivering a prototype of what the contract asked for,
while Northrop tried to deliver what the government wanted now.

Can't agree with that. In late '80s/early '90s the mandate was Ada.
Northrop had no choice and was certainly compliant. The RFP set
requirements and each competitor interpreted how best to meet them.

So, in the three politically sensitive issues for the selection, the YF-22
held the best hand.

You've mentioned program management, cockpit displays and language for
software. I don't think any of those could be called "politically
sensitive" issues. The major political sensitivity would be production
location and at the time of contract award, which was pre-merger for
both contenders, the apparent production would take place in the LA
area.

Cost overruns by Northrop on B-2 as well as some scandal on parts
ordering on missile guidance systems for the Electronics Division
certainly muddied the political waters and may have cost Northrop some
points.




Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

B-2 was released into production in 1988. It was built, designed, and
managed at Pico Rivera in what was logically named the "B-2 Division".


Very minor point. The B-2 was managed at Pico but manufactured at Palmdale in
the high desert save for some component parts. Eventually the entire B-2
program moved to USAF Plant 42 at Palmdale.




The ATF/YF-23 program was run from the Aircraft Division in Hawthorne.
Two distinctly different places. ATF fly-off decision came in 1990, so
it doesn't track that several thousand people at Pico Rivera would
have been caught drunk several years before program decision on a
different aircraft built at a different plant by a different division
of the company.

I am sounding like a "Me too" here but the B-2 program had a lot of issues
dealing with both the El Segundo and Hawthorne operations. They almost
operated like several different companies in total competition with one
another.



We might also note that the B-2 co-production company
was the F-22 partner of Lockheed.

Help me here. Boeing was a majo rmanufacturing partner of the B-2. I don't
remember muchif any involvement from Lockheed in the B-2 program even though
they were across the runway from Northrop at Palmdale.


You've mentioned program management, cockpit displays and language for
software. I don't think any of those could be called "politically
sensitive" issues. The major political sensitivity would be production
location and at the time of contract award, which was pre-merger for
both contenders, the apparent production would take place in the LA
area.


Full use of Ada was a source selection criteria at one time.

Final selection when the findings of the source selection board reach the
decison makers often gets influenced by political imperative and past
peformance.

Cost overruns by Northrop on B-2 as well as some scandal on parts
ordering on missile guidance systems for the Electronics Division
certainly muddied the political waters and may have cost Northrop some
points.




Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8



Steve

On 06 Jan 2004 18:04:10 GMT, (Smartace11) wrote:


The ATF/YF-23 program was run from the Aircraft Division in Hawthorne.
Two distinctly different places. ATF fly-off decision came in 1990, so
it doesn't track that several thousand people at Pico Rivera would
have been caught drunk several years before program decision on a
different aircraft built at a different plant by a different division
of the company.

I am sounding like a "Me too" here but the B-2 program had a lot of issues
dealing with both the El Segundo and Hawthorne operations. They almost
operated like several different companies in total competition with one
another.

Absolutely. I remember when trying to write initial concepts for how
to train ops and maintenance for a stealthy aircraft, I suggested that
since we couldn't very well ask Lockheed how they kept the lid on
their F-117 program training we might go cross-town and get a program
shell from Pico. The stunned looks that I might even consider the
division as part of the same company really set me back. Big walls
exist(ed) between divisions and there was no cross-talk or
cooperation.


We might also note that the B-2 co-production company
was the F-22 partner of Lockheed.

Help me here. Boeing was a majo rmanufacturing partner of the B-2. I don't
remember muchif any involvement from Lockheed in the B-2 program even though
they were across the runway from Northrop at Palmdale.

That's what I said. Boeing was a co- on B-2 and a partner with
Lockheed on F-22. Gosh, you think maybe some secrets leak across
programs?....nah, never happen. I wasn't implying that Lockheed was a
partner in B-2.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Cost overruns by Northrop on B-2 as well as some scandal on parts
ordering on missile guidance systems for the Electronics Division
certainly muddied the political waters and may have cost Northrop some
points.

Would that be on the Peasekeeper's guidance system? ISTR hearing
about that back then.








Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8