F15E's trounced by Eurofighters

Presidente Alcazar wrote in
:


Well, after experiencing the legendary Serdar Argic and his cult of
personality, I came to the conclusion that all usenet contributors
were basically frustrated loons, and it was all just a question of
degree (although the needle was off the scale with Serdar). But then
I realised this also logically applied to me, so I discarded that
piece of demented insight with all despatch.

No no, you were perfectly correct to begin with.
WHIBBLE
--
Regards
Drewe
"Better the pride that resides
In a citizen of the world
Than the pride that divides
When a colourful rag is unfurled"

Presidente Alcazar
wrote:

On Thu, 18 Mar 2004 16:55:13 -0500, Stephen Harding
wrote:

I see Johnny Wiz as a hard working fellow at some convenience
store during the day, earning min wage and putting in 12 hours
to make ends meet. He's annoyed and some days downright ****ed
at "the system".

Well, after experiencing the legendary Serdar Argic and his cult of
personality, I came to the conclusion that all usenet contributors
were basically frustrated loons, and it was all just a question of
degree (although the needle was off the scale with Serdar). But then
I realised this also logically applied to me, so I discarded that
piece of demented insight with all despatch.

Gavin Bailey

Congratulations Gavin!...insight is almost never 20-20...you done
good!...
--

-Gord.

"Evan Brennan" wrote in message
m...
Guy Alcala wrote in message
...
snip
British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British bombs
falling on Stanley airfield. : )


May have missed it somewhere else in the thread, (and I know it's got a
smiley after it) but wasn't the error on the Vulcan raid due to the
cartographer putting the wrong co-ordinates on the map?

Evan Brennan wrote:

Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
The Argentines had to fly hundreds of miles, had little or no fuel
reserve to dogfight and their jets were usually loaded for surface
attack, not air-to-air combat. Their flights were small because few
aerial tankers were available; no US Navy style Alpha Strikes for
them. Argentine AAMs were pure ****e, assuming they worked at all, and
most of the attack planes did not carry them. Ammo for cannons was
sometimes deleted to save weight. In that case their only defense was
to make a run for it.

Virtually every point of which, as well as several others, Sharkey's team
brought up in their TRE

Cite?

Well, you could start on page 56, where he discusses with his AWIs what preparation needs to be done, jump to page 66, where
he talks about Alan Curtis' experience of the A-4 and Mirage and how that info will come in handy, then to pages 73 and 74,
where he describes a conversation with a couple of friends on the strengths and weaknesses he sees, and then read all of
Chapter 9 which goes into the threat reduction exercise in some detail, especially as to AAF strike ranges, radar and
weapons capabilities (of both sides), AAR limitations, etc. Pg. 125-126 have a bit, pg. 129 talks about the limitations of
Port Stanley Airfield for fast jets, and their are various other small bits scattered throughout the book which you'll have
to re-read to find.

If true, he must have forgotten about it very quickly. All you have to
do is read the Epilogue and Sharkey's 'Layman's Guide to Fighter
Combat' which rolls the only highlights that were significant to
Sharkey.

the Epilogue states what mistakes he felt were made by the British, and what actions he felt should be taken, and little
else other than commenting that it's unlikely that the Falklands could be reinforced in time to prevent their being taken in
a surprise attack given less than a couple of day's warning, a fact that is demonstrably true. And this time, there's a
nice 8,600 foot runway that can take any a/c in the Argentine fleet, eliminating their geographical disadvantage. Do you
disagree with his analysis?

He droned on about ACM training (results according to him,
that is) which does not mention the lack of fuel that prevented
Argentine jets from doing much ACM. : )

Presumably this refers to the "Layman's Guide to Fighter Combat". Perhaps you should have been clued in to the intent of
the appendix by the title, as it wasn't called "An Analysis of the Specific Operational, Tactical, Technical and Human
Factors that Affected the Outcome of the Air Campaign in the Falklands War." Of course, he could have used that title for
the entire book, perhaps with the added subtitle "In the opinion of the CO of 801 Squadron, along with his personal
experiences." But perhaps you missed the following, on pg. 288 of the LGtFC:

"What is the fighter pilot's job when he is faced with an air combat situation against other fighters? It is 'to use his
aeroplane as a weapon system with which he can destroy any enemy aircraft that are menacing him or threatening the security
of the resources that he is there to protect.' and he must do this without letting the enemy threaten him.

"How does he carry out his task?"

And he then goes on to give some general rules, quickly discusses fighter performance issues, weapons issues, and BFM,
restricted to 1 v. 1, stating what he believes the key characteristics of a successful fighter are, points out that
multi-aircraft combat may well change the equation. He then devots a single paragraph about how a/c like the SHAR may well
be able to beat a/c of suprior book performance like the Mirage III, and various teens, talks about how weapon systems may
affect tactics, and fnally, in just about the only specific reference to the Operational and technical factors in the war,
other than the short mention of the Mirage III above, writes in regard to STOVL capability:

"The inability of the Argentine fighters to do this cost Argentina the Falklands War. If they could have operated from the
short runway at Port Stanley, the Task Force's job would have been vastly more difficult."

While it amy be arguable that this inability cost them the war, his conclusiomn in the second sentence is undeniable. I
know you must agree, because that single advantage would have eliminated AAF/CANA range problems, while increasing those of
the Brits.



all their AAMs weren't "pure ****e"; just the R.530 was.

The Sidewinder wasn't ****e -- but it wasn't used either.

The only version of the AIM-9 the Argentineans had was the AIM-9B and that's the next thing to ****, and vastly inferior to
either the Shafrir 2 or Magic. But we both agree it was never carried, so I considered it irrelevant and left it completely
out of my calculations.

This issue
is largely irrelevant because very few Argentine sorties carried
missiles after 1st May 1982.

No, the issue isn't irrelevant, it's the heart if the matter. We know they rarely did so, the question is "why not, when
they had done so for a large number of sorties on May 1st?"

Argentine Mirage and Dagger fighters
from 'Air War in the Falklands', Christopher Chant (2001):

" FAA, now fearing that Vulcan bombers could strike on strategic
targets, had decided to reserve the Mirage IIIEA fighters of Groupo 8
de Caza for defense of the mainland bases. So with the exception of a
few more sorties over the Falkland Islands, where they carefully
avoided any Sea Harrier fighters, the Mirage IIIEA force spent the
rest of the war at readiness on airfields that could have been
threatened "

Uh huh, they avoided the Sea harriers, but didn't on May 1st. So what changed? The answer is, they got beat early, and
decided to throw in the A-A towel.

" From this day forward the Dagger was employed as fighter-bomber
rather than a fighter, and for the rest of the war did not operate
over the Falklands with air-to-air missiles. Thus in the remaining six
weeks of the war British pilots were faced by many forms of danger,
but not missile-armed Argentine fighters "

Yup. And again, why not? They had the a/c, they had the missiles, and they had the pilots. The Dagger was marginally
better for CAP/escort than the Mirage III despite its lack of radar, because it carried more internal fuel. And yet they
forfeited the match and gave the Brits a free ride after May 1st, because the Brits had achieved a moral ascendancy over
them.

Jeff Ethell's 'Air War South Atlantic' (1983) cites A-4 pilot Lt.
Rotolo: " We never mounted Sidewinders on our Skyhawks because our
mission was always one of attack, never air-to-air combat "

Yup. Please note the rest of the quote from Rotolo:

"What were we briefed to do if jumped by Sea Harriers? Well, we had a lot of experience of air combat maneuvering, but in
the A-4 there was not much choice. Not only were we too slow, but we knew very well we could not outmaneuver the Sea
Harrier. All we could do was try to escape at full throttle at low level."

Now there's a pilot who's beaten before he starts. Too slow? Well, in the A-4B (A-4Q to the Argentine Navy), yeah, they're
slower than a SHAR but not all that much, especially when they've jettisoned the racks and tanks. But can't outmaneuver the
SHAR?! Hell, the A-4 can still outmaneuver most of the teen-series, and you can always make yourself a tougher target even
if you're at a disavantage. Just ask the Canberra pilot who managed to make a SHAR miss with 2 AIM-9Ls at low altitude.
But if you want to solve all the SHAR's tracking problems and give them a dead six shot on a non-maneuvering target, then
doing nothing but running away is the way to go about it. Not exactly good tactics there.

BTW, Rotolo was a Navy (CANA) A-4 pilot, and AFAICT, they were the only Argentine Skyhawks to be fitted for AIM-9s, and only
had the AIM-9B. But carrying it really wasn't an option, because the A-4B only has three pylons, and if they carried AIM-9s
on the wing pylons they're limited to a single fuel tank on the C/L, and probably couldn't even make the round trip (barring
a lot more KC-130s being available). Both Navy and Air Force A-4s had to operate with two wing tanks to have sufficient
range, carrying a bomb or bombs on the C/L.

Speaking of bad tactics, let's go up the page a bit, to the comments by Ruben Zini of Grupo 5:

"We were briefed to avoid dogfights [Guy: a good idea in general] and escape at low level and alone, 'every man for
himself.'"

Apparently they didn't consider the concept of mutual support important. But you can bet that a few 20mm rounds in the
general direction of a SHAR might rattle a pilot's aim, even if they missed. And it sure beats passively accepting their
fate, which in effect is what many of the pilots did.

Less than a dozen Mirage jets were available for air defense, and it
appears that they usually stayed home in case the British tried
to
bomb the mainland. Rest assured though that your standard, ten-megaton
explosion of geekspeak (mostly uncited) was noted and filed in the
proper place.

And rest assured that your usual Anglophobic bias was expected

British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British bombs
falling on Stanley airfield. : )

Said what same thing?

and your lack of understanding of the technical issues involved

likewise. Ordinarily I don't bother replying to your diatribes,
but in this case I felt that some other readers might benefit from
a more accurate description of the technical aspects, as the URLs
you provided were notably sloppy, incomplete or inaccurate.

Guy, you can't even put your NON-technical appeals in credible form! I
don't see why anyone should believe your continuous stream of
technical minutae is entirely "accurate".

Given that you have trotted out as evidence sources that are full of easily spotted, in some cases quite ludicrous errors,
you are clearly unable to evaluate the accuracy of the technical minutiae. Picking one at random, care to talk about
whether Coram's description of the TPS-43's radar's range and capabilities is accurate, as this is a source you seem to put
a great deal of faith in? That's the sort of technical minutiae you claim to be credible.

Re the point you attempt to make above, there were plenty of Daggers
available after May 1st to be used for A/A escort if the AAF
had wished to do so, even assuming they chose not to use the
Mirages for that job after May 1st. And the supposed reason for
holding the Mirages on the mainland for defense of the southern
air bases (or even, in the wilder version, defense of Buenos Aires),
in the worry that the Brits might bomb Rio Gallegos etc. with a Vulcan
is more than a little suspect, as the Mirages were used to fly decoy
missions over the islands later in the war. Clearly, if that was the real
reason, then the decision was only made after the results of the combats
on May 1st had convinced the AAF that they were outclassed A/A.

There's no sequence in your fantasy that follows logic. Every single
preposterous argument flows from another.

In other words, you are unable to rebut, so will just ignore it and hope we don't notice.

Argentine pilots were more impressed with the AIM-9L than British
piloting skills.

British tactics and training was far more important to the exchange ratio.

Argentine opinion of their low-level anti-shipping strikes vs. Sea
Harrier pilots and AIM-9L missile, 'History of the South Atlantic
Conflict', Ruben Moro (1989):

Ah, Ruben Moro. Have you read that opus, or are you quoting from another source? Let's just say that, like many Argentine
sources, it can be long on emotion and short on facts, kind of like the Junta's propaganda during the war. Here's a fairly
typical review:

"A glaring gap exists in the historical coverage of the Falklands War. That gap is due to the British monopoly in the
writing of this war's history. The reader picks up Moro's book hoping and expecting to find a welcome new perspective, that
of Argentina. The hopeful reader is destined to be disappointed, as the book is beset by severe deficiencies that render its
value as negligible. The major flaw of this work is its credibility. The accounts presented are an obvious mixture of fact
and fantasy that result in even the accurate narrations being cast in doubt. Wild claims of the aircraft carrier HMS
Invincible being bombed and severely damaged are a good example, as are claims for British aircraft downed in fantastic
numbers. Argentine forces are portrayed as heroic and effective to the extent that the uninformed is liable to believe that
Argentina won the war. The reader is left frustrated, as it seems that the British accounts must be tainted with a lack of
objectivity on occasion. Ruben Moro, however, does little but thicken the fog of uncertainty. Another disturbing flaw is the
style in which the book is written. It is devoid of any objective and academic character, and is consumed by emotive and
partisan rhetoric. At times the reader is impressed that he is reading an official history of the Galtieri Junta, published
by the Ministry of Information of the time. History is yet to be graced by a serious and dependable Argentinian perspective
of this war."

You might try to find a copy (Spanish only, I'm afraid) of the book by Pablo Carballo of Grupo 5, "Dios Y Los Halcones". He
flew many of the more important missions, and doesn't seem to have the hysterical and/or histrionic tone of many of the more
"official" sources, at least as far as I was able to puzzle out between my junior high-school Spanish and Babelfish. But
the most objective sources I've read about the Argentine (and British) sides of the air war are still written by British or
American authors, "Falklands: The Air War" being the essential source, with "Air War South Atlantic" being wuite good
considering it came out so soon after the war. Salvador Mafe' Huertas Osprey book on the Mirage III/V contains many good
accounts and pictures from Argentine pilots, and I'm told his book on the Mirage's combat record is also good.

" Fuel restrictions prevented them from making zig-zag maneuvers to
evade would-be pursuers or re-runs, or selecting secondary
targets

Fuel was certainly an issue, although not quite to that extent. The translation may be the problem here.

...once they penetrated San Carlos Bay, they had to proceed
posthaste to the first available target...

Because of the defenses, not fuel. BTW, that was one of the reasons Clapp and Thompson chose San Carlos Water, despite a
couple of disadvantages, including it being closer to the Argentine air bases compared to some of the other options, like
Cow and Volunteer bays.

one had to be careful
disturbing the Harriers, which having been alerted to their presence,
lay in wait for them as they returned to the mainland...

Assuming they hadn't hit them on the way in. Without doing a full count, AFAIR not a single Dagger was shot down while
returning to base; they were all shot down on the way in before they reached the AOA. The Skyhawks were slower, and they
were shot down both coming and going.

These
interceptors were well aware that the intuders carried no air-to-air
missiles, and that in order to use their cannon, they had to to be rid
of their external stores which could sacrifice the mission...

False. Are the SHAR pilots supposed to be mind readers, so they can know that the Daggers weren't carrying missiles? And
who says they couldn't fire cannon without dropping stores? This would come as news to both Dagger and Skyhawk pilots.

Add to
all this the handicap to these aircraft represented by the task force
Sidewinders, which turned the pilot's jobs into child's play, for they
knew that Argentine Mirage-IIIs, whether flying interception,
diversion, or escort, could not join the melee for lack of fuel "

It's awfully hard to "Join the melee" if you're sitting back at base or only fly decoy missions that chose never to close
within range. Which doesn't explain why the Daggers couldn't have joined the melee if they had been tasked to fly escort,
but they'd stopped doing so after May 1st.Oh, and as far as the Brit Sidewinders "turning the pilot's job's into child's
play," we've got Rotolo and Zini demonstrating that their tactics were the culprits.

Moro's opinion of British ground attack pilot training:

" It is quite probable that, in the wake of their experience in the
Falklands, the British may have beefed up their bombing crews' target
practice. Argentine pilots were to remark jokingly that their British
colleagues had been unable, throughout the whole of the conflict, to
"hit the broad side of a barn" said "barn" (the landing strip at
Puerto Argentino) having been 1,300 yards long and and 50 yards wide "

If he was referring to the RAF Vulcans, I might agree although much of that was due to the limitations of the weapon system,
and they did put the first bomb of the first mission on the runway. But in the case of the SHARS the comment is pretty
silly, as (with the exception of a couple of attacks, when some lay-down HE was used) they were using VT-fused bombs to
attack the airport facilities and a/c, not trying to crater the runway. They considered the latter to be almost pointless,
as they would be unable to keep it out of action unless they dedicated virtually every Harrier sortie to the job. So they
decided to keep everyone awake by each a/c dropping a VT-fused 1,000 lber on the airport, on the way to their CAP Station.
Minimal cost to them, harasses the troops on the ground, may get lucky occasionally.

But, I'm sure that Argentine jet pilots would agree that international
training was another lynchpin for the British. Harrier pilots had
prewar ACM combats against Skyhawk

Not that I'm aware of, but Alan Curtis, at least, had flown them with the RAN.

and Mirage aircraft (and Dagger was
similar to Mirage) so they had time to consider tactics well in
advance.

Not the pilots with the task force, but again Curtis had some experience in the back seat of one.


As far as I know, the Argentine squadrons did not have any

prewar ACM exercises vs. Harriers.

Correct, and especially in the case of the Harrier, that can be important. Even so, both sides tried to fight at altitudes
where they had the advantage: the SHARs at medium/low altitude, and the Mirage/Daggers up high. The SHARs refused to go up
to play, and the M/Ds didn't want to come down. But they should have, as that's where the strikers were, just to give the
SHARs something to think about. None of that explains the poor tactical formations used by the Argentine Mirage/Dagger
pilots on 1 May. You don't fly welded wing in a combat area.

Brigadier Crespo did do a few things right, like refusing to get involved in a battle for air superiority prior to the
landings and depleting his forces. OTOH, you could say that this reflected a lack of aggressiveness on his side, which
contributed to the morale advantage that the Brits established on May 1st. He should have provided escorts to the strikes
after May 1st.

Guy

Ian wrote:

"Evan Brennan" wrote in message
m...
Guy Alcala wrote in message
...
snip
British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British bombs
falling on Stanley airfield. : )


May have missed it somewhere else in the thread, (and I know it's got a
smiley after it) but wasn't the error on the Vulcan raid due to the
cartographer putting the wrong co-ordinates on the map?

Doubt it, since the first raid hit the runway almost dead center, albeit
long (the first bomb of the stick hit the runway, the next just off the
edge, with the rest continuing off to the southwest). The second raid was
slightly short for range but straddling, but considerably off for line if
they were aiming at the middle of the runway like the first raid. The stick
was centered perhaps 200 feet (eyeballing the recon photo) off the west end
of the runway. They were using radar offsets; at least the first raid
(according to Middlebrook) used Mengeary Point, a couple of miles short of
and almost on a direct line from the runway on the run-in heading of 235
deg.M (the runway is aligned 085/265), as the offset.

Guy

In article ,
Stephen Harding writes:
Guy Alcala wrote:

Time-limited killfile, maybe? Man, I shudder at the thought of my killfile
suddenly losing its memory and re-admitting all the loons and trolls I've
consigned to it over the years, even if many of them moved on once no one
was paying any attention to them. On the other hand, there's old Johnny
Wizard; I no longer bother trying to keep up with his numerous
re-incarnations. That boy's got stamina.

Johnny Wiz is indeed a piece of work.

Funny how images of people pop up into your mind just from
regular reading, without actual visuals involved in shaping
the image.

I see Johnny Wiz as a hard working fellow at some convenience
store during the day, earning min wage and putting in 12 hours
to make ends meet. He's annoyed and some days downright ****ed
at "the system".

Fryolator Driver at a Tim Horten's I suspect. IIRC, (I couldn't be
arsed to check), Whizzer's in Alberta, somewhere. I suspect that his
potential girlfriend ran off with an USAnian.

However he's a manifesto writer at heart, and unfortunately,
there just isn't much opportunity for employment for these
types in today's economy.

But there *are* newsgroups! *Lots* of newsgroups!

So the Wiz gets home from work, fires up his computer, or
perhaps more likely, shuffles off to the public library to
use theirs, and spends the night cranking out these 4000+
line beauties, taking the time to fully justify the lines
as he goes.

Justified lines are very important! Spelling, grammar,
thought organization and sentence structure are irrelevancies.

The post must be long, and it must be fully justified!!!

What really must be chapping his ass is that, given the close ties
between the U.S. Law Enforcement types, and the RCMP, (and the
duration that he's been reposting his. uhm. stuff) he's been
thoroughly checked out, and deemed as far too inconsequential to
bother with.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

Guy Alcala wrote:

Evan Brennan wrote:

Guy Alcala wrote in message

snip

all their AAMs weren't "pure ****e"; just the R.530 was.

The Sidewinder wasn't ****e -- but it wasn't used either.

The only version of the AIM-9 the Argentineans had was the AIM-9B and that's the next thing to ****, and vastly inferior to
either the Shafrir 2 or Magic. But we both agree it was never carried, so I considered it irrelevant and left it completely
out of my calculations.

snip

Let me add a qualification to my statement that the AIM-9B "was never carried," as my memory was bugging me so I went looking
for a cite. It was definitely never carried by naval strike A-4Qs, but apparently was carried by them when used in the air
defense role from 25 de Mayo, before she returned to harbor and the A-4Qs moved to Rio Grande. From "Falklands: The Air War,"
pg. 39, in the chapter on 3 Escuadrilla:

"The carrier force was not involved in the fighting of 1 May but, by the early hours of 2 May, '25 de Mayo' had established that
the British fleet was approximately miles away to her south-east and Task Force 79 remained at action stations. Following the
earlier launching of nine unproductive air defence sorties from '25 de Mayo' there had been much activity during the night by
the two opposing carrier groups and CANA was prepared to take offensive action at first light on 2 May. The 3 Escuadrilla crews
were called to a mission brieifing at 0500Z (it took two hours to complete) and were told that all eight Skyhawks would be
launched against the British fleet. Each was armed with iron bombs and the Skyhawks would have to fly without the benefit of
accompanying missile-equipped a/c."

This accords with my memory of reading another source that said they flew AD missions armed with AIM-9Bs, and I believe I've
seen a photo of an a/c so armed during the war, but I don't remember where I read/saw it. It wouldn't be the first time that
A-4s had been used in such a role from carriers when no other fast jets were available -- the USN did the same thing in Vietnam
when they sent some of their CVSs to operate as limited attack carriers, and I think the RAN used their A-4s for Ad as well as
strike. "F:TAW" is usually an extremely reliable source, but Rotolo states that this never was done. I'll have to call these
missions unconfirmed unless I can find some more evidence, preferably a photo or personal account.

Guy

Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
If true, he must have forgotten about it very quickly. All you have to
do is read the Epilogue and Sharkey's 'Layman's Guide to Fighter
Combat' which rolls the only highlights that were significant to
Sharkey. He droned on about ACM training (results according to him,
that is) which does not mention the lack of fuel that prevented
Argentine jets from doing much ACM. : )

Presumably this refers to the "Layman's Guide to Fighter Combat".
Perhaps you should have been clued in to the intent of the
appendix by the title, as it wasn't called "An Analysis of the
Specific Operational, Tactical, Technical and Human Factors that
Affected the Outcome of the Air Campaign in the Falklands War."


Ahhh, I get it. So the fact that the Argentine jets had little or
no fuel reserves for 'ACM' is not a signicant factor that affects
the outcome of 'ACM'?

The entire emotional palette of your pet beliefs is predicated
on the idea that the Sea Harrier, but not fuel consumption of
the Argentine jets, was the main influence on the tactics of
Argentine flights from the mainland to the Falklands. You have
implied elsewhere that there was a significant amount of
manuevering, positioning and set-up by the Argentine jets on
May 1st, which is not true. In fact there was minimal ACM by
them, and even less later. More to follow.


We know they rarely did so, the question is "why not, when
they had done so for a large number of sorties on May 1st?"


Oh? How many Daggers carried air-to-air missiles on May 1st?
We already know the Skyhawks did not.


Uh huh, they avoided the Sea harriers, but didn't on May 1st.
So what changed? The answer is, they got beat early, and decided
to throw in the A-A towel.


But fuel restrictions prevented the fighters from manuevering
much in the first place (and they did not) and that's the main
fact that you keep ignoring. All they did is take a few potshots,
with little actual manuevering, positioning and set-up for shots.
At least one missile was fired out of range, at least one was
fired way out of its envelope, and at least one misfired and
tumbled off its launch rail.

If you think that the Argentine fighters had enough gas to do
ACM in better quality and quantity, you'll have to prove it.
You'll also have to prove that their weapon systems were
consistently functioning as advertised.


Less than a dozen Mirage jets were available for air defense,
and it appears that they usually stayed home in case the British
tried to bomb the mainland. Rest assured though that your standard,
ten-megaton explosion of geekspeak (mostly uncited) was noted and
filed in the proper place.

And rest assured that your usual Anglophobic bias was expected

British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British
bombs falling on Stanley airfield. : )

Said what same thing?


The part about the Mirages being reserved in case the British
bombed the mainland, of course.



Re the point you attempt to make above, there were plenty of Daggers
available after May 1st to be used for A/A escort if the AAF
had wished to do so, even assuming they chose not to use the
Mirages for that job after May 1st. And the supposed reason for
holding the Mirages on the mainland for defense of the southern
air bases (or even, in the wilder version, defense of Buenos Aires),
in the worry that the Brits might bomb Rio Gallegos etc. with a Vulcan
is more than a little suspect, as the Mirages were used to fly decoy
missions over the islands later in the war. Clearly, if that was the real
reason, then the decision was only made after the results of the combats
on May 1st had convinced the AAF that they were outclassed A/A.

There's no sequence in your fantasy that follows logic. Every single
preposterous argument flows from another.

In other words, you are unable to rebut


Your interpretations are not based on facts -- the one about there
being 'plenty of Daggers available for A-A escort', and your conspiracy
theory that a few decoy flights somehow proves that the Mirages were
not held back because they anticipated bombings of the mainland.



Argentine opinion of their low-level anti-shipping strikes vs. Sea
Harrier pilots and AIM-9L missile, 'History of the South Atlantic
Conflict', Ruben Moro (1989):

Ah, Ruben Moro. Have you read that opus, or are you quoting from
another source? Let's just say that, like many Argentine sources,
it can be long on emotion and short on facts, kind of like the
Junta's propaganda during the war.


If Moro is a propagandist -- Sharkey is Dr. Goebbels.

Sharkey probably alienated every service he came into contact with.
His book is nothing more than a vanity piece designed to discredit
all his enemies. This is a man who entered a huge bureaucracy, only
to be disappointed when he found that it was a huge bureaucracy.
Even in the Epilogue of his book, Sharkey can't stop bitching; he
simply returns to his favorite themes:

1) The RAF is evil -- they robbed the RN of everlasting glory.
2) The RN is evil -- they wouldn't listen to Sharkey either.
3) The MOD is evil -- they wouldn't buy more Sea Harriers.

I wonder who has first dibs on the movie rights?

Evan Brennan wrote:

Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
If true, he must have forgotten about it very quickly. All you have to
do is read the Epilogue and Sharkey's 'Layman's Guide to Fighter
Combat' which rolls the only highlights that were significant to
Sharkey. He droned on about ACM training (results according to him,
that is) which does not mention the lack of fuel that prevented
Argentine jets from doing much ACM. : )

Presumably this refers to the "Layman's Guide to Fighter Combat".
Perhaps you should have been clued in to the intent of the
appendix by the title, as it wasn't called "An Analysis of the
Specific Operational, Tactical, Technical and Human Factors that
Affected the Outcome of the Air Campaign in the Falklands War."

Ahhh, I get it. So the fact that the Argentine jets had little or
no fuel reserves for 'ACM' is not a signicant factor that affects
the outcome of 'ACM'?

Sure it does, just as the fact that the CVs were operating so far to the east affected the SHAR's CAP time and their ability
to chase retreating Argentine a/c to the west. But those are factors specific to that particular war, not BFM in general or
the role of fighters, which is what the appendix was clearly about.

The entire emotional palette of your pet beliefs is predicated
on the idea that the Sea Harrier, but not fuel consumption of
the Argentine jets, was the main influence on the tactics of
Argentine flights from the mainland to the Falklands.

I've never claimed anything of the kind, but feel free to point out where you think I did. Fuel reserves played a part,
weapons played a part, a/c capability played a part, tactics played a part, GCI played a part (with the advantage on the
Argentine side here, as the Brits had no radar equivalent to the TPS-43). If you go back to my post of last Sunday, which I
think was the one you dismissed as full of technical minutiae, you can read the following:
---------------------------------------------------------

Now, if you want to postulate some major change in the results, give the
Argentine Mirage/Daggers AAR capability plus the
Cyrano IV from the Mirage F1 (or better yet, the entire a/c) and Super 530F
RHMs, plus an additional two and preferably four
more KC-130s. A roughly Sparrow-level FQ capability would give the Brits
similar problems as the AAF faced, although SARH
shots can certainly be avoided. But the AAF could then take long range FQ
shots and wait to get lucky while disrupting the
British CAPs, without needing to close into AIM-9L range. Oh, and they'd
want some Matra AS.37 Martel ARMs as well, to
remove the British GCI capability.
---------------------------------------------------------

Gee, why do you suppose I mentioned the Mirage/Daggers needing AAR capability and the Argentine AF needing more refueling
capability, plus better FQ weapons/radars, as necessary to cause some "major change in the results"? Could it be that I
think these "technical minutiae" were important to the outcome? You really need to work on the old reading comp. and/or
memory skills. Of course, if you don't bother to read the posts in the first place, as was apparently the case here, then
you're going to keep sticking your foot in your mouth.


You have
implied elsewhere that there was a significant amount of
manuevering, positioning and set-up by the Argentine jets on
May 1st, which is not true. In fact there was minimal ACM by
them, and even less later. More to follow.

I've never claimed that there was a significant amount of ACM (I'd say a grand total of two occasions), but there was
"maneuvering, positioning and set up", on May 1st, albeit limited. If you think I've claimed otherwise, please provide a
cite.

We know they rarely did so, the question is "why not, when
they had done so for a large number of sorties on May 1st?"

Oh? How many Daggers carried air-to-air missiles on May 1st?
We already know the Skyhawks did not.

According to "F:TAW", 12 A/A Dagger sorties were tasked on 1 May, with 11 launched (there were also 10 or 12 Mirage A/A
sorties flown. They'd moved 4 to Comodoro Rivadavia, 4 to Rio Gallegos, and kept four back at Mariano Moreno near Buenos
Aires). I've got the following specifics for 1 May, from that source and Mafe' Huertas "Mirage III/V":

Toro Flight, pilots Moreno/Volponi, t/o from Rio Grande some time after 0945Z (local time was Zulu - 4hrs), CAP (all Dagger
A/A missions carried 3 x 1,300l tanks, 2 x Shafrir 2, 250 rds 30mm. For reasons unknown to me they never carried 2 x 1,700l
tanks plus a 1,300l tank, which the Mirage/Dagger can do), intercepted by Kent/Haigh at 1125+Z, a/c merged with GCI on both
sides but neither side got tallies on the other despite both sides circling before breaking off (the Daggers using A/B).

Foco flight, Gonzalez/Bernhardt, t/o from Rio Grande about 1300Z, escort/cover for several Skyhawk flights, intercepted by
Harriers but results inconclusive again.

Ciclon flight, pilots unk., 2 a/c, t/o from unk. base probably about 1600Z, escort/cover or possibly CAP, no contact.

Dardo Flight, pilots unk., 2 a/c, t/o from San Julian ca. 1930Z, escort/cover for Skyhawks, contacts apparently nil.

Fierro flight, pilots unk., 2 a/c, t/o from San Julian ca. 1940Z, escort/cover for Skyhawks, contacts apparently nil.

Fortin flight, Donadille/Senn, t/o from San Julian ca. 1945Z immedately following Torno, a Dagger strike flight
(Dimeglio/Faget/Roman), escort for Torno (Torno attacked Arrow/Alacrity/Glamorgan off Port Stanley, causing minor damage,
after first looking in Berkeley sound and not finding any targets). SHAR CAP got to within 5 miles of Torno on egress (the
3 Torno a/c were flying at 45, 23 and 33kft to make interception more difficult), but broke off the chase for fuel and
because Fortin was closing on the SHARs. Note that San Julian put up 9 out of the 10 Daggers (6 CAP/3strike) at the base
virtually simultaneously.

Rubio flight, Ardiles (his wingman developed technical problems and aborted on t/o, so he was a single rather than the pair
that Hale/Penfold believed), t/o from Rio Grande ca.1955Z, CAP, intercepted by Hale/Penfold, Ardiles made shallow dive from
33kft towards SHARs at ca. 20kft, fired Shafrir from FQ at Hale which apparently tracked, was shot down by Penfold ca. 2040Z
(F:TAW says 1941Z; there is a discrepancy in the times between sources, but assuming the t/o time is accurate then 2040/41
would be correct) while climbing and turning in A/B.

To cover the Mirage missions more quickly, on 1 May they dispatched either 10 or 12 sorties, each flight involving two a/c:
Fiera flight, Tablon, Limon, Dardo, Buitre* (Garcia-Cuerva/Perona, who'd also made up 'Limon'. *"F:TAW" says they were
Dardo, but also says that was one of the morning flights), and one other flight claimed but not identified in Mafe'
Huertas. after 1 May, it appears that the two remaining Mirages were withdrawn to Comodoro Rivadavia where they apparently
flew some AD sorties along the Andes, a/c being redeployed back to Rio Gallegos in early June to fly decoy missions.


Uh huh, they avoided the Sea harriers, but didn't on May 1st.
So what changed? The answer is, they got beat early, and decided
to throw in the A-A towel.

But fuel restrictions prevented the fighters from manuevering
much in the first place (and they did not) and that's the main
fact that you keep ignoring.

As I pointed out above in my quote from my previous post, I'm not ignoring it. There was virtually no developed ACM in the
war, a point that Sharkey also makes. But so what? No one wants to maneuver; they want to kill on the first pass and haul
ass.

All they did is take a few potshots,
with little actual manuevering, positioning and set-up for shots.

True for both sides. The SHARs typically made (at most) one 180 deg. turn onto the target's tail and fired, which is the
way most kills have been scored in air combat since it began.

At least one missile was fired out of range, at least one was
fired way out of its envelope, and at least one misfired and
tumbled off its launch rail.

Most of the "missiles" claimed fired on 1 May by Argentine pilots, including the tumbler, were actually drop tanks. The
Fuerza Aerea states one of their Mirages launched an R.530, and Ardiles seems to have launched a Shafrir. There may have
been a couple of other launches they weren't admitting, but not many.

If you think that the Argentine fighters had enough gas to do
ACM in better quality and quantity, you'll have to prove it.

Again, I've never claimed anything of the sort, any more than I've claimed that the SHARs typically had enough fuel to do
so. Both sides were seriously fuel constrained. The Daggers had fuel for about 3-5 minutes on CAP over East Falkland, but
that was enough to make a difference, because they knew when the strikes would be there too. The Mirages were even more
limited in time, but again, they knew when they had to be there. Only one striker was shot down that day, a Canberra that
was the victim of a good radar pickup while flying a bit too high. The other three a/c lost were CAP/escorts, and they
kept the SHARs busy so the strikers could get in and out without loss. Ardiles shouldn't have been there by himself, but no
doubt felt it was important that he go. Fortin flight may have saved Torno flight from a SHAR CAP; certainly the SHAR
pilots didn't want to get into an A/A hassle while low on fuel and a long way from the carriers.

You'll also have to prove that their weapon systems were
consistently functioning as advertised.

The fact that a Shafrir seems to have been successfully launched from head-on indicates that in at least in that one
instance, the missile worked better than advertised. The R.530 is almost unemployable from head-on even if everything's
working properly, and the Mirages never got into a position where they could fire a Magic.

Less than a dozen Mirage jets were available for air defense,
and it appears that they usually stayed home in case the British
tried to bomb the mainland. Rest assured though that your standard,
ten-megaton explosion of geekspeak (mostly uncited) was noted and
filed in the proper place.

And rest assured that your usual Anglophobic bias was expected

British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British
bombs falling on Stanley airfield. : )

Said what same thing?

The part about the Mirages being reserved in case the British
bombed the mainland, of course.

I'm aware of the claim, and of the claim that they were worried that Chile might start something. The FAA did sit alert on
their bases during that time, for both reasons, using both Daggers and Mirages. But on 1 May, they also launched a whole
bunch of A/A CAP/escort missions, versus none afterwards that were likely to contact the Brits.

Re the point you attempt to make above, there were plenty of Daggers
available after May 1st to be used for A/A escort if the AAF
had wished to do so, even assuming they chose not to use the
Mirages for that job after May 1st. And the supposed reason for
holding the Mirages on the mainland for defense of the southern
air bases (or even, in the wilder version, defense of Buenos Aires),
in the worry that the Brits might bomb Rio Gallegos etc. with a Vulcan
is more than a little suspect, as the Mirages were used to fly decoy
missions over the islands later in the war. Clearly, if that was the real
reason, then the decision was only made after the results of the combats
on May 1st had convinced the AAF that they were outclassed A/A.

There's no sequence in your fantasy that follows logic. Every single
preposterous argument flows from another.

In other words, you are unable to rebut

Your interpretations are not based on facts -- the one about there
being 'plenty of Daggers available for A-A escort',

I've detailed 12 CAP/escort Dagger sortie 'facts' on 1 May for you, above.

and your conspiracy
theory that a few decoy flights somehow proves that the Mirages were
not held back because they anticipated bombings of the mainland.

Not a conspiracy theory, just an acknowledgement that there were other reasons why they conceded the A/A battle to the Brits
after 1 May, which is what they did.


Argentine opinion of their low-level anti-shipping strikes vs. Sea
Harrier pilots and AIM-9L missile, 'History of the South Atlantic
Conflict', Ruben Moro (1989):

Ah, Ruben Moro. Have you read that opus, or are you quoting from
another source? Let's just say that, like many Argentine sources,
it can be long on emotion and short on facts, kind of like the
Junta's propaganda during the war.

If Moro is a propagandist -- Sharkey is Dr. Goebbels.

Hardly. At least Sharkey's got success on his side, which he played no small part in achieving.

Sharkey probably alienated every service he came into contact with.

Probably. He does come across as having a chip on his shoulder.

His book is nothing more than a vanity piece designed to discredit
all his enemies.

Which he does successfully in some areas, and less so in others. His opinion of Woodward as an ignorant, arrogant subdriver
who was clueless about AAW (and amphibious warfare) was shared by both Clapp and Thompson, although they tend to put it more
diplomatically.

This is a man who entered a huge bureaucracy, only
to be disappointed when he found that it was a huge bureaucracy.

So what? He did quite well in that bureaucracy, in the job he was well suited for.

Even in the Epilogue of his book, Sharkey can't stop bitching; he
simply returns to his favorite themes:

1) The RAF is evil -- they robbed the RN of everlasting glory.

Yes. It is tiresome.


2) The RN is evil -- they wouldn't listen to Sharkey either.

Not evil, just wrong. BTW, Woodward is on record, prior to the war, as being against the FAA having a fixed-wing element.

3) The MOD is evil -- they wouldn't buy more Sea Harriers.

Same comment. And I agree with Sharkey's analysis of the situation in the Falklands since the Brits built Mt. Pleasant
airfield. Without several days of warning, all the Brits have done is eliminate Argentine range/basing problems, because
there's no way in hell they can reinforce in time. The forces currently there aren't all that much stronger than NP 8901
was in 1982, and now they've got to cover not only Stanley airfield but also Mt. Pleasant. Sure, they've got Tristar
cargo/tankers now, and C-17s. But how long will it take them to get the spearhead battalion to the Falklands, once they
decide to go? At a block speed of 460 kts, which assumes non-stop from the UK (and is undoubtedly high), it will take a
minimum of 15 hours just to get there, assuming they just happen to have several tankers pre-positioned at Ascension so they
don't have to stop, which is unlikely. Figure two days as a very optimistic minimum with 3-4 more likely, to get a company
of troops from the UK, allowing time for the government to make the decision, the troops to get themselves organized and
their gear to the appropriate airfield (and the a/c to get there as well), tankers in place, diplomatic moves made to try
and find some place to land if the airfields are already taken when they get there (as they almost certainly will be), etc.
Not that I think an invasion is likely, but then neither did the FCO in 1982.

Guy

"Ian" wrote in message ...
"Evan Brennan" wrote in message
m...
Guy Alcala wrote in message
...
snip
British and Argentine writers said the same thing about Mirage
fighters, so your accusations are as poorly aimed as the British bombs
falling on Stanley airfield. : )


May have missed it somewhere else in the thread, (and I know it's got a
smiley after it) but wasn't the error on the Vulcan raid due to the
cartographer putting the wrong co-ordinates on the map?



The wisecracks from the Argentine pilots came because the British
mounted such a massive effort to cause such minor damage. The Vulcans
and Harriers attacked the runway with 1,000-pounders, but only one
bomb hit.