Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?

Krztalizer wrote:

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

I know more revelevent people will chime in here, but that accolade is not at
all hollow. Their tactics meant that they followed the tactical definition of
Escort Fighter far more accurately than some of the other groups, who were
somewhat famous among bomber crews for failing to show up to cover their
assignments. Bomber guys talk with literal dread when they mention missions
where the escorts never arrived - the 303rd (?) BG was shredded after one such
event and it happened to other heavy bomber groups as well. How could
'provided excellent coverage and defense against all enemy comers' be
considered a hollow accolade?

If you've come to the show to win the war, it's a "hollow accolade"
in pointing to being adept at using the wrong tactics.

It's one thing if you don't know better, like trying to dogfight
Zeros in early 1942, but by 1944, weren't "the right" tactics in
bomber "escort" known?

Have I jumped the gun on what was known in the context of the times?


SMH

"Stephen Harding" wrote in message
...
Krztalizer wrote:

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

I know more revelevent people will chime in here, but that accolade is
not at
all hollow. Their tactics meant that they followed the tactical
definition of
Escort Fighter far more accurately than some of the other groups, who
were
somewhat famous among bomber crews for failing to show up to cover their
assignments. Bomber guys talk with literal dread when they mention
missions
where the escorts never arrived - the 303rd (?) BG was shredded after
one such
event and it happened to other heavy bomber groups as well. How could
'provided excellent coverage and defense against all enemy comers' be
considered a hollow accolade?

If you've come to the show to win the war, it's a "hollow accolade"
in pointing to being adept at using the wrong tactics.

It's one thing if you don't know better, like trying to dogfight
Zeros in early 1942, but by 1944, weren't "the right" tactics in
bomber "escort" known?

Have I jumped the gun on what was known in the context of the times?

Yes. Known as Monday morning quarterbacking.

Brooks



SMH

Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Stephen Harding" wrote in message

Have I jumped the gun on what was known in the context of the times?

Yes. Known as Monday morning quarterbacking.

I'll wait for some more opinions before I accept that.

It's not yet clear to me that the tactic of "sticking with
the bombers" was not known as the *wrong* tactic by early 1944.

I'm not even certain that "following the LW down and destroying
them" was considered the *right* tactic by the 8th AF at that
time either.

I *do* know that by 1944, the 8th had learned the tactic of
bombers "fighting their way to the target and back" without
escort was considered inappropriate.

Doesn't mean the crews that implemented that tactic during 1942/43
were somehow inferior by any measure, to those implementing the
more appropriate tactic (paradigm) later.


SMH

Subject: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
From: Stephen Harding
Date: 2/12/04 9:46 AM Pacific Standard Time

*do* know that by 1944, the 8th had learned the tactic of
bombers "fighting their way to the target and back" without
escort was considered inappropriate.

Inappropriate? Now there is an interesting word choice. (sigh)


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

On Thu, 12 Feb 2004 12:46:20 -0500, Stephen Harding
wrote:

It's not yet clear to me that the tactic of "sticking with
the bombers" was not known as the *wrong* tactic by early 1944.

As I recall the Battle of Britain, the German fighters were difficult
to cope with because they did *not* stick with the bombers -- at least
in the sense that they flew nearby. Instead they flew at a much higher
altitude. That's what caused the Brits to adopt the strategy of
sending the Hurricanes after the bombers and the Spitfires after the
fighters.

Nichts?

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

Subject: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
From: Stephen Harding
Date: 2/11/04 4:01 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?


Doesn't sound hollow to me. I guess you had to have been there.((:-))


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr wrote:

reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

Doesn't sound hollow to me. I guess you had to have been there.((:-))

If I had been there, I'd probably have been baking your bread!


SMH

Subject: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
From: Stephen Harding
Date: 2/12/04 5:39 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

ArtKramr wrote:

reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

Doesn't sound hollow to me. I guess you had to have been there.((:-))

If I had been there, I'd probably have been baking your bread!


SMH



Nice crisp crust please.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"Stephen Harding" wrote
Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.

However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
"Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
doing by 1944.

History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

What was the mission they were given? Bomber escort, ground attack, or air
superiority?

Leaving the bombers exposed leaves them vulnerable to other enemy fighters.

They flew their missions they were tasked with, did the job (exceptionally
well) and most came home.

Pete
Son and nephew of Tuskegee Airmen

Pete wrote:

What was the mission they were given? Bomber escort, ground attack, or air
superiority?

Leaving the bombers exposed leaves them vulnerable to other enemy fighters.

They flew their missions they were tasked with, did the job (exceptionally
well) and most came home.

Actually, I'd say they did more than their mission. They moved
American race relations ahead, towards the eventual goal of a
color blind nation.

But that wasn't the question. The question is was their mission
the wrong one, or improperly implemented by command?

Was B Davis the one who would dictate that fighters under his
command would implement bomber escort by sticking with the bombers
or was it an AF wide implementation order, done at a higher level
than Group or Wing?


SMH