Boeing Formally Protests US Air Force Tanker Contract Award

Bertie the Bunyip wrote:


Well, I would assume the military looked at the mission fist, a fact
that's often lost in the shouting and roaring that goes on in a case
like this. Presumably the 'Bus had some advantages in an actual
operational situation. No point buying a machine that's going to let you
down. I don't know that htis had anything to do with anything for sure,
but they don't buy toys like this without looking into these sorts of
things.


Here's where you might be wrong Bertie. The US Military has a long
history of buying hardware for political not strategic or tactical reasons.

On Fri, 14 Mar 2008 10:02:24 -0500, Gig 601XL Builder
wrote:

Bertie the Bunyip wrote:


Well, I would assume the military looked at the mission fist, a fact
that's often lost in the shouting and roaring that goes on in a case
like this. Presumably the 'Bus had some advantages in an actual
operational situation. No point buying a machine that's going to let you
down. I don't know that htis had anything to do with anything for sure,
but they don't buy toys like this without looking into these sorts of
things.

Here's where you might be wrong Bertie. The US Military has a long
history of buying hardware for political not strategic or tactical reasons.

It's called "maintaining the industrial base." My guess is if Boeing and MacDac
were still separate companies and had submitted separate entries, EADs probably
wouldn't have stood a chance. But the military prefers to keep a bit of
competition going, for obvious reasons.

It's not unique to government contracts. I knew a company planning on deploying
a new civilian space system that used large subcontracts to entice concessions
from various world governments. The problem was, the cost of the hardware
obtained this way was about double that of the low bidder. Maybe worth it to
the company, but its own engineers kept getting hammered by management because
they couldn't get the per-vehicle cost of the satellites down to the level
management needed to make the system viable....

Ron Wanttaja

Ron Wanttaja wrote in
:

On Fri, 14 Mar 2008 10:02:24 -0500, Gig 601XL Builder
wrote:

Bertie the Bunyip wrote:


Well, I would assume the military looked at the mission fist, a
fact that's often lost in the shouting and roaring that goes on in
a case like this. Presumably the 'Bus had some advantages in an
actual operational situation. No point buying a machine that's
going to let you down. I don't know that htis had anything to do
with anything for sure, but they don't buy toys like this without
looking into these sorts of things.

Here's where you might be wrong Bertie. The US Military has a long
history of buying hardware for political not strategic or tactical
reasons.

It's called "maintaining the industrial base." My guess is if Boeing
and MacDac were still separate companies and had submitted separate
entries, EADs probably wouldn't have stood a chance. But the military
prefers to keep a bit of competition going, for obvious reasons.

OK, I can buy that. I guess I was just looking at it as I might have done
it!
Just got a new car for Mrs Bunyip and about the only test it didn't go
through before I "approved" it was it's combat capability...



Bertie

The fat lady hasn't sung yet:

http://www.boeing.com/ids/news/2008/q2/080403d_nr.html
ST. LOUIS, April 03, 2008 -- While the U.S. Air Force awarded a
contract to build the next aerial refueling airplane to the team of
Northrop Grumman and the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company
(EADS), Air Force evaluators found the Boeing [NYSE: BA] KC-767
Advanced Tanker offers more mission capability and has a better chance
of surviving combat than the larger Northrop-EADS KC-30 tanker.

"The fact that the Air Force gave Boeing the highest possible
rating in mission capability and cited the KC-767 Advanced Tanker as
having three times more strengths than the Northrop-EADS tanker in
this most important category further highlights the inconsistencies in
the selection process," said Mark McGraw, vice president and program
manager for Boeing Tanker Programs. "As for protecting flight crews on
the most dangerous missions, the Air Force evaluated Boeing's tanker
as much more survivable than the Northrop-EADS tanker." ...

"Despite the changes made in favor of the KC-30 in the area of
mission capability, the evaluation was clear in its assessment,"
McGraw said. "The Air Force identified 98 strengths and only one
weakness with the KC-767, while they pinpointed 30 strengths and five
weaknesses for the KC-30, including four weaknesses in aerial
refueling." ...






On Wed, 12 Mar 2008 07:12:17 -0700 (PDT), AJ
wrote:

Boeing Formally Protests US Air Force Tanker Contract Award
Says KC-X RFP Differs From Criteria Cited In Going with KC-45A

(From: Aero-News.net)

It's official. Citing irregularities with the process of the
competition and the evaluation of the competitors' bids, on Tuesday
Boeing filed a formal protest with the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), asking the agency to review the decision by the US Air
Force to award a contract to a team of Northrop Grumman and European
Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) to replace the aging fleet
of KC-135 aerial refueling tankers.

"Our analysis of the data presented by the Air Force shows that this
competition was seriously flawed and resulted in the selection of the
wrong airplane for the war fighter," said Mark McGraw, vice president
and program manager, Boeing Tanker Programs. "We have fundamental
concerns with the Air Force's evaluation, and we are exercising
our right under the process for a GAO review of the decision to ensure
that the process by which America's next refueling tanker is selected
is fair and results in the best choice for the U.S. war fighters and
taxpayers."

Following an internal analysis of data presented at a March 7
debriefing on the decision, Boeing concluded what began as an effort
by the Air Force to run a fair, open and transparent competition
evolved into a process replete with irregularities. These
irregularities placed Boeing at a competitive disadvantage throughout
this competition, the American plane maker asserts, and even penalized
Boeing for offering a commercial-derivative airplane with lower costs
and risks and greater protection for troops.

"It is clear that the original mission for these tankers -- that is, a
medium-sized tanker where cargo and passenger transport was a
secondary consideration -- became lost in the process, and the Air
Force ended up with an oversized tanker," McGraw said. "As the
requirements were changed to accommodate the bigger, less capable
Airbus plane, evaluators arbitrarily discounted the significant
strengths of the KC-767, compromising on operational capabilities,
including the ability to refuel a more versatile array of aircraft
such as the V-22 and even the survivability of the tanker during the
most dangerous missions it will encounter."

Boeing is asking the GAO to examine several factors in the
competition, that it states were fundamentally flawed: The contract
award and subsequent reports ignore the fact that in reality Boeing
and the Northrop/EADS team were assigned identical ratings across all
five evaluation factors: 1) Mission Capability, 2) Risk, 3) Past
Performance, 4) Cost/Price and 5) Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling
Assessment. Indeed, an objective review of the data as measured
against the Request for Proposal shows that Boeing had the better
offering in terms of Most Probable Life Cycle Costs, lower risk and
better capability.

Flaws in this procurement process resulted in a significant gap
between the aircraft the Air Force originally set out to procure -- a
medium-sized tanker to replace the KC-135, as stated in the RFP -- and
the much larger Airbus A330-based tanker it ultimately selected. It is
clear that frequent and often unstated changes during the course of
the competition -- including manipulation of evaluation criteria and
application of unstated and unsupported priorities among the key
system requirements -- resulted in selection of an aircraft that was
radically different from that sought by the Air Force and inferior to
the Boeing 767 tanker offering.

Because of the way the Air Force treated Boeing's cost/price data, the
company was effectively denied its right to compete with a commercial-
derivative product, contrary not only to the RFP but also to federal
statute and regulation. The Air Force refused to accept Boeing's
Federal Acquisition Regulation-compliant cost/price information,
developed over 50 years of building commercial aircraft, and instead
treated the company's airframe cost/price information as if it were a
military-defense product. Not only did this flawed
decision deny the government the manufacturing benefits of Boeing's
unique in-line production capability, subjecting the Air Force to
higher risk, but it also resulted in a distortion of the price at
which Boeing actually offered to produce tankers.

In evaluating Past Performance, Boeing claims the Air Force ignored
the fact that Boeing -- with 75 years of success in producing tankers
-- is the only company in the world that has produced a commercial-
derivative tanker equipped with an operational aerial-refueling boom.
Rather than consider recent performance assessments that should have
enhanced Boeing's position, the Air Force focused on relatively
insignificant details on "somewhat relevant" Northrop/EADS programs to
the disadvantage of Boeing's experience.

"Boeing offered an aircraft that provided the best value and
performance for the stated mission at the lowest risk and lowest life
cycle cost," said McGraw. "We did bring our A-game to this
competition. Regrettably, irregularities in the process resulted in an
inconsistent and prejudicial application of procurement practices and
the selection of a higher-risk, higher-cost airplane that's less
suitable for the mission as defined by the Air Force's own Request For
Proposal. We are only asking that the rules of fair competition be
followed."

For better or for worse, they're gonna do it. Boeing announced early
Tuesday it will file a formal protest later today, asking the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review the decision by the
US Air Force to award a contract to a team of Northrop Grumman and
European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) to replace aerial
refueling tankers.

"Our team has taken a very close look at the tanker decision and found
serious flaws in the process that we believe warrant appeal," said Jim
McNerney, Boeing chairman, president and chief executive officer.
"This is an extraordinary step rarely taken by our company, and one we
take very seriously."

Following a debriefing on the decision by the Air Force on March 7,
Boeing officials spent three days reviewing the Air Force case for its
tanker award. Boeing states a "rigorous" analysis of the Air Force
evaluation that resulted in the Northrop/EADS contract led the
American plane maker to the conclusion that a protest was necessary.

"Based upon what we have seen, we continue to believe we submitted the
most capable, lowest risk, lowest Most Probable Life Cycle Cost
airplane as measured against the Air Force's Request for Proposal,"
McNerney said. "We look forward to the GAO's review of the decision."

Boeing said it would provide additional details of its case in
conjunction with the protest filing on Tuesday. Stay tuned.

FMI: www.boeing.com, www.globaltanker.com

Larry Dighera schrieb:

... said Mark McGraw, vice president and program
manager for Boeing Tanker Programs.

The ultimate unbiased source.

On Wed, 12 Mar 2008 07:12:17 -0700 (PDT), AJ
wrote:

Boeing Formally Protests US Air Force Tanker Contract Award
Says KC-X RFP Differs From Criteria Cited In Going with KC-45A

(From: Aero-News.net)
[snip]


From the press release below, it seems that Bowing feels a fly-by-wire
aircraft may not be suitable for operation in an EMP environment,
among other issues.

It sure is tough when you don't have a mole inside the Pentagon.



-----------------------
The Boeing Company http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/index.html
Boeing KC-767 Tanker Determined More Survivable in U.S. Air Force
Evaluation

ST. LOUIS, April 11, 2008 -- Boeing [NYSE: BA] today said the U.S. Air
Force's decision to award a contract for the next aerial refueling
airplane to the team of Northrop Grumman and the European Aeronautic
Defence and Space Company (EADS) is at odds with the fact that the
Northrop/EADS team's KC-30 is less survivable and more vulnerable to
attack than the Boeing KC-767 Advanced Tanker.

The Air Force evaluation cited the Boeing offering to be more
advantageous in the critical area of survivability. The evaluators
found the KC-767 tanker had almost five times as many survivability
discriminators as its competitor.

Speaking this week at the Aerial Refueling Systems Advisory Group
(ARSAG) Conference in Orlando, Fla., former U.S. Air Force Chief of
Staff and retired Gen. Ronald Fogleman stressed that survivability
greatly enhances the operational utility of a tanker.

"When I saw the Air Force's assessment of both candidate aircraft in
the survivability area, I was struck by the fact that they clearly saw
the KC-767 as a more survivable tanker," Fogleman told the ARSAG
audience in his role as a consultant to Boeing's tanker effort. "To be
survivable, tanker aircraft must contain systems to identify and
defeat threats, provide improved situational awareness to the aircrew
to avoid threat areas, and protect the crew in the event of attack.
The KC-767 has a superior survivability rating and will have greater
operational utility to the joint commander and provide better
protection to aircrews that must face real-world threats."

On Feb. 29, the Air Force selected Northrop/EADS' Airbus A330
derivative over Boeing's 767 derivative. Boeing subsequently asked the
Government Accountability Office to review the decision, citing
numerous irregularities and a flawed process that included deviations
from the evaluation and award criteria established by the service for
the competition.

During the Air Force debrief, the Boeing team discovered the KC-767
outranked the KC-30 in the critical survivability category. The KC-767
achieved a total score of 24 positive discriminators -- including 11
described as major -- while the KC-30 scored five, none of which were
major.

Major survivability discriminators for the Boeing KC-767 included:

* More robust surface-to-air missile defense systems
* Cockpit displays that improve situational awareness to enable
flight crews to better see and assess the threat environment
* Better Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) hardening -- the KC-767 is
better able to operate in an EMP environment compared with the KC-30
* Automatic route planning/rerouting and steering cues to the
flight crew to avoid threats once they are detected
* Better armor-protection features for the flight crew and
critical aircraft systems
* Better fuel-tank-explosion protection features.

Boeing's KC-767 Advanced Tanker will be equipped with the latest and
most reliable integrated defensive equipment to protect the aircraft
and crew by avoiding, defeating or surviving threats, resulting in
unprecedented tanker survivability -- far superior to all current Air
Force tankers as well as the Northrop/EADS KC-30. The Boeing KC-767
also includes a comprehensive set of capabilities that enables
unrestricted operations while providing maximum protection for the
tanker crew.

Boeing KC-767 Tanker Adds Up to Best Value for Warfighter, Taxpayers

ST. LOUIS, April 15, 2008 -- The Boeing [NYSE: BA] KC-767 Advanced
Tanker would save billions of dollars over the anticipated lifetime of
the aircraft compared with the larger Airbus-based KC-30. Nonetheless,
the U.S. government selected the larger air tanker from the team of
Northrop Grumman and the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company
(EADS).

Due to irregularities in the competition, such as the cost comparison,
Boeing has protested the decision and asked the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to determine if the tanker acquisition
process, including the cost analysis, was unfair and flawed. As the
GAO reviews the decision, Boeing is also calling on policymakers to
question why the comparison of full costs of the new tanker fleet
failed to reflect that the Airbus KC-30 tanker is larger, heavier,
less fuel-efficient and -- according to the Northrop/EADS team itself
-- more costly to operate.

"As Americans pay their taxes this week, it's essential that they
consider how effectively those dollars will be spent to equip U.S.
warfighters," said Sen. Sam Brownback of Kansas. "It's especially
important to think about the total cost of developing, producing,
operating and maintaining vital defense assets that must be ready to
fly at least two generations of American military men and women."

In evaluating the two tanker offerings, the U.S. government determined
that the Boeing KC-767 and the Northrop/EADS KC-30 were nearly equal
at a cost of $108 billion to buy and operate 179 tankers over 25
years. Boeing contends that a realistic comparison of life-cycle costs
-- what the Air Force calls Most Probable Life-Cycle Costs (MPLCC) --
should have resulted in a significantly higher price tag for the
Airbus KC-30 when considering the biggest cost drivers: fuel,
maintenance costs and infrastructure.

* Fuel: Using commercial aviation data, a Conklin & deDecker
Aviation Information fuel study funded by Boeing indicated that with
the price of oil between $100-125 per barrel, the larger, heavier and
less fuel-efficient KC-30 would cost $30 billion more in fuel costs
than the Boeing KC-767 over an anticipated 40-year service life.
* Maintenance: Based on the requirements for a smaller aircraft,
the KC-767 would be approximately 22 percent less costly than the
KC-30.

* Military Construction: The larger KC-30 would require
approximately $2 billion to build or upgrade hangars, ramps, access
roads and other facilities at tanker bases, while existing facilities
that are sized for the current fleet of KC-135 tankers will be able to
accommodate the smaller KC-767 with substantially less costly
improvements required.
* Additional Infrastructure Costs: To accommodate Air National
Guard and Air Force Reserve units -- which operate primarily from
civilian airfields and have 60 percent of the Air Force tanker fleet
--
further costly investment would be required to upgrade facilities
where KC-30s would be based.

On Apr 11, 2:54*pm, Larry Dighera wrote:
On Wed, 12 Mar 2008 07:12:17 -0700 (PDT), AJ
wrote:

Boeing Formally Protests US Air Force Tanker Contract Award
Says KC-X RFP Differs From Criteria Cited In Going with KC-45A

(From: Aero-News.net)

*[snip]

From the press release below, it seems that Bowing feels a fly-by-wire
aircraft may not be suitable for operation in an EMP environment,
among other issues. *

It sure is tough when you don't have a mole inside the Pentagon.

-----------------------
The Boeing Company http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/index.html *
Boeing KC-767 Tanker Determined More Survivable in U.S. Air Force
Evaluation

ST. LOUIS, April 11, 2008 -- Boeing [NYSE: BA] today said the U.S. Air
Force's decision to award a contract for the next aerial refueling
airplane to the team of Northrop Grumman and the European Aeronautic
Defence and Space Company (EADS) is at odds with the fact that the
Northrop/EADS team's KC-30 is less survivable and more vulnerable to
attack than the Boeing KC-767 Advanced Tanker.

The Air Force evaluation cited the Boeing offering to be more
advantageous in the critical area of survivability. The evaluators
found *the KC-767 tanker had almost five times as many survivability
discriminators as its competitor.

Speaking this week at the Aerial Refueling Systems Advisory Group
(ARSAG) Conference in Orlando, Fla., former U.S. Air Force Chief of
Staff and retired Gen. Ronald Fogleman stressed that survivability
greatly enhances the operational utility of a tanker.

"When I saw the Air Force's assessment of both candidate aircraft in
the survivability area, I was struck by the fact that they clearly saw
the KC-767 as a more survivable tanker," Fogleman told the ARSAG
audience in his role as a consultant to Boeing's tanker effort. "To be
survivable, tanker aircraft must contain systems to identify and
defeat threats, provide improved situational awareness to the aircrew
to avoid threat areas, and protect the crew in the event of attack.
The KC-767 has a superior survivability rating and will have greater
operational utility to the joint commander and provide better
protection to aircrews that must face real-world threats."

On Feb. 29, the Air Force selected Northrop/EADS' Airbus A330
derivative over Boeing's 767 derivative. Boeing subsequently asked the
Government Accountability Office to review the decision, citing
numerous irregularities and a flawed process that included deviations
from the evaluation and award criteria established by the service for
the competition.

During the Air Force debrief, the Boeing team discovered the KC-767
outranked the KC-30 in the critical survivability category. The KC-767
achieved a total score of 24 positive discriminators -- including 11
described as major -- while the KC-30 scored five, none of which were
major.

Major survivability discriminators for the Boeing KC-767 included:

* * * * More robust surface-to-air missile defense systems
* * * * Cockpit displays that improve situational awareness to enable
flight crews to better see and assess the threat environment
* * * * Better Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) hardening -- the KC-767 is
better able to operate in an EMP environment compared with the KC-30
* * * * Automatic route planning/rerouting and steering cues to the
flight crew to avoid threats once they are detected
* * * * Better armor-protection features for the flight crew and
critical aircraft systems
* * * * Better fuel-tank-explosion protection features.

Boeing's KC-767 Advanced Tanker will be equipped with the latest and
most reliable integrated defensive equipment to protect the aircraft
and crew by avoiding, defeating or surviving threats, resulting in
unprecedented tanker survivability -- far superior to all current Air
Force tankers as well as the Northrop/EADS KC-30. The Boeing KC-767
also *includes a comprehensive set of capabilities that enables
unrestricted operations while providing maximum protection for the
tanker crew.

The Air Force doesn't care about survivability... Tanker crews are
expendable.

Well, you've got to give Boeing high marks for tenacity even if their
history of unethical/criminal behavior put them at a disadvantage in
this competitive bid for USAF tankers. Here's the latest:



The Boeing Company http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/index.html
Boeing KC-767 Tanker: Sized Right for the Fight

ST. LOUIS, May 07, 2008 -- The KC-767 Advanced Tanker developed by
Boeing [NYSE: BA] was sized to meet the aerial refueling requirements
of the U.S. Air Force's mission and exceeded performance requirements
to replace the aging, yet storied fleet of KC-135 medium tankers.

Despite the fact that the stated parameters for evaluating the
aircraft said no extra credit would be assigned for exceeding certain
requirement objectives, the Northrop Grumman and European Aeronautic
Defence and Space Company (EADS) team received such credit. As a
result, the oversized Airbus A330-based KC-30 was selected. Boeing has
protested the decision to the U.S. Government Accountability Office.

According to the Statement of Objectives for the KC-X program, the
primary mission of the new tanker would be aerial refueling rather
than hauling cargo or transporting passengers. In order to meet the
documented mission requirements, Boeing offered the KC-767, which
efficiently fulfills the vital mission of a mid-sized aerial refueling
fleet while also exceeding the highest requirements for airlift,
passenger and aeromedical evacuation capabilities.

"Tanker flight crews are asked to bring the right amount of fuel to
the fight in the most efficient, reliable manner, and the KC-767 meets
that fundamental requirement," said Mark McGraw, vice president,
Boeing Tanker Programs. "Asking these aircrews to fly longer missions
in larger, less survivable planes with more fuel capacity than needed
and vast amounts of unused cargo and passenger space just doesn't add
up.

"The Boeing KC-767 exceeded the requirements in a manner that still
kept the plane right-sized and efficient," McGraw said. "Our
competition likes to talk about offering more, more, more -- but in
reality, the KC-30 will cost more to operate, more to maintain, and
more to house, with the U.S. taxpayer footing the bill."

A larger plane -- like the KC-30 tanker offered by Northrop Grumman
and EADS -- simply results in wasted capacity, wasted efficiency and
wasted taxpayer dollars.

The contrasts between the KC-767 and the KC-30 are notable and worth
considering in determining the appropriate tanker for the mission:

* Fuel Capacity -- The historical average offload on a tanker
mission is 60,000 to 70,000 pounds of fuel. The Air Force fuel offload
requirement was set at 94,000 pounds of fuel at 1,000 nautical miles,
comfortably above the historical average. The KC-767 exceeded the
94,000-pound requirement by 20 percent while remaining within the
optimum size for medium tanker operations. The KC-30 fuel capacity
exceeded that requirement by 50 percent -- meaning more than half of
its fuel load would be unused during an average mission. The result: a
large tanker that burns more fuel and requires significantly higher
costs in maintenance and support.
* Cargo/Passenger Capacity -- In 2006, the Air Force moved less
than 1 percent of its cargo and passengers in tankers. The KC-767 does
offer significantly more cargo and passenger capacity than the KC-135,
but not at the expense of airplane size or efficiency. Again, the
KC-30 carries more passengers and slightly more cargo based on weight,
but with a bigger, less survivable and more costly plane.
* Aeromedical Evacuation -- The Air Force Request for Proposals
set an objective requirement of being able to carry 24 litters and 26
ambulatory patients. The KC-767 carries 30 litters and 67 ambulatory
patients, far exceeding the highest requirement. The Air Force praised
the KC-767's superior aeromedical crew stations, its ability to
generate oxygen onboard, and the power provided for aeromedical crew
systems. The KC-30 again offered more quantity with less quality and
less survivability.

In article ,
Larry Dighera wrote:

Well, you've got to give Boeing high marks for tenacity even if their
history of unethical/criminal behavior put them at a disadvantage in
this competitive bid for USAF tankers. Here's the latest:

"history of unethical/criminal behavior"? Aside from the Drunyan stuff,
what history are you thinking about?

(Note: I have no interest in Boeing and nothing against Northrup, I'm just
uncertain as to what history)

--
Bob Noel
(goodness, please trim replies!!!)