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What if we ignored N. Africa and the MTO?
What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our full
resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war would have been over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and the MTO would have simply been isolated and would died on the vine. Why not? Regards, Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
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"ArtKramr" wrote in message ... What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our full resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war would have been over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and the MTO would have simply been isolated and would died on the vine. Why not? Regards, Because there is no way the invasion could have been successfully launched in 1943. The troops, landing craft and aircraft were simply not available and could not be mde available until the Battle of the Atlantic was won. Some 5000 ships and landing craft, 600,000 tons of supplies and 200,000 vehicles had to be assembled in addition to the armies and then there's the little matter of winning air superiority over the landing beaches. Without the decimation of the Luftwaffe in late 1943 and early 1944 and lacking long range escort fighters any attempted invasion would have been exceptionally risky. As for the MTO it was simply not possible to isolate the German and Italian armies and ignore them. Had they been able to seize the Suez canal and middle east they would have had access to virtually unlimited oil supplies from Iraq and Iran while at the same time cutting the supply of those products to allied forces. Not good at all. At the very least strong garrisons would have to be left along the Egyptian Libyan frontier and the Germans would be left with bases in North Africa with which to harrass and attack shipping from Australasia and South Africa heading for NW Europe. As it was the forces captured when Tunisia fell were greater than those captured at Stalingrad and not only was Italy knocked out of the war but the Germans had to garrison that country as well thus diverting troops who could have been used to defend Northern France. Keith |
#6
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There is a real question of whether we had the ability to launch any invasion of Europe in 1943, let alone sucessfully. Our costly "learning experiences" in Tunisia do raise the question of how ready the US was to take on the Wehrmacht. If the Allies (not just the U.S.) had landed in France in November 1942, they would have been massacred. The U.S. Army at the Battle of Kasserine Pass in February 1943 was indeed no match for the German army (properly called the Heer, not the Wehrmacht). It was a fairly inexpensive graduate course in the realities of combat. The USAAF, however, fared very well in comparison to the Luftwaffe. And the USN was streets ahead of the Kriegsmarine. Note also that the North African campaign proved the ability of the United States to launch an invasion across 4,000 miles of open ocean--something never done before, and rarely since. That was quite an accomplishment. It also turned a German ally -- the French colonial army -- into a member of the Allied forces, and thus paved the way for the Free French role in 1944. Later on, a lot of German troops were tied up in the MTO keeping us tied up in the MTO. Interesting question who came out ahead there... Given that German and Italian prisoners are generally numbered well to the north of 300,000, there is no question but that the North African campaign was an astounding success for the Allies. Tunisia was an Axis defeat on the scale of Stalingrad. Sicily too was a splendid victory. It's true that the Allies got bogged down in Italy in 1944, but that was largely because resources were diverted to the invasion of France. I don't think it's fair to say that the U.S. was "tied up" in Italy. We could have left any time we wanted to. It was the Germans who were tied down. all the best -- Dan Ford email: see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com |
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"ArtKramr" wrote in message ... What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our full resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war would have been over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and the MTO would have simply been isolated and would died on the vine. Why not? Because the Axis keeps a lot of natural resources available. The Med becomes an axis lake with secure lines of communication to Africa and greatly simplifying that beyond. Heck, with out North African bases there's not even an attack on Ploesti. |
#9
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In article , gme6
@cornell.edu says... (ArtKramr) wrote in : What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our full resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war would have been over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and the MTO would have simply been isolated and would died on the vine. Why not? To just list what I see as some reasons (In no particular order): Lack of experience: The invasions of North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio were learning experiences for the Allies. There would have likely been a lot of mistakes made without them. Perhaps a better plan might have been rather then fight a war in North Africa do a direct invasion of Sicily from Egypt. As it was North Africa costs the Axis dearly. IIRC about 25% of axis strength. U-boats: The U-boat menace wasn't really under control until mid 1943. This would have added extra difficulties in supplying a large army in mainland Europe (this is one of the reasons that the destruction of the German airforce didn't really get started till 1944). Aircraft: In 1943 the German airforce was more intact than in 1944. The Allies would have been dealing with a significantly stronger Luftwaffe while at the same time lacking some of their better aircraft. Italy (and MTO operations in general): Knocking Italy out of the war was worth a lot to the Allies, both on land and at sea. Germany was forced to devote units to Italy that could have been used elsewhere (like repelling an allied landing), and British navel assets were able to devote their energies to tasks other than trying to counter Italian and German ships (a task which tied up several British capital ships for most of the early war). Isolating the Germans in North Africa would have taken a lot of material, and would have been very difficult. An in-the-war Italy and the need to contest the Germans in the MTO would have still been a big equipment sink (definitely bigger than the Italian sideshow in 1944 was). As it was in 1944, Italy diverted almost a million German troops from more important fronts. It cost the Allies almost as much but they could afford it. Lack of specialized equipment: The Allies had a lot of specialized equipment that played an important part in the D-Day operations. An invasion in 1943 would have most likely lacked things like enough specialized landing craft, the more interesting supply solutions, and specialized tanks. Not as much as you would think. The invasion of Sicily involved more landing crafts then D-Day. -- Intelligence does not imply reason or purpose 17th saying of Bernard |
#10
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"Bernardz" wrote in message news:MPG.1a370ac351885d1d989763@news... In article , gme6 Perhaps a better plan might have been rather then fight a war in North Africa do a direct invasion of Sicily from Egypt. Look at a map, without control of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya your invasion convoy will have to go round the Cape through the Suez Canal and then fight its way through an area where the axis have air bases on both sides of the Med As it was North Africa costs the Axis dearly. IIRC about 25% of axis strength. Hardly a compelling argument for not fighting them there then. U-boats: The U-boat menace wasn't really under control until mid 1943. This would have added extra difficulties in supplying a large army in mainland Europe (this is one of the reasons that the destruction of the German airforce didn't really get started till 1944). Aircraft: In 1943 the German airforce was more intact than in 1944. The Allies would have been dealing with a significantly stronger Luftwaffe while at the same time lacking some of their better aircraft. Italy (and MTO operations in general): Knocking Italy out of the war was worth a lot to the Allies, both on land and at sea. Germany was forced to devote units to Italy that could have been used elsewhere (like repelling an allied landing), and British navel assets were able to devote their energies to tasks other than trying to counter Italian and German ships (a task which tied up several British capital ships for most of the early war). Isolating the Germans in North Africa would have taken a lot of material, and would have been very difficult. An in-the-war Italy and the need to contest the Germans in the MTO would have still been a big equipment sink (definitely bigger than the Italian sideshow in 1944 was). As it was in 1944, Italy diverted almost a million German troops from more important fronts. It cost the Allies almost as much but they could afford it. Lack of specialized equipment: The Allies had a lot of specialized equipment that played an important part in the D-Day operations. An invasion in 1943 would have most likely lacked things like enough specialized landing craft, the more interesting supply solutions, and specialized tanks. Not as much as you would think. The invasion of Sicily involved more landing crafts then D-Day. Operation Husky involved around 3000 ships and landing craft while overlord utilised in excess of 5000. While both invasions involved a similar size assault force, 3 Commonwealth and 2 US divisions the rate of reinforcement in subsequent waves was much higher in Normand which in part was a result of the lessons learned in Sicily. Keith |
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