French block airlift of British troops to Basra

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:
On Tue, 14 Oct 2003 14:08:58 GMT, Vince Brannigan
wrote:


I'm just back from Glasgow.


Remission of sentence is a wonderful thing.


Hey Glasgow's always fun and I got to go to Dundee and see the RRS
DISCOVERY and the HMS UNICORN, not to mention the site of the Tay bridge
disaster. I'm trying to cook up a deal to help advise them on fire
safety in historic ships.


Vince

"Vince Brannigan" wrote in message
...

"Whereas originally the name Cymry seems to have shared the same
British'/`Welsh' ambiguity of Britannia, Britones and so forth, by the
late eleventh century it is likely that Cymry was used solely to denote
the Welsh' and `Wales', being distinguished more clearly from the qually
long-established terms Brython and Prydain, which denoted `Britons' and
"Britain' respectively.(108) One could perhaps go further and argue that
the change in Latin terminology both reflected and helped to reinforce
an increasing assumption on the part of Welsh literati of a need to
distinguish more sharply between the twin elements in national identity,
namely, between a British dimension which defined the Welsh in relation
to the past and the future and, on the other hand, a Welsh dimension
which linked them to a specific territorial space in the present.(109)

British or Welsh? National Identity in Twelfth-Century Wales(*).

You're left with horribly complex ideas about the pre Roman natives of the
British archipelago and their relationship with a wider Western European
culture.

Did the 'British' tribes see themselves as part of a culture that extended
beyond their shores or did they see themselves as tribal where 'the people'
ended at the forest.

In reality the idea of the 'nation state' emerged in Western Europe in the
fifteenth century, a good illustration being the Hundred Years War which
started as a fight between feudal magnates and ended as a war between
England and France.

--
William Black
------------------
On time, on budget, or works;
Pick any two from three

William Black wrote:

In reality the idea of the 'nation state' emerged in Western Europe in the
fifteenth century, a good illustration being the Hundred Years War which
started as a fight between feudal magnates and ended as a war between
England and France.

nation states had of course emerged elsewhere at earlier times. Nations
, the latin "gens "had a long-standing albeit complex development
process.

Vince

On Tue, 14 Oct 2003 14:08:58 GMT, Vince Brannigan
wrote:



The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:
The myths of the American revolution, however, are fundamental to American
self-image and the definition of American culture and society in a
manner that nobody can claim for Robin Hood in the UK.


I'm not so sure. (although, I agree about Robin Hood). I'm just back
from Glasgow. I stood in a crowded pub in Shawlands for the Scotland
Lithuania match and then the England Turkey match. Yes I know they are
drunken footy fans, but the invocation of anti-english mythology was
fascinating. When the Scots started suggesting that the Turks break
English necks I inquired as to the basis of the hostility. They were
mildly surprised that a Yank wouldn't "hate the buggers as much as we
do". When I mildly suggested compound fractures of the English legs
would be sufficient and that permanent paralysis was unnecessary, it was
simlply accepted that I didn't understand just how deep Scotland's
grievances ran. The mythology of Culloden was invoked, as well as more
recent events dealing tieh sporitng contests that I was not aware of.
IIRC Further discussion followed after bioremediation of flammable
ethanol, but I'm not sure we advanced the ball any further.

Vince


Sounds rather like Southerners talking about the "Yankees". No real
hatred, but a casual, traditional demeaning.

Al Minyard

(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) wrote in message ...
On 12 Oct 2003 11:34:00 -0700, (Michael P. Reed)

The origins of British strategy date back to the summer of 1775
(prior to that they did not have one),

On the contrary, I suggest you actually aquaint yourself with Gage's
correspondance with the Northern Department in 1773-75, and the
increase in troop movements to Boston by the War Office which
resulted..

I suggest you acquaint yourself with sarcasm, Mr. Bailey.


when Bill Legge, a.k.a. 2nd
Earl of Dartmouth and Secretary of American Affairs in the Colonial
Office had some discussions with some folks knowledgable (or more
correctly with folks who thought themselves knowledgeable) of affairs
in America. After which, he came up with his grand plan of campaign.
Writing to Thomas Gage about it in August, he suggested that two
armies ought to be assembled. One in Boston, which was to be
reinforced, and the other, and Main, to occupy New York City, which
was to be a piece of cake since it was loyal.

And this plan was carried out to the point of Howe's force taking New
York while Boston was evacuated.... shurely shome mishtake if the plan
was to occupy Boston?

Uh, read on McDuff. The decision was taken by Howe (and Dartmouth
after he received Gage's pessimistic reports) to alter the plan by
taking the army *out* of Boston, and landing it at Rhode Island.

The British made no attempt to return to Boston
after the spring of 1786. So much for it being a central aim of their
strategy.

Strawman. I never claimed it was British strategy to capture Boston
first, but rather to operate against New England. Your argument is
also an induction, since circumstances not altogether under British
control intervened to prevent it. I do believe that this guy named
George, who had some friends by the name of Nathanael, John, Bill, and
Harry, had something to do with it.

screams for actions for protection. British officialdom missed the
boat twice. The first clue that the rebellion was not centered in New
England was the invasion of Canada. It being obvious that the army
which did so was not composed of New Englanders (other than a few from
New Hampshire).

And more from Connecticut and New York. Guess where the first of
those states is. Yes, that's right, New England.

New England Troops made up half the invasion forces. The other half
were composed of troops from New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
Virginia. Your point?

As mentioned, Howe pulled out (precipitacely) in March of '76 after
Henry Knox had drug some former British heavy artillery from
Ticonderoga to the heights overlooking the RN's anchorages in Boston
Harbor. Howe was to have pulled out before the onset of winter, but
had decided, for reasons that are really not clear, to remain, and
I've a sneaking suspicion that he had intended on keeping a garrison
in Boston despite the plan not too. We'll never know, though.

But we do know what Howe was recommending to Germain, and we know what
he actually did, and neither of these involved any plan to continue to
occupy Boston.

Read more carefully. I never said that Howe had a plan for occupying
Boston. I wrote that Howe's alteration to the original Dartmouth/Gage
plan was to *remove* the army from Boston and have it operate from
Rhode Island instead.

That you prefer to give scope to unfounded speculation
on this point rather than adhere to the evidence of the historical
record is instructive.

William Howe to Lord Dartmouth, October 9th, 1775

"In answer to your lordship's first query [presumably of August 2nd]
vizt. 'Whether the ensuing campaign should open from hence with the
whole force,' I beg leave to say that the opening of the campaign from
this quarter would be attended with great hazard, as well from the
strength of the country as from the entrenched positions the rebels
have taken. . . and from the difficulty of access further into the
country they would have every advantage in the defence of it on their
side."

Clearly, Howe was less than thrilled with operating out of Boston.
Which is why he later adds,

"But I am humbly of the opinion that by the entire evacuation of this
town and taking hold of Rhode Island with the force propsed for this
place, the army would be better connected and the corps would act with
greater effect on that side, from whence it might possibly penetrate
into the country [i.e. New England]; whereas in this station [Boston]
it could only defend the post and perhaps make some few incursions for
fresh provisions without the power of reducing the inhabitants."

[snip long, patronising and turgid exposition]

Snipped conveniently because it destroys your above argument.
Patronizing? I will readily admit my original response to Mr Sharrock
was indeed so, though not consciously intended, and for that I do
apologize. As for my response to you, my "exposition" while
tongue-in-cheek at times was otherwise not patronizing (unlike one
comment after another of yours--a dirty habit I've noticed on your
part before). Turgid? I prefer "informative and contextual." Trust
me Mr. Bailey when I tell you that I gave the short version. Nine
years of bloody research with few to discuss it does make one tend to
expouse when the opportunity arises. g

I would not subject myself to this to begin with if I didn't have some
clue about using responsible primary and secondary sources to form my
opinion.

Given that you have already argued two maybe three strawmen, misquoted
me several times, exhibited inductive reasoning, and called my
knowledge and objectiveness into question without the slightest shred
of supporting evidence to back it all up, I'm not entirely sanguine
about your "informed" opinion.

I've no intention of persisting if you want to indulge
yourself by lecturing an imaginary class of five-year olds.

In other words, you cannot dispute my points. But you needn't be so
childish about it.

You might
also want to diversify your reading of British strategy from sources
which make an effort to understand the context and internal logic
involved.

Er, Mr. Bailey, the entire point of my "exposition" *was* to put into
context. By the by, you are making some rather dangerous assumptions
about my "understanding."

Macksey wouldn't be a bad start, although he's not perfect.

And I am patronizing? Ok, so be it. Here be a few sources of light
reading which I found to be a tad useful in writing the afore snipped
"exposition."

Davies, K.G. ed.; DOCUMENTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION;
Isish Academic Press, Dublin, 1972-1981 It is basically the Colonial
Office Papers in published form, and comes in 22 volumes, but don't
worry too much only about half are actual letters. The remaining
volumes are mostly callenders.

For the naval content (specifically the "war scare") you'll want NAVAL
DOCUMENTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION which has been published by the
Dep't of the Navy. The volumes you want are five and six. Great
stuff. Each being over 1,000 pages in length. Still kicking myself
for not picking up the first eight (and very out of print) volumes
when I had the chance. You might also look in THE SANDWICH PAPERS for
some interesting tid bits not published in NDAR. The Parliamentary
Register for 1776 is an excellent source for the political debates
(the debate of Halloween 1776 is quite engrossing). You'll find the
fiscal information their as well, but the JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
LORDS is better organized. In the volume for 1779, you'll find the
entire correspondece for one year (1776-1777) between Germain and Howe
printed in its entirety. Most, but not all are in Davies.

If you wish, you can then purchase an airline ticket to Detroit, rent
a car, then drive to Ann Arbor to peruse the George Germain Papers (as
well as Gage's, Dartmouths, Knox's, Clinton's, Carleton's and many
other's as well) in the William L. Clement's library [you'll need to
forms of picture ID though], but you may still find a good deal
(though truncated and usually summerized) of Germain's and Knox's
correspondence in volume six of the Historical Manuscripts
Commission's REPORT OF MANUSCRIPTS IN VARIOUS COLLECTIONS.

That ought to serve you as a starter. FWIW, the only factoids in my
"exposition" coming from secondary sources was the mention of
Portugal's scratchiness with Spain (NAVIES, DETERRENCE, AND AMERICAN
INDEPENDENCE by Nicholas Tracy), and Burgoyne's "co-opting" of
Carleton's strategy (Gerald Howson's BURGOYNE OF SARATOGA). I
heartily recommend both books.

Now, what was this about Paine? Never really studied him.

Shame; you seem to have a good handle on prejudicial
characterisations of British strategy and policy which might be based
on his particular propaganda.

More name calling. My but you are a virtual cornucopia of fallacies,
Mr. Bailey. If you are unable to argue the point, concede the point.

--
Michael P. Reed

On Tue, 14 Oct 2003 17:20:51 GMT, Vince Brannigan
wrote:

I'm just back from Glasgow.

Remission of sentence is a wonderful thing.

Hey Glasgow's always fun

It's alright, Vince, you're back in civilization now. No need to make
patently ridiculous PublicRelationStatements in order to get out of
mob of wegians alive.

and I got to go to Dundee and see the RRS
DISCOVERY and the HMS UNICORN,

I used to live in Dundee, but I missed out on Unicorn. Discovery was
interesting, if only to check out the officer's berths and reflect on
the Edwardian class divide. Scott used to rope off the messes in huts
in the Antarctic as well, which I find a little distasteful with my
modern sensibilities, but was probably a simple reflection of the
times with no specifically demeaning intent. I have to say I always
preferred Shackleton myself, especially after reading about his small
boat journey from Elephant Island as a kid.

That was a _real_ sea story.

not to mention the site of the Tay bridge
disaster.

Victorian engineering at it's best. For full authenticity don't
forget to recite McGonagall as you cross it courtesy of Scotrail.

I'm trying to cook up a deal to help advise them on fire
safety in historic ships.

Tell Captain Haddock to put his pipe out. That should cut down the
premiums straight away.

Gaviin Bailey

--

"Will Boogie Down For Food".- Sign held by Disco Stu outside the unemployment office.

On 14 Oct 2003 22:17:37 -0700, (Michael P. Reed)
wrote:

The origins of British strategy date back to the summer of 1775
(prior to that they did not have one),

On the contrary, I suggest you actually aquaint yourself with Gage's
correspondance with the Northern Department in 1773-75, and the
increase in troop movements to Boston by the War Office which
resulted..

I suggest you acquaint yourself with sarcasm, Mr. Bailey.

I suggest you aquaint yourself with the result of Gage's return to
Britain in 1774. That British strategy to suppress colonial agitation
failed does not mean that didn't have a strategy.

And this plan was carried out to the point of Howe's force taking New
York while Boston was evacuated.... shurely shome mishtake if the plan
was to occupy Boston?

Uh, read on McDuff. The decision was taken by Howe (and Dartmouth
after he received Gage's pessimistic reports) to alter the plan by
taking the army *out* of Boston, and landing it at Rhode Island.

And the first actual deployment being withdrawing Clinton's force for
the attack on North Carolina, and the initial aim of Carleton's
operations after Burgoyne arrived with relief forces in Canada was to
operate in support of Howe's attack on New York.

None of these operations, the first active British offensives, were
directly aimed at conquering New England. Whatever the British
leadership might have been saying beforehand, reconquering New England
does not seem to have been their main strategic aim. I would contend
that by 1776 the continental scale of the problem was understood and
operations were framed accordingly to exploit factors (such as the
perceived strength of loyalism elsewhere) on a North American-wide
basis.

The British made no attempt to return to Boston
after the spring of 1786. So much for it being a central aim of their
strategy.

Strawman. I never claimed it was British strategy to capture Boston
first, but rather to operate against New England.

But the British made no direct move to recapture the acknowledged main
city of New England and the epicentre of resistance there after they
evacuated it in 1776. They also made no direct substantive effort to
reconquer New England. The closest they might have come to that was
Burgoyne's expedition, but even he was to complain afterwards that he
had been given no lattitude to redirect operations from a southwards
advance along the Hudson towards Connecticut and New England. In this
instance, the only person pushing for an invasion and conquest of New
England in was explicitly turned down.

Meanwhile, the ministry were content to follow Howe's strategy of
taking New York and then developing operations from there southwards,
away from New England. Now, if "conquering New England" was the
central aim of British strategy for the "first half of the war", as
you assert, then the facts of their actual historical behaviour seem
to flatly contradict this.

The first clue that the rebellion was not centered in New
England was the invasion of Canada. It being obvious that the army
which did so was not composed of New Englanders (other than a few from
New Hampshire).

And more from Connecticut and New York. Guess where the first of
those states is. Yes, that's right, New England.

New England Troops made up half the invasion forces.

So, more than "a few from New Hampsphire" then?

The other half
were composed of troops from New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
Virginia. Your point?

That your initial characterisation of the composition of the force
involved is inaccurate, as you appear to accept.

But we do know what Howe was recommending to Germain, and we know what
he actually did, and neither of these involved any plan to continue to
occupy Boston.

Read more carefully. I never said that Howe had a plan for occupying
Boston. I wrote that Howe's alteration to the original Dartmouth/Gage
plan was to *remove* the army from Boston and have it operate from
Rhode Island instead.

Let's not reduce your claims to a more defensible basis quite so
quickly. What I'm arguing with is your assertion that the British
were mistakenly obsessed with crushing the rebellion in New England
for the first half of the war and adopted this as their strategy.

Clearly, Howe was less than thrilled with operating out of Boston.

Indeed, and this is why he evacuated Boston when his supply route was
threatened. What needs to be reconciled with your assertions is why,
once he had reassembled his forces at Halifax and gained sufficient
logistical and naval transport resources, his first aim of operations
was New York, and not New England.

[snip long, patronising and turgid exposition]

Snipped conveniently because it destroys your above argument.

No, snipped because any amount of discourse, however interesting or
uninteresting, which doesn't address the argument in question is
irrelevant to the point at issue.

Turgid? I prefer "informative and contextual."

In that case, I would prefer you to post something of relevance to the
point at issue, not a discursive generalist essay on the war as a
whole.

Trust
me Mr. Bailey when I tell you that I gave the short version.

Well, I owe you thanks for that, at least.

Nine
years of bloody research with few to discuss it does make one tend to
expouse when the opportunity arises. g

Fine, but please confine yourself to the points at issue. I'm not
interested in specious generalities.

I would not subject myself to this to begin with if I didn't have some
clue about using responsible primary and secondary sources to form my
opinion.

Given that you have already argued two maybe three strawmen, misquoted
me several times,

In that case you'll have no problem with me reproducing the relevant
quotes, taken from your own posts, which I take issue with, viz:

"That was the single greatest misconception made on the part of the
British, and derived most other British misconceptions. Such as the
rebellion was centered in New England, and so all one had to do was
conquer New England and the rebellion would be crushed. This was the
thinking that drove British strategic planning for the first half of
the war. The never understood it, and worse yet, never even thought
of altering those preceptions though all evidence pointed to the
contrary."

Yet we know in fact that British strategy actually focussed on New
York, Philadelphia and then the south. However central they perceived
New England to be to rebel agitation in the pre-war period and in the
first half of the war, reconquest of New England was not actually the
strategy they adopted. In fact, their military efforts to end the
rebellion were directed elsewhere. This only becomes an issue when we
constrast it with your assertions on the issue.

Note that discussions about the "failure" of loyalism and so forth or
other British misconceptions and mistakes are not being challenged or
even discussed, at least by me in this thread so far. In fact, in the
light of the actual British operations adopted which covered much more
diverse ground than the focus on New England which you are putting
forward, it seems you're the one who apparently refuses to alter your
perceptions when evidence points to the contrary.

exhibited inductive reasoning, and called my
knowledge and objectiveness into question without the slightest shred
of supporting evidence to back it all up, I'm not entirely sanguine
about your "informed" opinion.

I've no intention of persisting if you want to indulge
yourself by lecturing an imaginary class of five-year olds.

In other words, you cannot dispute my points.

No, in other words I would like you to dispute my points by actually
_addressing_ them, not by rambling on about generalities.

But you needn't be so
childish about it.

This is usenet, I'm afraid. Although here, at least, your criticism
is bang on the money.

You might
also want to diversify your reading of British strategy from sources
which make an effort to understand the context and internal logic
involved.

Er, Mr. Bailey, the entire point of my "exposition" *was* to put into
context.

Spare yourself the effort. I can read, and have access to libraries.

By the by, you are making some rather dangerous assumptions
about my "understanding."

Not at all. You might have an outstanding academic understanding of
the subject, but it doesn't seem to be on display over this issue.

Macksey wouldn't be a bad start, although he's not perfect.

And I am patronizing? Ok, so be it. Here be a few sources of light
reading which I found to be a tad useful in writing the afore snipped
"exposition."

Thanks for the references. I'm actually familiar with the first, and
original documents in the WO and CO classes such as Howe's orderly
book. You certainly seem to have better access to relevant
correspondance in the original sources than I do. Hopefully you find
them more legible than I've found the public documents here.

Now, what was this about Paine? Never really studied him.

Shame; you seem to have a good handle on prejudicial
characterisations of British strategy and policy which might be based
on his particular propaganda.

More name calling.

Not at all. I think your exposition so far adheres remarkably to the
existing cliches.

My but you are a virtual cornucopia of fallacies,
Mr. Bailey.

So point them out in relation to this argument about the centrality of
the reconquest of New England to British strategy in the first half of
the war.

If you are unable to argue the point, concede the point.

If you're unable to substantiate the assertion, just say so. Somebody
with your familiarity with relevant sources should be able to
reconcile your strategic assertions with the historical evidence
without too much problem.

Gavin Bailey

--

"Will Boogie Down For Food".- Sign held by Disco Stu outside the unemployment office.

"Vince Brannigan" wrote in message
...


William Black wrote:

In reality the idea of the 'nation state' emerged in Western Europe in
the
fifteenth century, a good illustration being the Hundred Years War
which
started as a fight between feudal magnates and ended as a war between
England and France.

nation states had of course emerged elsewhere at earlier times. Nations
, the latin "gens "had a long-standing albeit complex development
process.

Those tended to be city states that got big or were the product of a single
man driven to build an empire.

The nation state, with the co-incident 'national identity' is later, and
still with us.

--
William Black
------------------
On time, on budget, or works;
Pick any two from three

Olivers wrote in message ...
Brian Sharrock muttered....


I imagine that a book about 'The Patriot' would finish on Page 6,
then have three-hundred -and seventy pages of Historic Corrections"

Two of the historical figures from whom Mel Gibson's part was drawn were
grandsires (multi-great) of mine. One was a man apparently acutely harsh
to the puir Native Americans, while the other weighed in at a solid 300
pounds, disenabling him in an attempt to walk to a major engagement.
Happily, a substantial mule was available. Nothing of either (aside from
commitment and courage/fool-hardy rashness) is apparent in the screenplay
or the Gibsonian interpretation thereof.

Hornblower and Sharpe (novels) are poles apart from the idiocy
and pure propagandising of 'The Patriot'.

Let me commend to your reading the novels of Kenneth Roberts covering the
American expereience 1755-1800 or so. While hardly bodice rippers,
actually demure by modern lubricious standards, they are well done, if not
a little slanted toward the "American" perspective. _Rabble in Arms_,
first read when I was eight or so, struggling with a real adult novel,
remains quite readable to day, and his descriptions of the travails of
Rogers and his Rangers provide a new and unusual view of the French &
Indian Conflict.

On the Boston issue....Could one interpret Britsh policy toward continued
or re occupation as based upon the concept that Boston unoccupied was no
threat, easily - and cheaply in men and money - guarded/blockaded from the
sea, and likely should other strategies succeed to fall gently into British
hands, the cold harsh mercantilism of the upper classes swallowing up all
those radical revolutionaries?

It probably was. But since at that time Maine was part of Massecusetts,
then as now, nobody but the *British* Military really cared all
that much about Boston mercantilism.

"William Black" wrote in message ...
"Vince Brannigan" wrote in message
...


William Black wrote:

In reality the idea of the 'nation state' emerged in Western Europe in
the
fifteenth century, a good illustration being the Hundred Years War
which
started as a fight between feudal magnates and ended as a war between
England and France.

nation states had of course emerged elsewhere at earlier times. Nations
, the latin "gens "had a long-standing albeit complex development
process.

Those tended to be city states that got big or were the product of a single
man driven to build an empire.

The nation state, with the co-incident 'national identity' is later, and
still with us.

The nation state is almost as old as the hills, look at Egypt,
Assyria, Israel, and Babylon of biblical times. These were established
nation states with national identities, dynastic rulers over long
periods, and are even reflected in modern states.

I would agree that the principle of Greco Roman states were city
based, although in later years the Roman state changed from the city
based concept to that of the true nation state.

Even in Europe many of the modern states were well established as
nation states by the end of the first millenia.

Peter