AC-130 Replacement Contemplated

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message ...
"sid" wrote in message
m...
After having been excoriated for saying that civil designs such as
those envisioned for the MC2A and ACS have no business over the
battlefield, this article gives me a bit of gratification:

There is quite a gulf between the kind of "battlefield" (or more
specifically "battle environment") that the special operations aircraft have
to operate in and that which the E-10 will be expected to survive. So I am
not really sure what your point here is...?

Brooks


Not nearly as big a gulf as you characterize. ISR assets are now
enmeshed in tactical operations. The days of these aircraft standing
off in benign airspace a la Cold War style are over:
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/111803ISR.pdf
• Without early air dominance, many ISR systems could not
have been used to optimal effect.
– Vulnerable manned aircraft like JSTARS & EP-3 operated deep
in Iraqi airspace
– Aerial refueling tankers penetrated to support ISR
– Unmanned vehicles nearly defenseless if attacked

To illustrate further, here are some comments on the expected use the
of the ACS:
http://www.defensenews.com/conferenc...3/2409450.html
....As one of the first systems to the fight, ACS will provide early
intelligence that could help shape the first stages of battle,[LtCol]
Hinsdale said Nov. 18 during a Defense News Media Group conference,
ISR Integration 2003: The Net-Centric Vision, in Arlington, Va.
For instance, it could warn forces if their port of entry has been
compromised "before we put our sons and daughters in harm's way." ...

Since the ACS will be "one of the first systems to the fight" its
axiomatic that air dominance may not be assured when the ACS "arrives
to the fight".

As I mentioned in previous posts, the aircraft in question make fine
civil transports, but shoot at them and you have death traps. They are
designed to withstand component failure;not damage.
Their electrical, avionics, and fuel systems in particular are
exceptionally vulnerable to even slight damage. In order to hold down
costs, these vulenrabilities are not being addressed as they get
shoehorned into military applications. These ain't your granddaddy's
C-135.
Later attempts to back engineer vulnerability improvements into former
transports have proven less than sucessful and expensive. The P-3
comes to mind.

So development of ths AX or whatever may prove a good thing. Also
Boeing and the other civil transport manufacturers now have a viable
commercial reason to harden their aircraft due to the MANPADS threat.

"sid" wrote in message
om...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
...
"sid" wrote in message
m...
After having been excoriated for saying that civil designs such as
those envisioned for the MC2A and ACS have no business over the
battlefield, this article gives me a bit of gratification:

There is quite a gulf between the kind of "battlefield" (or more
specifically "battle environment") that the special operations aircraft
have
to operate in and that which the E-10 will be expected to survive. So I
am
not really sure what your point here is...?

Brooks


Not nearly as big a gulf as you characterize. ISR assets are now
enmeshed in tactical operations.

Yes, but again, their exposure is an order of magnitude less than that
experienced by MC-130's and AC-130's.

The days of these aircraft standing
off in benign airspace a la Cold War style are over:
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/111803ISR.pdf

SOF platforms like the Combat Talon and Spectre operate in airspace that is
much more dangerous than that experienced by the E-8 or ARL-M's.

. Without early air dominance, many ISR systems could not
have been used to optimal effect.

Combat Talons operate in an environment that does not require "air
dominance". The AC-130's have to operate down within the MANPADS envelope to
be very effective (which is why they operate almost exclusively at
night--the last one to try daylight operations got picked off by a SAM
during ODS). When was the last time you heard of an ARL-M or E-8 doing
either?

- Vulnerable manned aircraft like JSTARS & EP-3 operated deep
in Iraqi airspace

AFAIK, the E-8 remained outside the SAM threat envelope. Not sure what the
operating altitude was for the Aries, but I'd be surprised if they ever
ventured down into the MANPADS range or within the engagement circle of
larger Iraqi SAM's.

- Aerial refueling tankers penetrated to support ISR

I know of one report of a KC-135 going *towards* Baghdad at one point, but
did it enter within range of the surviving Iraqi AD assets? Doubt it.

- Unmanned vehicles nearly defenseless if attacked

To illustrate further, here are some comments on the expected use the
of the ACS:
http://www.defensenews.com/conferenc...3/2409450.html
...As one of the first systems to the fight, ACS will provide early
intelligence that could help shape the first stages of battle,[LtCol]
Hinsdale said Nov. 18 during a Defense News Media Group conference,
ISR Integration 2003: The Net-Centric Vision, in Arlington, Va.
For instance, it could warn forces if their port of entry has been
compromised "before we put our sons and daughters in harm's way." ...

Obviously to be done using oblique imaging or UAV's reporting to the
aircraft--you don't think they intend to conduct overflights of an enemy
possessing an decent IADS, do you?


Since the ACS will be "one of the first systems to the fight" its
axiomatic that air dominance may not be assured when the ACS "arrives
to the fight".

In which case it had either be very stealthy or use long range
sensors/UAV's; otherwise it will be meat for an IADS.


As I mentioned in previous posts, the aircraft in question make fine
civil transports, but shoot at them and you have death traps.

No, you have to *hit* them in order to make them a "deathtrap". How many
KC-135's, KC-10's, E-8's, EP-3's, or ARL-M's have been hit during combat
operations to date? None. How many have even been shot *at*? Again, AFAIK,
none.

They are
designed to withstand component failure;not damage.
Their electrical, avionics, and fuel systems in particular are
exceptionally vulnerable to even slight damage. In order to hold down
costs, these vulenrabilities are not being addressed as they get
shoehorned into military applications. These ain't your granddaddy's
C-135.

Since they are not going into the hot part of the bad guy's threat envelope,
why do they need to be survivable in terms of enemy weapons effects?

Later attempts to back engineer vulnerability improvements into former
transports have proven less than sucessful and expensive. The P-3
comes to mind.

None of which have been lost due to combat operations, IIRC.


So development of ths AX or whatever may prove a good thing.

Since the SOF platforms operate in an entirely different threat environment,
I fail to see the connection to programs like ACS. Remember that the ACS
platform will be one of the current flock of business jets (Gulfstream and
Bombadier being major competititors for that role right now). The E-10 is
going to use a 767 platform. Now why do you think you know something about
the unsuitability of these systems that the combined brain power of the
USAF, USN, and US Army don't?

Brooks

Also
Boeing and the other civil transport manufacturers now have a viable
commercial reason to harden their aircraft due to the MANPADS threat.

"John" wrote in message
...
Bill McClain wrote:

Boeing has mentioned a tilt-wing design they call the Advanced Theater
Transport (aka Super Frog) that sure sounds like it fits the MX
mission
description. Doesn't look all that much like a C-130J.

http://www.boeing.com/phantom/att.html

Hmm...no vert stab and rudder.

is it just me, or does the ATT bear a strong resemblance to the
German Me 323 Gigant ?

I'ld have to come down on the "just you" side.

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
Not nearly as big a gulf as you characterize. ISR assets are now
enmeshed in tactical operations.

Yes, but again, their exposure is an order of magnitude less than that
experienced by MC-130's and AC-130's.


Sure. In the last few conflicts as the Lexington institue piece made
clear, but what about a few years down the road?

SOF platforms like the Combat Talon and Spectre operate in airspace that is
much more dangerous than that experienced by the E-8 or ARL-M's.


With long range SAM and AAW systems readily available for export its
not something that can be counted on. You may have missed this little
article in a December issue of AW&ST:
"Russian guided-weapons builder Novator is continuing to work, albeit
slowly, on an ultralong-range air-to-air missile, with a version on
offer for export to a select customer set.
Designated article 172, the weapon was included on a model of the
Su-35 derivative of the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker, on display during the
Dubai air show. The export version, known as the 172S1, has a 300-km.
(186-mi.) range, compared with 400 km. for the original version
specified by the Russian air force. The missile, which is also
referred to (perhaps erroneously) as the KS-172, is intended to engage
specific high-value targets such as airborne warning and control
aircraft, air-to-ground surveillance and tanker platforms."

- Aerial refueling tankers penetrated to support ISR

I know of one report of a KC-135 going *towards* Baghdad at one point, but
did it enter within range of the surviving Iraqi AD assets? Doubt it.

There were public reports of tanker assets going "downtown". The
commanding general flew one mission purportedly to allay tanker crews'
fears.


To illustrate further, here are some comments on the expected use the
of the ACS:
http://www.defensenews.com/conferenc...3/2409450.html
...As one of the first systems to the fight, ACS will provide early
intelligence that could help shape the first stages of battle,[LtCol]
Hinsdale said Nov. 18 during a Defense News Media Group conference,
ISR Integration 2003: The Net-Centric Vision, in Arlington, Va.
For instance, it could warn forces if their port of entry has been
compromised "before we put our sons and daughters in harm's way." ...

Obviously to be done using oblique imaging or UAV's reporting to the
aircraft--you don't think they intend to conduct overflights of an enemy
possessing an decent IADS, do you?


And against an S-300(or equivalent) capapble opponent? They may have
to be risked to get the job done.
"UAV Wrangling" from aircraft is still in the early stages. Given
budget realities its likely going to be a capapbility somewhere up the
"spiral". Until then the standoff ranges will be measured for the
aircraft.

As I mentioned in previous posts, the aircraft in question make fine
civil transports, but shoot at them and you have death traps.

No, you have to *hit* them in order to make them a "deathtrap". How many
KC-135's, KC-10's, E-8's, EP-3's, or ARL-M's have been hit during combat
operations to date? None. How many have even been shot *at*? Again, AFAIK,
none.

As improtant as these aircraft are bcoming to our operational
doctrine, and as few of them as there are or will be, these vulnerable
aircraft will offer a rich target for an opponent with a big payback
no matter the cost to neutralize them. Looks like Novator for one is
already moving in on the business.

Since they are not going into the hot part of the bad guy's threat envelope,
why do they need to be survivable in terms of enemy weapons effects?

Because it appears the threats will be reaching out to them.

Later attempts to back engineer vulnerability improvements into former
transports have proven less than sucessful and expensive. The P-3
comes to mind.

None of which have been lost due to combat operations, IIRC.

Two P-3s were lost in 1968 to ground fire actually. Likely because of
vulenrability to hydrodynamic ram after a small caliber round hit
them. Same vulnerabilty that turned the DHL 'bus into a roman candle
after a small shrapnel hit. Same vulnerability that all civil
transports share.

Since the SOF platforms operate in an entirely different threat environment,
I fail to see the connection to programs like ACS. Remember that the ACS
platform will be one of the current flock of business jets (Gulfstream and
Bombadier being major competititors for that role right now). The E-10 is
going to use a 767 platform. Now why do you think you know something about
the unsuitability of these systems that the combined brain power of the
USAF, USN, and US Army don't?

Read through this selection of links and you will see that
vulnerabilty is a perennial back burner issue...Until losses bring it
front an center.
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/
This one in particular discusses historical lapses in this regard:
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/8.pdf

"sid" wrote in message
m...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
Not nearly as big a gulf as you characterize. ISR assets are now
enmeshed in tactical operations.

Yes, but again, their exposure is an order of magnitude less than that
experienced by MC-130's and AC-130's.


Sure. In the last few conflicts as the Lexington institue piece made
clear, but what about a few years down the road?

At least two of your Lexington Institute "pieces" have endorsed the ACS and
E-10, with their commercial aircraft platforms--what does this say about
your theory that using commercial derivitive platforms is unacceptable?

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/031218.asp

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/031211.asp


SOF platforms like the Combat Talon and Spectre operate in airspace that
is
much more dangerous than that experienced by the E-8 or ARL-M's.


With long range SAM and AAW systems readily available for export its
not something that can be counted on. You may have missed this little
article in a December issue of AW&ST:
"Russian guided-weapons builder Novator is continuing to work, albeit
slowly, on an ultralong-range air-to-air missile, with a version on
offer for export to a select customer set.
Designated article 172, the weapon was included on a model of the
Su-35 derivative of the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker, on display during the
Dubai air show. The export version, known as the 172S1, has a 300-km.
(186-mi.) range, compared with 400 km. for the original version
specified by the Russian air force. The missile, which is also
referred to (perhaps erroneously) as the KS-172, is intended to engage
specific high-value targets such as airborne warning and control
aircraft, air-to-ground surveillance and tanker platforms."

What was there to miss? The acknowlegement that the pace of development on
this rather strange weapon is "slow"? How would it be targeted? 300 to 400
km is an awful long way for a fighter radar to "see", much less target.


- Aerial refueling tankers penetrated to support ISR

I know of one report of a KC-135 going *towards* Baghdad at one point,
but
did it enter within range of the surviving Iraqi AD assets? Doubt it.

There were public reports of tanker assets going "downtown". The
commanding general flew one mission purportedly to allay tanker crews'
fears.

Sure--going "downtown" after the IADS, or what was left of it pre-war, was
further destroyed. We lost *one* aircraft over Baghdad--an A-10 to an
SA-7/SA-18, IIRC. How much of a threat do you think that SA-18 was to any
KC-135's orbiting at 25K or so feet?



To illustrate further, here are some comments on the expected use the
of the ACS:
http://www.defensenews.com/conferenc...3/2409450.html
...As one of the first systems to the fight, ACS will provide early
intelligence that could help shape the first stages of battle,[LtCol]
Hinsdale said Nov. 18 during a Defense News Media Group conference,
ISR Integration 2003: The Net-Centric Vision, in Arlington, Va.
For instance, it could warn forces if their port of entry has been
compromised "before we put our sons and daughters in harm's way." ...

Obviously to be done using oblique imaging or UAV's reporting to the
aircraft--you don't think they intend to conduct overflights of an enemy
possessing an decent IADS, do you?


And against an S-300(or equivalent) capapble opponent?

Then you use your UAV's--that is what they are for, to go where manned
platforms shouldn't/can't.

They may have
to be risked to get the job done.

I don't see the USAF placing its RC-135's at great immediate risk, nor do I
see the EP-3's doing that. As to ACS, remember that it is intended to
replace ARL-M (and the remaining RC-12's)--that "L" means low, as in "low
intensity". Nobody is going to be sortying them into an IADS environment.
Period.

"UAV Wrangling" from aircraft is still in the early stages. Given
budget realities its likely going to be a capapbility somewhere up the
"spiral". Until then the standoff ranges will be measured for the
aircraft.

Let's get this straight--you see a strong potential of AAM's that can engage
our E-10's at 300-400 km, but you think managing an existing UAV from an
airborne operator's station is too tough to handle? I find that a bit hard
to digest.


As I mentioned in previous posts, the aircraft in question make fine
civil transports, but shoot at them and you have death traps.

No, you have to *hit* them in order to make them a "deathtrap". How many
KC-135's, KC-10's, E-8's, EP-3's, or ARL-M's have been hit during combat
operations to date? None. How many have even been shot *at*? Again,
AFAIK,
none.

As improtant as these aircraft are bcoming to our operational
doctrine, and as few of them as there are or will be, these vulnerable
aircraft will offer a rich target for an opponent with a big payback
no matter the cost to neutralize them. Looks like Novator for one is
already moving in on the business.

I would not be buying too much stock in that enterprise just yet.


Since they are not going into the hot part of the bad guy's threat
envelope,
why do they need to be survivable in terms of enemy weapons effects?

Because it appears the threats will be reaching out to them.

Your argument that this is the case is less than convincing so far.


Later attempts to back engineer vulnerability improvements into former
transports have proven less than sucessful and expensive. The P-3
comes to mind.

None of which have been lost due to combat operations, IIRC.

Two P-3s were lost in 1968 to ground fire actually. Likely because of
vulenrability to hydrodynamic ram after a small caliber round hit
them. Same vulnerabilty that turned the DHL 'bus into a roman candle
after a small shrapnel hit. Same vulnerability that all civil
transports share.

Checking around, there was one confirmed shoot-down of a P-3 in SEA (both
following incidents VP-26 Orions). One was an "unknown" (may have very well
gone down due to accident), the other took a burst of .50 cal while doing a
*low level* pass over a suspect LCM, which set set no. 4 engine on fire. The
crew apparently tried to put as much distance between them and the bad guys
as possible before attempting to ditch, and the wing snapped in the vicinity
of the aforementioned fire. Note that these guys were doing visual recon
from low level--they did not have the super synthetic aperture radars we
have today. The EP-3 does not conduct low level missions, nor do the
ARL-M/RC-12. So what is the applicability of the loss of one P-3 that got
hammered by .50 cal (which can be tough on any airframe, even those designed
to military specs--my brother lost a UH-1 Dustoff bird during Lam Son 719 to
a .50 cal, and more than a couple of A-1's, etc., were allegedly brought
down by 12.7mm and *below* calibers) to current programs like the E-10 and
ACS?



Since the SOF platforms operate in an entirely different threat
environment,
I fail to see the connection to programs like ACS. Remember that the ACS
platform will be one of the current flock of business jets (Gulfstream
and
Bombadier being major competititors for that role right now). The E-10
is
going to use a 767 platform. Now why do you think you know something
about
the unsuitability of these systems that the combined brain power of the
USAF, USN, and US Army don't?

Read through this selection of links and you will see that
vulnerabilty is a perennial back burner issue...Until losses bring it
front an center.

Great--for aircraft going into the thick of the combat. E-10 and ACS won't
be.

Brooks

http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/
This one in particular discusses historical lapses in this regard:
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/8.pdf

Other than additing bomb carrying capability, I don't see any use in
improving it.
"sid" wrote in message
m...
After having been excoriated for saying that civil designs such as
those envisioned for the MC2A and ACS have no business over the
battlefield, this article gives me a bit of gratification:

USAF Plans Serious Look At Replacing Special Ops Aircraft
By Marc Selinger
February 6, 2004

The U.S. Air Force plans to start taking a serious look at potential
replacements for several C-130 variants used by its special operations
forces, a service representative said Feb. 5.

Maj. Gen. John Dorris said the Bush Administration's fiscal 2005
budget request, submitted to Congress Feb. 2, contains "seed money" to
develop concepts for an "MX" aircraft, which would replace the
MC-130E/H airdrop/transport aircraft, and an "AX" which would replace
the AC-130 gunship. The analysis could take about two years.

With surface-to-air threats becoming increasingly sophisticated, the
Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) believes it will need to
begin fielding the new aircraft in about 2015 as a replacement for its
aging Lockheed Martin C-130 variants, Dorris said. He spoke to
reporters after speaking at a special operations conference sponsored
by the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA).

"After 2015, the ability of the C-130 as it's currently configured,
even with enhancements, is not going to be able to go into a lot of
the airspace that it needs to go into," he said.

The MX is envisioned as a long-range aircraft that is "able to do the
mission in one period of darkness," Dorris said. The latest thinking
for the AX is that it would be a "mothership that sends out sensors."
The sensors would then report back to the mothership, which would send
out "lethal and/or non-lethal projectiles," possibly small, guided
missiles.

A new aerial refueling capability will also be needed by AFSOC but
probably later than 2015, Dorris said.

To address AFSOC's tanker shortfall in the interim, about 27 MC-130H
Combat Talon IIs are being modified to be capable of refueling. That
work will be completed by about 2007. AFSOC's MC-130E Combat Talon Is
already can perform the tanker mission.

Hmm, maybe it's just you. To me it bears a strong resemblence to a
C-130.

John Keeney wrote:


is it just me, or does the ATT bear a strong resemblance to the
German Me 323 Gigant ?

I'ld have to come down on the "just you" side.

Oh Well, thats why I asked.

and JK isn't it nice to hear the C-130's again ? some but not all
of the local KYANG is back from deployment, and they are flying
over the homestead often, love to hear that hummmmmm. of the
turboprops when they fly in trail...

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message ...
"sid" wrote in message
m...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
Not nearly as big a gulf as you characterize. ISR assets are now
enmeshed in tactical operations.

At least two of your Lexington Institute "pieces" have endorsed the ACS and
E-10, with their commercial aircraft platforms--what does this say about
your theory that using commercial derivitive platforms is unacceptable?

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/031218.asp

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/031211.asp

One "piece" does advocate the E-10. The other is a bit of an oblique
endorsement of the G-450 over the EMB-145. It doesn't advocate civil
airframes for the mission per se.
Neither bears any real relationshop to the ISR lessons learned
presentation.
"Russian guided-weapons builder Novator is continuing to work, albeit
slowly, on an ultralong-range air-to-air missile, with a version on
offer for export to a select customer set.
referred to (perhaps erroneously) as the KS-172, is intended to engage
specific high-value targets such as airborne warning and control
aircraft, air-to-ground surveillance and tanker platforms."

What was there to miss? The acknowlegement that the pace of development on
this rather strange weapon is "slow"? How would it be targeted? 300 to 400
km is an awful long way for a fighter radar to "see", much less target.

The fact that there is a market for the capability to counter our ISR
assets and someone that is working on providing that capability is not
something to be missed.
Sure--going "downtown" after the IADS, or what was left of it pre-war, was
further destroyed. We lost *one* aircraft over Baghdad--an A-10 to an
SA-7/SA-18, IIRC. How much of a threat do you think that SA-18 was to any
KC-135's orbiting at 25K or so feet?

This is one of the accounts:
"In a risky bid to extend strike missions by making it easier for
planes to refuel, he ordered tanker aircraft -- which are relatively
vulnerable, because they lack their own warning radar and armaments --
to venture into Iraqi airspace, even though Iraq's dense air defense
network had not been eliminated."

Apparently this was early, before dominance was assured. I'll see if I
can find the AW$ST issue that reported the story. Do you think that
mag is a somewhat credible source?

To illustrate further, here are some comments on the expected use the
of the ACS:
http://www.defensenews.com/conferenc...3/2409450.html
...As one of the first systems to the fight, ACS will provide early
intelligence that could help shape the first stages of battle,[LtCol]
Hinsdale said Nov. 18 during a Defense News Media Group conference,
ISR Integration 2003: The Net-Centric Vision, in Arlington, Va.
For instance, it could warn forces if their port of entry has been
compromised "before we put our sons and daughters in harm's way." ...

Obviously to be done using oblique imaging or UAV's reporting to the
aircraft--you don't think they intend to conduct overflights of an enemy
possessing an decent IADS, do you?
Well, if it has to be done...The OP-2E story is a bit of a cuationary
tale.
It appears that there are (or at least were when this was written)real
issues with just such analysis abot the survivability of these
programs:
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/SIGINTWP.pdf

Let's get this straight--you see a strong potential of AAM's that can engage
our E-10's at 300-400 km, but you think managing an existing UAV from an
airborne operator's station is too tough to handle? I find that a bit hard
to digest.

I don't think its too hard to handle; our flawed budget process may
not get the capability to the warfighters in a timely fashion.
Regardless of when we field an operationally workable airborne
controlled UAV force the GMTI 767-400 and the ACS configured EMB-145
or G-450 are expected to use onboard sensors. for decades to come. In
the years ahead their vulnerabilities could well be exploited.
No, you have to *hit* them in order to make them a "deathtrap". How many
KC-135's, KC-10's, E-8's, EP-3's, or ARL-M's have been hit during combat
operations to date? None. How many have even been shot *at*? Again,
AFAIK, none.
So? That proves we have been up against inept opponents in recent
scraps thats all. As an FYI the Navy is moving the P-3s away from the
overland tactical support role.


Two P-3s were lost in 1968 to ground fire actually. Likely because of
vulenrability to hydrodynamic ram after a small caliber round hit
them. Same vulnerabilty that turned the DHL 'bus into a roman candle
after a small shrapnel hit. Same vulnerability that all civil
transports share.

Checking around, there was one confirmed shoot-down of a P-3 in SEA (both
following incidents VP-26 Orions). One was an "unknown" (may have very well
gone down due to accident), the other took a burst of .50 cal while doing a
*low level* pass over a suspect LCM, which set set no. 4 engine on fire. The
crew apparently tried to put as much distance between them and the bad guys
as possible before attempting to ditch, and the wing snapped in the vicinity
of the aforementioned fire. Note that these guys were doing visual recon
from low level--they did not have the super synthetic aperture radars we
have today. The EP-3 does not conduct low level missions, nor do the
ARL-M/RC-12. So what is the applicability of the loss of one P-3 that got
hammered by .50 cal (which can be tough on any airframe, even those designed
to military specs--my brother lost a UH-1 Dustoff bird during Lam Son 719 to
a .50 cal, and more than a couple of A-1's, etc., were allegedly brought
down by 12.7mm and *below* calibers) to current programs like the E-10 and
ACS?

The unknown was almost certainly shot down. Also, if you read the
account of the second carefully you will see it wasn't an engine fire
but an uncontrollable fuel tank fire. They weren't trying to ditch,
but instead make a small field on an island which they had a visual
on. The wing burned through as they were about to land.
Hydrodynamic ram killed that airplane and its crew. The navy tried an
abortive program to mitigate the effects with foam in the tanks but it
was a mess and they took the foam back out. The 767 EMB-145 and G-450
have no protection whatsoever against hydrodynamic ram fires. Not that
it imposssible to engineer in though:
http://jas.jcs.mil/news/newsletter_2000_spring.htm
Did you read this BTW:
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/8.pdf
In it you will see where a lack of recognition to vulnerability issues
caused the loss of many aircraft in Vietnam.



Great--for aircraft going into the thick of the combat. E-10 and ACS won't
be.

They threat will be reaching out to them in the next few years.

"sid" wrote in message
om...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
...
"sid" wrote in message
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"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
Not nearly as big a gulf as you characterize. ISR assets are now
enmeshed in tactical operations.

At least two of your Lexington Institute "pieces" have endorsed the ACS
and
E-10, with their commercial aircraft platforms--what does this say about
your theory that using commercial derivitive platforms is unacceptable?

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/031218.asp

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/031211.asp

One "piece" does advocate the E-10. The other is a bit of an oblique
endorsement of the G-450 over the EMB-145. It doesn't advocate civil
airframes for the mission per se.

They sure do seem to advocate the use of those commercial airframes in both
cases.

Neither bears any real relationshop to the ISR lessons learned
presentation.
"Russian guided-weapons builder Novator is continuing to work, albeit
slowly, on an ultralong-range air-to-air missile, with a version on
offer for export to a select customer set.
referred to (perhaps erroneously) as the KS-172, is intended to engage
specific high-value targets such as airborne warning and control
aircraft, air-to-ground surveillance and tanker platforms."

What was there to miss? The acknowlegement that the pace of development
on
this rather strange weapon is "slow"? How would it be targeted? 300 to
400
km is an awful long way for a fighter radar to "see", much less target.

The fact that there is a market for the capability to counter our ISR
assets and someone that is working on providing that capability is not
something to be missed.

The fact that the USAF,USN, USA, etc., are not going to place those assets
in a situation of undue risk is patently obvious. The fact that your Russian
"super AAM" is nothing more than a concept at present does not change that.

Sure--going "downtown" after the IADS, or what was left of it pre-war,
was
further destroyed. We lost *one* aircraft over Baghdad--an A-10 to an
SA-7/SA-18, IIRC. How much of a threat do you think that SA-18 was to
any
KC-135's orbiting at 25K or so feet?

This is one of the accounts:
"In a risky bid to extend strike missions by making it easier for
planes to refuel, he ordered tanker aircraft -- which are relatively
vulnerable, because they lack their own warning radar and armaments --
to venture into Iraqi airspace, even though Iraq's dense air defense
network had not been eliminated."

Apparently this was early, before dominance was assured. I'll see if I
can find the AW$ST issue that reported the story. Do you think that
mag is a somewhat credible source?

Credible, yes. But what does he mean by "eliminated"? We know that they
continued to pop off MANPADS even as the troops and marines entered into the
city--but again, those MANPADS were no threat to the tankers.


To illustrate further, here are some comments on the expected use
the
of the ACS:
http://www.defensenews.com/conferenc...3/2409450.html
...As one of the first systems to the fight, ACS will provide
early
intelligence that could help shape the first stages of
battle,[LtCol]
Hinsdale said Nov. 18 during a Defense News Media Group
conference,
ISR Integration 2003: The Net-Centric Vision, in Arlington, Va.
For instance, it could warn forces if their port of entry has been
compromised "before we put our sons and daughters in harm's way."
....

Obviously to be done using oblique imaging or UAV's reporting to the
aircraft--you don't think they intend to conduct overflights of an
enemy
possessing an decent IADS, do you?
Well, if it has to be done...The OP-2E story is a bit of a cuationary
tale.

"The OP-2E story"??

It appears that there are (or at least were when this was written)real
issues with just such analysis abot the survivability of these
programs:
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/SIGINTWP.pdf

Let's get this straight--you see a strong potential of AAM's that can
engage
our E-10's at 300-400 km, but you think managing an existing UAV from an
airborne operator's station is too tough to handle? I find that a bit
hard
to digest.

I don't think its too hard to handle; our flawed budget process may
not get the capability to the warfighters in a timely fashion.

That would be the same "flawed process" that has enabled us to leap ahead of
every other nation in the world in terms of these capabilities?

Regardless of when we field an operationally workable airborne
controlled UAV force the GMTI 767-400 and the ACS configured EMB-145
or G-450 are expected to use onboard sensors. for decades to come. In
the years ahead their vulnerabilities could well be exploited.

What vulnerabilities? The supposed vulnerability to a missile that has yet
been built, guided by a system not yet developed, while engaging in
overflights through an IADS that just won't happen? Not much of a
"vulnerability" you have illustrated there.

No, you have to *hit* them in order to make them a "deathtrap". How
many
KC-135's, KC-10's, E-8's, EP-3's, or ARL-M's have been hit during
combat
operations to date? None. How many have even been shot *at*? Again,
AFAIK, none.

So? That proves we have been up against inept opponents in recent
scraps thats all.

Ummm...no, that could also be proof that we don't place these assets into a
position where they are readily engaged.

As an FYI the Navy is moving the P-3s away from the
overland tactical support role.

What?



Two P-3s were lost in 1968 to ground fire actually. Likely because of
vulenrability to hydrodynamic ram after a small caliber round hit
them. Same vulnerabilty that turned the DHL 'bus into a roman candle
after a small shrapnel hit. Same vulnerability that all civil
transports share.

Checking around, there was one confirmed shoot-down of a P-3 in SEA
(both
following incidents VP-26 Orions). One was an "unknown" (may have very
well
gone down due to accident), the other took a burst of .50 cal while
doing a
*low level* pass over a suspect LCM, which set set no. 4 engine on fire.
The
crew apparently tried to put as much distance between them and the bad
guys
as possible before attempting to ditch, and the wing snapped in the
vicinity
of the aforementioned fire. Note that these guys were doing visual recon
from low level--they did not have the super synthetic aperture radars we
have today. The EP-3 does not conduct low level missions, nor do the
ARL-M/RC-12. So what is the applicability of the loss of one P-3 that
got
hammered by .50 cal (which can be tough on any airframe, even those
designed
to military specs--my brother lost a UH-1 Dustoff bird during Lam Son
719 to
a .50 cal, and more than a couple of A-1's, etc., were allegedly brought
down by 12.7mm and *below* calibers) to current programs like the E-10
and
ACS?

The unknown was almost certainly shot down.

Got some proof of that? And again--we no longer plan to use *any* of these
platforms in a direct visual recon role like they were used for in Market
Time. So how does this apply to supporting your assertions?

Also, if you read the
account of the second carefully you will see it wasn't an engine fire
but an uncontrollable fuel tank fire. They weren't trying to ditch,
but instead make a small field on an island which they had a visual
on.

Gee, the VP-26 vet who wrote up the description I read must have had all of
his facts wrong. He indicated that the engine was lost, and the fire was in
that vicinity--whether or not it also involved the fuel tankage is a moot
point.

The wing burned through as they were about to land.
Hydrodynamic ram killed that airplane and its crew.

FYI, *any* airplane with an uncontrolled fire in its engine/wing is
susceptable to subsequent structural failure. And you ignored the fact that
aircraft designed exclusively for military use have also been lost to .50
cal and below hits--so where is this much greater vulnerability of the P-3
in view of that fact?

The navy tried an
abortive program to mitigate the effects with foam in the tanks but it
was a mess and they took the foam back out. The 767 EMB-145 and G-450
have no protection whatsoever against hydrodynamic ram fires. Not that
it imposssible to engineer in though:
http://jas.jcs.mil/news/newsletter_2000_spring.htm
Did you read this BTW:
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/8.pdf
In it you will see where a lack of recognition to vulnerability issues
caused the loss of many aircraft in Vietnam.

I also note that in the first few sentences the authors identify the
difference between "susceptability" and "vulnerability"--the latter does not
come into play if the former is controlled such that hits don't occur--which
will be the predominant environment that the ACS and E-10 will operate in.




Great--for aircraft going into the thick of the combat. E-10 and ACS
won't
be.

They threat will be reaching out to them in the next few years.

So you say. Now go back and tell us what *you* think the "L" in ARL-M means.

Brooks