USS LIBERTY VETERAN ASSOC FILES WAR CRIMES AGAINST ISRAEL

USS LIBERTY VETERAN ASSOC FILES WAR CRIMES AGAINST ISRAEL

These USS Liberty freaks are amusing. Hey, we know what happened. End of
story. Get something sensible to do.

:

June 7th

An Israeli Nord aircraft took off from an airfield early on the morning
of the 8th with an Israeli navy spotter on board to patrol the shore and
insure that enemy vessels did not penetrate Israeli waters during the
night before. Israel had to have a human spotter for early warning
because Israel in 1967 had very limited radar capability.

Almost two hours after the aircraft started its patrol, it notified the
duty officer in the navy's war room that a ship had been spotted West of
Gaza. It appeared to be a destroyer from the air. The officer orderd a
red marker placed on the battle control table. Red was the color used to
indicate an "unidentified" ship.

Almost 20 minutes later the Nord sent another report in which the
spotter identified the ship as an "American naval-supply vessel. The
ship was identified by the spotter and would have then been considered
neutral, but the marker was not changed from red to green, to designate
a neutral vessel. The Israelis admitted this. They DID NOT DENY it. The
reason given by the duty officer at a board of inquiry was the
"identification had been vague and uncertain."

And, then from 6 to 9 a.m. the navy's attention in the war room was
diverted to an emergency, with the penetration of an enemy submarine
west of the town of Atlit, where a huge oil slick had been sighted. At
8:50 the navy dispatched the destroyer MV Haifa to the area. The Haifa
detonated five depth charges at 9:02 without success. While the hunt for
the enemy sub was ongoing, Admiral Erell entered the underground war
room to take personal command and he questioned the duty officer about
the red marker west of the Sinai coast. Told that the marker designated
what was thought to be an American supply ship, he ordered the marker
changed to green and he concentrated on the submarine.

More depth charges were detonated and air bubbles and oil was rising to
the surface. At the same time, the war room received a cable from an
Israel pilot reporting that he was being shot at by an "unidentified"
ship off the Sinai coast. After he landed and in debriefing he said that
he was not fired at, but he had seen a ship and it appeared to be "gray"
and "wider than usual, and with a bridge in the middle." The information
was filed and forgotten.

Then, after 10 a.m. the Nord aircraft returned and in debriefing the
navy spotter reported that he had clearly seen a GTR-5 on the side of
the vessel. Major Pinchasi at the naval operations room at Naval
Headquarters consulted Jane's Fighting Ships and identified the ship as
an American intelligence vessel named the "Liberty."

At 11 a.m. the duty cammanders in the navy war room changed shifts and a
Lt. Col took over temporary command. He ordered the green marker removed
from the battle control table so it would not be cluttered. Standard
naval operating procedure dictated that battle control table should be
kept as simple as possible, BUT in retrospect, it was a fatal decision
for the Liberty because from 11:05 on the Liberty was no longer a known
quantity for those who were operationally responsible for conducting a
FAST-MOVING THREE-FRONT WAR.., who were feeling the heat of battle
decision making. At 11:24 the air force reported to the naval chief of
operation, Col Issy Rehav, that the Sinai coast city of El Arish,
captured by Israeli forces the day before was being shelled from the
sea. And, at 11:27 a.m., a second, independent report ame in, and this
time from Southern Command Hqts, that El Arish was indeed being
bombarded from the sea.

In his book, Ennis also reported explosions in El Arish. The smoke and
explosions were clearly visible to the crew of the Liberty 'WHICH IS HOW
CLOSE THEY WERE' to what was presumed to be an enemy attack on the
coastal city. Later it was determined that an Egyptian ammo depot had
exploded in El Arish. The Israeli general command assumed that the city
was under attack from the sea and the Liberty 'JUST HAPPENED TO BE
THERE', which made it look an awful lot like the Liberty had been doing
the shelling.

Col Rehav at 12:05 p.m. ordered three torpedo boats from the 914
Squadron to leave Ashdod and proceed towards El Arish and at 12:15
captain of the flagship torpedo boat, Lt. Col Moshe Oren was ordered to
sail to 20 miles north of El Arish and patrol that area. At 1:07 p.m. he
was instructed to call for an air strike upon spotting the target.

At 1:41, 2nd Lt Aharon Yfrach, the radar operator about the flagship,
T-204, picked up a target on his scope. The ship was spotted at 20
nautical miles northwest of El Arish, 14 miles off the Bardawil shore,
and moving west at a speed of about thirty knots. Standard operating
procedure for the Israeli navy in 1967 was that any ship moving faster
than 20 knots in a battle arena was to be presumed hostile. A second
radar check indicated the target's speed at 28 knots. The Israelis later
said the reading was inaccurate, which can be attributed to what is
known as "radar jump" or simply an erroneous reading by the radar
operator? The radar on torpedo boats were often inaccurate. The
conclusions at the time however was, it was moving at faster than 20
knots and the TARGET IN QUESTION WAS PROBABLY A WARSHIP. It also
'APPEARED TO BE SAILING AN EVASIVE COURSE' in the direction of Port
Said, at the mouth of the Suez Canal, which would also indicate it was
hostile.

At 1:45 p.m. it was decided by Rehav to order an attack on the ship. It
would take awhile for the torpedo boats to get there so an air strike
was called. Senior air force battle controller, Lt Col Shmuel Kislev,
ordered two Mirage III C fighters on their way back to Israel from an
air patrol over the Suez Canal to divert to the target. The Mirages
reached the target at about 2 p.m. The lead plane dropped to an altitude
of 3,000 feet and circled the target twice. The second aircraft circled
the target only once. It was reported that the ship was NOT Israeli, it
was painted battle-gray and had two cannons in the forecastle, a mast in
the front and one funnel.

Major General Mordechai Hod, the commander of the Israeli air force,
asked the pilot by radio if any flag was visible. The pilot reported
back "I SEE NO FLAG OR OTHER SIGNS OF IDENTIFICATION." Members of the
crew find this a point of contention, but regardless of that fact, there
must still be ACCOUNTABILITY FOR BEING IN A BATTLE ARENA, and
assessments are made by the air force command, based on the pilot's
observation, the course of the ship, the reported speed and the evasive
running of the ship, location, etc., and the IMPRESSION WAS IT WAS A
HOSTILE SHIP.

At 2:06, the pilots began their straffing runs and straffed the Liberty
four times. Fire had broken out on the left side of the ship. Two more
aircraft were diverted, this time Super Mystere jets en route to a
bombing mission over the Mitla Pass in the Central Sinai. The were
carrying napalm bombs, which are not suitable for attacking targets at
sea but it was decided to use the aircraft anyway. The Mysteres made two
bombing runs, but only one bomb hit the ship.

As there was no return fire from the Liberty, the lack of a response was
puzzling and the lead pilot flew low enough to notice a P-30 painted on
the hull. He then dropped to only ninety feet above the water line and
this time noticed CTR-5 on the hull. 'HE SAID HE SAW NO FLAG'. He was
told to report on damages and leave the target area. At 2:15 the air
force controller in central operation dispatched two helicopters to the
area to pick up survivors. Meanwhile the torpedo boats had arrived at
the scene. The flagship flahed the message, "WHAT SHIP?" But, the
Liberty replied "AA" meaning "Identify yourselves first." That was
really dumb. Here they are listing, enveloped in smoke, heavily damaged
and their captain is telling the torpedo boats to identify themselves first?

Eleven years before, during the Sinai campaign, exactly the same
exchange had taken place between an Israeli destroyer, the MV Yaffo, and
an Egyptian ship, the Ibrahim-el-Awwal. Oren, who was a young offer on
the Yaffo's bridge at the time, 'REMEMBERED THE INCIDENT WELL'. If he
had any doubts that the burning vessel ahead of him was Egyptian, they
were now dispelled.

While he was deciding whether to attack, a burst of machine gun fire
erupted from the ship's forecastle. It seems that a seaman apprentice on
board did not hear the Captain's "hold-your- fire order" and fired
several volleys at the torpedo boats.

Oren still hestitated until he consulted the Israeli navy's book
identifying the ships of the Arab navies and concluded that the ship in
question was the Egyptian suppply vessel EL QUSEIR. One of the other
captains of another torpedo boat came up with the same identification.

And, at 2:37 Lt Col Oren gave the order to attack the ship. THIS WAS
'AFTER BEING FIRED UPON FROM THE LIBERTY'. At 2:43 advancing with rapid
cannon fire, the topedo boats fired torpedos. At least one torpedo hit
the ship. When the T-204 crossed the ship's bow, one of the officers
aboard noticed the letters GTR on the hull of the ship and Oren
immediately issued the hold-fire order. It was 2:47.

At 2:51, Oren radioed back to command headquarters that the ship could
be Russian. Rabin called an emergency meeting of his adviser to discuss
the possiblity of large sacale Soviet intervention but at 3:20 Oren
notified headquarters that the ship was NOT Russian, IT WAS AMERICAN. At
3:30 the news was conveyed to Commander Castle, naval atache in Tel
Aviv. ISRAEL OFFERED TO HELP WITH THE WOUNDED. The offer was rejected.

The attack on the LIBERTY was not with malice, but a genuine
understandable mistake, like many which are often made in battle, and
which could have been avoided if the Liberty had stayed out of harm's
way [as we learned later was the intention of the State Department and
the Chiefs of Staff]