If this is your first visit, be sure to check out the FAQ by clicking the link above. You may have to register before you can post: click the register link above to proceed. To start viewing messages, select the forum that you want to visit from the selection below. |
|
|
Thread Tools | Display Modes |
#81
|
|||
|
|||
Damn! I had no idea that the hundreds of NVN trucks
we destroyed in Laos during 1970/71 had left them with so few vehicles at home, just a year or so later. First, the "hundred or so trucks" I referred to were the ones in use on the Ho Chi Mihn trail, not delivering goods in downtown Hanoi. Secondly, throughout the war, post-strike assesments of trucks destroyed was so overly inflated that by late 1968, we had destroyed more trucks on the trail then North Vietnam had in the entire country. The CIA doesn't have a very good reputation now, but during Vietnam they were very accurate and routinely cut in half or even thirds the reported destroyed vehicle reports. They also were very accurate in their assesment of the effect we had on NVN POL stores. BUFDRVR "Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips everyone on Bear Creek" |
#82
|
|||
|
|||
That logistic analysis sounds real good at the micro-fiche machine,
but if you'll talk to some Marines who were at Khe Sanh and Hue in MR I and some ARVN and US troops at An Loc in MR III, you'll find that the bad guys seemed to be doing just fine regarding supplies. Which would show you why first hand accounts aren't always the best pieces of info. Post war interviews with NVA regulars engaged in the Easter offensive attest to severe shortages, including the tale of a young NVA 2nd Lt., sent into battle with an AK-47 and a sidearm with no ammo. For every NVA unit with "just fine supplies" there were two others with *none*. And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB. They weren't. I never claimed *every* LBII target was a "repeat", but a great majority were. And even those new targets (like Phuc Yen and Kep airfields) were hit repeatedly, beyond what kind of "maintenance" bombing you would do to keep an airfield shutdown. Come on Ed, B-52s alone dropped nearly 1,000 bombs on the Kep airfield. Other non-airfield targets got hit with as much as 4 times that amount. All in 11 days! And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed. Well, if you have Marshall Michel's phone number, you better give him a ring because he (and at least three other authors) claim that on night #9 B-52s went after SA-2 sites including the "infameous" VN-563 site (I think that was the number?). Karl Eschmann lists 8 SAM sites as B-52 targets and 7 SAM sites as F-111 targets in his book. SAM sites were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response targets for the Hunter/Killer flights. Not according to nearly every reference source I've seen.... BUFDRVR "Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips everyone on Bear Creek" |
#83
|
|||
|
|||
You have a few of your facts and explantions wrong.
Well, not just me but several prominant authors.. I have read several prominent authors, too, and some of their "facts" were point blank wrong. The two targets I mentioned were included in the lists of targets destroyed in the ACSC and Air War College texts. The coal fired electrical plant we took out with LGBs in the daylight on Day #3 after the bombers two nights in a row is one that stands out in my mind. The post strike photos in the textbook clearly shows the damage we left behind. Don't believe all you read unless the author was there himself. Hereis an interesting read for you from aother author http://www.sftt.org/303VINq.pdf You made prior reference to a hundred or so WWII French truck as being the exxtent of the NVN tranportation system. Doesn't explain the 800+ Russian and Chinese trucks we struck in Sept 22 These were truck being used as supply vehicles on the Ho Chi Mihn trail? Yes they were. We also used to escort Specter on the trails at night, in F-4Ds. We usually carried CBU-58 and MK 82 with daisy cutters. Specter would "mark" the lead and tail trucks and stop the convoys with 20 mm API then we would drop in the line between the two truck fires. According to the Specter guys the convoys were often in the miltiple hundreds of trucks. I seem to recall that the record number of Specter truck kills in one night was 500+. I got credit for a total of 400+ over a period of four months according to Specter BDA for whatever that was worth. I never cared much about BDA numbers but I understood them to be fairly accurate from recce photos and from Specter's night vision and IR gear. Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern. It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation. If so then why were the LGB and Loran bombers sent up in the daylight to go after targest that the bombers had missed? Must have made sense to somebady and we all worked for the politicians. Certainly would have been easier for the fighter bases that were having to put sorties up around the clock. I flew a 18 hour crew duty day with two sorties over RP 6 on Day 2/3. we continued to restrike targets that were missed by the bombers at night, recce'd in the AM and hit by fighters in the afternoon Of the 7 night #1 B-52 targets, only a "few" were recce'd prior to night #3. Had they recee'd immediately they would have noticed that the BUFFs bombing in a strong crosswind (the same crosswind that was moving the chaff corridor) were having accuracy problems due to those strong crosswinds. Interstingly enough, 18 years later, that same problem would resurface on targets in Iraq and Kuwait. SAC couldn't hit a point target with strings of up to 300 bombs in a crosswind or wind shear in other words? We managed reasonably well with the LORAN equipped A-6s, F-111As, and F-4s. An A-6 with two flights of three waqs accurate enough to nearly destroy the DaNang POL facility when the BN forgot to switch steering from his offset aimpoint to his target, similar to that incident where the B-52 cell hit Neak Long in Cambodia. My strong recollection was that we were trying to damage the NVN supply chain and command structure as much as we could while we had the opportunity as the war was Vietnamized. Which was done with great success during LB I and Freedom Porch. The NVN didn't recover until 1975. True, but the damage inflicted during LB II had much less to do with that than LB I. Maybe for the bombers but I would have to disagree for the fighters. On Day 8 for example, Korat was fragged against a rail LOC, first daytime strike for the AF A-7Ds. Unfortunately that one was a fiasco as the #2 -105 Weasel punched off his load on the runway on TO roll after an engine problem and shut the runway down for 45 min. We finally did get off and over the target but it was 100% unercast, the Pathfinder couldn't get a Loran lock and so we all went home. It is described in the ACSC thesis that Karl Eschmann wrote that became the book you refer to. I'd have to get it out to see exactly what the target was but I am almost certain it was a rail yard. Karl and I are friends and as I was a contributor and proofreader, he gave me a couple copies of the manuscript. I loaned my book out and never got it back. The book leaves out some information in places that is in the manuscript. The accounts of LBII are a sore subject with me as there seems to have been an element in the AF that was determined to show SAC in the best light possible. That revisonist history tries to say that the bombers won the war and any contribution from the fighters was purely coincidental. Particularly when I see BDA attributed to the bombers when I know for a fact that the fighters were responsible. I am in no way tryng to downplay the bravery of the SAC crews - I wouldn't have wanted their jobs for twice the pay - but I don't believe the bombing was all that effective.. What brought the North back to the bargaining table was the threat that the bombing was going to become a lot more effective. They were running out of missiles and fuel as their supply lines had been pretty well cut off as early as Day 3. I guess you could call that political but I see it as more of a tactical solution. Had the supplie lines stayed open, the bombong might have gone on a lot longer. I don't think it wold have happened as it did if NVN had more missiles. I sat in an orbit over downtown for 15 minutes on Day 3 until a single cloud drifted away from the target the the Ubon LGB guys were after. We had a total of seven rounds of 57 mm fired at us at 15,000'. It was a good day for sightseeing - in fact I still have some pictures I took with a little camera I carried with me. Regards. Steve Mellenthin BUFDRVR "Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips everyone on Bear Creek" |
#84
|
|||
|
|||
|
#85
|
|||
|
|||
The two targets I mentioned were included in the lists of
targets destroyed in the ACSC and Air War College texts. Which include "documented facts" on how 8th Air Force won WW in Europe. See my earlier posts for my opinion of AF PME. Don't believe all you read unless the author was there himself. That's ridiculous. Using that logic there is only one "believeable" book on the Peloponnesian War. Conversely, according to you I could right a definitive work on Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, which wouldn't be worth the cost of the paper because I was so deeply buried in B-52 stuff (flying and mission planning), that the "big picture" blew right by me. I never cared much about BDA numbers but I understood them to be fairly accurate from recce photos and from Specter's night vision and IR gear. Except that the over inflated truck count is now a documented fact and one of the accurate things taught at SOS and ASCS (I'm not sure about Air War College). Recently there was a program on the Discovery Channel that highlighted the Ho Chi Mihn Trail vehicle repair facilities and pointed out that many of the trucks on the trail were "destroyed" several times over. Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern. It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation. If so then why were the LGB and Loran bombers sent up in the daylight to go after targest that the bombers had missed? Because it made military sense to do that, however it would have made little difference in the end had the targets not been re-struck. Certainly would have been easier for the fighter bases that were having to put sorties up around the clock. I flew a 18 hour crew duty day with two sorties over RP 6 on Day 2/3. Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan. SAC couldn't hit a point target with strings of up to 300 bombs in a crosswind or wind shear in other words? Nope. The BUFF OAS calculates a release using the winds at altitude, should those winds change drastically on the way down, it could have a significant impact on accuracy. It happened in LB II, then again in DS. It was fixed after DS. We managed reasonably well with the LORAN equipped A-6s, F-111As, and F-4s. Not sure about the F-4s, but neither the F-111 or A-6 was dropping from inside or above the jet stream. If the F-4 has that capability great, its too bad they didn't give it to the BUFF following Vietnam, we could have used over Iraq/Kuwait. An A-6 with two flights of three waqs accurate enough to nearly destroy the DaNang POL facility when the BN forgot to switch steering from his offset aimpoint to his target A BUFF could do that from 5,000' AGL too. Its a whole different story at 30,000+' AGL. That revisonist history tries to say that the bombers won the war and any contribution from the fighters was purely coincidental. I've never read anything that infers that, however, I will admit that the bombers definitely have gotten more publicity. but I don't believe the bombing was all that effective.. Depends what effect you were looking for... What brought the North back to the bargaining table was the threat that the bombing was going to become a lot more effective. What brought them back to the *signing* table was the fact that congress was going to let the bombing continue; that and we told them (through the Swedish ambassador I believe) that we were ready to sign the original agreement. They were running out of missiles Marshall L. Michel's book "The 11 Days of Christmas" attributes this to myth. He supports this claim with interviews from NV SAM operators and commanders. They were never short of missiles in Hanoi (they did have trouble getting them out to some of the sites, but were given a reprieve when night strikes in Hanoi decreased markedly night #5 through #7 when the BUFFs went to targets outside Hanoi). The missile firings decreased because the bombers began to make the operators job much more difficult with varied routing. and fuel They had been low on fuel since May due to LB I. LBII had little to no impact on NV POL stores. I don't think it wold have happened as it did if NVN had more missiles. See above, or better yet, pick up Michel's book. Although, be forwarned, it includes very little about you fighter guys. I sat in an orbit over downtown for 15 minutes on Day 3 until a single cloud drifted away from the target the the Ubon LGB guys were after. We had a total of seven rounds of 57 mm fired at us at 15,000'. It was a good day for sightseeing The NV SAM operators were under strict orders to fire SAMs at only F-111s or B-52s. The one guy interviewed said he took a shot at an F-4 on night #1 and was very concerned he would face disciplinary action. BUFDRVR "Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips everyone on Bear Creek" |
#86
|
|||
|
|||
Seems to me that you can't have it both ways. If on scene US observers
aren't reliable sources of information, why should lowest level, in-the-jungle, low-tech, guerillas on the enemy side be more reliable? Well it depends on who is commenting on what. A U.S. Marine commenting on how well supplied the enemy was is conjecture, a NV officer discussing personal experiences about ammo shortages and testimony from high ranking government officials supporting that experience,makes that a documented fact. Dare I say that the Kep strikes by the BUFFs didn't close the airfield down? Probably not since IIRC, Kep was one of the "crosswind" missions. However that airfield received attention during the day on more than one occasion and the BUFFs returned there on three more occasions. I realize we're not talking about JDAMs here Ed, but surely you guys couldn't have been that bad? Recall that two MiG-21 kills were awarded to B-52 gunners? (I'm not saying they happened, merely that they were credited.) What? You mean everyone in the USAF from the Air Force Academy through Air War College is wrong? I'm shocked Before I exchanged posts here with you Ed, I had never even heard those shoot downs were questionable. After discussing it with you, Dr. Thompson and reading Michel's book I'm convinced both those guys shot at F-4s...however I can go to Maxwell and read about those shoot downs. By the way, those accounts were written by guys "who were there" and not in the back of a library. The operative word on those targettings is "probable". Absolutely. we could never be sure of exactly where a SAM site was going to pop up. Same is true today...for the most part, but you claimed SAM sites were always response targets, what you should have said was *confirmed* SAM sites were always response targets, although that might not have been true had an SA-2 been parked under any of those F-111 or B-52 target areas. BUFDRVR "Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips everyone on Bear Creek" |
#87
|
|||
|
|||
I never cared much about BDA numbers but I understood them to be fairly accurate from recce photos and from Specter's night vision and IR gear. Except that the over inflated truck count is now a documented fact and one of the accurate things taught at SOS and ASCS (I'm not sure about Air War College). Recently there was a program on the Discovery Channel that highlighted the Ho Chi Mihn Trail vehicle repair facilities and pointed out that many of the trucks on the trail were "destroyed" several times over. I don't disagree with you relative to overstating numbers . My body, truck, and tonnage of enemy supplies destroyed counts were ridiculous at times. I am trying point out that you are very much understating, at least with respect to my own personal observations. I've enough pre/post strike recce photos of truck parks and convoys to know that there were a lot of trucks, numbering int he hundreds, certainly more than the hundred you mentioned unless you want to tell me those photos wre faked. I wasn't impressed one way or the other by the accounts of LB I and II when I went through SOS and ACSC. The AWC readings were shown to me by an 0-4 and an 0-5 who were taking AWC by correspondence. I understand they upset a few folks when they pointed out the errors in the photos to the staff. Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern. It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation. If so then why were the LGB and Loran bombers sent up in the daylight to go after targest that the bombers had missed? Because it made military sense to do that, however it would have made little difference in the end had the targets not been re-struck. Possibly for some but not all the daytime targets that were struck. If it made little difference then why were the bombers targeted against them in the first place? You seem to be building a case that the the only thing that mattered was having the bombers scatter bombs all over the country side whether they hit anything or not, scaring the government back to the table and i don't quite hold that view. My own opinion is that the bombers failed miserably until HQ SAC got its collective head out of its ass, paid some attention to what the TAC guys had learned the hard way, and then the collective actions of both forces convinced the NVN there was no future in their current strategy once they started losing assets.. Certainly would have been easier for the fighter bases that were having to put sorties up around the clock. I flew a 18 hour crew duty day with two sorties over RP 6 on Day 2/3. Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan. So was blowing away their infrastructure. A BUFF could do that from 5,000' AGL too. Its a whole different story at 30,000+' AGL. The pathfinders usually operated above 15,000' to stay out of small arms and lighter AAA.like 23 and 37 mm. That revisonist history tries to say that the bombers won the war and any contribution from the fighters was purely coincidental. I've never read anything that infers that, however, I will admit that the bombers definitely have gotten more publicity. Certainly did in the ACSC reading I referred to above. You are making my pointwhen you say the bombers got all the publicity. Same difference. Several who have challenged that viewpoint have become pariahs, Dana Drenkowski for one. but I don't believe the bombing was all that effective.. Depends what effect you were looking for... As in the very first Arc Light in VN, that splintered 400 acres of jungle killed four monkeys and was hailed as a great psychological victory? What brought the North back to the bargaining table was the threat that the bombing was going to become a lot more effective. What brought them back to the *signing* table was the fact that congress was going to let the bombing continue; that and we told them (through the Swedish ambassador I believe) that we were ready to sign the original agreement. They were running out of missiles Marshall L. Michel's book "The 11 Days of Christmas" attributes this to myth. He supports this claim with interviews from NV SAM operators and commanders. They were never short of missiles in Hanoi (they did have trouble getting them out to some of the sites, but were given a reprieve when night strikes in Hanoi decreased markedly night #5 through #7 when the BUFFs went to targets outside Hanoi). The missile firings decreased because the bombers began to make the operators job much more difficult with varied routing. and fuel I read that too but I don't agree. The missile firings dropped off after Day 3. They were low on everything which also explains why the daytime AAA was so light. I was over Hanoi and saw the sky go from absolutelyclear to totally undercast from AAA. I never saw that in the daytime sorties I flew in LBII. You are making my point about why their follow-on warfighiing capability was set back by the fighter strikes. Whether the changed B-52 tactics or lack of operation missiles reduced bomber losses is almost a moot point but you are making my point that history downplays the role of the fighters in LB II See above, or better yet, pick up Michel's book. Although, be forwarned, it includes very little about you fighter guys. I have the book and have read it a couple of times. I agree with nearly all he has written. I guess we just see the accounts he describes differently. He does quote a squadron mate, Rex Rivolo, in several places.but there isn't a vast amount written about the daytime fighter sorties. the Ubon LGB guys were after. We had a total of seven rounds of 57 mm fired at us at 15,000'. It was a good day for sightseeing The NV SAM operators were under strict orders to fire SAMs at only F-111s or B-52s. The one guy interviewed said he took a shot at an F-4 on night #1 and was very concerned he would face disciplinary action. There must have been quite a few SAM shooters getting disciplined that night then. . One crew in our squadron had one fired at them, dodged it, then took it down again for another. The backseater saw the altimeter unwind to zero as they bottomed out in the pullup, but the SAM missed. It was the backseater's first mission in country. The F-111s operated far too low to be targeted once they were out onto the Red River delta and in SAM country. |
#88
|
|||
|
|||
|
#89
|
|||
|
|||
I am
trying point out that you are very much understating, at least with respect to my own personal observations. Well, perhaps my definition of truck is too narrow. My "understatement" comes from Robert Pape's "Bombing To Win" (I think, I'm moving and can't find my copy), IIRC Pape states there was "a hundred or so 2 1/2 Ton trucks" (I'm paraphrasing). Perhaps there were smaller trucks in use that account for your personal experience? If it made little difference then why were the bombers targeted against them in the first place? Because Nixon wanted B-52s over Hanoi. B-52 targeting in Hanoi was sometimes ridiculous. BUFFs were targeted against Radio Hanoi which consisted of a small building and a couple of antenna. 12 B-52s dropped weapons near Radio Hanoi without ever knocking it off the air. 4 were lost. You seem to be building a case that the the only thing that mattered was having the bombers scatter bombs all over the country side whether they hit anything or not As far as Nixon was concerned, that was true, as long as the civilian casulties were kept to a minimum. My own opinion is that the bombers failed miserably until HQ SAC got its collective head out of its ass, paid some attention to what the TAC guys had learned the hard way True, although I think "failed miserably" is a little too harsh. Night #2 saw no BUFFs lost and about average bombing accuracy. Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan. So was blowing away their infrastructure. That had already been accomplished for the most part by LB I. You are making my pointwhen you say the bombers got all the publicity. And you are making half of mine. Depends what effect you were looking for... As in the very first Arc Light in VN, that splintered 400 acres of jungle killed four monkeys and was hailed as a great psychological victory? No; as in it doesn't really matter if the Kihn No Vehicle repair yard get hits tonight or not, as long as bombs land somewhere near it and the NVN government gets a personal, up close viewing. but you are making my point that history downplays the role of the fighters in LB II Like I said, you're making half of mine. All you have to do is admit that the accuracy of the weapons you dropped wasn't nearly as important as dropping them and you and I will be in agreement. BUFDRVR "Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips everyone on Bear Creek" |
#90
|
|||
|
|||
You're hedging. You indicated that personal observation was a poor
source of historical fact; that on-scene observers were unreliable and only imperfectly viewed the metaphorical "lower right-hand corner of the big picture." Taken by itself, yes, personal observations are not adequate historical sources. When backed up by other personal sources they get more credibility, but when backed up by documents, they become factual. The munition, food and POL shortages experienced by the NVA in the summer of '72 are well documented by NV government records and by dozens of NV officers and enlisted who were obsessive diary keepers. Ed, you're arguing against a very solid historic fact. There were night strikes by the F-111s on the airfields during LB II. And BUFFs. As you know, an airfield is a very difficult target to disable. Not with 108 bombs its not! Come on Ed, I split the runways at Batajanica with a B-52 two-ship with a grand total of 90 weapons. 2 more two-ships followed until we quartered the runway making it useless for anything except a Cessna-172. This was all done with unguided Mk-82s. Its not really that difficult to cut runways, even with unguided weapons. And, consider the difference between unleashing a JDAM from 30 miles away 30 miles ? I wish it were possible.... and the idea of hurling your chubby pink body at the ground amidst a hail of 23/37/57/85/100 mm flak, SA-2s and other flying metal. I have seen, up close and personal, SA-2s, SA-3's and SA-6s. Operating in the "menopause" is not as safe as you seem to think. I suspect that they were shooting at shadows--no airplanes at all. However, this whole issue gets at the heart of your argument. Here you have reports from guys who were actually there and compared to studies done by guys who weren't actually there (sitting in the back of a library as you put it) we find the "library guys" more historically accurate. Why? Because the infameous "fog and friction" tends to distort reality. There's no fog and little friction from the back of a library. I'm not sure how familiar you are with the study Checkmate did in the 80s of a supposed F-4 to F-4 blue on blue kill in Vietnam, but several guys who were not old enough to drive when the incident occured, accurately figured out that a supposed blue-on-blue kill in 1971 (I think?) over NVN was, in fact, an enemy MiG-21 that shot down the F-4. As far as I'm concerned personal eyewitness accounts are good historical sources, but like all other sources, must be supported by other documentation. A SAM site without SAMs or radar in residence isn't really a SAM site is it? LOL...nope, not at all. I was trying to point out that had there been an SA-2 site located in those areas (which there wasn't), they would have certainly been destroyed, so the fact that no SAMs were attacked by B-52s is a matter of good NVN luck. BUFDRVR "Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips everyone on Bear Creek" |
Thread Tools | |
Display Modes | |
|
|
Similar Threads | ||||
Thread | Thread Starter | Forum | Replies | Last Post |
"Friendly fire" | Mike | Military Aviation | 0 | March 19th 04 02:36 PM |
B-52 crew blamed for friendly fire death | Paul Hirose | Military Aviation | 0 | March 16th 04 12:49 AM |
U.S. won't have to reveal other friendly fire events: Schmidt's lawyers hoped to use other incidents to help their case | Otis Willie | Military Aviation | 0 | December 18th 03 08:44 PM |
Fire officer tops in field — again | Otis Willie | Military Aviation | 0 | October 13th 03 08:37 PM |
Friendly fire pilot may testify against wingman | Otis Willie | Military Aviation | 0 | October 11th 03 09:32 PM |