The greatest missions were tactical, not strategic

"BUFDRVR" wrote in message
...
Bob Coe wrote:

It took years of strategic bombing to even have a Normandy.


Yes and no. Yes, the Strategic Bombing campaign did syphon off resources
and
men that would have been manning positions at Normandy, but it did not
make the
Germans short of any equipment or resources. Within a few months of D-Day,
the
POL shortages would begin, but on D-Day the Germans had plenty of POL.

The war in Europe was largely fought along the Russian front. The strategic
air campaign supported the Allied policy of keeping the Soviets in the war.
I think Roosevelt's biggest fear wa that the Soviet would make another
sepeate peace with Germany. It was a fear of Eisenhower.

I think it safe to say that the strategic air campaign shortened the war,
but I do t think the war could have been won without it.

David


David

"George Z. Bush" wrote in message
...



Half-heartedly following this exchange, it occurs to me that no one
person,
group, or even army can rightfully take credit for anything other than
their own
relatively tiny part in the overall picture. If you want to get downright
silly
about it, nothing that happened in the ETO would have happened if we in
the MTO
hadn't had Kesselring and his troops tied up in Italy. Those extra Heer
troops
might have had a decisive influence on the outcome of our invasion
efforts.


Except that we'd have had all those US, British and Canadian
troops that were tried down in Italy available for the campaign

Keith




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From: "George Z. Bush"

nothing that happened in the ETO would have happened if we in the MTO
hadn't had Kesselring and his troops tied up in Italy. Those extra Heer
troops
might have had a decisive influence on the outcome of our invasion efforts.

Not to mention on the Russian front. Operation Torch forced the Luftwaffe to
send 320 Ju 52s to the Med in November, 1942, just at the time the Soviets
mounted their counter-attack at Stalingrad and the Nazis tried to resupply
their troops their by air. Torch also forced the Germans to end their air
attacks on the Murmansk convoys and transfer anti-shipping and fighter units to
the Med. In the six months after Torch, the Germans lost more than 2,400
aircraft in the MTO fighting, including almost two-thirds of all their fighters
and bombers available as of Oct., 1942. When the Germans were driven from
Africa, among other things, they abandoned their aircraft maintenance and
repair equipment, tons of spare parts, and most of their ground crews.
The Germans rushed reinforcements to defend Italy, stripping other theaters.
Then came the assault on Sicily and Husky. In July 1943 alone, the Luftwaffe
lost more than 700 aircraft in the Sicilian fighting.
Just considering this period, and only the Luftwaffe, imagine if the forces
diverted to the Med, even just those lost there, had been available on the
Eastern Front.
Arguing about which theater was more important during the war is like arguing
which of your organs is more impartant. One says the heart is most important,
another the lungs, yet another the liver. Good arguments can be made in each
case, but remove any one of them and the other two are finished as well.


Chris Mark

"David Lentz" wrote in message
.. .


The war in Europe was largely fought along the Russian front.

True to a point up until D-Day but from that point onwards
the germans had to pull more and more troops from Russia to shore
up the Western front. The Nazis knew that once the Ruhr fell
it was all over and the western allies were a much more urgent
threat in late 1944.

By November 1944 there were more German troops committed
in the west than the east

The strategic
air campaign supported the Allied policy of keeping the Soviets in the
war.

It also diverted immense amounts of german air power and critically
weakened the German air force both by destroying large numbers
of aircraft and pilots and destroying their fuel supply.

I think Roosevelt's biggest fear wa that the Soviet would make another
sepeate peace with Germany. It was a fear of Eisenhower.


That was scarcely a likely outcome after the battle of Stalingrad
The Russians were themselves terrified that the AngloAmericans
would do the same. The Germans saw the western allies as
opponents but the Russians were a racial enemy. They
fought it not for territory but to make the Slav's extinct.
The Russians understood that.

I think it safe to say that the strategic air campaign shortened the war,
but I do t think the war could have been won without it.

Perhaps but at much higher cost.

Keith




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Keith Willshaw wrote:
"George Z. Bush" wrote in message
...



Half-heartedly following this exchange, it occurs to me that no one
person,
group, or even army can rightfully take credit for anything other than
their own
relatively tiny part in the overall picture. If you want to get downright
silly
about it, nothing that happened in the ETO would have happened if we in
the MTO
hadn't had Kesselring and his troops tied up in Italy. Those extra Heer
troops
might have had a decisive influence on the outcome of our invasion
efforts.


Except that we'd have had all those US, British and Canadian
troops that were tried down in Italy available for the campaign

Keith

Spoilsport! (^-^)))

George Z.

Chris Mark wrote:
From: "George Z. Bush"

nothing that happened in the ETO would have happened if we in the MTO
hadn't had Kesselring and his troops tied up in Italy. Those extra Heer
troops
might have had a decisive influence on the outcome of our invasion efforts.

Not to mention on the Russian front. Operation Torch forced the Luftwaffe to
send 320 Ju 52s to the Med in November, 1942, just at the time the Soviets
mounted their counter-attack at Stalingrad and the Nazis tried to resupply
their troops their by air. Torch also forced the Germans to end their air
attacks on the Murmansk convoys and transfer anti-shipping and fighter units
to the Med. In the six months after Torch, the Germans lost more than 2,400
aircraft in the MTO fighting, including almost two-thirds of all their
fighters and bombers available as of Oct., 1942. When the Germans were
driven from Africa, among other things, they abandoned their aircraft
maintenance and repair equipment, tons of spare parts, and most of their
ground crews.
The Germans rushed reinforcements to defend Italy, stripping other theaters.
Then came the assault on Sicily and Husky. In July 1943 alone, the Luftwaffe
lost more than 700 aircraft in the Sicilian fighting.
Just considering this period, and only the Luftwaffe, imagine if the forces
diverted to the Med, even just those lost there, had been available on the
Eastern Front.
Arguing about which theater was more important during the war is like arguing
which of your organs is more impartant. One says the heart is most important,
another the lungs, yet another the liver. Good arguments can be made in each
case, but remove any one of them and the other two are finished as well.


Chris Mark

My point exactly, but hopefully stated with less verbiage. (^-^)))

George Z.

Brooks wrote:

Yeah, but they did NOT have plenty of fighters stationed forward to use that
fuel to deal with the invasion force. They had retained the bulk of their
fighter force to protect against the strategic onslaught against Germany,

Absolutely, I used ground air defense assets as an example of syphoned
resources, but fighters were just as big a factor.

and IIRC by the summer of 1944 they were already suffering the strategic
campaign's attrition effects in terms of training of replacement pilots to
take the place of those they had lost, a large part of which were lost
defending against the 8th AF and RAF BC.

Absolutely.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

ArtKramr wrote:

But it was tactical bmbing that cut the Germans off from Normandy. They had
plenty, they just couldn't move it forward as we sliced up the roads and rail
lines and took out the bridges.


True, and Ira Eaker, Jimmy Doolittle and other prominent Army Air Force leaders
undertook the mission with great protests and completely under duress from
Eisenhower.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

Subject: The greatest missions were tactical, not strategic
From: (BUFDRVR)
Date: 9/2/2004 12:07 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

ArtKramr wrote:

But it was tactical bmbing that cut the Germans off from Normandy. They had
plenty, they just couldn't move it forward as we sliced up the roads and
rail
lines and took out the bridges.


True, and Ira Eaker, Jimmy Doolittle and other prominent Army Air Force
leaders
undertook the mission with great protests and completely under duress from
Eisenhower.


BUFDRVR


Geeez. And they never asked me whether I wanted to go or not. (sheeesh)


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"BUFDRVR" wrote in message
...
Brooks wrote:

Yeah, but they did NOT have plenty of fighters stationed forward to use
that
fuel to deal with the invasion force. They had retained the bulk of their
fighter force to protect against the strategic onslaught against Germany,

Absolutely, I used ground air defense assets as an example of syphoned
resources, but fighters were just as big a factor.

IIRC, their Wehrmacht units of 1944 *were* understrength in terms of both
equipment and manpower--they had been forced to cut the number of sub-units
in divisions, Panzer and Panzer-Grenadier divisions did not have near the
number of tanks they had in previous years, etc. Given that the German
government had been forced to increase production of anti-aircraft armament
(and was already resource constrained), and assign many more men to work in
AAA units, by '44, I'd posit that the strategic offensive *did* have a
definite effect in terms of reducing the available manpower and equipment
resources for their ground forces as well.

Brooks


and IIRC by the summer of 1944 they were already suffering the strategic
campaign's attrition effects in terms of training of replacement pilots
to
take the place of those they had lost, a large part of which were lost
defending against the 8th AF and RAF BC.

Absolutely.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it
harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"