Area bombing is not a dirty word.

On 01 Jan 2004 20:33:57 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

The impact the combined bomber offensive had against POL cannot be disputed.
POL was a "Top 3" target prior to the war, but when Intelligence officials were
replaced by American industrial "speacialists", it was dropped to #13 (IIRC).
The first Ploesti raid was undertaken not so much for the direct physical
effect, but to force Germany to defend themselves from the Baltic to the Med.
When a serious effort was undertaken to hit German POL (and sythetic POL) in
early 1944, the results were relatively quick and devestating.

History Channel Mode On

Between 12 May 1944 and 8 May 1945 the Allied air forces dropped
185,841 tons of high-explosive bombs on 87 German oil producing
targets (16 hydrogenation plants, 9 Fischer-Tropsch plants, 40
refineries, and 22 benzol plants), flying 61,712 sorties. At first,
production losses were extremely sharp, because the plants had not
been hit before and production loss resulted no matter what sections
were hit. In later attacks bombs which hit sections of the plant
already knocked out obviously could not contribute to further
production loss. As the intensity of the attacks increased, production
continued to fall until September, despite the frantic efforts of a
350,000-man emergency repair organization. Production increased
slightly in October and still more in November, mostly because weather
conditions interfered with bombing accuracy (10.1 percent of the bombs
dropped on synthetic plants in these months were by visual sighting,
as compared with 41.5 percent during the previous four months).

The Germans proved extremely adept at reparing these facilities.
A typical example of the recovery capacity of a plant is provided by
the records of the Ammoniakwerk Merseburg Coal to Oil Conversion
Plant, at Leuna. Because of this plant's great importance to the
German war economy, it is safe to assume that repair work was not held
up by lack of material or labor.

The first attack, 12 May 1944, knocked production from 100 percent
down to zero. On 28 May, when the plant was showing signs of
recovering, a second raid again knocked it flat but only for six days.
At this point the management drew up a plan that would have plant to
75 percent production in 27 days. The recovery followed the plan
closely, reaching 75 percent in 29 days. Four days later, a third
attack sent production back to zero. The recovery capacity was still
strong, however, and was back to 51 percent in 11 days on a plan which
called for 80 percent recovery in 13 days. At this point Attack 4 hit
the plant knocking it out of production for three days. After this it
restarted production and achieved 35 percent of normal in five days,
when Attacks 5 and 6 on 28 and 29 July stopped production for the
fifth time. This time the plant's recovery was slower and five
additional attacks on the now inactive plant kept production down
until 15 October. A recovery schedule drawn up at this time provided
for 50 percent production by the end of December. Despite two light
attacks, this plan was maintained, and production had 29 percent by 21
November when Attack 14 knocked it down to zero again. Five additional
attacks kept it down until 29 December when production was resumed on
a schedule that called for 30 percent recovery in one month and 45
percent in two. Recovery had reached 15 percent when Attacks 20 and 21
on 14 January put the plant again out of action for 38 days. Recovery
started again on 21 February, following a plan that foresaw 20 percent
production in one month and 30 percent in two. This schedule was
followed fairly closely, and production had reached 20 percent on 4
April when Attack 22 shut down the plant for the ninth and final time.
Allied occupation prevented any further recovery.

The Leuna versus Allied air forces bout resembled in some ways a prize
fight. The plant was knocked down nine times but never out, and
recovered rapidly at first but more slowly as the accumulating
punishment began to tell. Its recovery capacity also slackened as
indicated by the decreasing percentages of the recovery plans. It
might be said that the plant was finally defeated on points. To have
achieved a complete knockout the Allied air forces would have had to
destroy its recovery capacity, and they did not deliver a sufficiently
strong punch to accomplish this. However the production of the plant
dropped to a trickle after the bombing started, For nearly 11 months
of operation total output was equal to 12% or so of full production
and the ability to repair the plant was dropping fast.

/History Channel Mode Off
--
"The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability
of the human mind to correlate all its contents." - H.P. Lovecraft

On 01 Jan 2004 21:42:41 GMT, (B2431) wrote:

3) Targets kept changing prorities. If the bombing missions were planned to
knock out a system or production of a specific item such as ball bearings or
oil and continued until that system or product was brought to a stop they could
then go on to the next priority. Speer said a follow up to the Schweinfurt raid
would have seriously hurt ball bearing production to the point of affecting the
war effort. However the next bombing missions were elsewhere.

This was a necessity as the repair capacity of the Germans was
rather high. Two raids on a German Coal to Oil conversion plant
dropped production to zero; 29 days later it was back up to 75% of
normal capacity. After being hit again they were back up to 51% of
capacity in 11 days and expecting to be at 80% two days later. Hit
again and it was at 35% of capacity in 5 days; the Germans were just
too good at fixing the capacity to hope it would be out for good
without just hititng it constantly and ignoring other plants at 100%
capacity.

You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would have
lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther the war
would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole primary
targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and flack.

The problem with this is that we couldn't hit all their oil
production and distribution early in the war. Few if any, escorts
would have been available for nearly all the targets that we could
hit. We would keep hitting the same half of the production capacity
that was already at zero production.

--
"The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability
of the human mind to correlate all its contents." - H.P. Lovecraft

Subject: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
From: Johnny Bravo
Date: 1/2/04 6:05 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

On 01 Jan 2004 20:33:57 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

The impact the combined bomber offensive had against POL cannot be disputed.
POL was a "Top 3" target prior to the war, but when Intelligence officials
were
replaced by American industrial "speacialists", it was dropped to #13
(IIRC).
The first Ploesti raid was undertaken not so much for the direct physical
effect, but to force Germany to defend themselves from the Baltic to the
Med.
When a serious effort was undertaken to hit German POL (and sythetic POL) in
early 1944, the results were relatively quick and devestating.

History Channel Mode On

Between 12 May 1944 and 8 May 1945 the Allied air forces dropped
185,841 tons of high-explosive bombs on 87 German oil producing
targets (16 hydrogenation plants, 9 Fischer-Tropsch plants, 40
refineries, and 22 benzol plants), flying 61,712 sorties. At first,
production losses were extremely sharp, because the plants had not
been hit before and production loss resulted no matter what sections
were hit. In later attacks bombs which hit sections of the plant
already knocked out obviously could not contribute to further
production loss. As the intensity of the attacks increased, production
continued to fall until September, despite the frantic efforts of a
350,000-man emergency repair organization. Production increased
slightly in October and still more in November, mostly because weather
conditions interfered with bombing accuracy (10.1 percent of the bombs
dropped on synthetic plants in these months were by visual sighting,
as compared with 41.5 percent during the previous four months).

The Germans proved extremely adept at reparing these facilities.
A typical example of the recovery capacity of a plant is provided by
the records of the Ammoniakwerk Merseburg Coal to Oil Conversion
Plant, at Leuna. Because of this plant's great importance to the
German war economy, it is safe to assume that repair work was not held
up by lack of material or labor.

The first attack, 12 May 1944, knocked production from 100 percent
down to zero. On 28 May, when the plant was showing signs of
recovering, a second raid again knocked it flat but only for six days.
At this point the management drew up a plan that would have plant to
75 percent production in 27 days. The recovery followed the plan
closely, reaching 75 percent in 29 days. Four days later, a third
attack sent production back to zero. The recovery capacity was still
strong, however, and was back to 51 percent in 11 days on a plan which
called for 80 percent recovery in 13 days. At this point Attack 4 hit
the plant knocking it out of production for three days. After this it
restarted production and achieved 35 percent of normal in five days,
when Attacks 5 and 6 on 28 and 29 July stopped production for the
fifth time. This time the plant's recovery was slower and five
additional attacks on the now inactive plant kept production down
until 15 October. A recovery schedule drawn up at this time provided
for 50 percent production by the end of December. Despite two light
attacks, this plan was maintained, and production had 29 percent by 21
November when Attack 14 knocked it down to zero again. Five additional
attacks kept it down until 29 December when production was resumed on
a schedule that called for 30 percent recovery in one month and 45
percent in two. Recovery had reached 15 percent when Attacks 20 and 21
on 14 January put the plant again out of action for 38 days. Recovery
started again on 21 February, following a plan that foresaw 20 percent
production in one month and 30 percent in two. This schedule was
followed fairly closely, and production had reached 20 percent on 4
April when Attack 22 shut down the plant for the ninth and final time.
Allied occupation prevented any further recovery.

The Leuna versus Allied air forces bout resembled in some ways a prize
fight. The plant was knocked down nine times but never out, and
recovered rapidly at first but more slowly as the accumulating
punishment began to tell. Its recovery capacity also slackened as
indicated by the decreasing percentages of the recovery plans. It
might be said that the plant was finally defeated on points. To have
achieved a complete knockout the Allied air forces would have had to
destroy its recovery capacity, and they did not deliver a sufficiently
strong punch to accomplish this. However the production of the plant
dropped to a trickle after the bombing started, For nearly 11 months
of operation total output was equal to 12% or so of full production
and the ability to repair the plant was dropping fast.


Of course the important point you are making is the fact that no matter how
many times we bombed and they repaired, we would always be back. In the end we
prevailed. I have sort of lost track of how many missions we flew against the
marshalling yards at Cologne. See "Death of a Marshalling Yard" on my
website.




Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Subject: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
From: Johnny Bravo
Date: 1/2/04 6:15 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

On 01 Jan 2004 21:42:41 GMT, (B2431) wrote:

3) Targets kept changing prorities. If the bombing missions were planned to
knock out a system or production of a specific item such as ball bearings or
oil and continued until that system or product was brought to a stop they
could
then go on to the next priority. Speer said a follow up to the Schweinfurt
raid
would have seriously hurt ball bearing production to the point of affecting
the
war effort. However the next bombing missions were elsewhere.

This was a necessity as the repair capacity of the Germans was
rather high. Two raids on a German Coal to Oil conversion plant
dropped production to zero; 29 days later it was back up to 75% of
normal capacity. After being hit again they were back up to 51% of
capacity in 11 days and expecting to be at 80% two days later. Hit
again and it was at 35% of capacity in 5 days; the Germans were just
too good at fixing the capacity to hope it would be out for good
without just hititng it constantly and ignoring other plants at 100%
capacity.

You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would have
lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther the
war
would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole
primary
targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and flack.

The problem with this is that we couldn't hit all their oil
production and distribution early in the war. Few if any, escorts
would have been available for nearly all the targets that we could
hit. We would keep hitting the same half of the production capacity
that was already at zero production.


When you get an enemy operation down to zero production, the point is to keep
it there at all costs.

..
Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Before talking about all we did wrong, just consider all
that we did right.

However, it is useful today to study what you did wrong to ensure we do it
right the next time. Unlike infantry and artilliary tactics that are thousands
of years old, aerial warfare is a mere infant at less than a hundred and the
historical examples to study are much fewer. Don't take it personal Art, we are
in the process of sifting through what we did wrong over Iraq less than a year
ago. Sometimes it seems us air minded people are pretty self deprecating.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

The reason German production increased is because we stopped bombing
production
facilites and switched to oil knowing that they could make all they wanted
to,but without oil could never use any of it.

Well...kind of. Ike wanted to drastically reduce German mobility once Allied
ground forces were on the continent, so he urged the elevation in priority of
POL targets in late 1943. It obviously turned out to have a greater strategic
value, but many historians believe that had Ike not asked Hap Arnold to elevate
the priority of POL, it may not have been done. Ike was thinking tactically,
but the results were on the strategic level.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

the Germans were just
too good at fixing the capacity to hope it would be out for good
without just hititng it constantly and ignoring other plants at 100%
capacity.

However, don't underestimate the overall impact of reducing a fuel production
facility to 0% for even one day.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

Subject: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
From: (BUFDRVR)
Date: 1/2/04 2:51 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

Before talking about all we did wrong, just consider all
that we did right.

However, it is useful today to study what you did wrong to ensure we do it
right the next time. Unlike infantry and artilliary tactics that are
thousands
of years old, aerial warfare is a mere infant at less than a hundred and the
historical examples to study are much fewer. Don't take it personal Art, we
are
in the process of sifting through what we did wrong over Iraq less than a
year
ago. Sometimes it seems us air minded people are pretty self deprecating.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it
harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"


I think it is a question of who's ox is gored. We should always study the past
to correct errors. But it is a case of who is doing the studying. When those
who never flew a mission or even served in the military start telling us
everything we did wrong, I resent the hubris. When skilled experienced military
airman do the studying, I perk up and listen. I think it is a matter of
perspective. But from where I sat in WW II, it sure looked as though we did a
lot more right than wrong. And we left a burning defeated Germany as proof.



Regards,

Arthur

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

On 02 Jan 2004 14:21:00 GMT, (ArtKramr) wrote:

Of course the important point you are making is the fact that no matter how
many times we bombed and they repaired, we would always be back. In the end we
prevailed. I have sort of lost track of how many missions we flew against the
marshalling yards at Cologne. See "Death of a Marshalling Yard" on my
website.

It is also important to note that we had to go back. It just wasn't
possible to knock it out one time so we could ignore it from then on
and go on to the next target. The Germans were pretty good at the
repair business, even for the Coal-Oil conversion plants which
required some specialized components to function (mainly high pressure
domes).

--
"The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability
of the human mind to correlate all its contents." - H.P. Lovecraft

On 02 Jan 2004 22:57:45 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

the Germans were just
too good at fixing the capacity to hope it would be out for good
without just hititng it constantly and ignoring other plants at 100%
capacity.

However, don't underestimate the overall impact of reducing a fuel production
facility to 0% for even one day.

"If the bombing missions were planned to knock out a system or
production of a specific item such as ball bearings or oil and
continued until that system or product was brought to a stop they
could then go on to the next priority. "

I'm not saying there wasn't an impact from cutting it to 0% even for
a short time, just that we couldn't hit it once and forget it for the
rest of the war.

--
"The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability
of the human mind to correlate all its contents." - H.P. Lovecraft